employ assistants in various ways, not involving his official discretion or responsibility, but our laws have only allowed his official discretion to be delegated where assistant county attorneys have a right to insist upon the performance of public duties that are strictly official in the prosecution of crime by County Attorneys and assistants duly appointed and qualified as provided by law, and we think it would be directly contrary to public policy to allow or permit any general delegation of the County Attorney's power or responsibility in this respect.

It is our opinion that the County Attorney's name not having been subscribed to the information by himself or by a legally constituted assistant, the court acquired no jurisdiction to try the case, and the conviction and sentence of the defendant are void.

It also appears that the evidence is insufficien. to support the verdict and judgment.

The judgment of the county court of Oklahoma County is therefore reversed and the cause remanded thereto to be disposed of as required by law.

ARMSTRONG, P. J. and FURMAN, J., concur.

THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA.

CHARLES COHEE, et al., Plaintiffs in Error.

VS.

No. 2775.

TURNER & WIGGINS, Defendant in Error.

(Rendered July 7, 1913.)

Error from the District Court of Carter County.
S. H. Russell, Trial Judge.

I.

When the question arises in a suit on`a written obligation, as to whether the signers executed the same in a representative capacity or as individuals, and anything appears on the face of the instrument which suggests a doubt as to the party bound, or as to the character in which the signers acted, parol evidence is competent, as between the original parties at least, for the purpose of showing the true intent of the parties when executing the instrument.

(A) Such evidence is not admitted for the purpose, nor does it have the effect, of varying the language of the written instrument; it is admitted to explain and clear away the doubt and uncertainty in hearing in the written language itself.

(B) Where there is nothing on the face of the written instrument, which suggests doubt as to the party bound, or as to the character, whether representative or individual, of the signors, then it is error to admit parol evidence tending to show that the signers executed the same in a representative character, so as to relieve them from individual liability.

2.

The question of allowing amendments to pleadings, is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and its action in allowing or refusing same will not be disturbed except in cases where this discretion has been abused.

Syllabus by the court.)

OPINION OF THE COURT BY BREWER, C.

In January, 1906, the plaintiffs in error, entered into a written contract of employment with Turner & Wiggins, a firm of lawyers, by which said firm was employed to represent the interests and claims of a class of colored people in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations usually called "Freedmen,” before congress and its committees and the various departments of the Federal Government, in the protection of their rights and in the advancement of their claims and interest relative to enrollment of themselves and their new born babies, and as to their rights and claims of right in the lands and properties of said tribes. This suit was brought on said contract and a judgment obtained by said firm of lawyers from which the defendants below. as plaintiffs in error here, have appealed.

A number of questions are raised in the record, but two of which are seriously urged in the brief, the others appearing to have been been abandoned. These questions are: (First) That the court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to testify that they signed the contract in a representative capacity only and did not intend to be bound individually thereby. (Second) That the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit the defendants to

amend their answer in the course of the trial as to material matters.

(1) On the first proposition as stated above it is contended that although the contract in suit is in writing and its execution admitted in the pleading, yet that it is so framed as to be ambigious as to the capacity, whether representative or individual, in which the makers signed it. The contract recites:

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"Now, therefore, we, Charles Cohee, Robert Cobb, Ed Hundy, etc., constituting the Executive Committee and the duly authorized and empow ered members and claimants in this behalf, and for themselves and, those whom they represent as such claimants in the premises, do hereby as such, warrant and guarantee to said Turner & Wiggins, that in the event of diligent performance of duty, they shall receive as compensation for services under this contract, the sum of one dollar per capita aforesaid, to be paid by the said parties of the first part."

It seems to be well settled both in this and many other jurisdictions, that when the question arises in a suit on a written obligation, as to whether the signers executed the same in a representative capacity or as individuals, and anything appears on the face of the instrument which suggests a doubt or abiguity as to the party bound, or as to the character in which the signers acted, that parol testimony is competent as between the original parties, for the purpose of showing their true intent in the execution of the the instrument. Weagant vs. Camden et al (handed down this term and not reported); Farmers & M. Bank vs. Hoyt,

29 Okla. 772; Jones vs. Citizens Bank, 9 Okla., 546; Miller vs. Way, 59 N. W. 467 (S. Dak.); Case Mfg. Co. vs. Sexman, 138 U. S. 431, 34 L. Ed. 1019. The list of authorities on this point might be extended indefinitely.

Such parol evidence is not admitted for, nor does it have the effect of, contradicting or varying the language of the written agreement, but it is admitted to explain away the doutb inhering in the written language itself.

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But is the contract in suit ambiguous or uncertain as to who is to be bound, or as to the character in which the signers executed the same? The claim is made that the defendants executed it "as members of the executive committee of the Choctaw & Chickasaw Freedmen's Association," and in no other capacity." This contention does not appear sound. If we analyze the language we find these guarantrs saying "now therefore we, (following with the twelve individual names) constituting the executive committee, etc, ciation had any legal existence, and these men had compensation named in the contract." If this assorant and guarantee the payment of the authority to bind it they did so. But it is further clear that they went further than this, and by the very letter of the bond, bound themselves, as individuals, in specific language, in addition to attempting to bind the so called association and the members thereof. Bad grammar does not necessarily render the meaning of a writing ambiguous or doubtful.