apparatus to a similar or analogous subject, with no change in the manner of application, and no result distinct in its nature, will not sustain a patent, although the new form of result may not have before been contemplated.
Competent knowledge and skill of an intelligent
mechanic would have enabled him to construct the revolving billiard-cue rack in question with- out calling the inventive faculty into play.
January 7, 1868, for a revolving cue rack, is void for want of novelty.
Argued April 11, 1890. Decided April 28, 1890.
board has the same plenary power in respect to this new department, and is not hampered by limitations attached to the board which there- tofore had control of it. The presumption against implied repeal obtaining in the con- struction of ordinary statutes yields to the in- ferences arising from the subject matter of leg islation. Plenary powers having been found by experience valuable in the management of 3. The patent, No. 72,969, granted to Brunswick, affairs already under the control of the board, the transfer of another department to the same control carries with it a strong implication that the added department is subject to the same plenary powers. The primary thought is not a mere transfer of authority, but the bringing of the added department within the control of APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of the general supervising board. It is unity of California in favor of complainant for an in- administration and not change of commission.fringement of letters-patent. Reversed. But our conclusions are not controlled by this construction alone. The court below placed Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: its decision on what we conceive to be the true This was a bill filed by Emanuel Brunswick significance of the Act of 1878. As said by against Ferdinand de St. Germain in the Cir- that court, it is to be regarded as an Organic cuit Court of the United States for the District Act, intended to dispose of the whole question of California, October 25, 1880, for an alleged of a government for this District. It is, as it infringement of letters-patent No. 72,969, grant- were, a constitution for the District. It is de-ed to Brunswick January 7, 1868, for a revolv. clared by its title to be an Act to provide ing cue rack. permanent form of government for the Dis- The defendant demurred to the bill February trict." The word "permanent" is suggestive. 16, 1881, and among other causes of demurrer It implies that prior systems had been tempora- assigned that "the said complaint does not de- ry and provisional. As permanent it is com- scribe or set forth any new or useful invention plete in itself. It is the system of government. or discovery, or any invention or discovery The powers which are conferred are organic patentable under the Patent Laws of the United powers. We look to the Act itself for their ex- States, but, on the contrary, the descriptions tent and limitations. It is not one Act in a of the alleged inventions contained in said com- series of legislation, and to be made to fit into plaint show that the same is not patentable." the provisions of the prior legislation; but is a The demurrer was overruled, whereupon the single complete Act, the outcome of previous defendant answered, denying, among other experiments, and the final judgment of Con- things, that the alleged invention was of any gress as to the system of government which utility or value. Replication having been filed, should obtain. It is the constitution of the proofs were taken, and an interlocutory decree District, and its grants of power are to be taken was entered on the 12th of May, 1884, in favor as new and independent grants, and expressing of the complainant, sustaining the patent, find- in themselves both their extent and limitations. ing that there had been infringement, and Such was the view taken by the court below; referring the case to a master to take and state and such we believe is the true view to be taken an account of the gains and profits, and also of the Statute. Regarded in this light, but one the damages. The master subsequently re- interpretation can be placed upon the section ported that the defendant had realized $1,176 quoted. The power to remove is a power with-profits from the manufacture and sale of the out limitations. The power is granted in gen-cue rack, but that no damages had been sus- eral terms, as well as the authority to adopt such provisions as may be necessary to carry it into execution. Full authority is given to the com- mission; and in the absence of rules and regu- lations directing a different procedure, its act of summary dismissal cannot be challenged. The judgment is affirmed.
tained by complainant, by reason of respond- ent's sales, over and above the profits. Excep- tions were filed by both complainant and de- fendant and were overruled by the court, and on the 27th of May, 1886, a final decree in complainant's favor was entered in the case, for the amount reported by the master, with interest and costs, and an appeal duly taken to this court by the defendant.
The first error assigned is, "that the court
[227] FERDINAND DE ST. GERMAIN, Appt., erred in holding that the said letters-patent
(See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 227-231.)
were valid." The specification, drawings and claim are as follows:
"Be it known that I, E. Brunswick, of the
Patentability of inventions—inventive faculty- City of Chicago, in the County of Cook, State
of Illinois, have invented new and useful im. [229] provements in billiard cue racks, and I do here- by declare that the following is a full and ex-
1. The application of an old process or machine or NOTE.-For what patents are granted; when de-act description thereof, reference being had to
clared void. See note to Evans v. Eaton, 4: 433.
As to patentability of inventions, see note to Thompson v. Boisselier, 29: 76; also note to Corning v. Burden, 14: 683.
the accompanying drawings, making part of this specification, in which
"Drawing No. 1 represents the plain revolv. ing cue rack; and
"Drawing No. 2 represents the lock-up rack for private use.
