able admit advantage America answer appear appointment army attention authority body branch causes character circumstances citizens common confederacy confederation Congress consequence consideration considered Constitution continue Convention councils course courts danger depend duties effect elections equal established evident executive exercise existence experience extent favor federal federal government force foreign former give greater hands happen House immediate important independent individuals influence instance interests judges jurisdiction jury kind latter laws least legislative legislature less liberty limits majority means measures ment nature necessary necessity never objects observations officers operation particular parties peace period persons political possess practice present President principle probable proper proportion proposed provision question reason regard regulation relation render representatives require respect rule Senate side single situation society spirit sufficient supposed thing tion treaties trial Union United whole
Page 135 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law.
Page 247 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
Page 288 - In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger...
Page 429 - Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
Page 435 - NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support.
Page 268 - In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them : the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them : the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Page 246 - Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.
Page 47 - ... of legislators, but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are and must be themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail.
Page 50 - It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the...