We are of opinion that this writ must be dismissed, because no federal question is involved. The Supreme Court of Georgia decided that, if the trust deed was valid when made, the plaintiff took under it only a life estate, and that that had ceased by her death; that the deed, however, was void under the Statute of Georgia which existed when the deed was made in 1854; that therefore the trust deed was entirely out of the way; that at the time it became the law of Georgia that free in 73 Ga. 187, which was as follows: "This is | tiffs in error which can unsettle the result "1. Under the decision of this court in Swoll [253] V. Oliver, 61 Ga. 248, that deed, as the law of Georgia stood in 1854, was void. So, in Plant ers Loan & Sav. Bank v. Johnson, 70 Ga. 302 (an Augusta case), the same point is decided emphatically, based on the Act of 1818, Cobb's Digest, p. 993. Therefore the trust deed is out of the way. 2. When the law freed slaves in Georgia and put free persons of color, as to real property, on the same footing as whites, this lot, as divided, was in possession of these two colored women, a moiety with a house on it, erected by the husband and father, in possession of each. The primary element of title, possession, being thus in each, and the State never having escheated the property whilst the old law stood, this possession is good against the claim of all others, and the verdict and decree giving each ber several share is right. "3. The decree is all the more equitable, be cause complainant paid one half of the purchase money. Cases of this sort, under the anomalous condition of such property remaining in the possession of a class of persons who could not formerly hold title thereto, should be adjudicated under broad views of natural equity. "There is nothing in the minor points made by the able and indefatigable counsel for plain135 U.S. erty which was in her occupation, was right. Writ of error dismissed. 127 1 [100] GUS. LEISY & COMPANY, Piff. in Err., | proceeding on behalf of the State of Iowa v. A. J. HARDIN. (See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 100-160.) Right to import and sell beer in a State-power of State-right of transportation-state regulations-power of Congress to regulate commerce-is exclusive-when importation is un restricted-void state law. 1. A citizen of one State has the right to import beer into another State, and the right to sell it there in its original packages. 2. Up to such sale, the State has no power to interfere, by seizure, or any other action, to prevent the importation and sale by a foreign or nonresident importer. 8. The right of transportation of an article of commerce from one State to another includes the right of the consignee to sell it in unbroken packages at the place where the transportation terminates. It is only after the importation is completed and the property imported is mingled with and becomes a part of the general property of the State by a sale by the importer, that state regulations can act upon it. 5. The power vested in Congress to regulate commerce among the States cannot be stopped at the external boundary of a State, but is capable of authorizing the disposition within the State of the article imported. 6. Commerce between? the States has been confided exclusively to Congress by the Constitution and is not within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State, unless placed there by congressional action. 7. The absence of a law by Congress as to any article of commerce is equivalent to its declaration that the importation of that article into the States shall be unrestricted; and it is for the courts to determine what state action is or is not a regulation of such commerce. 8. A law of a State which forbids the receipt of an imported commodity or its sale before it has ceased to be an article of trade between one State and another, is a regulation of commerce be tween the States, and void. [No. 1459.] Submitted Jan. 6, 1890. Decided April 28, 1890. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the judgment court reversing the judgment of the Superior Court of Keokuk in Iowa and giving judgment against the plaintiffs and their sureties on their replevin bond for the value of the property, in an action of replevin to recover certain quantities of beer seized. Reversed. Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: Christine Leisy, Edward Leisy, Lena and Albert Leisy, composing the firm of Gus. Leisy & Company, citizens of Illinois, brought their action of replevin against A. J. Hardin, the duly elected and qualified marshal of the City of Keokuk, Iowa, and ex officio constable of Jackson Township, Lee County, Iowa, in the Superior Court of Keokuk, in said county, to recover 122 one quarter barrels of beer, 171 one-eighth barrels of beer and 11 sealed cases of beer, which had been seized by him in a against said defendants, under certain provisions of the Code of the State of Iowa; and upon issue joined, a jury having been duly waived by the parties, the case was submitted to the court for trial, and having been tried, the court, after