"The nature of my invention consists in making the billiard-cue rack so arranged that it may revolve and be detached from the wall. "To enable others skilled in the art to make and use my invention, I will proceed to describe its construction and operation.
"Two circular plates, A and B (drawing No. 1), are firmly secured to a vertical shaft, C. The lower plate A is provided with a rim, a, at its outer edge to prevent the butt ends of the cues from slipping off the plate and the upper plate B is provided with several openings through which the points of the cues are passed. Each plate is provided with a metallic pin, D, which enters a metallic socket, E, inlaid in the stationary brackets, F F, and revolve in it. The brackets are secured to a wall, a pillar or any other object, and support the rack.
"I make private cue racks (drawing No. 2) in which the lower plate A forms a bottom to a round box, B, open on top, and divided into compartments, CC, by partitions, pp, each compartment having a door, D, hung on hinges and provided with a lock and key. The upper plate E forms a bottom to the box B, and is provided with several holes. The rack, being revolving, is very convenient for handling the
hune v. Phillips, 99 U. S. 592 (25: 293); Curtis, Patents, SS 41, 44, 49, 52, 53, 55, 56, 66; Walker, Paten's, § 25 et seq.; Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U. S. 192 (27:438); Vinton v. Hamilton, 104 U. S. 492 (26: 810); Smith v. Nichols, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 119 (22: 567); Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U. S. 117, 118 (26: 95); Hicks v. Kelsey, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 670 (21: 852); Crouch v. Roemer, 103 U. S. 797 (26: 426); Gardiner v. Herz, 118 U. S. 180 (30: 158); Western Electric Mfg. Co. v. Ansonia Brass & C. Co. 114 U. S. 447 (29: 210); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Locomotive E. S. Truck Co. 110 U. S. 490 (28: 222); Day v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co. 132 U. S. 98 (33: 265); Watson v. Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. Co. 132 U. S. 161 (133: 295); Marchand v. Emken, 132 U. S. 195 (33: 332); Aron v. Manhattan R. Co. 132 U. S. 84 (33: 272).
Messrs. Willard Parker Butler and John L. Boone for appellee.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opin- [230 ion of the court:
This case falls within the familiar rule that the application of an old process or machine or apparatus to a similar or analogous subject, with no change in the manner of application, and no result substantially distinct in its nature, will not sustain a patent, although the new form of result may not have before been contemplated.
The ordinary cue rack was made with the upper part perforated with holes to receive the small ends of the cues when put in the rack, and with a ledge or molding along the front of the lower part, on which the cues stood, so as to prevent them from slipping off. The horizontal and straight upper and lower parts of the ordinary cue rack were changed by complainant into two circular disks, called "plates" in the specification, having the perforations and the rim, secured to a vertical shaft, and each provided with a metallic pivot, entering into and revolving in a metallic socket, inserted in ordinary brackets attached to the wall or pillar or any other object for the support of the rack.
As the revolving rack held the cues in the same way and by the same means as the ordinary rack, if patentable novelty existed at all it must be found in making the racks revolve, when constructed and operating in the manner stated.
But revolving contrivances, such as table casters and the like, for the reception and carriage of articles, so as to bring them easily within reach, were well known, and the application of such a contrivance to the holding and carrying of cues was but the application of an old device to a new and analogous use, with such changes only as would naturally be made to adapt it thereto.
The making of the old cue rack circular, putting in the revolving apparatus, and suspending it on brackets, a common use of the latter, involved mechanical skill simply, and not the exercise of invention, in the creation of a novel, substantive result.
The state of the art, as shown by the prior patents for revolving dining tables and bottle casters, introduced on behalf of defendant, illustrates the correctness of this conclusion.
These tables and casters were so arranged as
to revolve about a common centre and bring | also authorized Robertson, in case it should be around dishes and decanters in that way, as de- deemed advisable and to the interest of all con- sired. The office performed was the same in cerned that a sale of the property should take respect to dishes and decanters as that per- place, to sell and make titles to it, provided the formed by complainant's contrivance in respect consent of the said Frances and Fanny, their to cues. The difference between revolving and guardian or guardians, should be first had and stationary tables and casters and between re- obtained. volving and stationary cue racks is the same. Those revolve and these do not. We think that competent knowledge and skill in his call- ing on the part of an intelligent mechanic would have enabled him, on request, to con- struct the revolving billiard-cue rack in ques- tion, without calling the inventive faculty into play.
The patent was void for want of novelty, and the decree is reversed and the cause remanded, with a direction to dismiss the bill.
