The Colombian customs service, under the direction of a respected and competent retired admiral, is steadily increasing its drug interdiction efforts. With additional U.S. financial assistance, hopefully, this service will assume more of custom's traditional worldwide role in narcotics interdiction.

For our part, the U.S. Government contributed $2.4 million in fiscal year 1978 to help the Colombians with their antinarcotics campaign. Of this amount, $1.3 million went to the Guajira campaign.

In fiscal year 1979, we have pledged $3.8 million as our contribution to the Colombian effort. Of this amount, $2.4 million will go to the military campaign. The Colombians have devoted considerable resources in the form of men, planes, ships and money to this effort. There are at the present time about 3,700 members of the Colombian armed forces engaged in the Guajira campaign. The campaign has shown considerable success to date. From October 15, 1978, to the end of August 1979, the armed forces seized 2,765 tons of marijuana (unverified estimates of marijuana burned in the fields would at least double that figure), 85 airplanes, 294 vehicles and 76 boats; 1,481 persons were arrested, 1.278 Colombians and 203 foreigners, the greater majority of them Americans. The value of the marijuana in the United States, by the way, is almost $4 billion based on a street price of about $350 a pound.

The principal problems in Colombia have been the lack of appropriate institutions and the scarcity of resources to devote to the eradication of the narcoties problem. This led directly to the creation of the judicial police unit in the attorney general's office and to the decision to use the military on the north coast. We have, thus, been engaged in a traditional institution building exercise with attendant training, and we have attempted to act as a catalyst in specific areas with the meager funding at our disposal. In addition to training, our funds have served to provide specialized equipment, particularly communications, which were required in operations. Supplying of fuel has been important and the major part of our funding of the north coast operation.

Our strategy in the north coast operation is simple in its complexity. The concept is to intercept incoming planes and ships, effectively disrupting the transfer of drugs to the United States. The statistics mentioned above indieate that it is possible to do so even with extremely limited resources. We have had to make do with obsolescent destroyers and portable, Korean-war vintage radar units with very limited operating capabilities. With an effective radar capability and fast patrol craft, together with an additional helicopter capability, which we hope to program for the next fiscal year, the overall efficiency of the operation should increase exponentially. The idea is to operate the patrol craft off the Guajira Peninsula from mother ships. Helicopters would be used to expand the patrolling radius and to carry troops to the clandestine landing sites. Radar would give such operations a more effective cutting edge. On the drawing board is a projected operation to make the southern border, through which comes most of the raw material for cocaine, less permeable. Relying principally on Colombian customs, an attempt will be made to patrol selected choke points on the various tributaries of the Amazon which are used as part of the distribution system. In addition, river and air patrols will supplement these stationary points. This operation will begin within the next 60 days. In a more prosaic, diplomatic field, a new, modern extradition treaty has just been negotiated with Colombia. It will increase the rapidity with which an extradition can be accomplished. Each country will be required to extradite or prosecute its own citizens. It is more precise in its description and definition of the documents on which extradition is based. It provides for extradition without a formal proceeding if the accused agrees in writing to waive the proceeding and the protection it affords. We are in the process of negotiating a Mutual Assistance Agreement which will make the prosecution of crimes swifter and easier. It provides for the taking of testimony, the locating of persons, the appearance of witnesses, the seizure and return of objects involved in crimes, examinations and inspections and the service of legal documents.

In training, we probably had, last year, the best record in this particular field in the world; 206 Colombian officers received narcotics training. Much more has to be done, and we have on the drawing boards the establishment of a narcotic police training academy with the objective of training multiples of that figure.

These are some of the things that can be done. There are a number of other projects I can go into at the pleasure of the subcommittee. I would like to make the point, however, that, in my view, our priorities have been skewed. It is my understanding that if narcotics law enforcement efforts in the United States at

all levels-Federal, State and municipal-were quantified and totalled, the amount would probably exceed $1 billion. If in Colombia we are, indeed, talking about 70 percent of the trouble in both marijuana and cocaine, the funding of $2.4 million in fiscal year 1978 just does not make sense. The Congress at this moment is considering a bill which would provide approximately $16 million for drug enforcement in Colombia for the next fiscal year, a truly extraordinary sum in terms of our past funding experience. This figure represents the equivalent of the budget of the Birmingham, Alabama Police Department. The world-wide budget of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters of the Department of State is less than half the budget of the Baltimore Police Department. It is not my intention here to make a specific pitch for funds. Rather, I am making a doctrinal and philosophical point. The only truly successful program is to go after drugs where they grow. If we are thrown back on defending and patrolling our enormously extended coast line and in policing our very busy skies, we are talking about last resorts.

Such procedures are, of course, essential, but ultimate reliance on this method ensures that the battle will be lost. A 10 percent estimated seizure rate on this basis would be, indeed, phenomenal. It is not enough, since resources will, in the best of all cases, always be limited; the point I am trying to make is that a basic reassessment of where we put our money is necessary. We know where the marijuana plants are growing. We know where the coca bushes are located. We do not know on what night or at what point in the United States a boat or plane will arrive.

