Argument for Appellant.

the federal court has the question of its jurisdiction under consideration, has been condemned repeatedly by the higher courts. (Ches. & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207, 29 Sup. Ct. 430, 53 L. ed. 766; Coeur d'Alene Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Spalding, 6 Ida. 97, 53 Pac. 107; Dillon, Removal of Causes, 5th ed., p. 158.)

The petition for removal and the accompanying motion or application for an order of removal constitute appearance and pleading within the meaning and intent of the state law governing the authority of the clerk to enter default, and no default can be entered by the clerk until the petition has been finally denied or overruled. (Mattoon v. Hinkley, 33 Ill. 208; State v. Gittings, 35 Md. 169; Osprey v. Jenkins, 9 Mo. 643; Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Lambert, 31 Okl. 300, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 329, 121 Pac. 654; 6 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 93; 23 Cyc. 757.)

The petition for removal is a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, and in overruling a petition or motion for the removal of a cause the rule of respondeat ouster obtains, and the order should be that defendant plead further within the time fixed by the court, and until the expiration of such time no default can be entered against defendant. (Kelly v. Van Austin, 17 Cal. 564; Reinhart v. Lugo, 86 Cal. 395, 21 Am. St. 52, 24 Pac. 1089; 6 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 80; 1 Black on Judgments, 2d ed., sec. 13; 1 Freeman on Judgments, 4th ed., sec. 7; Trow v. Messer, 32 N. H. 361; Cooke v. Crawford, 1 Tex. 9, 46 Am. Dec. 93; Robb v. Parker, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 58; Kamp v. Bartlett, 164 Ill. App. 338.)

A simple default should be vacated in furtherance of justice and on such terms as may be proper. (McFarlane v. McFarlane, 45 Or. 360, 77 Pac. 837; Hall v. McCan, 62 Or. 556, 126 Pac. 5; Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah, 354, 90 Pac. 897; Melde v. Reynolds, 129 Cal. 308, 61 Pac. 932; Greene v. Montana Brewing Co., 32 Mont. 102, 79 Pac. 693; Staley v. O'Day, 22 Cal. App. 149, 133 Pac. 620; Douglas v. Badger State Mine, 41 Wash. 266, 83 Pac. 178, 4 L. R. A., N. S., 196.)

The application for vacating the default entered against defendant shows both mistake, inadvertence, surprise and excusable neglect, and the trial court erroneously assumed it had

Argument for Appellant.

no discretion in the matter. Statutes should be liberally construed with the view to determining causes on the merits. (Rev. Codes, secs. 4, 4225, 4226, 4228, 4229 and 4231; Shreve v. Cheesman, 69 Fed. 785, 16 C. C. A. 413; Flagg v. Puterbaugh, 98 Cal. 134, 32 Pac. 863; Smith v. Whittier, 95 Cal. 279, 30 Pac. 529; Wallace v. Okolona Savings' Inst. Co., 49 Miss. 616, 620.)

The cause was removable to the federal court, and an order should have been made transferring it. (Ex parte Nebraska, 209 U. S. 436, 28 Sup. Ct. 581, 52 L. ed. 876; Troy Bank v. Whitehead & Co., 222 U. S. 39, 32 Sup. Ct. 9, 56 L. ed. 81; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 28, 21 Sup. Ct. 251, 45 L. ed. 410.)

The liability of the surety on this bond does not extend to the general public depositing money in the banks of the state. (Ida. Rev. Codes, secs. 191, 194, 3000, 3001, 3003, 3005 and 3004.) Sec. 191, Rev. Codes, requires all damages against the bank commissioner to be adjudged against such bank commissioner before the surety of such commissioner can be held liable. (Umbreit v. American Bonding Co., 144 Wis. 611, 129 N. W. 789; Western Assurance Co. v. Klein, 48 Neb. 904, 67 N. W. 873; Blaufus v. People, 69 N. Y. 107, 25 Am. Rep. 148; Webb v. Bidwell, 15 Minn. 484; United States v. Irwin, 127 U. S. 125, 8 Sup. Ct. 1033, 32 L. ed. 99; Sans v. City of New York, 31 Misc. Rep. 559, 64 N. Y. Supp. 681; New Orleans Nat. Banking Assn. v. Adams, 3 Woods, 21, Fed. Cas. No. 10,184; Brownell v. Greenwich, 44 Hun (N. Y.), 611, 8 N. Y. St. Rep. 6; Wirt v. Peck, 184 Fed. 54, 107 C. C. A. 16; Tyler Min. Co. v. Last Chance Min. Co., 90 Fed. 15, 32 C. C. A. 498; Browning v. Porter, 12 Fed. 460, 2 McCrary, 581.) Sec. 3005 imposes unusually severe penalties on the commissioner if he proceeds against a bank without reasonable cause. In view

