Crown:

(i.) Ch. D.-Gold Mining-Mixture of Minerals-Right of Subject to Work1 Will. & M., c. 30; 5 Will. & M., c. 6; 55 Geo. III., c. 134.-The fact that quartz rock contains lead, copper, iron, and other minerals besides gold, in quantities so small that the rock could not be profitably worked for such minerals, does not entitle a subject to work the rock for gold without a licence from the Crown.-A.-G. v. Morgan, 59 L.J. Ch. 772; 63 L.T. 337; 39 W.R. 169.

Duress:

(ii.) Ch. D.-Stifling Prosecution.-The plaintiff, a married woman, sued to set aside a mortgage executed by her to the trustees of a loan society to secure moneys misappropriated by her husband, who had been secretary to the society, alleging that the deed had been executed under threats of a criminal prosecution against him. Held, that it was shewn that though there might have been no threat used against her, yet it had been conveyed to her, either by the trustees, or by her husband, or their agent, that he would be prosecuted unless some step was taken to prevent it, and that the deed had been executed by her with the motive of so doing, and must therefore be set aside.McClatchie v. Haslam, 63 L.T. 376.

Easement:

(iii.) Ch. D.-Ancient Lights—Present and Future Damage-Injunction or Damages. Where the right of the plaintiff to relief in an action to restrain the obstruction of ancient lights rests mainly on damage likely to accrue within a reasonable time, but not suffered in the present, the Court will grant an injunction, and not give compensation by way of damages. The possible future use of the plaintiff's premises must be considered in granting an injunction or directing an inquiry as to damages. Dicker v. Popham, Radford & Co., 63 L.T. 379.

(iv.) Q. B. D.-Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874, ss. 8, 9-Representation-Second Representation.-A "representation' was made to a bishop that images had been placed in the cathedral of the diocese, which tended to encourage superstitious ideas and devotions. The bishop refused to transmit it, and an application for a mandamus to direct him to do so was still sub judice. A second representation was made to the effect that the images had, in fact, encouraged superstitious ideas and devotions. The bishop refused to transmit it, on the ground that it was in substance the same as the former. On an application for a mandamus, held, by Stephen, J., that the application differed materially from the former one, and that the mandamus ought to go; held, by Hawkins, J., that it ought not to go, as, if the new matter disclosed a new offence, it was not within the Act, and that if it did not, the representation was substantially the same as the former; and further, that as the bishop had stated that he "had considered the whole circumstances of the case," there was no appeal from his opinion. —Reg. v. Bishop of London (No. 2), 39 W.R. 141.

Conviction under

(v.) Q. B. D.-School Board — Vacancy · "Crime" Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act, 1887-Elementary Education Act, 1870, Sched. II., Part I., r. 14.-A member of an English School Board was imprisoned in Ireland by a Court of Summary Jurisdiction for "unlawfully taking part in a criminal conspiracy to interfere

with the administration of the law " in a proclaimed district in Ireland. Held, that he had been "punished with imprisonment for a crime," and that his office was vacant.-Conybeare v. London School Board, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 118: 63 L.T. 651.

Extradition:

(i.) Q. B. D.-Political Offence-Habeas Corpus--Jurisdiction of Magistrate -Extradition Act, 1870, s. 3.—An offence of a "political character" for which a fugitive criminal is not to be surrendered, is a crime "incidental to and forming part of a political disturbance." On an application for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court before which the application is made may review the whole evidence brought before it, whether such evidence was brought before the committing magistrate or not.-E. p. Castioni, 39 W.R. 202.

(ii.) H. L.-Appeal-Judicature Act, 1873, s. 19.-There is no right of appeal from an order of the High Court of Justice granting a habeas corpus and discharging a prisoner.-Bell Cox v. Hakes and Lord Penzance, L.R. 15 App. Cas. 506; 63 L.T. 392; 39 W.R. 145.

(iii.) C. A.-Divorce-Access to Children-Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 8. 35. When a wife is divorced on the ground of her adultery, the judge has full discretion as to allowing her access to the children of the marriage. A marriage being dissolved on account of the wife's adultery the custody of the children was given to the father, and no declaration was made as to access by the mother. The father permitted her to see them for some time, and afterwards withdrew his permission. The judge refused her application for an order for access, and the Court of Appeal affirmed his decision.-Handley v. Handley, 63 L.T. 535; 39 W.R. 97.

(iv.) Ch.

