easy to chop off the bottom end of the spectrum, we do not bring or try user cases, one sale cases, as a regular practice in the Department and that quality over quantity approach is, I think, more than just a tag line.

Senator BIDEN. Now, when you say "the Department," are you referring to the Criminal Division or are you referring to the U.S. attorneys?

Mr. RUFF. I am referring to all prosecutors and with the entity agents with whom they work. Because the agents will not bring a minor use or possession or one sale case to a prosecutor who has been told you may not try that. In the narcotics area, there is a close linkage set by the prosecutors and that is followed by DEA.

Senator BIDEN. According to your prepared statement on page 5, Attorney General Bell decided after an in-depth investigation that consolidation of the FBI and DEA would not be advisable.

Could you summarize how the investigation was conducted and the results which led to that conclusion, if I properly characterized the conclusion?

Mr. RUFF. Yes; the inquiry was conducted at the Attorney General's request by a senior official of the FBI with substantial staff and with the full cooperation of the Drug Enforcement Administration. I think it is fair to say that the basis for the conclusion was multifold but certainly involved the assessment that the Bureau had in its special expertise and its special qualities, a long history of involvement in certain kinds of criminal investigations, but that DEA, at least over the last several years, had come to the point where its special expertise and its special approaches to drug enforcement were working effectively and would not, in fact, be enhanced by once again. undergoing the extraordinary trauma of a reorganization, not simply an internal reorganization but the wrenching, one, of being moved over to another law enforcement agency.

On the one hand, I think it was a matter of assessing the impact of such a formal shift; second, assessing the quality of the work that DEA had done over the last several years and then ultimately concluding that the answer was not merely a paper and personnel transfer but taking that expertise that we found in the FBI and making it available in the new and sophisticated investigations that DEA was conducting.

Senator BIDEN. In your repsonsibility within the Department, have you ever spoken to anyone within the CIA? Ever?

Mr. RUFF. Ever?

Senator BIDEN. Yes; I am serious. I am not trying to be sarcastic. Mr. RUFF. Yes; certainly.

Mr. BIDEN. And characterize for me the relationship that you think you have with the CIA in drug-related cases.

Mr. RUFF. Well, I have virtually no personal relationship with the CIA at this time in drug-related matters.

Senator BIDEN. Would you be the one to have a relationship if it was appropriate to have a relationship?

Mr. RUFF. The Department's office would be the place where general oversight and general policymaking would go on with respect to relationships with all the intelligenence agencies. The day-to-day and even month-to-month activities of the Drug Enforcement Ad

ministration, as they linked up to international intelligence concerns, would be the place where most of the CIA contact would occur. And I am a little leery of getting in an open hearing too much of a discussion.

Senator BIDEN. I did not intend to do that. I plan on having closed hearings in this area and I have raised the issue in the Intelligence Committee in another context.

But let me characterize it and then you respond.

It seems to me, that there is a low priority within the intelligence community which has been somewhat beleaguered of late, and I think it has been getting an unjustifiable bad rap on a number of issues.

But it seems to me that whenever you talk or discuss international drug trafficking and what part the agency can or should play, my reading is that the response is something like this. On drugs, oh, yes, yes, drugs.

I do not get the feeling that in the agency or in the Government, there is really any significant role for the intelligence community to play here.

Now, am I mistaken in that impression? Am I being deliberately harsh in that impression?

Mr. RUFF. Yes; and I think you are unduly harsh, Senator. I think that the relationship is a better one than that.

I know that I will, and certainly Administrator Bensinger will be prepared to respond other than with that general conclusion in another setting.

But I do think, and I have had some past experience in this field when I was with DEA, that although we could always do better and, indeed, perhaps should do better in that field, I think your assessment is unduly pessimistic.

Senator BIDEN. I will not characterize the Justice Department but I will characterize the State Department. I hope you will not give me a State Department "non-answer" answer to this question.

Mr. RUFF. I will try not to, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. I realize diplomats are trained to be diplomatic, which means they are trained not to give opinions. But I would like your opinion. I am being serious about this.

What one area of endeavor would you suggest that this committee stay away from as it delves into and tries to coordinate from a legislative standpoint the drug issue? What do you think we should not do?

What mistakes that other congressional attempts have made that you think would be advisable to avoid? One area may be a total reorganization.

Obviously, you or the Department concluded that there should not be a wrenching reorganization. Also if you were in my position, what would you make the primary focus of this subcommittee as it relates to drugs? You may not be able to answer that.

Mr. RUFF. No; I can answer it, and it comes, I think, it will be 2 or 3 parts, but it comes, I think, not only from any official function as the Acting Deputy, but my very personal experience with DEA.

