out regard to the place or the country in which they reside; secondly, that a law which does not provide for alien depen ents places a premium upon the employment of immigrants.

XIV. EMPLOYMENTS COVERED.

One of the principal purposes of compensation being to eliminate the technicalities and injustices of the old liability law, it is evident that an act awarding compensation for an injury in one industry and not for a similar injury in another industry not only leads to confusion but breeds a disrespect for the law. It must fall strangely upon the ears of a widow to say, "You and your children shall not receive compensation for the death of your husband, although your neighbor, another widow, and her children receive compensation, the reason being that your husband's work was not hazardous." In the words of one of the representatives of the Illinois Steel Co. before the commission at Chicago:

The workman would not be likely to understand why one man should receive compensation and another should not receive it.

This discrimination exists in the State of Washington, where the compensation act includes only certain specified hazardous employments. For instance, teamsters engaged in one kind of employment are entitled to compensation under the act, no matter how slight the injury, whereas teamsters in other employments are not so entitled, notwithstanding the fact that the injury may be serious. This unsatisfactory result is peculiar to a compensation law which seeks to classify hazardous occupations, and is in direct contrast with States in which all employments, except certain specified occupations, are included.

The practical difficulty of applying an act limited to certain socalled hazardous occupations was apparent to all who discussed this feature at the various conferences. It was well stated at Cleveland by the manager of the accident and pension department of the American Steel & Wire Co., when, in speaking of the original Illinois compensation act, which has been amended to cover practically all employments, he said:

My principal objection to the law in that State is that it attempts to define what may be hazardous and extra-hazardous occupations. In our Illinois plant we have accepted the act as a whole; but we do not like to be compelled to consult an attorney frequently to determine what may be called hazardous and extra-hazardous risks. It is very annoying to be compelled to consult counsel frequently for definitions-narrow definitions, as they may be termed to determine the particular place where the law governing such occupations applies.

Other quotations to the same effect might be added; in fact, it was generally the view of employers that a system of law that imposed a different liability in different industries for the same kind of an injury was impractical, confusing, and unjust. And that it also was expensive, as it necessitated the employer carrying two kinds of insurance, one to cover compensation cases and another to cover accidents falling under the liability law. Nowhere did the commission find workmen asking for such a distinction, as their general attitude is that all industrial accidents should be covered. (For a detailed statement of the State laws on this question, see the "Digest of laws" in Appendix No. 1.)

XV. INJURIES COVERED.

What injuries ought to be covered by a compensation act is a question involving considerable difference of opinion. Many employers contend that they ought not to be required to pay compensation for injuries due to acts of the injured employee in violation of rules or orders of the employer. The workmen, on the other hands contend that where the work is so complicated as to require rule, and orders, the injuries resulting from the violation of such rules and orders are really a part of the hazard of the business and should be compensated, as the workman's mind is primarily upon his work rather than upon his own safety, and that, while to deprive him of compensation for such injuries may be proper under a liability law based upon negligence, it has no place in a system of workmen's compensation in which fault on both sides is ignored. This question is much like that considered in the determination as to whether the employee should be permitted to retain the common-law remedies against the employer for negligence where the latter has violated the safety statute or a rule promulgated by State officials for the safety of working men. As appears in Section XVII, employers are generally opposed to the retention of common-law liability even where the employer has violated a safety statute or rule, and the trend of legislation and the attitude of workmen has been favorable to the acceptance of this position. The recently enacted New York statute deals with both of these questions in the same way. It grants immunity to the employer from common-law liability for his violation of safety statutes by making the compensation remedy the exclusive one and at the same time ignores the employee's violation of a rule or order of the employer by granting him compensation for injuries except where the injury is occasioned

by the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another, or where the injury results solely from the intoxication of the injured employee while on duty.

As will be seen from a digest of the laws (Appendix No. 1), a few of the States still retain the language of the English statute, which deprives employees of compensation where the injury was caused by "serious and willful misconduct" on their part, or this in substance. The industrial accident boards have given this language a narrow construction, and its full scope is yet to be determined by the courts. In considering the effect of this clause it must be borne in mind that the English statute, having been given a broad construction, and compensation, as a result, denied to many workmen for injuries resulting from the violation of orders and rules, was subsequently amended so as to prevent the application of the words "serious and willful misconduct" where the accident resulted in serious and permanent disablement.

