Page images
PDF
EPUB

Opinion of the Court-Budge, J.

It is therefore, we think, the settled law of this state, that no title to islands, lakes or the bed of navigable streams passes to the patentees of the United States by the sale of border lots, and that the state holds the title to the beds of navigable lakes and streams below the natural high-water mark for the use and benefit of the whole people, and that the right, title or interest of riparian proprietors or owners of uplands, to such shores are determined by the laws of the state, subject only to the rights vested by the constitution of the United States.

The Salmon river is a navigable stream, and is therefore a public highway belonging to the state upon its admission to the Union, and may be used and disposed of by the state, subject only to the rights of the public in such waters and to the paramount power of Congress to control their navigation so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce among the states and of foreign nations. (St. Clair County v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, 68, 23 L. ed. 59; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 24 L. ed. 224; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Chicago, 176 U. S. 646, 20 Sup. Ct. 509, 44 L. ed. 622.) In this last-named case it is held that the right of the state to regulate and control the shores of navigable waters and the land under them is supreme; that it depends upon the law of each state as to what waters and to what extent this prerogative of the state over the beds of such streams shall be exercised; that after statehood, the state holds the title to the beds of the navigable streams and may dispose of them if it desires to do so to private owners, but that no such disposition shall interfere with the rights of the general government to regulate commerce on such navigable streams, or in any manner interfere with the right to the use of the navigable lakes, rivers or streams as public highways over which every citizen has a natural right to carry commerce, whether by ships, boats or the floating of logs or lumber; having due consideration and reasonable care for the rights of individuals as well as the public in the common use of such public highways.

Points Decided.

The cases of Johnson v. Hurst, 10 Ida. 308, 77 Pac. 784, Lattig v. Scott, 17 Ida. 506, 107 Pac. 47, Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Ida. 561, 95 Pac. 499, 24 L. R. A., N. S., 1240, and Ulbright v. Baslington, 20 Ida. 539, 119 Pac. 292, 294, are hereby overruled in so far as they conflict with this opinion.

Upon an examination of the record and the authorities applicable to this case, we are satisfied that our conclusions are not only supported by the great weight of authority, but that this case comes squarely within the rule laid down in the cases of Scott v. Lattig, supra, and A. B. Moss & Bro. v. Ramey, on rehearing, supra.

The trial court did not err in granting a nonsuit in this We have also examined appellant's second assignment

case.

of error and find that there is no merit in it.

It is therefore ordered that judgment of nonsuit in favor of respondent be and the same is hereby affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent.

Sullivan, C. J., and Morgan, J., concur.

(February 8, 1915.)

STATE ex rel. CANYON COUNTY, Appellant, v. JACOB FORCH, J. FORCH DRUG CO., and UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY CO., a Corporation, Respondents.

[146 Pac. 110.]

LIQUOR LAW-Druggist-BOND-CONDITION OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-ACTION ON BOND.

1. Under the provisions of sec. 4 of an act commonly known as the Haight Liquor Law (1913 Sess. Laws, pp. 121 and 415), a bond conditioned that the one giving it "shall use and dispense with such intoxicating liquors in accordance with the laws of the state of Idaho, then this obligation to be void; otherwise to remain in full force and effect," is a sufficient bond under the provisions of said act.

Argument for Respondents.

2. Held, that the provisions of said sec. 4 requiring a bond "conditioned that none of said liquors shall be used or disposed of for any purpose other than in compounding or preserving medicines, the sale of which would not subject him to the payment of the special tax required of liquor dealers, by the United States," is surplusage and contradictory to the legislative intent and purpose of said act, inasmuch as the purpose of said act was to permit druggists to sell intoxicating liquors in accordance with the provisions of such act.

3. Said condition of the bond is out of harmony and in conflict with the clear intent and purpose of said act."

4. When a statute contains a clause that is directly contrary to the legislative intent, as collected from the whole act, such clause will be treated as surplusage and be disregarded in the proper construction of such act.

5. The title to an act may be resorted to as an aid in determining the intention of the legislature.

6. Held, that the conditions of the bond given by the respondent make him and his sureties liable thereon if he violates any laws of the state of Idaho in the sale of intoxicating liquor.

