(i.) Ch、 D.— Writ-Special Indorsement—Interest-R.S. C., 1883, O. iii., r. 6. The indorsement on the writ claimed to have a legacy of £2,750 bequeathed by the will of B., "which has remained unpaid by reason of a breach of trust on the part of the defendants," paid by the defendants, with interest from April 12th, 1885. B.'s will had directed that interest on the legacy should be paid from the death of his wife, who died on April 12th, 1885. Held, that the writ was specially indorsed, as the interest was claimed as payable under the will, and not by way of damages.-Hamilton v. Brogden, 60 L.J. Ch. 88.

(ii.) C. A.-Writ-Service-Foreign Firm-Alleged Partner within_Jurisdiction.-R.S.C., 1883, O. ix., r. 6; 0. xi.-In an action against a foreign firm, having no place of business in England, all the partners being resident and domiciled abroad, the writ was served on K., who was alleged to be a partner, while temporarily in England. He appeared, and applied to have the writ set aside, on the ground that he was not a partner. Held, by the majority of the Court, that the service was bad as against the firm; but that if the plaintiff should elect to amend the writ so as to state that K. was sued together with the other partners (naming them), the service should stand as against him, as he had waived the irregularity in the nomenclature of the writ by appearing. -Western National Bank of the City of New York v. Perez Triana & Co.; Koppel's Appeal, L.R. [1891] 1 Q. B. 304; 39 W.R. 245.

(iii.) C. A.-Winding-up-Staying Action.-When a petition to wind up a company has been presented in the Chancery Division, an application to stay an action against the company in the Queen's Bench Division, must be made in the last-mentioned Division.-In re General Service Co-operative Stores, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. D. 496; 64 L.T. 228.

(iv.) Ch. D.—Winding-up-Petition for Supervision Order-AmendmentCompulsory Order-Advertisement.-In accordance with resolutions for the voluntary winding-up of a company, a shareholder and the liquidator presented a petition for a supervision order. The petition was amended by adding a statement that difficulties had arisen, and a prayer for a compulsory order was added. Held, that the petition must be readvertised. In re National Wholemeal Bread & Biscuit Co., 39 W.R. 380.

Principal and Surety :

(v.) C. A.-Discharge of Surety-Giving Time.—By a covenant in a mortgage deed A., the mortgagor, and the defendant, as his surety, covenanted for the payment of the mortgage debt of £450, on March 4th, 1858. In December, 1884, the said mortgage and other mortgages given by A. were consolidated, the plaintiff advancing a large sum for payment of the various mortgage debts, and taking assignments of such debts and the mortgaged properties, "with the full benefit of the covenants" contained in the various mortgage deeds; and A. covenanted with the plaintiff for the payment of the sum so advanced on January 19th, 1885. The defendant was not a party to the deed carrying out the transaction. Held, that the last-mentioned covenant necessarily implied that A. could not be sued for the £450 due under the first-mentioned deed before January 19th, 1885, and that there was a giving of time to the principal debtor by which the surety was discharged.-Bolton v. Buckenham, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 278; 39 W.R. 293. (vi.) Ch. D.- Surety for Mortgagor-Discharge.- Where a person joins in a mortgage as surety for the mortgagor by giving security and covenanting for payment of the mortgage debt, if the surety is discharged from liability on the covenant by reason of alteration of the contract with the principal debtor, the security given by the surety is also discharged. -Bolton v. Salmon, 60 L.J. Ch. 239; 64 L.T. 222.

Railway :

(i.) Q. B. D.-Passenger Travelling without Paying Fure-Demand of Fare - Criminal Proceedings.-Where a person has travelled in a carriage of a higher class than that for which he has taken a ticket, and the excess fare has been demanded and refused, the railway company is not debarred by such demand from proceeding criminally against such person.-Noble v. Killick, 60 L.J. M.C. 61.