of such penalties a very strong showing should be required before any court would be justified in holding the commissioner liable for an abuse of discretion in failing to close a bank. (Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 22; Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 114, 6 Am. Dec. 359.)

Argument for Respondent.

On official bonds there can be no liability and no recovery without malice alleged and proved. (Wheeler v. Patterson, 1 N. H. 88, 8 Am. Dec. 41; Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 120; Wilson v. Mayor, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 599, 43 Am. Dec. 719; Venderheyden v. Young, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 160; State v. Chadwick, 10 Or. 465.)

The duties of the bank commissioner under sec. 3005, Rev. Codes, are not ministerial. They are of a highly discretionary character. (State ex rel. Irvine v. Brooks, 14 Wyo. 393, 84 Pac. 488, 7 Ann. Cas. 1108, 6 L. R. A., N. S., 750.)

The official is not liable in damages for either error of judgment, incompetency or mistakes of law or fact. (Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N. C. 1, 25 Am. Dec. 677; Edwards v. United States, 103 U. S. 471, 26 L. ed. 314; United States v. McClane, 74 Fed. 153; Gould v. Hammond, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5636; Pratt v. Gardner, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 63, 48 Am. Dec. 652; Stone v. Graves, 8 Mo. 148, 40 Am. Dec. 131; Rains v. Simpson, 50 Tex. 495, 32 Am. Rep. 609; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 16 Sup. Ct. 631, 40 L. ed. 780.)

J. H. Peterson, Attorney General, for the State, and Sullivan & Sullivan, for Respondent.

Default cannot be set aside by reason of mistake of law. (1 Black on Judgments, secs. 335, 340a; Freeman on Judgments, secs. 58, 508; 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 831, 833; 6 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 167; 23 Cyc. 938, 939; Smith v. Pelton Water Wheel Co., 151 Cal. 394, 90 Pac. 934; Allen v. Continental Ins. Co., 97 Ill. App. 164; Keenan v. Daniells, 18 S. D. 102, 99 N. W. 853; Plano Mfg. Co. v. Murphy, 16 S. D. 380, 102 Am. St. 692, 92 N. W. 1072; McDaniels v. Bank of Rutland, 29 Vt. 230, 70 Am. Dec. 406, 412; Phifer v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 123 N. C. 405, 31 S. E. 715.)

There can be no relief against mistake of law. (Wilmerding v. Corbin Banking Co., 126 Ala. 268, 28 So. 640; Early v. Bard, 93 App. Div. 476, 87 N. Y. Supp. 650; City of Noblesville v. Noblesville Gas etc. Co., 157 Ind. 162, 60 N. E. 1032; Mouser v. Harmon, 96 Ky. 591, 29 S. W. 448; Cox v. Arm

Argument for Respondent.

strong (Ky.), 43 S. W. 189; Mantle v. Casey, 31 Mont. 408, 78 Pac. 591; Donlan v. Thompson Falls Copper etc. Co., 42 Mont. 257, 112 Pac. 445; Willoburn Ranch Co. v. Yegen, 45 Mont. 254, 122 Pac. 915.) The early decisions of California, under a statute identical with ours, should be followed in construing the word "mistake" in sec. 4229, Rev. Codes. (Chase v. Swain, 9 Cal. 130; People v. Rains, 23 Cal. 128.)

This court in Morbeck v. Bradford-Kennedy Co., 19 Ida. 83, 113 Pac. 89, has passed upon this question of a "mistake of law" not being sufficient to set aside a default. (See, also, Donovan v. Miller, 12 Ida. 600, 88 Pac. 82, 10 Ann. Cas. 444, 9 L. R. A., N. S., 524.)

