Page images
PDF
EPUB

CORPORATIONS (Continued).

erty to such corporation prior to such filings shall be absolutely void.
(Dickens-West Mining Co. v. Crescent Mining & Milling Co., 153.)

COSTS.

See Appeal, 7; Eminent Domain, 5.

COUNTIES.

Fiscal Affairs-Bonds-Injunction.

1. Under the provisions of sec. 10 of an act of the legislature
to create and organize the county of Gooding, and for other pur-
poses (Sess. Laws 1913, p. 13), the county commissioners of Good-
ing county should make provision for the payment of the bonded
indebtedness apportioned to it by levy and taxation at the times
fixed by law for so doing, and in the same manner that the com-
missioners of Lincoln county could or should have done had
Gooding county not been created. (Frazier v. Hastings, 623.)

2. Under the provisions of said section, the legislative intent
was to give the same power and authority to the commissioners
of Gooding county in dealing with said bonded indebtedness that
the county commissioners of Lincoln county had prior to the crea-
tion of Gooding county. (Frazier v. Hastings, 623.)

3. Under the provisions of sec. 1960, Rev. Codes, the board of
county commissioners of Lincoln county was authorized to issue
negotiable coupon bonds of their county for the purpose of pay-
ing, redeeming, funding or refunding the outstanding indebted-
ness of the county, and after said Lincoln county debt had been
apportioned to Gooding county, the board of commissioners had full
authority to issue funding or refunding bonds in payment of said
apportioned indebtedness. (Frazier v. Hastings, 623.)

4. Held, that the plaintiff is not entitled to a writ of injunction
to restrain the county commissioners from issuing and selling such
funding or refunding bonds. (Frazier v. Hastings, 623.)

5. Sec. 99 of chap. 58 of Sess. Laws 1913 was passed in obedi-
ence to the mandate of sec. 15 of art. 7 of the constitution. By
said provision the legislature declared its purpose to place the coun-
ties of the state upon a cash basis. (Peavy v. McCombs, 143.)

6. By sec. 99 of chap. 58 of Sess. Laws 1913, the power of the
board of county commissioners to issue bonds for the payment or
redemption of outstanding county warrants is abrogated. This
applies to warrants which were issued before said law went into
effect, as well as to warrants which were issued after it went into
effect. (Peavy v. McCombs, 143.)

COUNTIES (Continued).

7. Sec. 99 of chap. 58 of Sess. Laws 1913 repeals sec. 1960 of the
Rev. Codes as amended by chap. 33 of the Laws of 1913, so far as
said sec. 1960 empowers the county commissioners to issue county
bonds to pay or redeem outstanding warrant indebtedness. (Peavy
v. McCombs, 143.)

Fixing of Salaries-Mandamus.

8. Sec. 2118, Rev. Codes, as amended by Sess. Laws, 1911, chap.
103, p. 345, provides that, "It shall be the duty of the county com-
missioners to fix the annual salaries of all county officers at their
regular session in April next preceding any general election, except
the annual salary of county attorney." (Ward v. Holmes, 602.)

9. The adoption of sec. 6, art. 18 of the constitution, as amended
(Ex. Sess. Laws 1912, p. 53), which provides, "That that sentence
of sec. 6 of art. 18 of the constitution of the State of Idaho read-
ing: "The legislature by general and uniform laws shall provide for
the election biennially in each of the several counties of the State,
of county commissioners, a sheriff, a county treasurer, who is ex-
officio public administrator, a probate judge, a county superintendent
of public instruction, a county assessor, who is ex-officio tax col-
lector, a coroner and a surveyor,' be amended by striking out the
words 'who is ex-officio tax collector' after the words 'a county
assessor' and inserting the words 'and also ex-officio tax collector'
after the words 'public administrator,'" in no way affects the
terms of such officers, the time of their election, or their compensa-
tion. (Ward v. Holmes, 602.)

10. County commissioners have no authority to increase or de-
crease the maximum or minimum compensation of county officers in
anticipation of the adoption of a constitutional amendment. (Ward
v. Holmes, 602.)

11. A writ of mandate should not be denied where a board of
county commissioners exceed their authority in fixing the annual
salaries of county officers below the minimum provided by law.
(Ward v. Holmes, 602.)

See Bridges.

COURTS.

Supreme Court-Filling Vacancies.

1. An election to fill a vacancy in the office of justice of the
supreme court is not authorized under the constitution of this state,
and no attempt at a special election to fill such vacancy by writing
in the name of the office to be filled and the person to be voted for
would be legal and valid. (Budge v. Gifford, 521.)

COURTS (Continued).

2. Under the provisions of sec. 6, art. 4 of the state constitu-
tion, when a vacancy occurs in the office of justice of the supreme
court, it becomes the duty of the governor to fill the same by ap-
pointment, and such appointee shall hold such office until the end
of the term for which the original incumbent was elected. (Budge
v. Gifford, 521.)

on.

2a. Certain provisions of the constitution cited and commented
(Budge v. Gifford, 521.)

3. All provisions of the state constitution relating to a given
subject must be construed together, and where certain provisions
are definite and explicit, they must be given precedence over ex-
pressions which are merely of a general character. (Budge v.
Gifford, 521.)

4. Held, under the facts of this case the peremptory writ must
issue. (Budge v. Gifford, 521.)

In General.