In March, 1879, Fanny Gardner filed a bill in equity, in the Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia, setting forth the purchase of the lot of land by Gardner from Carrie, for $600, and the making of such deed; that Gardner, who was her husband, and the father, by a former wife, of Frances Gardner, who had intermarried with one Beatty, died in 1865; that all of those persons were free persons of color; that, on the 3d of May, 1854, Gardner and the plaintiff and Frances took possession of the property; that afterwards, Frances having married, Gardner divided the lot and erected a house on a part of it for Frances; that the
FRANCES BEATTY ET AL., Plffs. in Err., parties thus continued in the possession of the
(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 244-254.)
Review of state judgment.
Where the case was decided by the state court on an independent ground, broad enough to main- tain the judgment and not involving a federal question, even though the state court also decided a federal question, this court will dismiss the writ of error without considering the federal ques- tion.
[No. 279.] Submitted April 18, 1890.
IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia to review a judgment, af- firming a judgment of the Superior Court of Richmond County in that State, in favor of plaintiff, settling her title to certain land. Dis
property until the death of Gardner; that from that time Frances had remained in posses- sion of the portion of the lot on which the house was erected for her use, and the plaintiff had occupied the remaining part of the lot; that the deed to Robertson was void, because at that time all conveyances of real estate in Au- gusta to or for the use of free persons of color residing therein were prohibited by law; that the plaintiff acquired title to the property oc- cupied by her, by actual adverse possession of the same for twenty years, and Francis had acquired title in the same way to the premises occupied by her; that the plaintiff desired to sell her part of the property, but could not do so, because Frances claimed that under the terms of the trust deed she owned a re-
mainder interest in the whole of the property. and the plaintiff had only a life estate therein; and that the property could not be sold except with the consent of Frances.
owned a fee-simple title to the portion of the The bill prayed for a decree that the plaintiff lot so occupied by her; that the trust deed be canceled; that, if the court should hold that the
The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Salem Dutcher for plaintiffs in error. title of the plaintiff and of Frances was derived (No counsel for defendant in error.)
Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court:
On the 3d of May, 1854, one Carrie executed and delivered to Elijah D. Robertson, a white man, a warranty deed of a lot of land in Augusta, Georgia, 82 feet 6 inches in width by 200 feet in depth. The consideration expressed in the deed was $600, and it conveyed to Robertson, his heirs and assigns forever, the lot in question, in trust nevertheless, to and for the sole use, benefit and behoof of the follow
[245] ing free persons of color of Augusta, "to wit, Fanny Gardner, the wife of Thomas Gardner, and their daughter, Frances Gardner, and any future issue of the said Fanny by the said Thomas, and, in case of the death of the said Frances and Fanny, in trust for the next of kin of the said Thomas Gardner." The deed
NOTE.-Jurisdiction of United States Supreme Court; it is for state courts to construe their own statutes; supreme court will not review their decisions except when specially authorized by statute. See note to Commercial Bank v. Buckingham, 12:169.
from seven years' possession under the trust terms of such deed did not bind the plaintiff or deed, as color of title, it would decree that the tiff did not have a fee-simple title to the part limit her title in the property; that, if the plain- in her possession, she and Frances might be decreed to be tenants in common of the entire property, and the same might be divided by commissioners, or be sold and the proceeds divided, share and share alike, between the plaintiff and Frances; and for general relief.
The bill was afterwards amended by inserting Gardner at the time of the purchase one half of an allegation that the plaintiff furnished to the purchase money of the property, the same being the proceeds of her labor as a free person of color; and further that if the court held that division of the lot by Garduer, in the part which the plaintiff acquired no legal interest under the he gave to her and on which she had since lived, and no interest that could ripen by prescription, then Gardner died in possession of all of the lot, leaving the plaintiff and Frances as his only heirs; that such heirs had, by tacit con- sent, actually occupied, held and claimed the
portions so divided to them by Gardner, from the time of his death; and that Gardner made no will and left no other heirs.
