An action pending in the superior court of Cincinnati, on and before November 1, 1893, and in which a judgment was entered on June 20, 1894, ten days before the law of May 16, 1894, took effect, cannot properly be appealed to the circuit court, and a motion to dismiss such appeal will be sustained and the case stricken from the docket. Thompson v. Building Assn. 68.
Where an appeal has been perfected, and the court has acquired jurisdiction of the parties, but no pleadings having been filed within the rule days for filing pleadings in such cases, the defendant may either move to dismiss the appeal or file his answer, asking for judgment upon the answer, for failure of plaintiff to file his petition. Parker v. Haight. 609. A petition on appeal may be amended. Bausch v. McConnel.
An appeal bond from the probate court to "the appellate court" is vacated when the judgment which follows in the common pleas is reversed and a different judgment rendered by the circuit court. Miller v. Ryan. 319. APPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY
Where a railroad has taken possession of land for its right of way without the owner's consent, such property belongs to the owner up to the time he tenders the deed, and, if, at the time of tendering the deed, he elected to hold the company for the land and receive for it the compensation due him for its value, his cause of action arose by that election, and he had the right to bring and maintain his suit, and damages should be awarded of the date when the title of property passed, that is, for the value of the land to the owner at that time. & L. E. Ry. Co. v. Fries et al. 297. In such case it is error to allow testimony to be offered as to the value of the land when the railroad went into possession, in that it was offered and directed to a point of time prior to the time when the cause of action accrued. Such testimony should have been confined to the time when the deed was delivered. Ib.
It is error to refuse to charge the jury that in such case plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages to land not taken by the railroad, but
is restricted to compensation for Ib. land taken.
In determining the market value of lands sought to be appropriated by a city for water-works, the jury are precluded from considering its enhanced value, from the fact that it was adapted for a reservoir, which was the very purpose for which it was being appropriated, and the jury is not permitted to make any use of the fact that such lands may have increased in value by the proposal or construction of the work for which it is to be taken. Gibson v. Norwalk. 6.
When a municipal corporation seeks to appropriate private property under sec. 2235, Rev. Stat., as amended (91 O. L., 127), the mortgagees of such property are not necessary parties to be notified of the resolution before the passage of the same. Put-in-Bay v. Stimmel.
Where plaintiff, a municipal corporation, seeks to enjoin a party from cutting trees on certain lands, which plaintiff alleges in its petition it has commenced proceedings to appropriate, and defendant answered denying the allegations in the petition and also sets up a crosspetition asking for a counter injunction enjoining plaintiffs from prosecuting their aforesaid appropriation proceedings: Held, that defendants could not maintain a cross-petition enjoining plaintiff from prosecuting another suit in the same court for any reasons or grounds which might have been set up as a defense to the appropriation proceedings. Put-in-Bay v. Webb et 478.
of ordinary prudence to believe in the guilt of the person arrested, and if the facts show that to be the case, then there is probable cause for arrest. Britton v. Granger. 182.
Where an officer finds one violating a law or ordinance, and then and there arrests him, and thereafter files an affidavit charging him with the offense he was found committing, the prosecution begins with the filing of the affidavit and not with the arrest. If such officer, before making the affidavit, takes the advice of an attorney-at-law, upon full and fair disclosure of the facts and follows his advice in making an affidavit, and prosecuting the person SO charged, the officer is entitled to the benefit of such consultation and advice, in determining whether he had reasonable or probable cause for the prosecution.
Where an affidavit charging a person with the commission of a crime, describes the accused by initials merely, and a warrant is issued upon such affidavit, such warrant is not void for that reason, the same being regular in form in all respects to constitute it a valid warrant for the arrest of the accused and the officer having such warrant to execute is clothed with the authority to make the arrest. State v. Miller. 552.
In attempting the arrest of one accused with the commission of a crime, who is found expecting the officer and is armed with deadly weapons to resist the arrest, it is the right of such officer to use necessary strategy to disarm the accused before producing the warrant.
Where an owner of premises abutting upon a street leases them with the provision that the lessee, in addition to annual rental, is to pay all taxes and improvement assessments, and the street is afterwards paved when a street railway secures a franchise in said street,
and in return agrees to repay the assessments that were made for paving, such money belongs and should be paid to the property owner. Harkness v. Schiely. 108.
