Opinion of the Court-Budge, J.

and unless when it applied to the state of Idaho for admission to do business within this state and by a full compliance with the constitution and laws of this state affecting foreign corporations it thereby became a resident corporation within the meaning of the attachment law, and thereby became exempt from attachment within the meaning of the statutes above cited, it could at this time be considered in no other light than a nonresident.

In the case of Boyer v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 8 Ida. 74, 66 Pac. 826, 70 L. R. A. 691, the court says:

"Both upon principle and authority, private corporations are residents of the state in which they are created. They have, and can have, but one domicile-that the state of their birth, and which is fixed by the charter of incorporation. They may migrate into other countries and jurisdictions for the purpose of business, and may be permitted to carry on business in other states; yet, so far as jurisdiction of courts is concerned, they are treated both by our federal courts and by our state courts as residents of the state in which created, and nonresidents of other states. The appellant in this case is a foreign corporation. . . . . Foreign corporations are and remain, to all intents and purposes, so far as jurisdiction of actions is concerned, nonresidents of the state."

In the case of New York Life Ins. Co. v. Pike, 51 Colo. 238, 117 Pac. 899, the supreme court of Colorado says:

"The authorities, both court and text-writers, announce as settled doctrine that a corporation organized under the laws of one state is a resident of the state under whose laws it was created; that it cannot be a resident of any other state; and, though such a corporation be permitted by another state, upon compliance with its laws, to carry on its business there, such permission and compliance does not make it a resident of such other state. . . . . To hold otherwise would be to ingraft upon the statute an exception which is wholly foreign to its plain terms, and would be only an amendment thereof."

In Cook on Corporations, 7th ed., sec. 1, it is said: "The domicile, residence, and citizenship of a corporation are in the state where it is created."

Opinion of the Court-Budge, J.

To grant to a foreign corporation the right to hold property, to do business, maintain actions, enjoy the benefits of eminent domain, does not make it a domestic corporation, and notwithstanding the right to the enjoyment of all of these privileges, and such others as the legislature may from time to time provide, the residence or citizenship of a foreign corporation would not be changed and it would still, under the great weight of authority, be subject to attachment as a foreign corporation. (Barbour v. Paige Hotel Co., 2 App. Cas. (D. C.) 174; Cowardin v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 32 Gratt. (Va.) 445; Merrick v. Van Santvoord, 34 N. Y. 208; Blackstone Mfg. Co. v. Blackstone, 13 Gray (Mass.), 488; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (U. S.), 519, 10 L. ed. 274; Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co., 145 U. S. 444, 12 Sup. Ct. 935, 36 L. ed. 768.)

The supreme court of California in Waechter v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 10 Cal. App. 70, 101 Pac. 41, had under consideration the question of venue in a suit brought against a foreign corporation, involving the same principle that we are called upon to consider. The court held that "Its primary purpose was apparently to place foreign railway and transportation companies upon an equal standing in this state with domestic corporations, in respect to building railways and exercising the right of eminent domain, and the rights and privileges incident thereto. To construe it as taking such companies out of the operation of the provisions of the general section relating to the place of trial of actions would be to create a specially privileged class of nonresident corporations who would be favored above, not only nonresident natural persons, but all other foreign corporations that might be doing business in the state. This would not only result in creating a special class of corporate defendants in civil actions, but would also arbitrarily discriminate in favor of corporations against natural persons who were nonresidents."

The authorities are uniform that the domicile, residence and citizenship of a corporation are in the state where it is created, and that where the corporation is not domesticated, that is, reincorporated in other states where it does business, it can have but one domicile, one residence and one citizenship,

Opinion of the Court-Budge, J.

and that is in the state issuing its charter and maintaining supervision and control over the corporation.

on Foreign Corp., 2d ed., sec. 6629.)

(5 Thompson

In Drake on Attachments, 7th ed., sec. 80, the proposition is stated as follows:

"The foreign character of a corporation is not to be determined by the place where its business is transacted, or where the corporators reside, but by the place where its charter was granted. With reference to inhabitancy, it is considered an inhabitant of the state in which it was incorporated." These general principles respecting residency or inhabitancy of corporations cannot be denied or questioned. (Cowardin v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 32 Gratt. (Va.) 445.)

It must be conceded that it is beyond the power of the state to forfeit or extend the corporate existence of a foreign corporation. It can exercise no power or control over the corporation as such. A foreign corporation by compliance with the constitution and laws may do business within the state at its pleasure, and when dissatisfied can withdraw at will.