D.-Divorce-Access—Jurisdiction—Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886. A husband obtained a divorce on the ground of his wife's adultery, and was given the custody of the infant child. The mother applied to the Chancery Division for an order allowing her access. Held, that the Divorce Court had full power to make orders as to access, and that if the Chancery Division had also power to make an order, it ought not to be exercised in a case where the Divorce Court had dealt with the matter.-Manders v. Manders, 63 L.T. 627. (v.) P. D.-- Divorce Husband's Suit - Verdict Against Co-respondentDismissal as Against Respondent.-In a husband's suit for divorce on the ground of adultery, the respondent did not file any answer or appear. The jury found a verdict against the co-respondent, and con. demned him in damages. The Court, not being satisfied with the evidence against the wife, directed her to be summoned. She was examined by the Court, and cross-examined, and the Court being satisfied that she had been forced, dismissed the petition as against her, but gave judgment against the co.respondent for damages and costs.-Long v. Long, L.R. 15 P.D. 218.

(vi.) P. D.-Restitution of Conjugal Rights - Order for Allowance.-The wife having failed to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights obtained by her husband, the Court ordered her to make him an

allowance of £200 per annum, with liberty to deduct £75 per annum till she had recouped herself the amount of a debt due to her by her husband for money lent to him. The Court refused to enter into a minute debtor and creditor account between the parties, referring to the time when they were living together.-Swift v. Swift, 63 L.T. 711. See Practice, p. 55, v.

Infant:

(i.) C. A.-Illegitimate Child-Rights of Mother.—The mother of an illegiti. mate child is entitled to its custody, unless she proved to be unfit to have control of it. She does not lose her rights over the child by com. mitting it to the care of another person for the purpose of its education, and the Court will assist her to regain its custody. She has also the right to nominate a guardian for the child, whom the Court will appoint if he be a fit and proper person.--Reg. v. Barnardo; Jones's Case, 39 W.R. 195.

See Married Woman, p. 48, 5. Practice, p. 55, v.

Justices:

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Discretion-Declining Jurisdiction.-Upon an application for a summons for penalties for which a company was liable for failing to complete a reservoir, the justices refused to hear the application, on the ground that the present prosecutor had previously taken out a summons for an offence of the same kind, which was dismissed on legal grounds. Held, that the justices were wrong in declining jurisdiction, and that they must be ordered by mandamus to hear the application.Reg. v. Bryde and The Pontypool Gas Co., 63 L.T. 645; 39 W.R. 171. Landlord and Tenant :

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Covenant to Repair-Breach-Ejectment-Compensation in Money-Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 14, sub-s. (1).—Action for ejectment for breach of covenant to repair, the landlord claiming a sum paid by him as a surveyor's fee as "a reasonable compensation in money for the breach." The jury found that the premises were out of repair at the time of the notice given by the landlord, but could not agree whether they were so at the date of the writ. Held, that the landlord could not recover possession, as it was incumbent on him to prove want of repair at the date of the writ. Held, also that the landlord could not claim payment of the surveyor's fee.-Skinners' Company v. Knight, 63 L.T. 698.

Lease:

(iv.) Ch. D.—Usual Covenants –Re-entry-Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 14. --An agreement for a lease of houses provided that the lease should contain the usual and proper covenants "to insure from loss by fire, repair, and pay rent and all outgoings that may be charged on the property and ground." The lease, as settled by the conveyancing counsel of the Court, contained a proviso for re-entry, not only for nonpayment of rent, but for breach of any of the covenants and agreements contained in the lease. Held, that the proviso for re-entry must be limited to non-payment of rent.-In re Anderton and Milner's Contract, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 476; 59 L.J. Ch. 765; 63 L.T. 332; 39 W.R. 44.

Libel:

(v.) Q. B. D.-Municipal Corporation-Action by-Allegation of Corruption. -In an action by a municipal corporation for libel, the alleged libel was the publication of statements that bribery and corruption existed in the

municipal offices, and that the plaintiffs were either parties thereto or culpably ignorant thereof. There was no allegation in the pleadings that the property of the corporation had been injured. Held, that the action would not lie. Mayor, &c., of Manchester v. Williams, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 94; 60 L.J. Q.B. 23.

Licensing:

(i.) Q. B. D.—Provisional Grant-Final Order-Variation in Plans Licensing Act, 1872, s. 37-Licensing Act, 1874, s. 22.-A provisional licence had been granted upon plans which had been confirmed by the confirming committee. The plans had been prepared for a site on a level surface, whereas the site was on a slope, and it became necessary to make certain alterations in the plans. The premises having been completed in accordance with the altered plans, held, that as they were as nearly as possible in accordance with the original plans, and there was no substantial variation, that is, no variation which made the premises less fit for their purpose than if the plans had been accurately followed, the licensing justices had power to allow the variation, and were bound to grant the final order.-Reg. v. Pownall, 63 L.T. 418.

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Sale of Liquor-Marked Measure-Licensing Act, 1872, s. 8.-A publican was requested by a customer to sell him a "blue" of beer. A "blue was well known in the locality as a vessel of a particular shape, containing about one third of a quart. The beer was drawn direct into the "blue," and not into a measure marked according to the Imperial Standard. Held, that the publican was rightly convicted of selling intoxicating liquor by retail, and not in cask or bottle, and in a quantity not less than half-a-pint, otherwise than in a measure marked according to the Imperial Standard.-Payne v. Thomas, 60 L.J. M.C. 3; 63 L.T. 456.

