Opinion of the Court-Sullivan, C. J. the law sufficiently to authorize him to do so will not protect him from the payment of legally assessed taxes. Under the reclamation law, where a person has so far complied with the provisions thereof by residing on and cultivating the land for more than five years, he can complete his title at any time by making the final proof required and paying the fees provided by law. While it is true the government retains the title, this is done simply as a security for the payment of the money still to become due on the purchase price of the water right. The purchaser under that law has an equitable interest in such land which will ripen into a title in fee, and he may receive a patent if he complies with the law. It was held in Iowa R. R. Land Co. v. Fitchpatrick, 52 Iowa, 244, 3 N. W. 40, that where a corporation is entitled to have certain land certified to under a grant, it cannot escape taxation by failing to have such certification made. In Herrick & Stevens v. Sargent & Lahr, 140 Iowa, 590, 132 Am. St. 281, 117 N. W. 751, it was held that where one is entitled to make final proof under a homestead entry, the failure to do so is no reason why the land should be exempt from taxation. (See, also, Bellinger v. White, 5 Neb. 399.) The complaint shows that the plaintiff has done all that is required under the law as regards residence, cultivation and improvement. He can at any time complete the irrigation of at least half of the area in the entry, if he has not already done so, and make final payment of the charges, fees and commissions due and receive his patent. Under that state of facts his interest in said land is subject to taxation. (See Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Myers, 172 U. S. 589, 19 Sup. Ct. 276, 43 L. ed. 564.) Considering the authorities above referred to in connection with the reclamation act, which act provides that the entryman may sell, assign and mortgage the lands after the five years' proof has been made and accepted by the government, necessarily leads to the conclusion that when the requirements as to residence, improvement and cultivation have been met, the government recognizes that the settler has a valid and Opinion of the Court-Sullivan, C. J. substantial property right in and to his land, since it permits him to sell and give the purchaser the same right that he has, and to obtain patent by making proof of reclamation and final payment, and does not require the purchaser or assignee to be a qualified entryman. In like manner it protects the mortgagee and the grantee of the entryman. It clearly recognizes that if the entryman has fully complied with the law, he has a complete equitable title which by his affirmative action can be made at any time into a full legal title and obtain a patent. He therefore has such an interest in said land as is taxable under the constitution and laws of this state. The plaintiff's interest in said land is not such as is referred to in the statutes of this state as a possessory right to public lands. Such possessory rights thus referred to are recognized by sec. 4552 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure of Idaho. The right referred to there was a squatter's right upon unsurveyed land and the squatter had no legal or equitable interest in the land. There is a clear distinction between a "possessory right" which is initiated and made good by occupancy and settlement and filing a notice thereof as required by sec. 4554, Rev. Codes, and the right which accrues to a person through the making of a formal homestead or other entry of the land under the laws of the United States. When the public land is surveyed by the government and filed upon by a qualified entryman in the usual way, it ceases to be public. land; and if the entryman complies with the law thereafter, he is entitled to a patent, and when he makes his proof of residence and cultivation and makes proof of reclamation of one-half of the irrigable land contained in his entry, he is entitled to a patent from the government. In the case of Shiver v. United States, 159 U. S. 491, 16 Sup. Ct. 54, 40 L. ed. 231, which was a case involving the cutting of timber from a homestead entry, the court said: "While we hold in this case that, as between the United States and the settler, the land is to be deemed the property of the former, at least so far as is necessary to protect it from waste, we do not wish to be understood as expressing an opinion whether, as between the settler and the state, it may not be Opinion of the Court-Sullivan, C. J. deemed the property of the settler, and therefore subject to taxation." The interest held by the plaintiff in said lands is private property and is recognized as private property by the laws of the United States and by the laws of this state. If the interest of the settler on such lands is not subject to taxation until patent finally issues, it would permit the settler to enjoy for years, and perhaps for an ordinary lifetime, all the rights and privileges of his property without sharing in the burden of taxation. He is permitted under the law to lease, mortgage or sell his interest in such land; is not required to reside on it after the period of five years has expired; in fact, has all the privileges of possession and ownership, and clearly has such an interest in the land as is subject to taxation under the constitution and laws of this state. The record shows that he has made five payments on his water right and there are five deferred payments remaining