Two developments during World War II transformed those potentialities to realities by 1946. Filleting and freezing facilities were expanded greatly in Canada, Iceland, and other northern nations to provide food fish for the Allies. Liberal governmental subsidies helped their fishing fleets to grow. Moreover, price inflation cut the ad valorem equivalent of the American tariff from a level of 24.7 percent in 1939 to 9.3 percent in 1946. Foreign producers rushed to take advantage of the favorable situation. Imports of ground fish fillets alone were five and a half times as large in 1948 as they had been in 1940.

Thoroughly alarmed by the flood of postwar imports, representatives of the New England industry have visited regularly in Washington to seek greater protection. Interests in the industry which have never seen eye to eye on any other problem have pooled their resources to try to set an import quota on foreign fillets of about 43 million pounds annually. So far their efforts have succeeded only in maintaining present restrictions from further cuts under reciprocal trade agreements. The evidence which they have presented to consional committees, however, shows the vulnerability of the New England industry.

New England's principal foreign competitors have several important cost advantages. They are closer to their fishing grounds and can land fresher, higher quality fish; their prices for landed fish are appreciably below American prices; and their labor costs in processing fillets are substantially lower. Foreign fishermen can reach the fishing grounds in as little as 3 to 6 hours. The New England fleet, in many instances, sails from 3 to 5 days to get supplies. On the larger American vessels, trips last 9 to 12 days. Foreign dealers pay 40 to 50 percent less for ground fish than New England dealers pay. Shore labor in Canada, Newfoundland, and Iceland receives wage rates from 35 to 60 an hour less than prevailing rates in New England. Labor productivity is as high in foreign shore plants as it is at the New England ports.

Despite their greater distance from American markets, foreign concerns do not face an important disadvantage in the cost of transporting their fishery products. Water shipment rates are low, and rail rates from the Maritime Provinces to the Midwest are about the same as those paid by New England dealers.

The effects of the foreign cost advantages are accentuated by present world monetary conditions. The competing nations are anxious to maximize their earnings of dollar exchange. They are subsidizing their fishing industries in

der to increase their dollar-earning power. New England fishermen, vessel Aers, and dealers will have to achieve greater efficiency and develop their market if they are to meet the vigorous foreign competition based on natural vantages and planned objectives.

sternal conflict

Two unions represent most of the workers in the major New England fishing *** The Seafood Workers' Union, affiliated with the International Long& remen's Association, A. F. of L., has locals in each port and contracts with tear y all dealers and processors using shore help. The Atlantic Fishermen's son, affiliated with the Seafarers' International Union, A. F. of L., represents na.lv all fishermen in Boston, Gloucester, and New Bedford. It has been ganizing fishermen in Portland and Rockland, Maine, since 1946. The Seafood Workers' Union and the dealers have enjoyed comparatively ea eful relations. Few strikes or lockouts have occurred, although company ☎tais in Boston and Gloucester have complained about union restrictions on «factivity. Both sides have tried to keep discord at a minimum. The fishermen's organization has had a much more stormy record. Since its formation in 1937, it has had repeated difficulties with the dealers in each of the Massachusetts ports. The underlying basis for the conflict has been the denendence of fishermen's earnings on the lay system of wage payments. The fabermen have agitated continuously for higher prices and for "fair-weighing" methods to improve the value of their catch. They have also imposed catch restrictions calculated to yield the most favorable prices and incomes.

Dealer-fishermen controversies.--The worst relations between the fishermen and dealers have prevailed at Boston, where most of the vessels are dealerowned The groups have clashed both as buyers and sellers and as employers and employees.

Relations between the fishermen's union and the association of dealer-vessel owners have deteriorated progressively. The three contracts negotiated between 1969 and 1946 were signed only after aggregate losses in fishing time of more than 13 months. Since the last agreement expired in 1947, t' e parties have not initiated negotiations for a new one. Operations continued under the old contract only because each group hesitated to insist on changes which both knew won.d almost certainly precipitate a bitter labor dispute when the port could ill afford it.