You took the words out of my mouth, the one thing this committee. need not focus on, and indeed should not focus on, is some attempt to reorganize for the uncountable time, the structure of the Drug En

forcement Administration. I think it is important to ask questions about how the present structure works, whether indeed it is calculated to fulfill its mission.

My answer to that is that, yes, it does. Never perfectly, no one organization ever does, but having been through the 1973 through 1976 years when DEA went through what I characterized earlier as a major trauma, and having seen the extraordinary progress in both morale and efficiency of that organization, I think the focus of this set of hearings really should be on the substance of what the organization is doing.

Now, in that area, I would have only two or three suggestions. One of them was made quite well, I think, by Senator Nunn. Marihuana is a serious problem for us in the Department of Justice, wholly apart from anyone's assessment of its impact on the health or morality of the American public. Any time that the Department of Justice is asked to enforce a set of criminal statutes, which make it a serious crime to import and distribute quantities of a substance like marihuana, but sees at the very end of that distribution line a set of standards which either makes it noncriminal or at least socially acceptable to us, the products which we are charged with keeping out of the country and keeping from being distributed, we have to ask ourselves and indeed we are, the very hard question, what kinds of resources are we to devote to this area? What kinds of vehicles are we to employ in dealing with our enforcement responsibilities here, and as Senator Nunn suggested, I think it is at least equally the role of the Congress to tell us what it is that is expected of us. So that I would wholly, apart from the issue of marihuana as a harmful drug, although that is obviously underlying much of our concern, we must have some guidance and we must be able to address the question of how it is we create a credible and meaningful enforcement policy in this very difficult area. Beyond that, of course, I think, and again more personal comment than an institutional one, it is important not to focus on the anecdotal approach to enforcement in this area.

Senator BIDEN. What do you mean by that?

Mr. RUFF. That is, that it is possible in any set of hearings or any analysis of an area, whether it be from the executive branch or from the congressional branch or the public to talk about major successes and major disasters in particular cases, or in particular areas, and thus, I think, lose sight of some of the underlying structural and societal problems involved. And I think both I and Administrator Bensinger have managed to stay away from the list of marvelous accomplishments approach to our testimony here, and I think that is an important thing for us at the executive branch for us to do. I think it is equally important for the committee not to lose sight of the forest for a very few tall trees.

Senator BIDEN. I could not agree with you more, and I would invite you to privately or publicly communicate to me when you think we are trespassing in what I think should be the fundamental rule as this committee begins in earnest a serious study of this area.

I think that one of the things that I have decided, is that this and the SALT Agreement are going to be the two most important things that I dealt with in this Congress. The body of congressional information other than anecdotal information that has been collected and coordinated within the committees of the Congress on the Senate side

is not sufficient. Therefore, I will measure the success of these hearings in part by whether we get by without having the press attend. I could not agree with you more.

Anything else that you would suggest?

Mr. RUFF. I have nothing further, Senator, unless you have any further questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ruff follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES F. C. RUFF

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, today I would like to discuss the role of the Department of Justice in controlling the domestic availability of illicit drugs.

The Deputy Attorney General is responsible for all of the Department's criminal law enforcement activities, and in the drug field those include primarily the operations of the Criminal Division, the United States Attorneys, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Later today you are scheduled to hear testimony from Peter Bensinger, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and although I plan to discuss several aspects of DEA's investigative mission, I would like to turn first to federal prosecution of drug-related offenses.

Responsibility for prosecution of criminal offenses under the Controlled Substances Act and similar statutes is assigned to the Criminal Division and the United States Attorneys. The integration of enforcement activities is the responsibiliy of the Division's Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, which, I feel confident in stating, is stronger and more effective today than ever before. Assistant Attorney General Heymann has assigned one of his Deputies, Irvin Nathan, to provide direct oversight of both that Section and the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, and has, thus, substantially improved the Division's capacity for policy development and coordination between those two closely related operations. Recently, a new chief of the Narcotics Section, Alexander Williams, has been appointed-an appointment of particular significance because Mr. Williams has had several years of prosecutorial experience in the narcotics field as an Assistant United States Attorney in Los Angeles.

Among the first steps that then-Deputy Attorney General Civiletti took, working with Mr. Heymann and his staff; was to develop a mission statement for the Narcotics Section. The principal mission of the Section and its 23 lawyers is to improve relations with and provide direct support to the United States Attorneys. who are our front-line forces for prosecution of drug cases. Much of this effort focuses on the operation of 23 Major Drug Trafficker Prosecution Units (MDTPU's) in the United States Attorneys' offices, a program established formally two years ago, although similar units have been in existence in a number of offices since 1975. The 23 MDTPU's now in existence are staffed by 85 Assistant U.S. Attorneys, assigned to work full time on drug matters.