Under sec. 4229, to set aside simple default, it is necessary to show mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. "If on the face of the record, including the petition for removal of a cause, the suit does not appear to be a removable one, the state court is not bound to surrender jurisdiction, but may proceed as if no application for removal had been made." (Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Chappell, 206 Fed. 688; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Pechner, 95 U. S. 183, 24 L. ed. 427; Yulee v. Vose, 99 U. S. 539, 25 L. ed. 355; Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485, 26 L. ed. 354; Gregory v. Hartley, 113 U. S. 742, 5 Sup. Ct. 743, 28 L. ed. 1150; Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430, 6 Sup. Ct. 799, 29 L. ed. 962, 963; Crehore v. Ohio etc. Ry. Co., 131 U. S. 240, 9 Sup. Ct. 692, 33 L. ed. 144, 145; Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207, 29 Sup. Ct. 430, 53 L. ed. 765; Springer v. Howes, 69 Fed. 849; Monroe v. Williamson, 81 Fed. 977, 984; Eisenmann v. Delemar's Nevada Gold Min. Co., 87 Fed. 248; Fife v. Whittell, 102 Fed. 537; Dalton v. Milwaukee M. Ins. Co., 118 Fed. 881; McAlister v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 157 Fed. 740, 85 C. C. A. 316, 13 Ann. Cas. 1068; Phillips v. Western Terra Cotta Co., 174 Fed. 873; Mannington v. Hocking Val. Ry. Co., 183 Fed. 133; Stevenson v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 192 Fed. 956; Hansford v. Stone-Ordean-Wells Co., 201 Fed. 185; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. McAllister, 59 Tex. 349; McWhinney v. Brinker, 64 Ind. 360; Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Le Blanc, 74 Miss. 626, 21 So. 748; Hickman v. Missouri etc. Ry. Co., 151 Mo. 644, 52 S. W. Idaho, Vol. 26-42

Argument for Respondent.

351; White v. Holt, 20 W. Va. 792; Hayes v. Todd, 34 Fla. 233, 15 So. 752; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Griffith, 104 Ga. 56, 30 S. E. 420; Bixby v. Blair, 56 Iowa, 416, 9 N. W. 318; Stone v. Sargent, 129 Mass. 503, 510; Howard v. Southern Ry. Co., 122 N. C. 944, 29 S. E. 778; Howard v. Stewart, 34 Neb. 765, 52 N. W. 714; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 607, 612; Knott v. McGilvray, 124 Cal. 128, 56 Pac. 789; Golden v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 39 Mont. 435, 104 Pac. 549, 18 Ann. Cas. 886, 34 L. R. A., N. S., 1154; Debnam v. Southern Bell Tel. etc. Co., 126 N. C. 831, 36 S. E. 269, 65 L. R. A. 915; Western Coal & Min. Co. v. Osborne, 30 Okl. 235, 119 Pac. 973; Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Brazzell, 33 Okl. 122, 124 Pac. 40; Black's Dillon, Removal of Causes, secs. 190, 191; Faust on Federal Procedure, 579; Moon's Removal of Causes, sec. 177; 2 Foster's Fed. Prac., sec. 391; 2 Rose's Code of Fed. Prac., sec. 1138 (e), (g); 10 Ency. of U. S. Sup. Ct. Reps. 704, 705; 18 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 338, 351; 34 Cyc. 1305, 1308; A Federal Equity Suit (Simkins), 806; Coeur d'Alene Ry. etc. Co. v. Spalding, 6 Ida. 97, 53 Pac. 107.)

"If a litigant desires to have a cause removed from the state court to the United States court, he has the right to have it so removed if he has sufficient grounds therefor; but if he has not sufficient grounds, and undertakes to secure a removal and fails, he must take the consequences." (Finney v. American Bonding Co., 13 Ida. 534, 90 Pac. 859, 91 Pac. 318; Mills v. American Bonding Co., 13 Ida. 556, 91 Pac. 381.)

The rule under the cases cited by appellant, where individuals are sureties, does not apply to companies engaged in the surety business for hire. (23 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1087; Atlantic Trust etc. Co. v. Laurinburg, 163 Fed. 690, 90 C. C. A. 274; American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. 552, 42 L. ed. 977; Hull v. Massachusetts etc. Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 342, 120 Pac. 544; Rule v. Anderson, 160 Mo. App. 347, 142 S. W. 358.)

"In an action on a joint and several bond, all or any of the sureties may be sued." (State v. McDonald, 4 Ida. 468, 95 Am. St. 137, 40 Pac. 312.)