Controversies over the process of price determination on the New England Fish Exchange have continued apace. The fishermen have argued that the dealers violate the rules of the exchange daily in their zeal to obtain fish at cheaper prices. They also disagree violently with the rules themselves.

The fish-resale provision, or sellover, is the fishermen's outstanding grievance. This arrangement allows a dealer to refuse to take any more fish after a certain quantity has been removed from the vessel, if he feels that the fish are no longer first quality. If the dealer is successful in his stand, the fish still in the vessel must be “sold over" or auctioned a second time. The resale nearly always results in lower prices for the remainder of the fish on the boat.

In practice, the fishermen always challenge the dealer's quality protest and maintain that the fish are still No. 1 quality. An arbitration board consisting of the dealer, the fishermen's representative, and any mutually acceptable third person willing to serve is then invoked to settle the dispute. If the dealer and the fishermen cannot agree upon a third party, the exchange manager determines the quality. The fishermen lack faith in the exchange manager's decisions because he is indirectly an employee of the dealers and because he operates a supply house which sells materials to the dealers,

Perhaps the principal reason why the sellover presents so many difficulties is that its use appears to depend more upon the state of the market than upon the physical qualities of the fish. Dealers are most likely to question quality when demand is only fair and supplies of fish are large. It appears, for example, that the same quality fish may be top quality on Monday when supply is short in re1ation to demand and second quality on Tuesday when the opposite market conditions exist Dealers seldom asked for the sellover when competition for fish was extremely keen during World War II. That experience strengthened the fishermen's belief that the sellover is a price-cutting device "built into the market mechanism" so that the dealers may evade responsibility for the bids which they originally made.

The dealers are equally insistent that the sellover is essential to the maintenance of their competitive position. They claim that the incomes of fishermen It would then be impossible, would be lower if the sellover were eliminated they say, for the dealers to bid extra amounts for the higher quality fish.

Despite its volatile character, the sellover seems to be a desirable feature of the Boston market. It promotes emphasis on quality in the primary market. In highly perishable food operations, a market should stress anything which improves quality. Nevertheless, changes should be made to eliminate the issues which the sellover has raised. They ought to be made soon, for the sellover difficulties are symptomatic of the turbulent industrial relations in the fishing port of Boston.

The sellover dispute interferes with cooperation between Boston's fishermen and dealers on all other matters. Since mid-1949, for example, the fishermen's union has been urging the return of some of the 12 trawlers sold to the United States Army early in 1949 for use in the German North Sea fisheries. The union argues that the Army has found the trawlers unsuited for North Sea use and that they should be returned to increase Boston's catch. The dealers and vessel owners retort that more vessels are not needed. Their solution is fuller operation of the present fleet, with less shore time for fishermen between trips. The fishermen in return state that they see no reason for making more frequent trips as long as the dealers refuse to consider changes in the sellover rules. The discussion bogs down in argument at that point.

The fishermen's union and the independent boatowners in Gloucester and New Bedford have enjoyed fairly harmonious relations. Both have the basic common interest of maximizing the value of the catch; both have reasonably adequate information about the economic limitations of the other. Generally, the vessel owners have watched with interest the fishermen's attempts to increase the prices of fish landed.

The fishermen set up selling rooms as their first move. They hoped to eliminate price controversies and promote competition among the fish dealers. On the whole, competition for catches has increased, but controversies over the proper value of the catch have continued.

At Gloucester, disputes have centered about weight allowances and weighing methods. The fishermen's local has forced the dealers to use de-icing machines in unloading the catch. The dealers now submit samples to a joint committee representing the crew and the dealer as the vessel is unloaded. The committee determines a fair weight deduction for ice and trash. Even that agreement has not eliminated controversy between the parties over weight determination. The fishermen still feel that some dealers' scales weigh short. An impartial arbitrator suggested the use of bonded weighers. The union secured them, but the dealers refused to buy fish tallied by the bondsmen.

At New Bedford, the union has sought to keep the dealers from paying dock prices for fish which are lower than those previously bid in the selling room, Some dealers tried to lower prices by several cents a pound on the ground that not all fish delivered were first quality. To meet that problem, the union has employed a sales contract which the dealer and the captain sign in the selling room. Nevertheless, at least one dealer has attempted to cut prices at his dock even after signing the selling-room contract.

