The acts provided only for horse power. But the advantages of steam locomotion were so urgently represented by George Stephenson that, in 1823, Parliament amended the charter of the Stockton & Darlington Railway, granted two years before, giving power to use steam-engines. In view of the fact that no feature of railway management is so objectionable as discrimination in favor of through freight, it is noteworthy that, in order to prevent this becoming a coal line to shipping ports, a clause was inserted in its charter limiting the charge for hauling coal to Stockton for shipping purposes to d. per ton per mile, whereas the rate allowed for all transportation of local traffic was continued at 4d. It was believed such a low rate would entirely stop the through trade; yet, not only did it prove profitable, but it established a precedent in favor of lower rates for large quantities of the same through freight that has since been a source of increasing complaint.

Ten years afterward, on the passage of the Liverpool & Manchester Railway Act, in addition to the maximum rate clause, another was inserted that, if the dividend should exceed ten per cent., an abatement should be made from the maximum tonnage rates of five per cent. on the amount thereof for each one per cent. which the company might divide over and above a dividend of ten per cent. on its capital.

Although owning the roads, railway companies were not originally intended to have a monopoly or preferential use of the means of communication on their lines. Provision was made enabling all persons to use the road as canals are used. So long as cattle and horses supplied the motive power this was practicable, but the application of steam created a revolution in transportation. It was found impracticable for any or every man to run his own cars; and, in order to insure a profit, the companies were forced to

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monopolize the conduct of the lines and become common carriers.

Considerable stress has recently been laid upon the public character of the first railways, and the original charters have been quoted to show that they were not designed to be monopolies. The people are reminded that they still have the right to run their own cars upon the several railroads. Let us consider the feasibility of the plan. A man goes into the Lake Shore Railway office, at Chicago, and says: "I want to start a daily train for New York, at 11 A. M;" another, "I want to start a train at 3 o'clock;" and a third wants to start one at 5 o'clock. Very well, gentlemen," remarks the officer; "start them as you wish." But the man whose train leaves at 11 o'clock will find that he has not patronage enough to pay expenses, and the one who selected 3 o'clock will fare little better, while the 5 o'clock train is crowded. Why? Simply because to start at 11 or 3 o'clock breaks into a day, whereas 5 o'clock is at the close of office hours, is the most convenient time, and, perforce, monopolizes the travel. The 11 and 3 o'clock men then demand that their trains shall be started at 5 o'clock. And they are denied, simply because a railway track is not like an old turnpike road, where vehicles turn out to allow others to pass. The train going at a fixed time has the right of way, and, to prevent collision, becomes a monopoly. Were every one allowed common use of the single track, in the manner of a highway-to start out at their pleasure some one's car that could not get out of the way would be getting run into continually. This certain result was so apparent to a select committee of the House of Commons, appointed in 1840 to investigate the subject, that they concluded the public right to run their own cars on the railways was, practically, a dead letter for three sufficient

reasons: "(1.) Because no provisions had been made for insuring to independent trains and engines access to stations and watering places along the lines. (2.) Because the rates for toll limited by the act were almost always so high as to make it difficult for independent persons to work at a profit. (3.) Because the necessity of placing the running of all trains under the complete control of one head interposed numerous difficulties in the way of independent traders." To which conclusions the committee sensibly added: 'That, however, improvidently Parliament may, in the first instance, have granted to the railway companies such extensive powers, it is now advisable to interfere with them as little as possible."

Complaints against the railways still being persistently urged, in 1844 another Select Committee, after giving the question a more thorough consideration than it had hitherto received, observed that "the complaint of monopoly urged against railways was an indication of the benefits they had conferred on the country, as it was not by force of special privileges bestowed upon them, but by superior accommodation and cheapness, that they had acquired the command of traveling in their district; that railway enterprise should be encouraged; that the country still afforded great scope for the extension of the railway system; that Parliament should take no step which would induce so much as a reasonable suspicion of its good faith with regard to the integrity of privileges already granted, because one of the elements of encouragement to future undertakings was just and equitable dealings with those already established." The foregoing italicised words, taken from the Parliamentary Blue Book of 1867, page 11, are as pertinent as though written yesterday for the infatuated people of Illinois to ponder over to-day. Disastrous will it be alike for us and the too-confiding foreigners, whose

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money rendered the West habitable, if the admonitions of recorded experience are blindly disregarded.

In the earlier days the cars of one company were not transferred to the tracks of another; consequently the expense and inconvenience of making the change were very great, to obviate which, a railway clearing-house was established in London by voluntary association of the companies, and was afterward recognized by Parliamentary act of Incorporation, in 1850. One delegate from each company constituted a committee who were empowered to recover all balances due from the companies.

It was about this time that the tendency to consolidate became alarming. The first railways were very short lines. The one extending from London to Liverpool was owned by three separate companies; disagreements between the several managements were frequent, to the great inconvenience of the public. When, therefore, the interests of both the companies and the public suggested unity of management, Parliament freely bestowed authority to consolidate.

As the localities increased in population, additional railroads were constructed, creating such active competition that the stronger companies found it expedient to buy up their rivals. This "offensive and defensive" policy aroused public hostility, because it deprived the people of competition— their only hope of protection from monopoly. Parliament was importuned to restrict amalgamation. Various expedients were suggested. The one finally adopted empowered Parliament to determine the conditions upon which the future consolidations should be made. But the principle thus laid down was practically ignored. Consolidations continued to be made whenever the interests of corporations drew them together. Failing, therefore, to prevent them, Parliament sought to insure such advantages as would in

duce the companies to remain separate. Inability to secure good running arrangements with connecting lines was the great disadvantage under which the separate lines labored. This difficulty the most stringent legislation failed to remove. No legal enactment could impel the roads to work as harmoniously as single ownership; and the result was that the route managed by one directory possessed advantages over that composed of several disjointed lines separately owned. Still the public would not accept the situation; and, so recently as last year, a Royal Commission, appointed to investigate the subject, made their report in a blue book, containing over one thousand pages, in which the present system of railway management throughout Europe is comprehensively reviewed. The evidence of some fifty experts, and several unprejudiced witnesses is given verbatim; the experiences of France, Belgium, Austria, and Prussia are succinctly stated; and the conclusions arrived at are summed up by the Commissioners, in a statement of which the opening words are an index of the whole: "Past amalgamations have not brought with them the evils which were anticipated."

The policy of the French Government averted consolidation by preventing the construction of more railways than would adequately accommodate the districts. Thus, while in France there was only one mile of railway open to twenty-six square miles of country, in England there was one to about six miles of territory. The result was that railways in France were assured all the business they could handle.

In Belgium, many of the lines were constructed by the State and leased to individuals, who are guaranteed the same protection assured in France.

In Prussia, competing lines are not allowed until thirty