(ii.) Railway Commission Court.-Undue

Preference-ParcelsForwarding Agent.-A., a carrier of goods and parcels, complained that a railway company instead of delivering the parcels sent by him over the company's line to his agents, deuvered the parcels to the addressees either themselves or by their agents, and further that the company allowed their agents to deliver parcels to the addressees at rates and charges less than those at which they performed the same services for A. Held, that the company had treated themselves and their agents with undue preference.-Ford & Co. v. L. & S.W.R., 60 L.J. Q.B. 130; 63 L.T. 841.

(iii.) Railway Commission Court. - Undue Preference Grouping Rates-Reasonable Distances-Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, s. 29. -Ironworks were situated at distances of 18, 27, 28 and 38 miles respectively from X. The respondent company carried coke and pig. iron to and from the works from and to X., and fixed a uniform rate of carriage for the pig-iron to X. from all the works, and also a uniform rate of carriage for coke from X. to all the works, with the exception that the nearest works were charged sixpence per ton less for coke than the others. Held, that the uniform rate for pig-iron constituted an undue preference against the nearest works, but that the allowance in respect of coke was sufficient considering the distance between the works.-North Lonsdale Iron & Steel Co. v. Furness Railway Co., 64 L.T. 122.

Registration :

(iv.) C. A.-County Vote-Ownership-Description of Qualification-Power to Amend. Decision of Q. B. D. (see Vol. 16, p. 58, vi.) affirmed.-Plant v. Potts, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 256; 60 L.J. Q.B. 33; 63 L.T. 730.

(v.) Q. B. D.-Claim of Vote-Agent-Delegation of Authority.—The appellant had signed an authority to an agent to claim a vote for him, and to sign his, the appellant's, name, and to appear and support the claim. The agent delegated his authority to sign the claim to his clerk. Held, that the claim was good, and the signature of the agent's clerk, acting under his instructions, was the same as though the agent had signed it himself.— Brown v. Tombs, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 253; 60 L.J. Q.B. 38; 64 L.T. 114.

(vi.) Q. B. D.-Freehold Qualification-Member of Chapter. The canons residentiary of a cathedral, who are entitled, under 4 & 5 Vict., c. 39, s. 25, to a fixed share in the corporate revenues, have no freehold qualification in respect of shares in the freehold lands of the corporation.-Harris v. Phillips, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 267.

Restraint of Trade :

(vii.) C. A.-Agreement-Construction.-Agreements in restraint of trade are to be construed according to the principles of construction applicable to all other agreements, and there is no prima facie presumption against their validity. The test in each case of the validity or invalidity

of an agreement in restraint of trade made between a master and his servant, is whether on the true construction of the agreement, the restraint is not or is, having regard to the nature of the business and the character of the employment, greater than is reasonably necessary for the protection of the master.-Mills v. Dunham, 39 W.R. 289.

Revenue:

(i.) Q. B. D.-Income Tax-English Company-Business Abroad-Profits Earned Abroad and Not Remitted—5 § 6 Vict., c. 35, s. 100—16 § 17 Vict, c. 34, s. 2, Sched. D.-A banking company, registered under the Joint Stock Companies Acts, had its chief office in London, and had foreign branches. For the purpose of paying dividends, which were paid in London, no distinction was made between profits earned abroad and profits earned in the United Kingdom. Part of the profits earned abroad was not remitted to this country. Held, that income tax was payable on the profits earned abroad, and not so remitted.-London Bank of Mexico and South America v. Apthorpe, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 383; 60 L.J. Q.B. 196.

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Income Tax-Gasworks Carried on by Corporation-Assessment of Profits.--The respondents were empowered by their Act to supply gas to private consumers after they should have lighted the town of H. They made a profit on the supply to private consumers. Held, that they must be assessed to income tax on the whole of such profit, without deducting the expenses of the public lighting.-Dillon v. Corporation of Haverfordwest, 64 L.T. 202.

