the people, are required to follow plain, universal rules of law, which are fair alike to all concerned.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

J. B. Sykes, for plaintiff in error,

Smith Matson, Asst Atty Gen. for the State.

The Plaintiff in Error, Laura Courtney, was convicted at the January, term of the County Court of Garfield County, on a charge of selling intoxicating liquor and her punishment fixed at a fine of $250.00 and imprisonment in the County Jail for a period of sixty days. The proof on behalf of the State was by two witnesses who testified that at about 7:30 P. M. on the 14th day of January, 1913, they bought onehalf pint of whiskey from the plaintiff in error, at a certain rooming house in Enid, and paid seventy-five cents therefore. The improperly sustained objections to certain questions asked on cross examination of the principle witness. Two witnesses in addition to the plaintiff in error testified that she was8 not at the place where the posecution contended, at the time contended, but was at their home some distance away and was there from ten o'clock in the morning until about eleven o'clock at night. After the testimony was closed and before instructions was delivered to the jury by the court, counsel for plaintiff in error requested instructions on the law of alibi as a defense, which instructions were refused by the court. No instruction was given covering the law of alibi. The usual instructions as to presumption of innocence, burden of proof, etc., were given. The only material question presented by this appeal is whether or not it was error for the trial court to refuse to give specific instructions covering the law of alibi as a defense when properly requested so to do, when there is evidence in the record tending clearly to establish such defense and when no other defense or testimony is offered. This specific question has never been presented to this court. In Brock, vs. State, 6-Ok. Cr. 24, we said:

"The policy of the law is that all persons shall have a

fair and impartial trial. It cannot be said that a fair and impartial trial has been had unless the jury has been properly instructed as to the law of the case, and when instructions do not fully present all the material issues raised, the judgment of conviction must be set aside."

Andni Robertson v. U. S. 4-Ok. Cr. 336, we said:

"Where an instruction requested by the defendant is not in proper form, but pertains to a material issue in the case as made by the evidence, the court should correct it and give it in proper form, if he has not otherwise instructed upon that issue.'

In Reed v. State, 3-Ok. Cr. P. 18, we said:

"The defendant is entitled to an instruction definding the law applicable to his theory of the case covering his defense, if there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to substantiate the theory."

See also the general rule stated in 12 Cyc. 619, and cases cited under Note 1. Under these authorities the failure of a trial court to instruct on the law of alibi, when requested so to do and when the evidence clearly raises that issue, is prejudicial error and in our judgment of necessity requires the reversal of a judgment of convic tion. It appears to be practically the unanimous rule that where alibi is the sole defense and there is material evidence in support of it, that it is reversible error for the trial court to refuse instruct on that question.

See Ayers v. State, 26-Tex. App. 324.

The Assistant Attorney General has filed a written brief urging this court to abandon or depart from the well established doctrine of practically all courts on this question. We are unable to conclude that the position is tenable or that such departure on the part of this court would be warranted. It is just as important to the public that persons who are charged with crime be accorded a fair and impartial trial as it is that the law be enforced at all.

This Court has gone as far as any court to aid in the enforcement of the law, but we do not feel called upon to overturn all established customs and usages for the pur

pose of upholding the judgment of careless or indifferent trial courts. The rights of the citizen should be protected as well as the rights of the public and it is not imposing an unfair burden on the people to require the trial courts of Oklahoma to follow the rules of law which have been in force and universally upheld by all courts of last resort and especially so when such rules are fair alike to all concerned,

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, DOYLE, J., and FURMAN, J., concur.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Late Important Opinions.

Where a judgment is obtained upon a statute, and an appeal is taken to the United States Supreme Court, from such judgment and before such appealed case is reached on the docket, the Supreme Court of the State in which such Statute was enacted, declared the statute unconstitutional it is the duty of the United States Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal that had been brought thereon.

Metzger Motor Car Company vs. Parrott

Sand in the Beds of Navigable Rivers.It is a question of local law whether the title to the bed of navigable riv. ers of the United States is in the State in which the rivers are situated or in the owners of the land bordering on such rivers. An owner of the upland, who, under the the law of the state, owns to the middle of a navigable river, has such an interest in the bed of the stream that, even though he cannot remove gravel therefrom without the consent of the Secretary of War, he can maintain an action to prevent others from doing so.

Archer vs. Greenville Sand and Gravel Co. Decided April 6, 1914.

FRANKLIN vs. LYNCH.

Error to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

37 Okla. Affirmed by the

Supreme Court of the United States.

1. The act of April 21, 1904, c. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 204, removing restrictions on alienation of lands of non-Indian allottees of the Five Civilized Tribes, did not au thorize members of the tribes to sell future acquired property.

2. Under Rev. Stat., § 2116, no conveyance of an Indian tribe shall be valid except as authorized by treaty, and individual members cannot sell future allotments, as, prior to allotment, there is no individual interest in any particular tract. Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U. S. 640.

3.

While the act of April 21, 1904, removed some restrictions, it did not permit either members of the tribes or non Indians to sell mere floats of expectancy. 4. One who has applied for and been admitted to membership in an Indian tribe by intermarriage cannot thereafter claim the rights of an Indian as to receiving allotment and the rights of a white non-Indian as to alienation; and all parties dealing with such a person do so with knowledge of the restrictions on alienation imposed by the act of 1902.

5. As § 642 of Mansfield's Digest, providing that title to subsequently acquired property conveyed shall inure to the benefit of the grantee, was only extended to Indian Territory so far as applicable and not inconsistent with any law of Congress; it has no effect on titles to allotments which, under the act of 1902, cannot be affected by conveyance before patent.

233 Advance Sheets of U. S. Reports, 269 –The Bank's Law Company' Publication.

The Office of Commissioner of Indian Affairs was established to create an administrative agency with adequale powers to execute the policy of the Government towards the Indians, and one of the important duties of the Indian Office is the enforcement of liquor prohibition. U. S. v. Birdsali.

REVIEWS.

THE LAW of COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES.

By Chester Arthur Legg, A. B., LL. D., member of the Chicago Bar.

Published by Baker, Voorhis & Company, Price $3.

New York

This is a work covering an entirely new field; a book of over four hundred pages and beautifully executed, It begins with a history of Commercial exchange and imparting a large amount of information not usually well understood by the average lawyer. The fact that some states are dissatisfied with the manner of conducting exchanges and clamorous for their proper incorporation so as to secure state control and supervision over theii operation, this book is timely and desirable. The work is comprehensive in the discussion of the power and liabilities of Commercial Exchanges; whether as simple association of individuals or properly incorporated organizations. The value of this book to the up-to-date lawyer is a very great one for many reasons: many men are interested in commercial association and occasions arrise where information is sought concerning their stock or the management of the officers conducting the "Exchange," and a lawyer would feel in an awkward position, if by want of the knowledge of the literature of the subject in the ordinary law book he could impart no information to his would be client. The field of the legal counsellor is rapidly enlarging and the man who chooses to be up to the line of progress cannot ignore this new book. Hence we heartily recommend it to his serious consideration. The book is neatly bound in a fine grade of flexible black leather binding. Address the publishers for a copy.