The street assessment on a triangular corner lot should not exceed its greatest breadthwise frontage. Thompkins et al. v. Village of Norwood. 416.
An assessment for paving a street and for building a side walk adjoining the lot is an assessment for two separate improvements, and there being no statute limiting the amount of an assessment, or percentage of an assessment for two different improvements, such as the above, therefore, there is no limitation which will render either invalid because the sum of the two shall exceed twenty-five per cent. of the value of the lot. Hunt v. Hunter. 495.
The twenty-five per cent. limitation, as found in sec. 2271, applies to the construction of sidewalks, and, therefore, where a sidewalk is constructed and an assessment is levied, such assessment shall not exceed twenty-five per cent. of the value of such lot at the time the sidewalk was built.
The claim for damages in an action for breach of a contract of marriage, is a debt on demand aris ing upon contract, within the mean- ing of sec. 5521, Rev. Stat., and plaintiff may have an attachment on the ground that defendant is a non. resident. Albert v. Armstrong.
705. Refusal of a justice to discharge an attachment cannot be reviewed on error when there was no excep- tion to such ruling and no bill of exceptions taken, setting out the evi- dence submitted. Bradley v. Wacker. 565.
It is error for a justice for failing to discharge an attachment, where the only evidence was the affi- davit of plaintiff averring the grounds of attachment, and defend- ant's affidavit denying those aver- ments. In such case the burden of proof is on plaintiff to prove by other evidence that his affidavit is true. Ib.
Where an attachment has been granted against an unmarried man, his subsequent marriage will not affect the vested rights of plaintiff, nor will the attachment be dissolved on these grounds.
shown a disposition to have sexual intercourse, was properly excluded: First, because of the remoteness of the time. Second, because evidence of mere opportunities without evi- dence of disposition also to commit such acts was immaterial. Ely v Ott. 677.
Reviewing court is not author- ized to disturb the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the judgment required to be paid by the reputed father for the mainte-
nance of the bastard child is exces sive, unless it shall appear that there has been an abuse of the dis- cretion vested in said trial court, and in this case the court refuses to disturb a judgment of $1,300. Ib. BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-
The failure of a justice to transmit a bill of exceptions to the clerk of the common pleas within ten days from its allowance, is not ground for striking such bill from the files. Borsodi v. State.
A bill of exceptions must be in the hands of opposite counsel on or before the fortieth day after the overruling of the motion for a new trial, and in the hands of the judge for his allowance on or before the forty-fifth day after the overruling of such motion. Dwelle v. Wilson. 610.
There is no provision for taking a bill of exceptions to a matter con sidered alone by the judge, therefore, it is impossible to take a bill of exceptions to the consideration by the judge of the question as to whether he shall sign another bill of exceptions, consisting of facts Ib. occurring in a trial in court. BILLS AND NOTES-
No action can be maintained against the maker of a promissory note, which is barred by the statute of limitations, on a verbal promise to pay, made after the bar had arisen the consideration of the promise being the original and valid debt. Stephenson v. Line.
Where a person draws a number of bills and endorses a number of notes, signing his own name thereto, with the word "agent" added, such person is personally liable upon such bills and notes. Barnhisel v. Bank. 535.
Where a note on its face is barred by the statute of limitations, and a payment endorsed thereon is relied upon to bring it within the exception provided by sec. 4292, the
Under sec. 6830, there are two ways by which the crime of black- mail may be committed. One is to accuse of a crime, punishable by law, or of immoral conduct, etc., with in- tent to extort or gain chattel, money or valuable security. The other, to knowingly send or deliver any letter or writing, or a matter of printed communication with or without a name, or with any letter, mark or designation, accusing or threatening to accuse of any crime punishable by law, etc., or to do injury to the person or property of any person, with the intent above stated. Jones v. State. 716. An affidavit filed with a mayor, charging a person with having com- Imitted the crime of murder, with the intent thereby to secure chattel, money or valuable security, is suffi- cient to sustain an indictment under sec. 6830. lb.
It is not necessary, in such in dictment based on the filing of an affidavit with the mayor, accusing a person of committing a crime, to allege or set forth the warrant or its service. Ib.