CREDITOR'S BILL.

Held, that a complaint on a judgment brought against a per-
son alleged to have money of the judgment debtor in her possession,
under the authority of the order provided for in sec. 4510, Rev.
Codes, which substantially shows that the judgment was rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, its date, amount and the
parties thereto, and then alleges facts showing that proper proceed-
ings under the provisions of chap. 2 of title 9, providing for pro-
ceedings supplementary to execution, had been taken, that the
order provided for in said sec. 4510 had been duly obtained, and
further alleges that the defendant has money belonging to the
judgment creditor subject to execution in her possession, is suffi-
cient when tested by a general demurrer. (Boise Butcher Co. v.
Anixdale, 483.)

CRIMINAL LAW.

Appeal by State-Probate Court.

1. Where a defendant is tried in the probate court for selling
intoxicating liquors without a license, under the provisions of sec.
1518, chap. 33, title 8, of the Rev. Codes, and is convicted and
appeals to the district court, held, that the district court erred in
dismissing said action on the motion of the defendant, on the
ground that the probate court had no jurisdiction to try such case
but should have held a preliminary examination. (State v. Stafford,
381.)

2. Held, that the misdemeanor for which the defendant was
tried and convicted in the probate court was not the crime of sell-

CRIMINAL LAW (Continued).

ing liquor in a prohibition district, since the defendant was not
charged in the complaint filed in said action with selling intoxicat-
ing liquors in a prohibition district, but was charged with selling
liquor without first procuring the license required by law. (State
v. Stafford, 381.)

3. Under the provisions of the first subdivision of sec. 8043, Rev.
Codes, the state is authorized to take an appeal from a judgment
for the defendant on demurrer to the indictment or information.
(State v. Stafford, 381.)

4. Under the provisions of sec. 8325, Rev. Codes, when an appeal
is taken from a justice's or probate court, the clerk of the district
court must file the papers received and enter the action on the
calendar in its order with other criminal cases, and such case must
be tried anew in the district court at the next term thereof, unless
for good cause the same is continued. (State v. Stafford, 381.)

5. When a criminal case is appealed from a probate court, the
case stands on appeal the same as though it had been begun in the
district court. It is there for a new trial on every point in question
that could legally be raised therein. (State v. Stafford, 381.)

6-8. On an appeal from the probate court to the district court in
a criminal case, the proceedings in the trial de novo is substantially
the same as in a case before the district court on indictment or
information. (State v. Stafford, 381.)

9. Held, under the provisions of the statute, the state has the
authority to appeal in a case on appeal from the probate court in
criminal cases, where the appeal is dismissed on the demurrer or
motion of the defendant, on the ground that the probate court had
no jurisdiction to try said case. (State v. Stafford, 381.)

Alibi.

10. If the defendant relies upon an alibi for the defense the
burden of establishing such alibi is upon him. (State v. Webb, 6
Ida. 428, 55 Pac. 892, cited and approved. (State v. Bogris, 587.)
See Accomplices; Continuances.

DEDICATION.
See Highways.

DEEDS.

See Mortgages; Taxation, 11-16.

DEFAULT.

See Judgment, 1–5.

Idaho, Vol. 26-52

Motion for Nonsuit.

DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT.

1. Upon motion for nonsuit, as provided by sec. 4354, Rev.
Codes, the defendant admits the existence of every fact which the
evidence tends to prove or which could be gathered from any rea-
sonable view of the evidence, and plaintiff is entitled to the benefit
of all inferences in his favor which the jury would be justified in
drawing from the testimony. (Southern Idaho Conference Assn. of
Seventh Day Adventists v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 712.)

2. Evidence examined and held that upon close of plaintiff's
case a nonsuit was properly granted. (Elder v. Idaho-Washington
Northern Railroad, 209.)

DRUGGISTS.

See Intoxicating Liquors, 1-5.

EJECTMENT.

Ejectment-Location of City Lot-Sufficiency of Evidence.

1. Held, that the evidence is sufficient to support the finding of
facts. (Fife v. Village of Glenns Ferry, 763.)

ELECTIONS.

Election Returns-Board of Canvassers-Mandamus.

1. Where the county board of canvassers rejects certain returns
from certain precincts on account of informality, ambiguity or un-
certainty, under the provisions of sec. 448, Rev. Codes, the returns
rejected must be delivered by the board to the sheriff of the county,
who must proceed at once to summon and call together the judges
of election of such precinct and inform them that the return made
by them has been rejected, and it is made the duty of such judges
to meet publicly at the place where the election was held in such
precinct and at once proceed to put said returns in due form and
certify the same, and for the purpose of so doing they may have
the ballot-box brought in and opened in their presence and the con-
tents thereof inspected, and when such returns have been duly
corrected, they must be delivered into the hands of the sheriff.
(Davies v. Board of County Commissioners, 450.)

2. Sec. 442, Rev. Codes, provides what must be done by the
judges of election after the canvass of the votes, and further pro-
vides that the poll-box and ballots must be kept with the seal un-
broken for at least eight months, unless the same is required as
evidence in a court of law in any case arising under the election
laws of the state, and then only when the judge having the ballot-box
in charge is served with a subpoena to produce the same. (Davies
v. Board of County Commissioners, 450.)

« PreviousContinue »