The fishermen reacted in the same way at both Gloucester and New Bedford. They either refused to sell to recalcitrant dealers in the selling rooms, or they tied up the boats. Both courses of action were costly. The first left fish to deteriorate in the boats while the parties argued the second reduced the number of fishing trips. In their present circumstances, neither port can afford to continue these costly conflicts. The elimination of basic differences between fishermen and dealers is a prerequisite for improving the competitive position of both groups.

Restrictive union policies.-Union restrictions upon the kind and amount of fish caught are as old as the fishing industry itself, for fishermen have always sought to land only those fish which the public favors. The members of the Atlantic Fishermen's Union have sought to systematize such regulations since the organization of the union. They have specified either the type and quantity of fish which they will land, or they have limited the total catch indirectly through restrictions on the amount of fishing.

Direct controls were by far the more common before June 1947. Whenever the fishermen felt that a particular species of fish was too plentiful in relation to demand, they simply voted to limit the quantity which could be landed per trip. That system had to be abandoned, however, when the Massachusetts courts enjoined the dumping of fish at sea and the refusal to sell fish for less than a stipulated price as conspiring to prevent the sale of fresh fish at its fair market value when offered for sale.

They

7- fishermen retained their fair-price concept and turned to indirect methods structing the catch. They have adopted limits on trip length where such etan seemed desirable, and they have also developed the practice of spending ≈2 days to a week ashore between trips. Since these regulations are volunin restrictions upon the work the fishermen are willing to do, they seem to be The effects of restrictive policies cannot be measured with precision. 5 Nowever, raise costs of operation considerably. Overhead constitutes a high ~rtion of the cost of running fishing vessels. Policies which reduce their iuti e use or cut the volume of fish landed must result in higher unit costs r «duction. Moreover, it is not true that the reduced intensity of fishing t from these policies is necessarily very favorable to conservation. The rictions do not always reduce the catch of scarce species, nor have they part of a systematic conservation program. It seems clear that restrice union policies are a distinct competitive handicap to the New England Ang industry as a whole.

A CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM

We have outlined the serious problems which confront New England's prina fshing ports. Unless those problems are solved, the ports cannot maintain rstanding as major fishing centers of the United States.

Fishermen, vessel owners, and dealers must realize that the problems of the * England fishing industry are of mutual concern and not just the responsi*y of one group. Moreover, the solution to their difficulties depends largely 1; n constructive action which they themselves must initiate and carry out. Urgent Need for Cooperation

The abandonment of internal conflict is the fundamental requirement for the *.* are prosperity of the New England fishing ports. The industry cannot afford vinity. Cooperation has become the price each interest group must pay for *ngre security. The solid foundation of enlightened self-interest should force - development of cooperation. Each segment of the industry has much to gain 1. ; a great deal to offer to make a joint effort successful.

The various groups undoubtedly recognize that all interests must work together *e indstry is to be prosperous in the future. Spokesmen for each group have festifed to this, either in private or at congressional hearings in Washington. No group has been sufficiently willing to compromise its own position, however, -","1st the cooperation of the other interests for the good of the entire industry. The fishermen, through their union, can remove those restrictions upon catch, *ye of fishing, and length of fishing trips which clearly raise the costs of vessel teration. They can impose upon themselves higher standards for handling fish 1 ∞a. They can adopt a systematic program for supplying men to keep fishing tessels in reasonably continuous use.

Vessel owners can insure that the facilities for handling and storing fish 'ward their boats are adequate and sanitary. They can minimize breakdowns and sinkings of vessels at sea by insisting on high standards of care and main

The dealers can take steps to settle the price and weight-determination diffities in the Massachusetts ports. In Boston, certain features of the sellover shonid be changed. At the very least, the dealers should agree to a final arbiter fish quality who is an outside agent acceptable to both the dealers and the He should be paid jointly by both parties. Such a move by the dealers ght lead to negotiations concerning further desirable changes in the exchange and in the method of conducting the sellover itself. In Gloucester and New Piford, the dealers could demonstrate their good faith by refraining from attempts to circumvent the established market system. Their bids in the selling *** ms should reflect their real estimates of fish value, not figures to be reduced en the fish are delivered.

