After the Session.

Certain developments in the political and communal situation in India since the proroguing of the Delhi Session form an epilogue to it so important that it demands to be written, although the events to be described fall outside the period of this review. The Swarajist walk out' of March 8th fell absolutely flat and even the hardiest extremists of the Swaraj Press could not support it save by strained and unnatural arguments far more damning to the die-hard Swarajists than any open condemnation could be. Almost immediately, important defections took place from the neo-Congress party represented by the Swarajist die-hards who had walked out of the legislatures, and there were ominous rumblings even among the remainder of the party. The leaders of the other parties were quick to grasp the opportunity given them by these circumstances and they arranged for a conference to be held in Bombay on April 3rd when they hoped to form a new National Party composed of Responsivists, Independents and Moderates. About 125 persons from all over India attended the Conference, these being fully representative of all shades of political opinion save the die-hard Swarajist, and non-co-operation. The conference was presided over by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, and those present included Sir Moropant Joshi, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Mr. J. Baptista, Dr. R. P. Paranjpye, Mr. N. M. Joshi, Sir Dinshaw Petit, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Mr. Bipin Chandra Pal, Mrs. Anne Besant, Mr. J. Chaudhuri, Mr. Ratansey Murarji, Mr. B. Chakravarti, Mr. K. Nataranjan, Mr. C. Y. Chintamani, Mr. S. N. Malik, Lala Har Kishen Lal, Sir Chamanlal Sitalvad and Mr. M. R. Jayakar. These names show that the conference was probably the most representative political meeting held in India since 1921. The deliberations lasted for two days and ended in the formation of an Indian National party "to prepare for and accelerate the establishment of Swaraj or full responsible Government in India, such as obtains in the self-governing dominions of the British Empire, with a due provision for the protection of the rights and interests of minorities and the backward and depressed classes." It was resolved that the new party would employ all peaceful and legitimate means (not including mass civil disobedience or the general non-payment of taxes) with liberty, as and when necessary, to resort inside the Legislatures to respon

sive co-operation. It was no easy task to discover a common basis. for representatives of such different schools of political thought as were present at the conference, and the concessions made by the orthodox liberals included the promotion of "a movement of individual or group resistance to authority for definite objects on particular occasions in particular localities." Though the conference declared that the Government of India Act of 1919 was inadequate and unsatisfactory, it realised that the existing constitution should be utilised to the fullest extent, including the acceptance of offices, to accelerate the revision of the constitution, to ameliorate the condition of the people and to advance their interests. The new Nationalist Party decided to make the necessary arrangements for fighting the next elections. Mr. Jayakar took part in the deliberations but was unable to join the Nationalist party until the matter had been considered by the Responsive Cooperators.

Pandit Motilal Nehru regarded the formation of the Nationalist Party as a challenge to the Swarajists, and described it as "a conglomerate in the first stage of geological formation." He realised that he could not easily afford to lose the Responsivists and in a speech at Lahore on April 10th he referred to Mr. Jayakar as his "erstwhile comrade" and acknowledged in and acknowledged in a handsome manner the help he had received from Responsive Co-operators with whom, he added, he had very few differences. This was, perhaps, the first unambiguous recognition by the leader of the Swaraj Party of the seriousness of the split. Faced with the probability of the Responsivists definitely breaking off from the Swarajists, the Pandit referred to them in terms of high appreciation. After some negotiation it was decided to hold a meeting of the two wings of the Swaraj Party at Subarmati on April 21st to see if reunion were possible. Mr. Gandhi, who had decided to have a year's rest and had taken no part in the policy or the working of the Swarajists or in their walk-out, was present at the meeting, and among others who attended were Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, Lala Lajpatrai, Messrs. Kelkar, Jayakar and Aney and Dr. Moonje. Subject to the confirmation of the All-India Congress it was agreed among the signatories to the agreement arrived at Subarmati that the response made by the Government to the demand of February 1924 should be considered satisfactory in the provinces "if the power, responsibility and initiative necessary for the effective dis

charge of their duties are secured to Ministers." The sufficiency of such power, responsibility and initiative in each province was left to the decision of the Congress Members of the Legislative Councils concerned, subject to confirmation by a committee consisting of Pandit Motilal Nehru and Mr. M. R. Jayakar. General satisfaction was expressed at the conclusion of this agreement which came to be known as the Subarmati Pact. The ink on the pact was, however, barely dry when Mr. Prakasam, President of the Andhra (Southern India) Provincial Congress Committee, expressed dissent, and said that the position of the Congress had been compromised even more at Subarmati than it had been at Cawnpore. Dissatisfaction was also expressed by several other prominent Congressmen. The pact was differently interpreted by different persons. According to one interpretation the Swarajists had yielded to the Responsivists, the return of the Swarajists to the various legislatures from which they had withdrawn would follow, and the acceptance of office by the Swarajists had come within the range of practical politics. This, however, was not the interpretation of Pandit Motilal Nehru, who came forward with various explanations, in one of which he declared that three conditions had to be satisfied before offices could be accepted, namely:-

(1) that the Ministers should be made fully responsible to the legislature, free from all control of Government;

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(2) that an adequate proportion of the revenues be allotted for the development of nation-building" departments; and

(3) that Ministers be given full control of the services in the transferred departments.