having taken the case under advisement, finally "rendered and filed in said cause its findings of fact and conclusions of law in words and figures following, to wit: "1st. That plaintiffs, Gus. Leisy & Co., are a firm of that name and style, residing in the State of Illinois, with principal place of business at Peoria, Illinois; that said firm is composed wholly of citizens of Illinois; that said firm is engaged as brewers in the manufacture of beer in the said City of Peoria, Illinois, selling same in the States of Illinois and Iowa. "2d. That the property in question, to wit, 122 one-quarter barrels of beer, of the value of $300, 171 one-eighth barrels of beer, value $215, and 11 sealed cases of beer, value $25, was all manufactured by said Leisy & Co. in the City of Peoria, Illinois, and put up in said kegs and cases by the manufacturers, viz., Gus. Leisy & Co., at Peoria, Illinois; that each of said kegs was sealed and had placed upon it, over the States internal revenue stamp of the district in plug in the opening of each keg, a United which Peoria is situated; that said cases were substantially made of wood, each one of them containing 24 quart bottles of beer, each bottle of beer corked and the cork fastened in with a metallic cap, sealed and covered with tin foil, and each case was sealed with a metallic seal; that said beer in all of said kegs and cases was manufactured and put up into said kegs and cases as aforesaid by the manufacturers, to wit, Gus. Leisy & Co., plaintiffs in this suit, and to open said cases the metallic seals had to be broken. "3d. That the property herein described was transported by said Gus. Leisy & Co. from Peoria, Illinois, by means of railways to Keokuk, Iowa, in said sealed kegs and cases, as same was manufactured and put up by them in the City of Peoria, Illinois. "4th. That said property was sold and offered for sale in Keokuk, Iowa, by John Leisy, a resident of Keokuk, Iowa, who is agent for said Gus. Leisy & Co.; that the only sales and offers to sell of said beer was in original and sealed case as manu factured and put up by said Gus. Leisy & Co. and imported by them into the State of Iowa; that no kegs or cases sold or offered for sale were broken or opened on the premises; that as soon as same was purchased it was removed from the premises occupied by Gus. Leisy & Co., which said premises are owned by Christiana Leisy, a member of the firm of Gus. Leisy & Co., residing in and being a citizen of Peoria, Illinois; that none of such sales or offers to sell were made to minors or persons in the habit of becoming intoxicated. "5th. That on the 30th day of June, 1888, the defendant, as constable of Jackson Township, Lee County, Iowa, by virtue of a search 'warrant issued by J. G. Garrettson, an acting justice of the peace of said Jackson Township, upon an information filed charging that in premises occupied by said John Leisy there were (10: [102] certain intoxicating liquors, etc., seized the property therein described and took same into his custody. "6th. And the court finds that said intoxicating liquors thus seized by the defendant in his official capacity as constable were kept for sale in the premises described in the search warrant in Keokuk, Lee County, Iowa, and occupied by Gus. Leisy & Co., for the purpose of being sold, in violation of the provisions of the laws of Iowa, but which laws, the court holds, are unconstitutional and void, as herein stated. 7th. That on the 2d day of July, 1888, plaintiffs filed in this court their petition, alleging, among other things, that they were the owners and entitled to the possession of said property, and that the law under which said warrant was issued was unconstitutional and void, being in violation of section 8 of article I. of the Constitution of the United States, and, having filed a proper bond, a writ of replevin issued and the possession of said property was given to plaintiffs. "From the foregoing facts the court finds the following conclusions: "That plaintiffs are the sole and unqualified owners of said property and entitled to the possession of same and judgment for $1 damages for their detention and costs of suit; that so much of chapter 6, title XI., of the Code of 1873, and the amendments thereto, as prohibits such sales by plaintiffs as were made by plaintiffs, is unconstitutional, being in contravention of section 8 of article I. of the Constitution of the United States; that said law has been held unconstitutional in a like case heretofore tried and determined by this court, involving the same question, in the case of Collins v. Hills, decided prior to the commencement of this suit and prior to the seizure of said property by defendant; to all of which the defendant at the time excepted." Judgment was thereupon rendered as lows: fol the court that the plaintiffs have and recover "To which findings, order and judgment A motion for new trial was made and over ruled, and the cause taken to the Supreme "I. The court erred in finding that the plain- II. In finding that the plaintiffs were entitled to one dollar damages for their detention, and for