Salt Lake City et al. v. Salt Lake City W. & E. P. Co. et al., 54 Utah 10. and what little of the pumped water did flow into the canals of the other users was merely incidental, and hence has no bearing upon what the decision in this proceeding should be. The appellant in 1914 did, however, use more water in its canal than it was entitled to from the gravity flow. It, however, did not obtain such excess from the water that was pumped by the applicant from Utah Lake in response to any demand made by the appellant for water. The facts respecting the excess water used by appellant for the year 1914, the only year in question here, are as follows: The appellant applied to Salt Lake City for permission to use a certain quantity of water to which said city was entitled, but was not using, during the whole or a portion of the irrigation season of 1914. Pursuant to said application, the city engineer wrote the following letter to the water commissioner, whose duty it was to distribute the water among the several users, to wit: "July 15, 1914. "Mr. J. Fewson Smith, Commissioner, Salt Lake City, Utah-Dear Sir: You are hereby authorized and instructed to deliver to the South Jordan Canal Company sixty (60) second feet of water, or any part thereof, belonging to the Jordan and Salt Lake City Canal, that may be desired by them, during the remainder of this irrigation season, unless otherwise notified by me." The commissioner distributed sixty second feet of water belonging to Salt Lake City to the appellant. Salt Lake City, during all of the time that said water was distributed to appellant, was entitled to said 60 second feet of water as part of the gravity flow, and hence no part of the sixty second feet appellant received from Salt Lake City, and no part of the water that was distributed to it through its canal for the year 1914, was pumped water within the purview of the decree as we construe it. It is manifest, however, that if Salt Lake City had not authorized appellant to divert the sixty second feet of water into appellant's canal appellant would have been compelled to make application for and use sixty second feet of pumped water. It is, however, equally mani Appeal from Third District. fest that if Salt Lake City had used the sixty second feet of water for any purpose the applicant would have been required to pump precisely the same quantity of water during the season of 1914 it in fact did pump, and in such event it could not have called on Salt Lake City, nor on any of the other owners of canals, to contribute to the cost and expenses of pumping water unless one or more of the others had used water in excess of the gravity flow. Applicant's counsel, however, most earnestly contend that, in view that the appellant during the irrigation season of 1914 did use water in excess of the amount it would have received from the gravity flow, it should contribute to the cost and expense of pumping water to the extent that it used water in excess of the gravity flow, regardless of the agreement between appellant and Salt Lake City respecting the use of the latter's water. While counsel for applicant do not contend that the arrangement between Salt Lake City and the appellant for the use of the sixty second feet of water was wrong or unlawful, yet they insist that under that portion of the decree we have above quoted no party to the decree may use any water from Utah Lake in excess of the gravity flow to which such party is entitled without becoming liable to contribute to the cost and expense of pumping, although such party may use the gravity flow to which one or more of the water users may be entitled. The district court so construed the decree, and hence found and entered judgment as before stated. Appellant's counsel, with much vigor, insist that the court. erred in its construction of the decree and in entering the judgment. It devolves upon us, therefore, to construe and determine the meaning of the original decree on which this proceeding is based. 1 It seems to us that the language of the decree is clear and free from ambiguity. In the first paragraph of the decree quoted above it is quite clear when and under what circumstances the pumps may be started. It is there provided, in clear and explicit terms, that in case three or more of the five parties named in the decree shall request Salt Lake City et al. v. Salt Lake City W. & E. P. Co. et al., 54 Utah 10. that the pumps be started, then each one of the five parties must contribute to the cost and expense of pumping water in the proportion there stated. In the succeeding paragraph of the decree it is, however, just as clearly and explicitly provided that in case three of the parties fail to agree upon the time the pumps shall be started the pumps may, nevertheless, be started at the request of either one of the five parties aforesaid; but that, in the event less than three make the request, to start the pumps, the one, or, if there be two who request that the pumps be started, the two requesting, must pay the cost and expense of pumping the water unless some of the others are using more water than would flow into their canals by gravity, and in case they use more than the gravity flow they must contribute to the cost and expense of pumping in the proportion that they are using water in excess of such gravity flow. In that paragraph it is, however, again stated that in case three or more request the operation of the pumps, all five must contribute in the proportion that they receive water into their canals. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, however, of what is meant in the decree by "gravity flow," it is explicitly provided: "The gravity flow herein referred to is the proportion of water which each of said parties would be entitled, under the original decree herein, to receive, if said pumping plant were not in operation." The court thus, in express terms, determined what is meant by the gravity flow. If, therefore, Salt Lake City was entitled to sixty second feet of the gravity flow when the pumps were started in 1914, and the appellant was also entitled to the amount of gravity flow it received at said time, then the mere fact that Salt Lake City permitted appellant to use the gravity flow to which the former was entitled could in no way affect the applicant in the amount of water it was required to pump for either of the other water users. Applicant's counsel in effect concede this, since they admit that if Salt Lake City had used the sixty second feet of water, and the appellant had used the precise amount which came to it by gravity flow, the appellant could not require contribution in this proceeding Appeal from Third District. from either of the parties. If that be so-and there can be no doubt concerning the truth or correctness of the statement— how can the applicant complain because Salt Lake City permitted the appellant to use the gravity flow to which the city was entitled so long as what was used did not exceed "the proportion of the water which each of said parties would be entitled, under the original decree," as it is expressed in the decree? If Salt Lake City could have used the sixty second feet of water through its canal without affecting the rights and without becoming liable for any part of the cost of pumping the water, how can it be held that the appellant is liable merely because it used what it is conceded by the applicant that Salt Lake City had a right to use and could have used with impunity? In doing that, how did either the appellant or Salt Lake City transgress anything said in the decree, or how did that require the applicant to pump a drop of water it would not have been required to pump if Salt Lake City had used all of its sixty second feet of water and the appellant had used all of its gravity flow? What was done amounted to just that nothing less, nothing more. In doing that no liability arose under the terms of the decree. True, the decree could have been so framed as to prohibit one party to the decree from using the gravity flow of one or more of the other parties if to do that resulted in injustice or inequality. But such was not done. The natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning of the language used in the decree is clearly to the contrary. Counsel for the applicant have, however, at great length, set forth in their brief and argument the entire history of the litigation, and all of the circumstances and conditions which, they contend, have a bearing upon the equities of the case and the justice of their contention. Where the meaning of the language of a statute, writing, or document is obscure, ambiguous, or uncertain, it is always proper to have recourse to the surrounding circumstances and conditions for the purpose of determining the meaning of the language, and in that way arrive at the intention of those who used the language to express their purpose. Where, however, as here, the language of the decree by which all parties Vol. 54-2 2 Salt Lake City et al. v. Salt Lake City W. & E. P. Co. et al., 54 Utah 10. thereto are bound is free from ambiguity and doubt, then the rule is elementary that extraneous circumstances and conditions may not be resorted to if to do that makes the meaning of the language uncertain or ambiguous. Extraneous matters may be invoked to clear up uncertainty and doubts, but not to create them. Neither is this a case where it is necessary or proper to expand or restrict the meaning of words or phrases to create harmony between conflicting provisions. There is no reason whatever why the natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning of the language used in the decree should not be followed. If, under such circumstances, the ordinary meaning of the language used is departed from, there is really no limit to which a court could not go. The exigencies of the particular case would perhaps suggest a limit, but even that could not prove a deterrent in all cases. The only safe and rational rule, therefore, is to abide by the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, and such rule we feel in duty bound to follow in this as in all other cases. 3 By what we have said we do not wish to be understood as holding that the decree as it now stands is or is not, under all circumstances, fair, equitable, and just in so far as the apportionment of the costs and expenses of operating the pumps are concerned. If, however, conditions requiring it have arisen that can be established by proper evidence, the lower court has ample power to modify the decree so as to reflect equity and justice under all circumstances to all the water users. The decree cannot, however, be modified by construction. If that is done, it should be done upon a proper application, and after giving all the interested parties an opportunity to produce evidence, and to be heard upon the necessity for and the extent of the modification, if any be necessary. The court, after hearing the evidence, should make findings of fact and modify the decree only in accordance with the evidence, and so as to make the same fair, just, and equitable to all the parties. Merely to apportion the costs and expenses of operating the pumps, as was attempted in this case, may, under the circumstances, not be fair, just, and equitable to all of the water users. This fact, |