Proof that the warrant issued on an affidavit, charging a person with the crime of murder, was com- municated to accused, or sent or delivered with the purpose of having it communicated to accused, under circumstances which rendered it probable that the same would be so communicated, with intent alleged to the indictment, will not justify conviction of the crime of black- mail and it is error in the court to charge that this proof, upon failure to prove the filing of the affidavit, will warrant conviction.
Where certain lands have been platted in lots which the owner con- veys by lot numbers, it matters not whether their boundary lines are correct or whether he gave entirely wrong lengths to all of them, as the intent is manifest to convey all the land, which intent cannot be overcome by any theory that may be subsequently discovered. Ib.
If there is a shortage on a plat in which the owner intended to plat all his property, it is the well set- tled rule, in this state, that such shortage will be divided as near as possible pro rata between the owners of the whole. Ib.
Where a person purchasing a ticket from a railroad company enti tling the purchaser to be carried from one station to another on the line of its road, and the purchaser, after having inquired of the ticket agent, is told to take a certain train, which, according to the schedule of the railroad company, does not stop at his destination, and as a conse- quence he is ejected from the train
by the conductor, such passenger has a cause of action against the railway to recover damages as for a tort, and not merely for a breach of contract. Reynolds v. Railway Co. 501.
The contract of a common carrier is not that he will ascertain the owner of goods, and deliver them to him, but he will deliver the goods according to directions; that is, at the place of destination, and to the party designated to receive them or to his order. Southern Ex. Co. v. Oskamp, Nolting & Co. 417.
Where two men of like name live in the same town, and one orders goods from a dealer, who ships them in the common name, simply; in the absence of notice to the contrary, the party giving the order is, in contemplation of law, the one to whom they are sent. Conse- quently, delivery to him will be a due execution in that particular of the contract of carriage, although the consignor believed the order was from, and intended the goods to go to the other man. Ib.
The result is not varied by the circumstance that the purchaser fraudulently assumed the name used in buying, provided it is that by which he was known at the place of destination, unless negligence be shown; and this, the mere fact that delivery was not refused by the carrier, until inquiry could be made of the shipper as to which party the goods were designed for, fails to establish. Ib. CEMETERIES-
Brothers and sisters are the next of kin, under the act of May, 1894 (91 O. L., 231), providing for the removal of bodies from ceme- teries, but where they are minors, the parents are next of kin and en- titled to make the application. State v. Shonhoft. 716.
CHARGE OF COURT-
It is not error for a court to refuse to send its charge to the jury, where there was no request made of the court to reduce it to writing, though it had voluntarily reduced it to writing, therefore the parties were not entitled to demand, as of right, that the charge should be sent to the jury, along with the papers in the case. Railroad v. Bishop. 73.
The warranty in a contract for the sale of glass survives the acceptance of the goods, and it is,
therefore, error for the court to charge that if the goods were re ceived and used after the purchaser saw, or had an opportunity to see and know their condition, that he could not afterwards be heard to complain and recover damages of the vendor because the glass was not of the quality called for by the contract. Tillyer et al. v. Glass Co. 209.
In an action for damages, in- cluding physician's fees, for injuries sustained by plaintiff, a married woman, it is error to charge the jury that plaintiff's right to recover such fees depended upon the fact "whether she herself is or is not liable to pay these expenses." Toledɔ v. Duffy. 113.
Such fees cannot be recovered where the evidence clearly shows that there was no employment by plaintiff of the physician, but that instead the husband was clearly liable and it was therefore the duty of the court to have directed the jury that the fees for the physician's services could not be recovered by the plaintiff in this case as against the city.
Where defendant, charged with shooting another with intent to kill, pleads a justification on the ground of self-defense, it is error to charge that the person who assaulted him must have come at him "malici ously and with every manifestation of endeavoring to kill the person assaulted, and that he was prepared and manifested the fact that he was able to carry out his malicious assault. It is only under such cir cumstances that the person assaulted may use the force necessary, without retreating," to kill the assailant. Jordan v. State. 123.
That the jury must be satisfied from a preponderance of the evi dence that the defendant "used no more force than was necessary to repel the assailant," or than "was reasonably necessary to save his life, or his person from great bodily harm."
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