Frances, being then the wife of one Davis, answered the bill, denying that the property was ever divided between her and the plaintiff by Gardner, or since his death, otherwise than that Gardner built another house for her on the property, for convenience, because she was married and had many children; and that her title and that of the plaintiff was that of co-cestuis que trust for life, with remainder over to the children of Frances who should be living at the termination of such equitable life estate.
within the jurisdiction of the United States be- came entitled to the equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as was enjoyed by white citizens, and all citizens of the United States became enti- tled in every State to the same rights as were enjoyed by the white citizens thereof, as re- spected real and personal property; that, under the first section of the 14th Article of Amend- ment to the Constitution of the United States, it was provided that no State should make or enforce any law which should abridge the priv- ileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; that under said Act of Congress and said Amendment the de- fendant became entitled to the same rights, as to prescriptive title by possession under color of title, as any white person; that under said Act of Congress and said Amendment, the Act of Georgia of December 19, 1818, and that of December 22, 1819, could not be lawfully en- forced as against the rights of the defendant under the trust deed as color of title, even if the deed were originally void; and that, under said Act of Congress and the 14th Amend- ment, the plaintiff and the defendant, under the trust deed, and their occupancy of the lot thereunder for seven years after the death of Gardner, had an equitable life estate in com- mon in the lot, with remainder in fee to the next of kin of Gardner.
By way of cross-bill, the answer averred that, before January 1, 1863, no proceedings were ever instituted to escheat the property as being conveyed for the benefit of free persons of color; that by section 2627 of the Code of [247] Georgia, becoming of force on January 1, 1863, it was declared that escheat should lie only on failure of heirs; that by the Act of Georgia of March 17, 1866, free persons of color were vested with all the property rights of white persons; that among those rights was that to a prescriptive title by adverse possession for seven years under written evidence of title; that by possession adverse to all the world, under the trust deed, for seven years and more prior to the bringing of the bill, the plaintiff and Frances had a good prescriptive title to the property under the limitations of the deed, and had an equitable life estate in common, with remainder in fee, on their death, to the next of kin of Gardner; that Frances bad six children The answer was also amended by averring then living, two of them by her first husband, that the claim of the plaintiff that she had furBeatty, one of whom was an adult and the other nished to Gardner, at the time of the purchase, a minor, and four of them by her husband one half of the purchase money of the prop Davis, all of whom were minors, such six chil-erty, was barred by the Statute of Limitadren being the next of kin after Frances to Gardner, their grandfather; and that Gardner had no issue by the plaintiff.
tions, the claim being first asserted by an amendment to the bill, made June 28, 1884, more than thirty years after the purchase of the property by Gardner; and that the plaintiff was estopped by laches from asserting such claim.
The answer prayed that the court might de- clare the trust to be valid, and appoint a trustee to hold the property for the joint use and benefit of the plaintiff and the defendant during A guardian ad litem was appointed for the their lives, or the life of either of them, and, at minors, and he and the adult Beatty were the termination of such lives, to convey the made defendants. The case was tried by a property to such children of the defendant as jury. The court at the trial charged the jury might then be living, and should there be none as follows: Under the law in force at the such, then to whoever should be next of kin time of making this deed, free persons of color to Gardner; and that the adult son of the de- could not hold real estate, and the deed from fendant be made a defendant, with a guardian Carrie to Gardner in trust was absolutely void, ad litem to be appointed for her minor children. and the fact that the war and its results, as de- The answer was afterwards amended by clared by the Constitution of the United States averring that Gardner died in November, 1865; and the Acts of our own Legislature, have put that from the date of the trust deed to that all colored persons on the same footing with time the plaintiff and the defendant and Gard-white persons, does not and cannot make the ner resided together on the lot, being in occu- pation of it under and by virtue only of the trust deed; that from the time Gardner died until the bringing of the suit, the plaintiff and the defendant continued to occupy the lot; that more than seven years elapsed from the death of Gardner to the bringing of the suit; that under the laws of Georgia, as they existed from the date of the trust deed, any instrument in writing purporting to convey a title to land, even if void, was good as color of title, and adverse possession of the land thereunder for seven years gave a good title by prescription to the land; that, under the first section of the Act of Congress of April 9, 1866, all persons
laws invalid or validate any title acquired un- der them, and no continuance of possession for any number of years by the wife and daughter under this void deed can ripen it into a good title. The transaction being illegal and void, no act of either and no post-war enactments can galvanize it into life. If you believe that Thomas Gardner paid Carrie for this land, it being admitted that there were no proceedings before 1860 to escheat this property, and re- mained in possession of the land until after the close of the war, and died in November, 1865, then, notwithstanding the law which made a trust deed void, and he died in possession of the land, the wife and daughter took this