I wish to emphasize that I am not referring to the use of herbicides; only to the thesis that the closer to the sources, the more effective the enforcement action. I am not convinced, for instance, that the use of herbicides in Colombia would be either desirable or cost effective although a Colombian Government study is currently in progress. I do not think that the current controversy over the use of paraquat has been helpful. It has raised serious questions in Colombia concerning our resolve and determination.

The other issue that raises many questions in Colombia is, again, equally simple in appearance and just as complex as the paraquat issue. Many Colombians ask how the most powerful nation, militarily, in the world can permit itself to be "invaded" in this fashion. The continual violations of our airspace and maritime areas by unauthorized craft is inconceivable to foreigners. Where are our radars, where the response of our war planes and our naval patrols? Explanations and protestations concerning possee comitatus fall on deaf ears in Colombia. The Colombian military do not consider narcotics enforcement an appropriate mission for the armed forces. They are concerned that the huge profits involved will be utilized to corrupt some elements of their own forces. They have a number of other national security and public order functions to perform. They are, nevertheless, performing admirably because there were no current alternatives to their participation and because President Turbay assigned the activity a high priority. We have supported them only minimally through narcotics funding. They have received no consideration from the foreign military sales program for the heavy drain on their limited equipment and resources. We, on the other hand, have not made a comparable effort in utilizing our own military resources. I would think that serious consideration of a modification of the possee comitatus principle is in order.

The principal point I would like to leave with the subcommittee is that this problem is susceptible of solution; that there is no reason to despair. With the splendid cooperation we have been receiving or can receive from governments such as that of Colombia, the actions that have to be taken are clear. To harp on an old saw, it is merely a matter of political will. There are a great many voices from abroad, a number of them quite respectable, that call into question our resolve. No one doubts our capability.

Senator BIDEN. The hearing is recessed until the call of the Chair, when the gentleman, whom we are anxious to hear from, from the CIA will testify.

[Whereupon. at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR LAXALT AND RESPONSES OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

December 19, 1979

Dear Senator Laxalt:

I am writing in response to your letter of September 25, 1979, setting forth questions to be answered for the Hearing record of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Senate Judiciary Committee. My responses to your questions are enclosed.

I appreciate your continuing interest and support for the international narcotics control program.

Sincerely,

Mather Falco

Mathea Falco

Enclosure:

Responses to Questions
submitted September 25.

The Honorable

Paul Laxalt,

United States Senate.

This is in response to your letter concerning my findings and conclusions as to whether the spraying of marijuana with paraquat is likely to cause serious harm to the health of those who use marijuana sprayed with the herbicide.

As you know, Section 4 of the International Securities Assistance Act of 1978 (the "Percy Amendment") provides that assistance under that chapter may not be provided for any program involving the spraying of a herbicide to eradicate marijuana if the use of the herbicide "is likely to cause serious harm to the health of persons who may use or consume the sprayed marijuana," unless a marker is used which will "clearly and readily warn potential users" of the herbicide. This section further provides that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, upon being advised of the use or intended use of such a herbicide, and on the basis of scientific information and after receiving comments from the Secretary of Agriculture and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall advise the Secretary of State whether the use of the herbicide is in fact likely to cause serious health harm, as defined in the statute..

At ny request, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) have investigated the health consequences of consuming paraquat-sprayed marijuana. Their findings, concurred in by the Surgeon General, are that the Sinoke of paraquatcontaminated marijuana is likely to cause serious and in some cases irreversible lung damage when inhaled in sufficient quantities by marijuana users. There is a direct relationship between the amount of paraquat inhaled and the extent and severity of lung damage that results. Lung damage from intermittent or short-term exposure may be reversible, but frequent, high-level exposure over a long period of time can result in a severe form of damage called fibrosis.

Marijuana smokers in the United States are exposed to varying levels of paraquat contamination. Fewer than one percent of marijuana samples confiscated by the Drug Enforcement Administration from the East Coast, Midwest and Pacific Northwest regions were contaminated, while over 12percent of the samples from the Southwest contained paraquat. Using computer simulation studies, we estimate that 50 to 100 marijuana smokers in the Southwest are exposed each year to 500 micrograms or more of unaltered paraquat in marijuana smoke. Based on estimates

by the National Institute of Drug Abuse and NIEHS that the percentage of sprayed paraquat which passes unchanged into marijuana smoke is about 0.2 percent, this dosage is capable of producing a toxic effect in the lungs of these smokers. We further estimate that an additional 2,000 marijuana smokers from this region are exposed to between 100 and 499 micrograms of paraquat in marijuana smoke each year. Such exposure might be expected to produce less severe lung damage.

Although it is difficult to formulate precise or unarguable assumptions concerning the pattern of purchase and use of marijuana, based on the common judgment of several HEW -health and research agencies, these conclusions constitute our best judgment.

I have also received the comments on this issue of
Administrator Costle and Secretary Bergland.

Administrator Costle states that:

While we believe...it is difficult to predict with absolute certainty that there will be a cause and effect link between low-level paraquat exposure and full-scale pulmonary fibrosis, the data available certainly points to a variety of pathologic pulmonary and respiratory conditions which may result from paraquat exposure via treated marijuana. We believe that these adverse health effects can constitute "serious harm" to human health..

He concludes that "EPA supports (HEW's) conclusion that serious human health effects may result from exposure to marijuana treated with paraquat."