INJURIES ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Another clause, limiting the right to compensation for injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment," which appears in most of the American statutes, has been the source of a great deal of litigation in Great Britain and has been the basis of a considerable

proportion of the questions that have been arbitrated before the American commissions. Among those which have arisen under this clause in Great Britain and the United States are, whether employees are entitled to compensation for injuries in going to and from places of employment, for injuries at mealtime, doing forbidden acts, obeying unauthorized orders, acts in emergency, saving life or property, practical joking and playing, assault and battery by fellow workmen, malicious injuries, acts of God, injuries to commercial travelers and collectors, while receiving pay, and going after tools. Other cases might be named, but these are illustrative of the questions that arise under this provision.

So far neither of the above exceptions to the right to compensation have caused much litigation or controversy in the various Ŝtates.

WHAT ARE ACCIDENTAL INJURIES.

The question also arises as to whether the nature of the particular injury is such as to entitle the workman to compensation. This brings up such questions as occupational diseases, defective medical treatment, sunstroke, frostbites, hernia, sprains, overexertion, heart disease, pneumonia, mental shock or fright, insanity, aggravation of preexisting disease, gas poisoning, blood poisoning, and erysipelas. Most of the statutes limit the right to compensation to personal injuries "by accident." Massachusetts and Michigan do not use the words "by accident," but the statutes of these States read "personal injuries arising out of" the employment, and consequently an effort has been made in these States to reach certain occupational diseases arising under circumstances that might not be called "by accident,' and yet alleged to arise out of and in the course of employment.

In Michigan the board has given compensation for occupational disease. (Case of Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Works; opinion by Industrial Accident Board of Michigan, under date of Oct. 28, 1913.)

A member of the Industrial Accident Board of Massachusetts said: Turning for a moment to the subject of occupational diseases, dusty trades, industrial poisons, and occupational diseases are responsible for an annual loss in the United States of $750,000,000 through needless diseases and disablement, and Massachusetts has its proportion of this enormous waste. The great majority of wage earners spend at least one-third of every 24 hours in the factory, mill, or shop. Conditions in any of them are such that the worker is unable to attain fullest efficiency by reason of the conditions which surround him, and this has a direct bearing upon the number of accidents or the quantity of the output per worker. All this imposes an additional burden on the taxpayer and increased expenditures in our cities and towns, in the departments of health, charity, education, and police. It has a direct bearing upon the cost of production, and it vitally affects the pocketbook nerve of the employer through high insurance-premium rates under the workmen's compensation act, through a diminished output and a lack of efficiency, due to insanitary conditions, overcrowded and ill-planned workshops, and a lowering of the vitality of the workers, so that they are incapable of producing the best results, thus limiting the output and increasing its cost.

The Commonwealth has, through its general court, passed legislation that will bring these conditions to an end. In order to do so effectively and without the employment of harsh methods, Massachusetts depends upon the hearty and loyal cooperation of both employers and employees.

This commission found a general feeling among workmen in favor of the granting of compensation for well-defined occupational diseases.

XVI. CONTRACTORS' LIABILITY TO EMPLOYEES OF SUBCONTRACTORS.

In those States in which contractors are not liable by statute to pay compensation to employees of subcontractors a good deal of confusion arises, as quite frequently an employee does not know that he is not working for the principal contractor. He sees notices posted showing the principal employer to be under the compensation act, but when injured he receives nothing, owing to the fact that he is working for a subcontractor. This difference, if permitted to continue, may lead to a subletting of the dangerous parts of any work. The justice of making the principal contractor liable to all workmen was generally admitted; in fact, their attitude on this question is another indication of the broad way in which employers are meeting the spirit of compensation laws. An official of the builders' exchange in one of the States visited took the position that men might refuse to work for a subcontractor who had not accepted the compensation act, and that the labor unions should insist upon the acceptance of the act by subcontractors. Some employers have written us that they always require a subcontractor to come under the law. One contractor wrote that in accepting bids he takes the man who has accepted the compensation act, even though his bid was higher. In Massachusetts an electrical contractor stated: "I was obliged to accept (the act) by general contractors insisting upon it before placing contracts with us." The result has been that the trend of legislation is toward making the contractor liable for compensation to the employees of subcontractors where the latter have not accepted the compensation act.

California, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, and Nevada have legislated upon this subject and have made the principal contractor liable to the employees of subcontractors. Minnesota and Nebraska have not gone so far, but limit their statutes to provisions preventing fraudulent schemes to avoid liability by letting out work on contract.

Evidence was offered the commission that such provisions were necessary. A representative of the Structural Iron Workers' Association in Michigan said:

I know where a large number of men have sustained injuries in connection with their work in this State, and after receiving such injuries were very much disappointed in discovering they had been working for a subcontractor instead of the principal. They have a very good compensation law in the State of Ohio. I believe if the State of Michigan had a law similar thereto it would give more satisfaction. There is a great dissatisfaction with the law as it exists in this State. We find that many of our contractors evade the law in this respect. Unless the law is compulsory as far as requiring the employers to come under its provisions, I do not think it is of much advantage to the workmen. It is true, as has been stated here, that many men employed in shops and elsewhere are not familiar with the provisions of the law. I think a copy of the law should be posted where men are employed, so that every employee may become familiar with the requirements of the law. I think this feature of the law should be carefully considered and the men employed under a subcontractor should be protected.

A representative of the hoisting engineers said:

In speaking for the hoisting engineers in their dealings with subcontractors I will say that 75 per cent of our men work under subcontractors and are therefore not protected by the compensation law. Our organization would recommend that the law be amended whereby the general contractor be made responsible for accidents that may happen under the subcontractor.

The president of a building trade employers' association thus gave his views:

We have been trying to educate our contractors with reference to the advisability and benefit of coming under the law. Would it not be for the advantage of the workman, for instance, to see that the man for whom he is working is under the provisions of the compensation act? He should see that he would be properly protected before he enters the employ of any contractor. I believe that the principal contractor and the workman have a common interest whereby they should see that the subcontractors come under the act. I think the interests of the contractor and the employee are identical. The principal employer who is under the provisions of the act demonstrates by so doing that he is anxious that the men working for him should be amply protected, and therefore he avails himself of the benefit of the act, not for himself alone, but also for the benefit and welfare of the workman and his family. It may be that the subcontractor may avail himself of not coming under the law be cause of the fact he will save the money required in connection with the necessity of availing himself of the expense incurred by going under the act. For instance, in bidding on a piece of work in competition with a man who is under the provisions of the act he may say that he can bid cheaper or lower than the other man who is under the act, because he is not obliged to pay the expense of being under the act. I can not understand why a workman should not interest himself sufficiently to see before he enters on his work that the man or firm by whom he is employed is under the workmen's compensation act. I think it is to his own interest to acquaint himself on this point.

XVII. EXCLUSIVENESS OF REMEDY.

When workmen's compensation acts were first written in this country, they retained the old system of employers' liability and added the new scheme of workmen's compensation, so that, after an accident, an employee could take his choice of accepting the compensation or suing the employer under the employers' liability law. Of course, in those cases in which there was no liability, the employee would naturally accept the compensation, while in cases where he felt that negligence had occurred he would pursue his remedy under the liability law.

The commission found that one of the prime considerations that induced employers to accept compensation acts was a desire to get away from the old system of litigation, waste, and uncertainty, and they objected for this reason to any retention of the old system. One of the early statutes was that of New Hampshire, which gave the employee his option after an accident as to which remedy he would pursue. This act has been accepted by only 21 employers in that State. One large employer from New Hampshire wrote:

We believe that the fact that an employee in New Hampshire has a right to elect after an accident whether he will accept compensation or pursue his common-law right of action is an exceedingly great detriment and deprives the act of much of its intended value. We take it that one object of a workmen's compensation act is to render definite and easily ascertainable the amount to which an injured employee is entitled, thereby Bettling the matter in his mind and in the mind of his employer and rendering unneces sary prolonged controversy or litigation. In as many cases as heretofore, the matter resolves itself into the same drawn-out and troublesome controversy that under the common law is followed upon the occurrence of accidents in mills and factories.

Another large manufacturer in New Hampshire wrote the commission:

In reference to our experience with the employers' liability and workmen's compensation law, I would say that this company has not as yet decided to accept this law as it at present stands. The objection that we find is the section that gives the employee the privilege to elect after an accident whether he will accept compensation or pursue the common-law rights. As you get replies from other manufacturers throughout the State, we believe you will find a great many who have taken the same view of the law, which indicates that with this one change the law would prove to be workable.

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