estate by inheritance absolutely, each being | his rights, or unless he assumes exclusive pos- entitled to one half. If the evidence does not session of the whole property, and refuses to show that, but shows that Thomas Gardner admit his co-tenant to his rightful participa- [251] paid the purchase money and went into posses- tion, after the co tenant demands such admis- sion and then divided the lot between Fanny sion. If, therefore, you find that Frances and and Frances, and that they both went into pos- Fanny became simultaneously entitled to the session and remained in possession until after use and enjoyment of this lot, they were ten- the war closed and are still in possession, ants in common and are so still, unless you Frances is estopped from denying the title of find that Fanny has taken some of the steps Fanny to the one half now claimed by her; so above mentioned against Frances and followed that you see that my view of the law is that it up with adverse possession for seven years the trust deed cannot be enforced or be made under color of title or twenty years without it. the basis of any title. If, therefore, you find 4. The next of kin to Thomas Gardner, as the for the complainant, Fanny, you may appoint words are used in the deed of 1854, mean bis three discreet persons to make the division of nearest blood relations after his own child the lot, providing for a sale in case no division Frances. A man's nearest blood relations after of the kind can be made." his own children are bis grandchildren. Thom- The defendants requested the court to charge as Gardner's grandchildren are parties respond- the jury as follows, which requests were de- ent to this bill. If Fanny and Frances are ten- clined: "2. If you find from the evidence in ants in common for life in this land, these this case that Thomas Gardner bought this grandchildren, should they outlive them, would land for the joint use of Fanny and Frances be entitled to the land, share and share alike. during their lives, and at their death to go to Fanny claims that she has a fee-simple interest his next of kin, and had the deed of 1854 made in a part of this land, by possession thereof for to carry out this purpose, and that Frances and twenty years, and consequently there is no re- Fanny entered on the occupancy of the land | mainder in this part for the next of kin. You by virtue of the deed, and were in the occu- cannot find that Fanny has a fee-simple inter- pancy of the land under the deed at the time est in any part of this land by adverse posses free persons of color became entitled to equal sion for twenty years unless you find that she property rights under the law with white per- has been in such possession of such part for the sons, and remained in such possession and full period of twenty years from the time that occupancy for seven years thereafter, then I free persons of color became vested in this charge you that, even if the deed itself were State with the same property rights as white void, they obtained a good prescriptive title persons. 5. If you find that a good prescrip- such as set out in the deed-that is, a good pre- tive title has arisen under this trust deed, the scriptive title to the joint use and enjoyment of effect is that Fanny and Frances will each be the land during their lives. The fact that the entitled for life to the use and enjoyment of deed was void, or that Fanny or Frances were one half of the property, and at their death it free persons of color, in no wise prevents such goes to the next of kin of Thomas Gardner. a prescriptive title as stated accruing to them, If you find that Fanny has a fee-simple inter- if the evidence shows the facts above stated.est in that part of the lot whereon she now re- 3. Whenever two persons are from any cause entitled to the possession simultaneously of any property in this State, they are tenants in common and each entitled to the use and enjoy ment of one half of the common property, and are each liable for one half of the burdens im- posed by law on the common property, such as taxes. If, therefore, you find, from the evi- dence in this case, that Fanny and Frances be- came simultaneously entitled to the possession of this property, they were tenants in com- mon, equally entitled to its benefits and equally liable for its burdens. If you find that one lived on one half and one on the other, this is nothing more than the law entitled them to; and if one paid the taxes on her half and the other on hers, this is nothing but what the law required them to do. The fact of one living on one half and the other on the other, or of one paying the taxes on one half and the other the taxes on the other, no matter how long this was kept up, would not give either one a fee-simple title to the particular half on which she lived and paid taxes. At the end of half a century they would still be tenants in com- mon, each having the right to possess the joint property and to use and enjoy one half of it. No tenant in common can set up an exclusive right by prescription against his co-tenant in the whole or any part of the property, unless he actually ousts his co-tenant, or expressly notifies his co-tenant that he holds adversely to
sides, the next of kin of Thomas have no rights whatever therein. Fanny may dispose of it while living, as she pleases, and if she dies intestate it would go to her next of kin. 6. If you find, from the evidence, that the complainant did not set up any claim to the property in dispute, by having furnished part of the purchase money, until twenty years had expired from the time the purchase was made, I charge you that she is now barred by the Statute of Limitations from setting up title to the property, for that reason."
The jury found the following verdict: the jury, find for the complainant the exclu- sive right and fee-simple title to that portion of said property now occupied by her." The defendants moved for a new trial, alleging as grounds therefor error on the part of the court in charging the jury as set forth, and in refus- ing to charge them as requested. The motion for a new trial was overruled, and a judgment was entered to that effect. The defendants ex- cepted to the judgment, and a bill of exceptions was made and certified to the Supreme Court of Georgia, to which the defendants took the case by a writ of error. The plaintiff having died, leaving a will which was duly admitted to probate, her executrix and sole legatee, Georgia Benton, was made a party in her place. The case was heard in the supreme court, and it affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of Richmond County, in an opinion reported
« PreviousContinue » |