Opinion of the Court-Ailshie, C. J. Then follow allegations of carelessness and negligence in that the defendant permitted such loose wires, so charged with electric current, to hang uninsulated and unprotected, and an averment of its duty "to see that persons employed to work upon said building were afforded a reasonably safe protection from the said dangerous agency." The fifth and seventh paragraphs we quote in full: "V. That some time prior to the 16th day of April, 1913, defendant engaged one R. B. Ward, a contracting painter, to paint the aforesaid station and office building; that said R. B. Ward hired, among others, the plaintiff to paint said building; that, shortly after commencing to work in the employment aforesaid, on the afternoon of the 16th day of April, 1913, plaintiff let himself down below said charged wires and connections; that in painting he carefully avoided contact with said charged wires which entered said building and which evidently were or might have been carrying electricity; that while engaged in painting and while exercising due care in so avoiding said wires, and inadvertently, but without negligence or lack of care on his part, plaintiff's left forearm came in contact with the uninsulated and unprotected ends of the said two unused wires which were separately and loosely hanging down the side of said building as aforesaid, and that by reason of said contact with the ends of said wires plaintiff was severely burned, and shocked by reason of said injury, suffered great bodily pain and mental anguish, and was compelled to expend large sums of money for medical attendance and care and is still required to be attended by a physician." "VII. That plaintiff had no knowledge of the danger lurking in said two unused and unprotected wires, and had no reason to apprehend any danger from contact with them; that plaintiff had a right to rely, and did rely, upon the defendant furnishing a reasonably safe place for him to work, and if said wires were dangerous to have had them joined, protected or insulated, or a warning given him of their dangerous character, or to have them removed; that the said loose ends. were by reason of the carelessness and negligence of the Opinion of the Court-Ailshie, C. J. said defendant, its officers, servants or employees, not removed, nor connected and insulated, nor was plaintiff warned by defendant nor by any person by or on behalf of the defendant, of the dangerous character of said loose wires; that defendant remained and was at all of the said times in possession of said building and in control of said wires and said electric current and that all of the hidden danger due to or arising out of the carelessness, negligence and improper care of said wires, was solely within the knowledge of the said defendant or should by the exercise of reasonable care have been within its said knowledge." The remaining paragraphs of the complaint set forth the permanent injury to plaintiff's left hand and arm and allege his earning capacity. To this complaint defendant demurred on the following grounds: "1. That said complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. "2. That there is a defect of parties defendant as appears upon the face of said complaint in this: That it is alleged in paragraph five of said complaint that the plaintiff at the time of the alleged injury was working for R. E. Ward, a contracting painter, and upon the face of the complaint it shows that plaintiff's cause of action, if any he has, is against said Ward, his master, and not against the defendant named." A third ground is that of uncertainty with reference to the allegations of earning capacity, but which counsel do not urge in this court. The trial court sustained the demurrer specifically on the first ground, viz., that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and gave plaintiff leave to amend. Plaintiff elected to stand on his pleading and appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing the action. Respondent contends that the complaint itself shows appellant to have known and appreciated the danger of his employment on respondent's premises, and that he therefore assumed the risk. He particularly calls attention to the language used in paragraph 5, where after stating that plaintiff Opinion of the Court-Ailshie, C. J. "carefully avoided contact" with the main transmission wires which entered the building, the pleader goes on to say: "and inadvertently, but without negligence or lack of care on his part, plaintiff's left forearm came in contact with the uninsulated and unprotected ends of the said two unused wires." From this language, and especially the use of the word "inadvertently," it is urged that both knowledge of the danger and negligence in the avoidance of it is imputable to plaintiff, and that for this reason alone he could not recover. We think, however, that the meaning of the pleader may be fairly gathered from a succeeding allegation in paragraph 7, where he avers that plaintiff "had no knowledge of the danger lurking in said wires, and had no reason to apprehend any danger from contact with them." We are not disposed to commend the allegations of paragraph 5 as affording a model of good pleading in a personal injury case, but taking the complaint as a whole, and viewing the allegations of paragraph 5 together with those of paragraph 7, at the same time bearing in mind the rule for liberal construction of pleadings which has been so often