costs of suit. "III. The court erred in holding that the sales of beer in 'original packages,' by the keg and case, as made by John Leisy, agent of plaintiffs, were lawful. "IV. The court erred in its conclusions and finding that so much of the law of the State of [104] Iowa embraced in chapter 6, title XI., Code of 1873, and the amendments thereto, as prohibits such sales of beer in the State of Iowa, was un. constitutional, being in contravention of section 8, article I., of the Constitution of the United States. "V. The court erred in rendering a judg ment for plaintiffs and awarding them the intoxicating liquors in question and damages and costs against defendant. "VI. The court erred in overruling the defendant's motion for a new trial." the superior court and entered judgment The supreme court reversed the judgment of against the plaintiffs and their sureties on the replevin bond in the amount of the value of the property, with costs. The judgment thus concluded: "And it is further certified by this "This cause coming on for hearing, plaintiffs that in the decision of this suit there is drawn court, and hereby made a part of the record, [103] appearing by Anderson & Davis, their attorneys, in question the validity of certain Statutes of and the defendant by H. Scott Howell & Son the State of Iowa, namely, chap. 6 of title XI and Wm. B. Collins, his attorneys, and the of the Code of Iowa of 1873 and the amend cause coming on for final hearing on the plead-ments thereto, on the ground of their being reings on file and the evidence introduced, the court makes the special finding of facts and pugnant to and in contravention of section 8 law herewith ordered to be made of record and finds that plaintiffs are the sole and unqualified owners and entitled to possession of the following described personal property, to wit: 122 one-quarter (2) barrels of beer, of the value of $300; 171 one-eighth (4) barrels of beer of the value of $215 and eleven (11) sealed cases of beer of the value of $25. "That, plaintiffs being in possession of said property by virtue of a bond heretofore given, said possession in plaintiffs is confirmed. The court further finds that the writ issued by J. G. Garrettson, a justice of the peace, under which defendant held possession of said property and seized same, is void, same having been issued under sections of the law of Iowa that are unconstitutional and void. "That plaintiff is entitled to one dollar damages for the wrongful detention of said property. "It is therefore ordered and considered by of article I. of the Constitution of the United Iowa." sued out from this court. The opinion of the supreme court, not yet constable was made under the provisions of Section 1523 of the Code is as follows: "No person shall manufacture or sell, by himself, his clerk, steward or agent, directly or [105] indirectly, any intoxicating liquors except as hereinafter provided. And the keeping of intoxicating liquor, with the intent on the part of the owner thereof, or any person acting under his authority, or by his permission, to sell the same within this State contrary to the provisions of this chapter, is hereby prohibited, and the intoxicating liquor so kept, together with the vessels in which it is contained, is declared a nuisance, and shall be forfeited and dealt with as hereinafter provided." Chapter 71 of the Laws of the 22d General Assembly is an Act approved April 12, 1888 (Laws Iowa 1988, p. 91), of which the first section is as follows: "That after this Act takes effect no person shall manufacture for sale, sell, keep for sale, give away, exchange, barter or dispense any intoxicating liquor, for any purpose whatever, otherwise than as provided in this Act. "Persons holding permits as herein provided shall be authorized to sell and dispense intoxicating liquors for pharmaceutical and medicinal purposes and alcohol for specified chemical purposes, and wine for sacramental purposes, but for no other purposes whatever; and all permits must be procured as hereinafter provided from the district court of the proper county at any term thereof after this Act takes effect, and a permit to buy and sell intoxicating liquors when so procured shall continue in force for one year from date of its issue unless revoked according to law or until application for renewal is disposed of, if such application is made before the year expires. "Provided, that renewals of permits may be annually granted upon written application by permit holders who show to the satisfaction of the court or judge that they have during the preceding year complied with the provisions of this Act, and execute a new bond as in this Act required to be originally given; but parties may appear and resist renewals the same as in applications for permits." Section 2 provides for notice of application for permit, and section 3 reads thus: "Applications for permits shall be made by petition signed and sworn to by the applicant and filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the proper county at least ten days before the first day of the term, which petition shall state