Limitations:

(iii.) Ch. D.—Mortgage of Reversionary Interest--Remedy on CovenantRemedy Against Property Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, ss. 2, 8.-In 1870, A., B. and C., mortgaged reversionary shares in a fund in Court to which B. and C. were entitled. A. and C. jointly and severally covenanted for the payment of principal and interest. In 1873 the mortgagee recovered judgment against C. on her covenant. In 1889 the reversionary interests fell into possession. No interest had ever been paid on the mortgage or judgment, and no acknowledgement had been given. Held, that although the personal remedy against C. was barred, the assignment of the mortgaged property was good, and that the mortgagee was entitled to C.'s share of the fund in Court.In re Lake's Trust, 63 L.T. 416.

(iv.) C. A.-Title Deed-Detinue-Conversion-Accrual of Cause of Action. -The plaintiff was owner of leaseholds. X., who had possession of the lease, deposited it with B. to secure repayment of a loan to himself, and signed a memorandum of deposit. B. became bankrupt, and his trustee transferred all his interest under the memorandum and the lease to the defendant. The plaintiff demanded the return of the lease, which was refused, and commenced his action for detinue and conversion more than six years after the original deposit with B. Held, that there was no cause of action till the defendant's refusal to return the lease, and that the Statute of Limitations was no bar. Semble, that the deposit was not a conversion of the lease.-Miller v. Dell, 63 L.T. 693.

See Trustee, p. 65, v.

Local Government:

(i.) Ch. D.-Main Road-" Roadside Wastes"-Vesting-County CouncilLocal Government Act, 1888, s. 11, sub-ss. 1, 6.-Strips of grass bordering the metalled part of a main road are "roadside wastes," and the herbage thereon does not vest in the county council. At the instance of the tenant for life of a manor which included the waste land adjoining certain highways and his tenauts, an injunction was granted restraining the county council from cutting and removing the grass, timber, and other growths from the sides of the main road, the county council having sold the grass by the side of the main road to T. for a year.-Curtis v. Kesteven County Council, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 504; 63 L.T. 543; 39 W.R. 199.

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Police Districts-Local Government Act, 1888, ss. 3, 9, 28, 30, 81.-The power of altering police districts is now vested in the standing joint committee instead of in quarter sessions.-E. p. Leicestershire County Council, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 53; 39 W.R. 160.

(iii.) H. L.-Powers for Lighting-General and Special Expenses-Assessment of Railway-Public Health Act, 1875, ss. 161, 207, 211, 229, 230, 276, 295.- Decision of C. A. (see Vol. 15, p. 47, vi.) affirmed.L. & Y. R. Co. v. Bolton Union, L.R. 15 App. Cas. 323; 63 L.T. 358.

Married Woman:

(iv.) Q. B. D.-Innkeeper-Lien for Charges-Wife's Separate Effects.Where a husband and wife stay together at an inn, the innkeeper's lien for his charges extends to effects which are the separate property of the wife.-Gordon v. Silber, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 491; 59 L.J. Q.B. 507; 63 L.T. 283; 39 W.R. 111.

(v.) Ch. D.-Infant-Marriage Settlement-Voidable Covenant-Ratification. -By an ante-nuptial settlement, the wife being then a minor, the husband covenanted, and the wife agreed that she should, when she attained twenty-one, assign certain property to the trustees on the trusts declared by the settlement; and it was also agreed that her afteracquired property should be assigned on the same trusts. The husband and wife, after she attained twenty-one, assigned the specified property to the trustees, the deed not being acknowledged by the wife. The husband and wife afterwards appointed a new trustee under a power contained in the settlement, the deed not being acknowledged by the wife. She afterwards, on becoming entitled to certain property, repudiated the covenant to settle after-acquired property, and elected not to be bound by it. Held, that the fact that she had joined in an appointment of a new trustee did not, by itself, constitute an election to ratify the settlement.-Haywood v. Tidy, 63 L.T. 679.

(vi.) C. A.-Indemnity — Liability-Separate Estate - Trader.

Where a married woman is carrying on a trade, it must be assumed, unless the contrary is shown, that she has separate estate. Where a firm, in which such married woman is a partner, carrying on business abroad, was entitled to the benefit of an indemnity against the claims of A., who had commenced an action and obtained judgment against the firm, but no execution had been issued under the judgment, and it appeared that the married woman resided abroad and had no property in this country, held, that she was not damnified by the judgment, and was not entitled to relief under the contract of indemuity (see Vol. 15, p. 124, iv.)— Eddowes v. Argentine Loan and Mercantile Agency Co., 63 L.T. 364.