unpaid. Congress passed an act extending the period for payment under reclamation projects, which was approved August 13, 1914. Under that act the time for making payment was extended to twenty years, and if the plaintiff takes advantage of the liberality of the government as expressed in that act, he may, by declining to make proof of reclamation and final payment on his water right, be protected from paying taxes on his interest in said land for twenty years, provided the contention of counsel for plaintiff be correct. And during that time his interest in said land will no doubt become more and more valuable and he has a right therein that he may assign, sell or mortgage and that may be sold under judicial sale. Such a settler clearly has a vested and private interest in the land, a right separate and distinct from that of the government, and such an interest or right is taxable under the laws of this state. The record shows that plaintiff has made proof showing that he has complied with the requirements of the general homestead law, and if it were not for the fact that his land is on a reclamation project and that he owes the government certain payments for his water right, he would now be entitled Idaho, Vol. 26-31 Opinion of the Court-Sullivan, C. J. to a patent, upon making proof of reclamation of one-half of the irrigable land in his entry and making the deferred payments. The real interest of the government in the land at the present time is that of a mortgagee and lienholder only, which lien the government is not required to go into a court to foreclose, under the reclamation law. Counsel for plaintiff suggests that there is no method of enforcing the collection of the tax against the interest of a settler in such lands. That certainly need not worry him, since the land is subject to taxation. Clearly the interest of the entryman can be sold at tax sale and the lien of such sale foreclosed and title thereto obtained, under the provisions of the present revenue law found in secs. 127-144, chap. 58, Sess. Laws 1913. The settler has the right under the reclamation act to mortgage or sell and convey his interest in said land, and may lose it through the foreclosure of a mortgage. The county may tax his interest, and if the taxes become delinquent, may sell his interest in the land. Nothing that the county authorities have done or could do can or will affect the rights or interests of the United States in such lands, since the right to enforce its claim for deferred payments on water rights exists unchanged and unimpaired, whether the land remains the property of the original entryman or has passed by voluntary conveyance or judicial sale from him to a grantee, or whether it has been sold and transferred by the county for the payment of delinquent taxes. We therefore conclude that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint and entering judgment perpetually, or at all, enjoining and restraining the county from assessing said interest of the plaintiff in said land and from selling or disposing of such interest as the plaintiff has in such lands for delinquent taxes. The cause is remanded, with directions to sustain the demurrer and enter judgment in favor of the defendants. Costs awarded to defendants. Truitt, J., concurs. Points Decided. (November 6, 1914.) BOISE BUTCHER CO., LTD., a Corporation, Respondent, V. ANNA V. ANIXDALE, Appellant. [144 Pac. 337.] CREDITOR'S BILL-PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTARY TO EXECUTION-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT-SEPARATE PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMANCOMMUNITY PROPERTY-ESTOPPEL. 1. Held, that a complaint on a judgment brought against a person alleged to have money of the judgment debtor in her possession, under the authority of the order provided for in sec. 4510, Rev. Codes, which substantially shows that the judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, its date, amount and the parties thereto, and then alleges facts showing that proper proceedings under the provisions of chap. 2 of title 9, providing for proceedings supplementary to execution, had been taken, that the order provided for in said sec. 4510 had been duly obtained, and further alleges that the defendant has money belonging to the judgment creditor subject to execution in her possession, is sufficient when tested by a general demurrer. 2. A married woman bought a meat market which was personal property, placed her husband in possession of the shop, authorized him to manage and control the business, buy and sell meat, receive the money from sales and pay the bills incurred in the business and thereafter her husband, as manager of the business, went to a wholesale butcher company, represented himself as the proprietor of said meat market, bought meat there, and obtained credit from said company, which was given under the belief that he owned the shop and the business, and his wife never notified said company of her ownership of the property, and the company had no knowledge of it. Held, that under these circumstances she is estopped from asserting ownership to the property when it would result in the loss of a debt contracted by her husband. APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District for Ada County. Hon. Carl A. Davis, Judge. Action in the nature of a creditor's bill brought by the respondent, to subject certain money alleged to be in the hands of the appellant to the payment of a judgment obtained against Alfred Anixdale, her husband, under the provisions |