Opinion of the Court--McCarthy, District Judge.

of statutory construction should be borne in mind. Chap. 33 and chap. 58 relate to revenue and the power of the commissioners in relation to it. The rule that statutes in pari materia should be construed together applies with peculiar force to statutes passed at the same session of the legislature; they are to be construed together, and should be so construed, if possible, as to harmonize and give force and effect to the provisions of each. If, however, they are necessarily inconsistent, the statute which deals with the common subject matter in a more minute and particular way will prevail over a statute of a more general nature. These rules are so well established as to neither require nor justify any citations of authorities in support of them.

Since chap. 58 contains an emergency clause, and chap. 33 does not, chap. 58 went into effect before chap. 33.

The general rule at common law seems to have been that of two inconsistent statutes enacted at the same session of the legislature, the one which went into effect at the later date would prevail. (Harrington v. Harrington, 53 Vt. 649; State v. Edwards, 136 Mo. 360, 38 S. W. 73; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 2d ed., p. 541, sec. 280, note 45.)

At common law this was a sensible rule, because the general rule was that a statute went into effect from the date of its passage, that is, from the date of the last act necessary to complete the process of legislation and give the bill the force of law. (Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 2d ed., p. 308, sec. 172.) Under our constitution no act takes effect until sixty days from the end of the session at which the same shall have been passed, except in case of emergency, which emergency shall be declared in the law. (Const., art. 3, sec. 22.) Thus, except in the case of emergency acts, all acts of the legislature go into effect at the same time. Therefore, in the great majority of cases, the common-law rule would not be an effective guide. While it is not necessary for the purposes of this case to lay down a general rule for all cases, we will say in passing that we are inclined to the opinion that, in case of an irreconcilable conflict between two acts passed at the same session of the legislature, the one should prevail

Opinion of the Court-McCarthy, District Judge.

which was last approved by the governor, the approval of the governor being the last act in the process of legislation under our constitution and statutes.

It has been held that where two conflicting acts upon the same subject matter are passed at the same session of the legislature, and their conflict is such that they cannot be harmonized and stand together, where one of them contains an emergency clause and the other does not and the one containing the emergency clause was passed by both houses of the legislature after the other, under such circumstances the act containing the emergency clause should prevail over the other. (Heilig v. City Council of Puyallup, 7 Wash. 29, 34 Pac. 164.) The supreme court of Washington says in the last-mentioned case: "The simple fact of there being an emergency clause would tend to show that the subject matter of the act was more clearly and pointedly before the legislature than the subject matter of the other act." Another reason for the decision is that the act which is passed later is the later expression of the legislative will. To the same effect see Belding Land etc. Co. v. City of Belding, 128 Mich. 79, 87 N. W. 113; Dewey v. City of Des Moines, 101 Iowa, 416, 70 N. W. 605; Board of Education v. Tafoya, 6 N. M. 292, 27 Pac. 616.

This court takes judicial notice of the journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of this state in passing upon legislation. (Sec. 5950, subd. 3, Rev. Codes; Burkhart v. Reed, 2 Ida. 503, 22 Pac. 1.) Chap. 33 passed the House and was transmitted to the Senate on February 5, 1913, and passed the Senate and was returned to the House on February 20, 1913; it was presented to the governor on February 24th. (House Journal, pp. 183 and 360; Senate Journal, p. 212, printed copies.) It was approved by the governor on February 25th. Chap. 58 passed the House and was transmitted to the Senate on March 4th, was passed by the Senate and returned to the House on March 8th, and was presented to the governor on March 8th. (House Journal, pp. 503 and 615; Senate Journal, p. 393, printed copies.) It was approved by the governor on March 13, 1913.

Opinion of the Court-McCarthy, District Judge.

It thus appears that chap. 58 passed both Houses and was approved by the governor later than chap. 33, and therefore was a later expression of the legislative will than chap. 33. The fact that chap. 58 carries an emergency clause signifies that it was considered more urgent and more important by the legislature than chap. 33, which does not carry an emergency clause.

For these reasons we think that in case of an irreconcilable inconsistency it should be held that chap. 58 repeals chap. 33 to the extent of such inconsistency.