It is interesting to note that in spite of these conflicting explanations, there was no refutation of the admission underlying the Subarmati Pact, that all through the years in which efforts had been made to wreck the constitution, there had been in that constitution something that could be worked to India's advantage. Explanations and counter-explanations continued and it soon became obvious that the battle would have to be fought afresh at a forthcoming meeting of the All-India Congress Committee at Subarmati which had been expected merely to register a formal assent to the pact. But when the Committee met it was found that the inter

pretations put upon the pact had already led to complications and the climax was reached when, before the meeting, a draft was put into the hands of the Responsivists which Mr. Jayakar publicly stated to be a "travesty travesty" of the original pact and "a complete repudiation of the terms of the same under the guise and in the name of clearing doubts and differences about the interpretation of the pact." From that moment the split between the Swarajists and the Responsivists became more clearly pronounced than ever. The door of the Congress instead of being opened to let in Liberals and others has been closed for the present against all but the die-hard Swarajists.

The growing strain on Hindu-Muslim relations, which has already been discussed, led at the beginning of April to fierce and deplorable rioting in Calcutta. It started in an affray outside a mosque between Muslims and some Arya Samajists and continued to spread until April 5th, though there was only one occasion on which the police or military were faced by a crowd which showed determined resistance, namely, on the evening of the 5th April, when fire had to be opened. The firing was strictly controlled and did not exceed the barest requirements of the situation. It was significant that the bulk of the press had no complaint against the firing, some newspapers even declaring that a severer handling of the situation by the police had been called for. Apart from this incident, the rioting was confined to sporadic street fighting and isolated attacks. There was also a great deal of incendiarism and in the first three days the Fire Brigade had to deal with 110 fires. An unprecedented feature of the riots were the attacks on temples by Muslims and on Mosques by Hindus, which naturally led to intense bitterness. There were 44 deaths and 584 persons were injured. There was a certain amount of looting and business was suspended, with great economic loss to Calcutta. Shops began to re-open soon after the 5th, but the period of tension was prolonged by the approach of a Hindu festival on the 13th of April, and of the Id on the 14th. The Sikhs were to have taken out a procession on the 13th, but Government were unable to give them the necessary license. The apprehensions with regard to the 13th and 14th of April, fortunately, did not materialise and outward peace prevailed until the 22nd April when it was abruptly broken as a result of a petty quarrel in a street which restarted the rioting.

Fighting between mobs of the two communities, generally on a small scale, accompanied by isolated assaults and murders continued for six days. During this period there were no attacks on temples or mosques and there was little arson or looting. But there were more numerous occasions on which the hostile mobs did not immediately disperse on the appearance of the police and on 12 occasions it was necessary to open fire. The total number of casualties during this second phase of the rioting was 66 deaths and 391 injured. The dislocation of business was much more serious than during the first riots and the closing of Marwari business houses was not without an effect on European business firms. Panic caused many of the markets to be wholly or partially closed and for two days the meat supply was practically stopped. So great was the panic that the removal of refuse in the disturbed area was stopped. Arrangements were, however, made to protect supplies, and the difficulty with the municipal scavengers was overcome as soon as the municipality, had applied to the police for protection. There was a slight extension of the area of rioting, but no disturbances occurred in the mill area around Calcutta. Systematic raiding of the portions of the disturbed area, the arrest of hooligans, the seizure of weapons and the reinforcement of the police by the deputation of British soldiers to act as special police officers had the desired effect, and the last three days of April, in spite of the continuance of isolated assaults and murders, witnessed a steady improvement in the situation. Isolated murders were largely attributable to hooligans of both communities and their persistence during the first as well as the second outbreak induced a general belief that these hooligans were hired assassins. Another equally persistent feature of the riots, namely the distribution of inflammatory printed leaflets by both sides, together with the employment of hired roughs, encouraged the belief that money had been spent to keep the fight going. The Calcutta riots, have, unfortunately, greatly aggravated the communal tension. This new intensification of communal antagonism has found full expression in subsequent meetings of the Khilafat Committee and the All-India Mahasabha. The Khilafat Conference on the 9th May, decided to change its creed. In future, while keeping in view the aim of ridding the Holy Places and Jazirat-ul-Arab of non-Muslim control, it will promote the welfare of the Muslims of India in matters religious, educational, social, economic, and political.

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