the applicant's name; place of residence; in what business he is then engaged, and in what business he has been [106] engaged for two years previous to filing petition; the place, particularly describing it, where the business of buying and selling liquor is to be conducted; that he is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Iowa; that he is a registered pharmacist and now is, and for the last six months has been, lawfully conducting a pharmacy in the township or town wherein he proposes to sell intoxicating liquors under the permit applied for, and, as the proprietor of such pharmacy, that he has not been adjudged guilty of violating the law relating to intoxicating liquors within the last two years next preceding his application; and is not the keeper of a hotel, eating-house, saloon, restaurant or place of public amusement; that he is not addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, and has not, within the last two years next preceding his application, been directly or indirectly engaged, employed or interested in the unlawful manufacture, sale or keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors; and that he desires a permit to purchase, keep and sell such liquors for lawful purposes only." bond; petition as to the good moral character Various sections follow, relating to giving of applicant; hearing on the application; oath upon the issuing of permit; keeping of record; punishment by fine, imprisonment, etc., etc. By section 20, sections 1524, 1526 and other sections of the Code were in terms repealed. The Code provided for the seizure of intoxino question in reference to that arises here, if cating liquors unlawfully offered for sale, and the law in controversy be valid. 1884, p. 8, ale, beer, wine, spirituous, vinous By section 1 of chapter 8 of the Laws of and malt liquors are defined to be intoxicating liquors. Section 1524 of the Code of 1873, p. 279, was as follows: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to forbid the sale, by the importer thereof, of foreign intoxicating liquor imported under the authority of the laws of the United States regarding the importation of such liquors and in accordance with such laws: Provided, That the said liquor, at the time of said sale by said importer, remains in the original casks or packages in which it was by him imported, and in quantities not less than the quantities in which the laws of the United States require such liquors to be imported, and is sold by him in said original casks or packages and in said quantities only; and nothing contained in this law shall prevent any persons from manufacturing in this State liquors for the purpose of being sold according to the provisions of this chapter, to be used for mechanical, medicinal, culinary or sacramental purposes.' This section is substantially identical with section 2 of chapter 45 of the Acts of the Fifth General Assembly of Iowa, approved January 22, 1855 (Laws Iowa, 1855, p. 58); and it was carried into the Revision of 1860 as section 1560 (Revision 1860, chap. 64, p. 259). It was repealed by section 20 of the Act of April 12, 1888, as before stated. Section 1553 of the Code as amended by the Act of April 5, 1886 (Laws Iowa 1886, p. 83), forbade any common carrier to bring within the State of Iowa, for any person or persons, or corporation, any intoxicating liquors from any other State or Territory of the United States, without first having been furnished with a certificate, under the seal of the county auditor of the county to which said liquor was to be transported, or was consigned for transportation, certifying that the consignee, or person to whom such liquor was to be transported, conveyed or delivered, was authorized to sell intoxicating liquors in such county. This was held to be in contravention of the Federal Constitution, in Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 125 U. S. 465 [31:700]. Mr. James C. Davis, for plaintiff in error: The power to regulate commerce among the [107] several States rests wholly with Congress to the | Iowa, 295; State v. Stucker, 58 Iowa, 498; exclusion of state authority. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 279 (23: 349); Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 127 (26: 104); Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 469 (24:529); Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 697 (26:239); Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 631 (29: 260); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446 (29: 691); Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 573 (30: 249); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 492 (30: 695); Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32:311); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344 (26: 565); Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129 (32: 368); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141 (32: 637). The Supreme Court of Iowa has recognized the same principle. Marshalltown v. Blum, 58 Iowa, 184; Pacific Junction v. Dyer, 64 Iowa, 38. The limits and extent of the police power have been established by the Supreme Court of the United States. Henderson v. New York City, 92 U. S. 271 (23: 548); New York v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 60 (27: 384): 7nibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. . . .68 (24: 529); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446 (29: 691); Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465 (31: 700). Beer is an article of commerce, and the provision of the Iowa Law, prohibiting its importation into the State, is unconstitutional and void. Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465 (31: 700). Commerce among the States must of necessity be commerce within the States. The power of Congress is to be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 7, 9 (6: 24, 25); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 447 (6: 688); Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 132 (19: 384). The negotiation of sale of goods, which are in another State, for the purpose of introducing them into the State in which the sale is made, is interstate commerce. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. 8. 497 (30: 697). There is no analogy between the power of taxation and the power of regulating com merce. Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165. Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 718 (25: 501). It cannot be maintained that every law which tends to diminish the consumption of any article is unconstitutional. License Cases, 46 U. S. 5 How. 621 (12: 309). Rights are held subject to the police power of the State. Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 32, 33 (24: 991, 992); Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501 (24: 1115); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (31: 205); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 (25: 1079); Butchers Union §. H. & L. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746 (28: 585); Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659 (24: 1036); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 679 (32: 254); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 36, 62 (21:394, 404). The police power cannot be surrendered to the general government by the States. Cooley, Const. Lim. 282, 283. The Statute of Iowa was a proper exercise of the police power of the State. Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 474-476 (31: 703). Statutes of other States, having the same pur. pose, have been held to be constitutioual. Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 576; Metropolitan Excise Board v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 666; Bode v. State, 7 Gill, 326; Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456; Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; Jones v. People, 14 Ill. 196; Mette v. McGuckin, 18 Neb. 323; License Cases, 46 U. S. 5 How. 504 (12: 256); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (28: 923); Foster v. Kansas, 112 Ü. S. 206 (28: 629); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 (32: 346); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 685 (32: 257). The regulation of the liquor traffic is a proper subject for the exercise of the police power of the State. Collins v. Hills, 8 L. R. A. 110, 77 Iowa, Hinson v. Lott, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 150 (19: 388); The cases of Willson v. Black Bird Creek Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32: 311). Marsh Co. 27 U. S. 2 Pet. 245 (7:412); Gibbons The purpose and effect of the Iowa Statutes v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 1 (6:23); Gillman is to prohibit all foreign and interstate com-v. Philadelphia, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 713 (18:96); merce in liquors. Swift v. Sutphin, 39 Fed. Rep. 630; Re Christian, 39 Fed. Rep. 636; Re Barber, 39 Fed. Rep. 641. Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678 (27:442; Parkersburg & O. R. Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 701 (27: 588); Peik v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 94 U. S. 178 (24: 98); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 135 (24: Messrs. W. B. Collins, John Y. Stone and H. Scott Howell, for defendant in er-87); Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board ror: The Statutes of Iowa which are claimed to be unconstitutional have been declared to be constitutional by the Supreme Court of Iowa in many cases. Collins v. Hills, 3 L. R. A. 110, 77 Iowa, 181; Grousendorf v. Howat, 77 Iowa, 187; Drake v. Kaiser, 73 Iowa, 703; Dickinson v. Heeb Brewing Co. 73 Iowa, 705; Pearson v. International Distillery, 72 Iowa, 848; Martin v. Blattner, 68| of Health, 118 U. S. 466 (30: 242),-hold that Congress, not having legislated upon the subject, has left the States free to do so. Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 482, 483 (31: 706). No class of legislation falls more clearly under the police power of the State than does the liquor traffic. Kohn v. Melcher, 29 Fed. Rep. 435; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 103 (23: 820); Nathan v. |