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Income Tax-Exemption for Necessary Expenses-Joint Income of Husband and Wife.-A man and his wife were engaged as master and mistress of a board school at a joint salary. In order to enable her to attend to her school duties, the wife had to engage a servant to do the work of the house. Held, that the board and wages of such servant could not be deducted as an expense necessary for the performance of the duties of the employment, and that the whole income must be charged in the name of the husband under schedule E.Bowers v. Harding, 64 L.T. 201.

(iv.) Ch. D.-Legacy Duty-Annual Payment to Executor and Beneficiary for Managing Business.-A testator directed his executors and trustees to carry on his business, and authorised a beneficiary to assist in the management, and directed that each of the executors and trustees and the beneficiary should receive an annual sum so long as he should continue to manage the business. Held, that such sum was liable to legacy duty.—Thorley v. Massam, 60 L.J. Ch. 217; 64 L.T. 15; 39 W.R. 233.

(v.) C. A.-Stamp Duty- Settlement-Contingent Interest-Proper StampStamp Act, 1870, Schedule.-Decision of Q. B. D. (see Vol. 15. p. 94, vii.) affirmed.-Onslow v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 239; 60 L.J. Q.B. 138; 64 L.T. 211; 39 W.R. 373.

River:

(vi.) Q. B. D.-Pollution-Liability-Two Local Boards.-The T. Local Board owned sewerage works. The T. Local Board and the W. Local Board, pursuant to the provisions of an Act of Parliament, appointed a joint committee to deal with the sewerage of their two districts. The sewerage works of the T. Board continued to be the property of the T. Board, but were managed exclusively by the joint committee. Sewage flowed from such works into the river Lea, and the Conservancy Board served a notice on the T. Board requiring them to discontinue

such flow, which notice was not complied with. Held, that the T. Board was not liable, as they had no control over the sewerage works, and so could not have "caused" or "suffered" the flow into the river within the meaning of the Lea Conservancy Act, 1868, under which the proceedings were taken. Held, also, that there was no appeal, as it was a quasi-criminal proceeding.-Lea Conservancy Board v. Tottenham Local Board, 64 L.T. 198.

Settlement:

(i.) Ch. D.-Marriage-Parol Agreement.-In 1882 A., in contemplation of a second marriage, covenanted under seal with his two daughters by his first marriage, that he or his executors should settle on them and their issue specified funds. Advances to be deducted from the sum settled. There was no power of revocation, except for the purpose of making provision for the husbands and children of the daughters. In 1887 X. married one of the daughters, on the faith, as he alleged, of representations made by A. that he would allow the daughter £300 a year, and that he had settled on her and her issue one moiety of the funds specified in the deed above mentioned. In 1889 A. purported to revoke the said deed. He had made one payment to the wife of X., which he called an "advance." Held, that the alleged promise to pay £300 a year not being in writing could not be enforced, and that marriage was not a part performance of such a parol agreement. Held, also, that the deed above mentioned was a complete settlement, and that the trusts ought to be executed, and that the sum paid by A. to his daughter could not be treated as an "advance" in diminution of the sum settled.Johnstone v. Mappin, 64 L.T. 48.

Ship :

(ii.) Ch. D.-Bill of Lading-Exceptions-Thieves.-Goods were shipped under a bill of lading which exempted the shipowner from liability for loss caused by "thieves of whatever kind, whether on board or not, or by land or sea." The goods were stolen during the stowage by some of the stevedores, who were in the shipowner's service. Held, that he was liable for the acts of his own servants, notwithstanding the exception in the bill of lading.-Steinman & Co. v. Angier Line, 39 W.R. 392. (iii.) C. A.-Charter.Party--Bill of Lading-Exceptions-" Baltic Clause."Decision of Q. B. D. (see Vol. 16, p. 24, i.) affirmed.-Serraino v. Campbell, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 283; 39 W.R. 356.