7. Under the provisions of the Haight Liquor Law, a civil action may be maintained on the bond given in case of a violation of its conditions, and a criminal action may also be maintained for using or selling intoxicating liquors in violation of the provisions of said law.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Canyon County. Hon. Ed. L. Bryan, Judge.

Action to recover on a bond given by a drug company for the observance of the laws of the state in the sale of intoxicating liquors. Judgment for the defendant. Affirmed.

J. H. Peterson, Attorney General, E. G. Davis and T. C. Coffin, Assistants, and B. W. Henry, for Appellants, cite no authorities.

Scatterday & Van Duyn, for Respondents.

Statutes should be construed so as to render them valid and give them force and effect. (36 Cyc. 1111 (e), notes 74 and 75.)

Opinion of the Court-Sullivan, C. J.

Particular expressions in one part of a statute, not so large and extensive in import as other expressions in the same statute will yield to the larger and more extensive expression when the latter embodies the real intent of the legislature. (36 Cyc., p. 1131, note 70.)

The title of chapter 27 is an aid in determining the intent of the legislature. (36 Cyc., p. 1133 (f); State v. Paulsen, 21 Ida. 686, 694, 123 Pac. 588.)

Construction leading to absurdity, injustice or contradiction is to be avoided in interpreting statutes. (Chandler v. Lee, 1 Ida. 349; Ex parte Ellis, 11 Cal. 223; Knowles v. Yeates, 31 Cal. 82; Greathouse v. Heed, 1 Ida. 494; Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 12 Am. St. 819, 22 N. E. 188, 5 L. R. A. 343.)

Sections of statutes should be construed with reference to the purposes and policy of the act and the object intended to be accomplished. (36 Cyc. 1110 (d).)

SULLIVAN, C. J.-This action was brought by Canyon county, whereby the county seeks to recover from Jacob Forch, a druggist, the Forch Drug Company, and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company a judgment for $500 on a bond given by Forch for an alleged violation by Mr. Forch of the liquor laws of the state.

It is alleged in the complaint that the defendant Forch had sold alcohol and wine in Canyon county in September, 1913, and that by reason of making said sales he had become liable upon his bond by reason of the fact that the laws of Idaho prohibited the sale of alcohol and wine in a dry territory, and that Canyon county is a dry territory.

Forch and the bonding company answered in substance and effect denying that defendant Forch and the defendant drug company had made any sale of intoxicating liquors in violation of the laws of this state. Upon the issues thus made. the case was heard before a jury and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The state appeals from that judgment.

Opinion of the Court-Sullivan, C. J.

The only question presented for consideration is the proper construction of the act known as the Haight Liquor Law (Sess. Laws 1913, chap. 27, p. 121, and chap. 99, p. 415), and involves particularly the provisions of sec. 4 of said act. Said section provides, among other things, that a bond of $500 shall be given, to be approved by the probate judge in the county in which the pharmacy is located, "conditioned that none of said liquors shall be used or disposed of for any purpose other than in compounding or preserving medicines, the sale of which would not subject him to the payment of the special tax required of liquor dealers, by the United States, and that he will not violate any of the provisions of the laws prohibiting the sale or disposal of intoxicating liquors in any prohibition district in this state as herein provided."

Forch filed a bond which had been approved by the probate judge, upon which bond the defendant the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company was surety, conditioned as follows: "Now, therefore, if the said Jacob Forch, doing business as the J. Forch Drug Company, shall use and dispense with such intoxicating liquors in accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho, then this obligation to be void; otherwise to remain in full force and effect."

This action is brought on that bond.

It is contended by the attorney general that said bond is not sufficient under the provisions of said sec. 4 of the Haight Liquor Law, for the reason that it does not contain the provision that "none of said liquors shall be used or disposed of for any purpose other than in compounding or preserving medicines, the sale of which would not subject him to the payment of the special tax required of liquor dealers, by the United States"; that to condition said bond, as the said bond is conditioned, to wit, that Forch "Shall use and dispense with such intoxicating liquors in accordance with the laws of the state of Idaho, then this obligation to be void; otherwise, to be in full force and effect," is not a compliance with the provisions of said sec. 4; that the defendant Forch is in fact selling intoxicating liquors without first filing a bond con

« PreviousContinue »