The provisions of our attachment law provide for no such exemption as contended for by appellant, and even though the legislature should attempt to make some such provision looking to the exemption of foreign corporations from attachment by a compliance with the constitution and laws, such legislation might be seriously questioned upon the ground and for the reason that it would be class legislation, or an attempt on the part of the legislature to confer special privileges upon a particular class of persons which could not be enjoyed by all alike. We do not think that the legislature ever intended that a foreign corporation, by complying with the constitution and laws of this state permitting it to do business should be regarded as a resident of this state within the meaning of our attachment laws, and that its property should be exempt from attachment. (Voss v. Evans Marble Co., 101 Ill. App. 373.)

In view of the conclusion reached by this court upon the second ground of objection urged to the validity of the attachment of the property of appellant, it becomes immaterial whether or not the stock pledged by the Idaho Railway, Light

Points Decided.

& Power Company to respondent is or became valueless by the fault of respondent or the conduct of appellants.

The third objection urged, namely, that the undertaking for attachment was insufficient, was not discussed by counsel for appellants, either during the oral argument or in the brief filed on appellants' behalf.

The order of the district court refusing to dissolve the attachment is hereby affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.

Sullivan, C. J., and Morgan, J., concur.

(January 21, 1915.)

THE SOUTHERN IDAHO CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS, a Corporation, Appellant, v. THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE CO., a Corporation, Respondent.

[145 Pac. 502.]

POLICY OF INSURANCE-NONSUIT-EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY OF-REJECTION OF EVIDENCE-PROOF OF Loss-WAIVER OF.

1. Upon motion for nonsuit, as provided by sec. 4354, Rev. Codes, the defendant admits the existence of every fact which the evidence tends to prove or which could be gathered from any reasonable view of the evidence, and plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of all inferences in his favor which the jury would be justified in drawing from the testimony.

2. The refusal of the court to admit certain evidence on the trial held reversible error.

3. Where a waiver of proof of loss is an issue in a case, all evidence tending to establish such waiver ought to be admitted.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District for Ada County. Hon. Charles P. McCarthy, Judge.

Action to recover on a policy of insurance. Judgment of nonsuit for the defendant. Reversed.

Argument for Appellant.

Richard H. Johnson, for Appellant.

The rule of law which governs on a motion for nonsuit is clearly laid down by this court in Later v. Haywood, 12 Ida. 78, 85 Pac. 494, and Bank of Commerce v. Baldwin, 12 Ida. 202, 85 Pac. 497, to the effect that such a motion admits the existence of every fact in favor of the plaintiff which the evidence tends to prove or which could be gathered from any reasonable view of the evidence. (See, also, Shank v. Great Shoshone & Twin Falls Water Power Co., 205 Fed. 836, 124 C. C. A. 35; Culver v. Kehl, 21 Ida. 596, 123 Pac. 301; Allen v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 12 Ida. 653, 88 Pac. 245, 10 Ann. Cas. 328, 8 L. R. A., N. S., 903; Pratt v. Dwelling-House Fire Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 206, 29 N. E. 118.)

An agreement to renew insurance in force is presumed to have reference to the terms and conditions of the existing policy. (19 Cyc. 630, and cases cited in note 33.)

Where plaintiff's last insurance was had with the defendant insurance company through the same agent, the word "renew" in an oral contract with such agent to renew the insurance sufficiently designates the company, as well as the property to be insured, and the terms of the policy. (Abel v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. Supp. 218, 219, 47 App. Div. 81.)

In the following cases there was less evidence than in the case at bar to show a contract of insurance, and in all of them the court held that the question was one for the jury to determine: Smith v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc., 65 Fed. 765, 13 C. C. A. 284; Dove v. Royal Ins. Co., 98 Mich. 122, 57 N. W. 30; Bowman v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 59 N. Y. 521; Church v. La Fayette Fire Ins. Co., 66 N. Y. 222; Welsh v. Continental Ins. Co., 47 Hun (N. Y.), 598; Hardwick v. State Ins. Co., 23 Or. 290, 21 Am. St. 879, 31 Pac. 656; Long v. North British & M. F. Ins. Co., 137 Pa. 335, 21 Am. St. 879, 20 Atl. 1014; Latimore v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., 153 Pa. 324, 25 Atl. 757; Nute v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 109 Mo. App. 585, 83 S. W. 83; Gerib v. International Ins. Co., 1 Dill. 443, Fed. Cas. No. 5298; Forehand v. Niagara Ins. Co., 58 Ill. App. 161; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Coffman, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 631, 32 S. W. 810.