applied by this court, we are inclined to think that so far as this contention is concerned, the demurrer should have been overruled. A more important question is raised by the second ground of defendant's demurrer, and although the lower court did not sustain the demurrer specifically on this ground, yet as the same question must arise in proceeding further under the complaint, it seems advisable to dispose of it in this opinion. It is also true that if the demurrer was good on any ground stated, it would be the duty of this court to sustain the trial court, even though he sustained the demurrer on an erroneous ground. Respondent's contention is, that since the complaint shows the appellant to have been the employee of an independent contractor, the respondent corporation was not liable for any injury received by him under the facts stated. It is pointed out that respondent exercised no supervision or control over and had no contractual relation whatever with the appellant, Opinion of the Court-Ailshie, C. J. and it is therefore urged that respondent was under no obligation, such as ordinarily devolves on the master toward the servant, to furnish the contractor's employee a safe place to work, or to warn him in regard to dangers on the premises. which might not be obvious to a stranger; that if any such obligation existed, it was on the part of the contractor toward his employee. Counsel for both appellant and respondent cite and comment upon a number of cases involving the question of liability for injury to the servant of an independent contractor upon a property owner's premises. From an analysis of these cases, it is apparent that they constitute a class by themselves where the questions of fact are peculiarly diverse on account of the various elements that enter into consideration. In the first place, there is an infinite diversity of manner and capacity in which one may be injured on the premises of another. Confining the class of persons who may be so injured to employees of independent contractors, we are confronted with varying conditions of relationship between the employee and the contractor on the one hand and both of them with the proprietor on the other. Then, again, there are the various gradations in degree of care required on the part of the proprietor for the protection of those who have a right to be on his premises, corresponding both to the nature of his own business and the business of the invitee. If it is a dangerous business, of course a higher degree of care is required. On the other hand, if the invitee is familiar with the premises or particular conditions thereof, he assumes proportionately more risk. Possibly, therefore, there is not so much a conflict of authority running through the cases as a remarkable diversity of facts and conditions. Appellant cites, as sustaining his contention on this point, Clark v. St. Louis etc. R. Co., 234 Mo. 396, 137 S. W. 583; 1 Thompson on Negligence, secs. 680-979; Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N. Y. 124, 15 Am. Rep. 387; Johnson v. Spear, 76 Mich. 139, 15 Am. St. 298, 42 N. W. 1092; Brannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55, 21 S. W. 451; Union Traction Co. v. Fetters, 99 Fed. 214, 39 C. C. A. 474; Samuelson v. Cleveland Opinion of the Court-Ailshie, C. J. etc. M. Co., 49 Mich. 164, 43 Am. Rep. 456, 13 N. W. 499; John Spry Lumber Co. v. Duggan, 182 Ill. 218, 54 N. E. 1002; 29 Cyc. 456, note 12, and cases cited; Ryan v. St. Louis Transit Co., 190 Mo. 621, 89 S. W. 865, 2 L. R. A., N. S., 777; Stevens v. United Gas & Electric Co., 73 N. H. 159, 60 Atl. 848, 70 L. R. A. 119; Thomas v. Harrington, 72 N. H. 45, 54 Atl. 285, 65 L. R. A. 742; Young v. Waters-Pierce Oil Co., 185 Mo. 634, 84 S. W. 929; Wilson v. Hibbert, 194 Fed. 838, 114 C. C. A. 542; Katalla Co. v. Johnson, 202 Fed. 353, 120 C. C. A. 481; Murch Bros. Const. Co. v. Johnson, 203 Fed. 1; 121 C. C. A. 353; Bright v. Barnett & Record Co., 88 Wis. 299, 60 N. W. 418, 26 L. R. A. 524; Dunn v. Cavanaugh, 185 Fed. 451, 107 C. C. A. 521; Hoppe v. City of Winona, 113 Minn. 252, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 247, 129 N. W. 577, 33 L. R. A., N. S., 449. Respondent cites the following authorities on this question: Myers v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 225 Pa. 387, 74 Atl. 223; Callan v. Pugh, 54 App. Div. 545, 66 N. Y. Supp. 1118; Proctor v. San Antonio St. Ry. Co., 26 Tex. Civ. App. 148, 62 S. W. 939; Bush v. Grant, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1766, 61 S. W. 363; Reisman v. Public Service Corp., 82 N. J. L. 464, 81 Atl. 838, 38 L. R. A., N. S., 922; Campbell v. Jones, 60 Wash. 265, 110 Pac. 1083; Wright v. Big Rapids Door & Blind Mfg. Co., 124 Mich. 91, 82 N. W. 829, 50 L. R. A. 495; Cole v. Louisiana Gas Co., 121 La. 771, 46 So. 801; Blalack v. Texas Traction Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 149 S. W. 1086; Robichaux v. Morgan's L. & T. & S. S. Co., 131 La. 727, 60 So. 206. In the first place, it must be conceded that appellant in this case was at least an invitee upon the premises of the respondent corporation. Judge Thompson in his work on "Negligence," vol. 1, sec. 680, says: "The servant of the contractor must be deemed to be upon the premises of the proprietor by his invitation, express or implied; and therefore he owes him the same duty of guarding him against the consequences of hidden dangers on the premises, that a proprietor would in any case owe to |