Mr. Chairman, these units represent a considerable investment of attorney resources dedicated solely to drug prosecutions. As a result, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, the staff of the Narcotics Section, and I have examined them carefully to determine whether they are operating effectively, and we will continue to pay close attention to their progress. While it obviously takes time to develop the prosecutorial expertise required to handle complex drug cases, we are finding a wide variation in the success of the MDTPU's. Many of our best cases have come from some of these units, while others have not performed up to the expected level. The Narcotics Section will conduct regular reviews of the units, so that we can improve or eliminate those that are not performing well, and support with additional resources those with a record of, and management commitment to, prosecutorial success. On the whole, however, I believe that the Major Drug Trafficker Prosecution Units in many cities have proved effective, and they will continue to receive strong support from the top levels of the Department.

Support for the United States Attorneys involves other programs as well. Each year, in conjunction with DEA and the Department's Executive Office for United States Attorneys, the Narcotics Section trains 150 prosecutors and agents in the latest investigative and trial techniques. As DEA agents and Justice Department lawyers are increasingly being oriented toward prosecutions that reach the highest levels of the drug traffic, there has been a parallel emphasis on

sophisticated investigative approaches, such as tracking the flow of funds through complex documentary transactions, and the use of continuing-criticalenterprise and anti-racketeering statutes. This training, together with legal support from the Section, will help Assistant U. S. Attorneys and DEA agents to pursue these cases effectively. In addition, Mr. Williams has taken a number of steps within the Section to support its mission, including the designation of staff attorneys with responsibility for specific geographic regions and the publication of a highly informative newsletter for federal drug prosecutors.

A second major mission of the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section is to provide operational support for drug prosecutions. I should state here that the Department is committed to leaving principal responsibility for drug prosecutions with the United States Attorneys. Yet, as our experience demonstrates certain investigations and prosecutions, in particular, DEA's CENTAC operations, may demand more resources than are available in any office, or they may involve novel and intricate questions of law and procedures. We cannot afford a full-scale field operation with the limited staff of the Narcotics Section, but, where necessary, the Section will provide direct field support by assigning its experienced prosecutors to work with the United States Attorneys and DEA agents. This system has worked well in the past, and I expect it to continue with close attention being paid to demonstrated need and potential benefits.

In the past, this Department and other federal agencies have been criticized, not unjustifiably, for failing to coordinate effectively available resources to combat drug trafficking. Improvements have been needed, and I believe that we have made progress.

One issue that had been raised frequently over the years was the desirability of involving the capacity and expertise of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this area. In his first year in office, Attorney General Bell asked that this idea be explored in depth. As a result of that study, the Attorney General decided that consolidation of the FBI and DEA would not be advisable, but that joint FBI-DEA teams should operate on a pilot basis in three cities. The major objective set for the teams was to develop investigative targets of mutual interest, and to pool information and agent resources.

Recently Director Webster of the FBI and Administrator Bensinger have reviewed the results of this pilot effort and have concluded that these formally constituted teams are less effective than joint operations organized in the field to meet specific case needs. Both FBI and DEA will pursue this ad hoc approach, and I believe that it will produce positive results.

Administrator Bensinger will discuss in detail the work of Operation Banco in Southern Florida, and I believe that Banco is a prime example of the coordination that should be encouraged. In brief, it is an operation staffed jointly by agents from DEA, FBI, and other federal agencies, working with experienced prosecutors assigned full-time from the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, and involves the tracing of the flow of assets and funds associated with drug trafficking organizations in Florida. This approach combines the financial investigation expertise of the FBI and the drug law enforcement experience of DEA, with the integrating role of the prosecutors. The work has been difficult, but we expect it to result in the penetration of sophisticated trafficking organizations.

The task force effort has been only a small part of recent cooperation between the FBI and DEA. In addition, the FBI has appointed special narcoties coordinators in its field offices, and the field offices for both agencies report increased liaison and exchange of vital enforcement information.

Our cooperation reaches out to other federal agencies as well. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard has taken the lead in interdicting the movement of illicit drugs by sea. Also, we have seen dramatic improvements in cooperation between DEA and the Customs Service. With the creation of DEA in 1973, a significant amount of planning and management direction was needed to define the respective responsibilities of these agencies in the drug area. Those steps have been taken, and I believe that the successful relations that exist today can be tied directly to the efforts of Commissioner Chasen and Administrator Bensinger.

The close relationship with Customs is particularly important in view of the developing complexity of drug trafficking. As the Banco operation illustrates. tracking the financial flow of drug operations is a powerful law enforcement tool. One major facet of the tracking process is the use of information about currency transactions and foreign bank accounts gathered by the Customs Service under the Bank Secrecy Act. This information recently has been computerized, speeding access by investigators and prosecutors to this vital resource.