The dealers, in cooperation with the Seafood Workers' Union, should install a seť policing system of quality inspection for processing plants in each port. This would improve conditions in some shops, particularly the smaller ones. It won'd help New England fishing products to live up to standards claimed for then and to meet foreign quality competition.

If each group in the industry would take the Indicated steps, a better foundation would be Inid for cooperative action. Equally important, the industry as a whole would benefit directly from the lower cost and higher quality product that would result. None of the suggested changes would cost much, but all would require sharp changes in attitude.

The Fish-Scarcity Problem

While the scarcity of fish is the immediate concern of the fishermen and vessel owners, its successful solution is of the utmost importance to the dealers dependent on the fishery. Two immediate steps should be taken to meet this problem.

Vessel owners should first of all adopt the mesh-net and legal-size recommendations for haddock conservation proposed by the Fish and Wildlife Service to reduce the uneconomic destruction of baby haddock before they grow to marketable size. Further, all interests in the industry should impress upon the Federal Government their genuine interest in the earliest possible activation of the international conservation treaty. These moves would be convincing evidence that the industry is anxious to cooperate in developing the technical and biological knowledge of the fisheries. The industry can also help to accumulate the information required for a comprehensive conservation program covering redfish and yellowtail, as well as other species in danger of depletion.

Secondly, the regional industry should initiate a research program, founded jointly by the Fishermen's Union and by the dealer and vessel-owner organizations, to cooperate with the Fish and Wildlife Service in discovering profitable uses for fish which are now abandoned or under-exploited. At present, only eight of the eighty or more available species of edible fish are fully exploited. Furthermore, the variety of uses for inedible fish and waste taken from North Atlantic waters seems to be almost unlimited. In the last year alone, a huge new "trash-fishing" industry has developed. Fish unsuited for eating are in great demand for the production of fish meal, fish oil, and fish solubles. More than 70 million pounds of such fish were landed at the main New England ports in 1949. The industry cannot afford to leave a major development like that to chance, as it did in the redfish expansion of the 1930's.

The research program might also encourage and foster the adoption of the latest technological developments for catching, handling, and processing fishery products. One such recent innovation is the freezing of whole fish at sea for later thawing and processing ashore. Fish and Wildlife research has reached a preliminary conclusion that this process is practical and advisable. It will have revolutionary effects when and if it can be adopted by the New England industry. The fishing range of New England vessels will have wider limits if the dangers of spoilage are eliminated. Equally important, it will allow the landing of whole fish in frozen form, with all waste available for New England's expanding by-products industries.

The Federal Government might give financial assistance to such a program, as the Secretaries of State and Commerce and the United States Tariff Commission recommended in 1949. The Fish and Wildlife Service already has a research vessel, the Albatross III, and several competent fishery biologists who are experimenting with freezing fish at sea. The industry has several sources of financial assistance, therefore, and should not defer action on such a project. It would represent the first coordinated research effort sponsored by the industry in its long history.

Expansion of the Consumer Market

As important as are the other elements in a forward-looking program for the New England fisheries, none is more vital than expansion of the consumer market. Here lies the answer to the problem of more income for the industry and, In part, to foreign competition.

Intensified programs to educate the American housewife in the use of fishery products are badly needed. They might be sponsored by New England interests in cooperation with the present efforts of the Fish and Wildlife Service. Consumer surveys have indicated that the average American homemaker is not aware of the variety of fishery products, the nutritional qualities of fish, and the varied methods of preparing fish.

There is a huge slumbering demand for fresh and frozen fish which could be awakened by more widespread education about fishery products, by persuasive advertising, and by attractive packaging. Those activities will cost money, and It is to the interest of each group in the industry to share the burden through its respective organizations. Joint promotion could emphasize the virtues of eating New England fish and supplement the advertising of individual firms. Furthermore, the Fish and Wildlife Service might increase its fish-cookery demonstrations throughout the country.