The defendants contend that to make chap. 58 apply to warrants issued before it went into effect would be to render it a retroactive or retrospective law. It is the rule that all statutes are to be considered as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is clear. (36 Cyc. 1205, "c," and cases cited; Katz v. Herrick, 12 Ida. 1, 86 Pac. 873.) This rule is embodied in sec. 3, Rev. Codes, which provides that "No part of these Revised Codes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." We do not think, however, that this section means that the statute must use the words "this statute is to be deemed retroactive." We think it is sufficient if the enacting words are such that the intention to make the law retroactive is clear. In other words, if the language clearly refers to the past as well as to the future, then the intent to make the law retroactive is expressly declared within the meaning of sec. 3, Rev. Codes.

Bearing in mind the rules of statutory construction which are outlined above, the question is, What was the intention. of the legislature in enacting chap. 33 and chap. 58 so far as the precise point which we are considering is concerned? Sec. 15, art. 7 of the constitution made it the duty of the legislature to enact chap. 58, and it should have been enacted long before it was, in fact, at the first session of the legislature. After directing that such a law should be passed, it says: "And after the levy of such special tax, all warrants issued before such levy, shall be paid exclusively out of such fund." Of course

Opinion of the Court-McCarthy, District Judge.

the legislature had this language in mind when it passed and enacted chap. 58.

This court held, in Bannock County v. C. Bunting & Co., 4 Ida. 156, 37 Pac. 277, that sec. 15, art. 7 of the constitution was not self-executing, for the reason that it did not provide necessary machinery for its execution. However, when such machinery was provided by chap. 58, sec. 99, we think that the language of said section just above quoted is self-executing, and that all warrants issued before the levy of the tax for the purpose of paying warrant indebtedness must be paid out of that fund to the exclusion of any other method.

Sec. 99 of chap. 58 says that the board must levy a tax for the redemption of outstanding county warrants issued prior to the second Monday of April in the year in which the tax is levied. Reading this language in the light of the constitutional provision, it seems to us that it clearly refers to all warrants issued before the levy of the tax. Sec. 15, art. 7 of the constitution makes it the duty of the legislature to pass such laws as shall place and maintain the counties of the state upon a cash basis. We do not think that a law passed in obedience to such a mandate should be given a construction which would defeat in part the mandate itself.

It should be borne in mind that chap. 58 is a remedial statute, or one relating to procedure. It does not impair any existing right or indebtedness, but simply relates to the method of procedure which shall be followed in paying an indebtedness. The provision of sec. 101 of chap. 58 that the county auditor shall furnish the board with a statement of the amount of outstanding warrants for the current year and for prior years also enforces the conclusion that the legislature did not mean to confine the operation of the law to warrants issued after the law went into effect. We conclude that the legislature, when enacting sec. 99 of chap. 58, intended to make it apply to all warrant indebtedness irrespective of whether the warrants were issued before or after that chapter went into effect, that there is no rule of law which prevents or inhibits such construction, and that such construction should be placed upon the statute. It follows, then, that

Points Decided.

chap. 58 repeals the provision of chap. 33, which empowers the commissioners to issue funding bonds for the purpose of paying any warrant indebtedness. Chap. 33 is not, however, entirely repealed, but is still in effect so far as bonded indebtedness is concerned.

Counsel for both plaintiff and defendants have referred to the decision in the case of Bannock County v. C. Bunting & Co., 4 Ida. 156, 37 Pac. 277. We cannot see that this decision is directly in point. It of course holds by implication that sec. 15 of art. 7 of the constitution is not self-operative. Sec. 99 of chap. 58 makes that provision of the constitution operative. In that case the court upholds the old law granting the commissioners power to bond not only for refunding bonded indebtedness but also for warrant indebtedness. The court, however, had no such provision before it as the provision of sec. 99 of chap. 58, which, as we hold in this opinion, abrogates such power.

The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered. Costs awarded to respondent.

Ailshie, C. J., and Sullivan, J., concur.

(June 2, 1914.)

DICKENS-WEST MINING CO., a Corporation, Respondent, v. CRESCENT MINING & MILLING CO., a Corporation, Appellant.

[141 Pac. 566.]

MINING CLAIMS SUIT TO QUIET TITLE-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS—COMPLIANCE WITH STATE LAW STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - VOID CONVEYANCE-ANNUAL LABOR-AFFIDAVIT OF PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE SUBSTANTIAL CONFLICT.

1. Where a foreign corporation fails to comply with the laws of this state in filing its articles of incorporation and designating an agent upon whom service of process may be made with the Secretary of State and with the clerk of the district court of the county