(iv.) P. D.--Charter-Party-Bill of Lading-Exceptions-Negligence of Master.-Cargo was shipped under a charter-party and bill of lading, which excepted perils of the sea, and accidents of navigation, even if caused by negligence of the master, and provided that a certificate of good stowage should be given by W., a surveyor. W. furnished a certificate which stated that the vessel could carry a dry and perishable cargo. Owing to heavy weather the vessel leaked and damaged the cargo, and the damage was increased owing to the negligence of the master in not stopping the leak, and also owing to the want of sufficient dunnage. The surveyor's certificate had not mentioned dunnage. Held, that the shipowner was not liable for the original leak as an accident of navigation, or for the negligence of the master in not stopping the leak, both being excepted perils, but that he was liable for the additional damage caused by insufficient dunnage, the certificate of the surveyor not being conclusive. The Cressington, L.R. [1891] P. 152; 60 L.J. P. 25.

(i.) C. A.- Charter Party- Cesser and Lien Clauses-Demurrage.-Where it is possible the cesser and lien clauses in a charter-party should be construed as co-extensive. The word "demurrage" in the lien clause does not cover undue detention at the port of discharge, and the charterer is, therefore, not exempted from responsibility for such detention by the cesser clause.-Clink v. Radford, 39 W.R. 355.

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Charter-Party-Cesser Clause-Demurrage.-A charter-party provided that the charterer's liability should cease when the cargo was shipped, the owner having a lien for freight. The bills of lading of the cargo contained no reference to the charter, or any clause to relieve the consignees from loss occasioned by strikes; but provided that if the consignees did not apply for the goods within twenty-four hours of the ship's arrival, the master was to be at liberty to land them at the risk and expense of the owners of the goods. On arrival in London the consignees' labourers struck, and the unloading was prolonged. Held, that the charterer was not liable, but that the consignees were liable as they had not discharged the ship within a reasonable time.-Hick v. Rodocanachi, 64 L.T. 138.

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Charter-Party-Vessel "always afloat."-By a charterparty it was agreed that A.'s ship should proceed to the N. Dock, and there load "always afloat' a complete cargo, "lighterage, if any necessary, to enable steamer to complete loading at N. Dock to be at merchant's risk and expense." The ship could have loaded her full cargo at the N. Dock, but A., to prevent her being delayed by not being able to get out when loaded, removed her to another dock, where. by lighterage became necessary. Held, that the clause as to lighterage was ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence was admitted, which shewed the intention to be that the charterer. should bear the expense of loading elsewhere, if the ship could not complete her loading at the N. Dock. Held, that A. was liable for the cost of lighterage, as the vessel could have loaded "always afloat" at the N. Dock, and the fear of detention did not justify A. in removing her.-The Curfew, L.R. [1891] P. 131; 39 W.R. 367.

(iv.) Q. B. D.-Charter-Party-Liability of Person Signing AgreementReady to receive Cargo."-The defendants agreed to charter the plaintiffs' ship by a letter signed by them and containing the words "charterers to have the option of cancelling if she (the ship) is not ready to receive cargo by the 12th Dec. next. Steamer to be loaded on usual berth terms, 2 per cent. commission to us." The defendants had made contracts with merchants for loading the ship, of which the plaintiffs had no notice, the merchants to have the power of cancelling if the vessel was not ready on the 12th Dec., and the vessel not to be considered ready unless moored "alongside" the quay. The vessel was moored with her stern touching the quay by Dec. 12th, but was not "alongside" till Dec. 18th. Held (1) that the defendants were liable as principals, having contracted in their own names without any qualification; (2) that the vessel was ready" on Dec. 12th, though not "alongside," and that the matter was not affected by an alleged custom of the port that a vessel was not considered "ready" until alongside; (3) that the contract was at an end on Dec. 12th, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages for demurrage or detention after that date.-Hicks v. Tweedy, 63 L.T. 765.

(v.) H. L.-Charter-Party-Efficiency of Ship.-A., by a charter-party, agreed to hire B.'s ship at a certain sum per month, B. to maintain the ship in an efficient state for the service, and it was stipulated that "in the event of loss of time from deficiency of men or stores, breakdown of machinery, want of repairs, or damage, whereby the working of the