were in a state of delirium tremens," " or suppose I had added to that further stories I had heard that you were utterly intoxicated in the streets." The respondent brought an action for libel against the appellant. Held, that the words were reasonably capable of being understood in a libellous sense, and that there was therefore a question to go to the jury.-Ritchie v. Sexton, 64 L.T. 210.

(i.) C. A.-Publication-Privileged Occasion.-The manager of the defendant company, in the course of business, dictated to a type.writer employed in the company's office a letter to be sent from the company to the plaintiffs. The letter was written in type, and a press copy was taken by an office boy. It was then sent to the office of the plaintiffs, where it was opened and seen by three clerks. Held, that assuming the letter to be libellous, there was a publication at both the offices, and that neither publication was on a privileged occasion.-Pullman v. Hill & Co., L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 524; 39 W.R. 263.

(ii.) P. C.-Privilege-Malice-Burden of Proof.-In cases of libel, the same considerations apply to all classes of privileged communications. If the occasion is privileged, it is not for the defendant to prove that he was acting under a sense of duty, but for the plaintiff to prove affirmatively that the defendant was acting under some other motive.-Jenoure v. Delmege, L.R. [1891] A.C. 73; 63 L.T. 814; 39 W.R. 388.

Licensing:

(iii.) H. L.-Renewal-Discretion of Justices-9 Geo. IV., c. 61, s. 1— Licensing Act, 1872, s. 42.- Decision of C. A. (sce Vol. 14, p. 40, i.) affirmed.-Sharpe v. Wakefield, 64 L.T. 180.

Limitations :

(iv.) C. A.-Cause of Action-Accrual of-Subsidence-Continuous-Public Health Act, 1875, s. 264.-In consequence of the faulty laying of a sewer by the defendants, the plaintiff's land subsided, and his houses were damaged. The damage commenced more than six months before the plaintiff commenced his action in respect of such subsidence, and went on continuously increasing until the commencement of the action. Held, that a distinct cause of action accrued in respect of the subsidence which took place during the six months before action.-Crumbie v. Wallsend Local Board, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 503.

(v.) Ch. D.-Fraud-Liability-Sum Deposited with Solicitors for Investment-Trustee Act, 1888, s. 8.-The plaintiff at different times, between 1867 and 1874, deposited money with a firm of solicitors for investment. The firm consisted of A., B., and C. A. died in 1877. Down to 1886 interest was regularly paid on the sum deposited, but part of that sum had never been invested. The action was to render the partnership estate, and subject thereto the separate estates of the partners, liable for the sum which had not been invested. The legal personal representatives of A. contested the claim, relying on the Statute of Limitations, and sect. 8 of the Trustee Act, 1888. Held, that the Trustee Act, 1888, did not apply, as the question was one of the law of partnership, not of the law of trusts, and that the Statute of Limitations did not bar the claim, as the money had got into the hands of the firm without fraud, and had been misapplied, and the partners had acted so as to conceal their frand until 1886.-Moore v. Knight, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. D. 547; 63 L.T. 831; 39 W.R. 312.

Local Government:

(i.) Q. B. D.-Costs of Quarter and Petty Session-Borough Rate---County Fund-Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, ss. 169, 248, sub-ss. 2,5,- Local Government Act, 1888, s. 35, sub-ss. 2, 5, s. 38, sub-s. 5, s. 100.-Semble, that under the Local Government Act, 1888, where the population of a borough having a separate court of quarter sessions is 10,000 or upwards, the expenses of quarter and petty sessions are payable out of the borough rates; where the population is less than 10,000, out of the county fund.-E. p. County Council of Kent and Council of Dover; e. p. County Council of Kent and County of Sandwich, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 389.

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Paving Expenses-Chapel-Trustees of Liability-Public Health Act, 1875, ss. 4, 150, 151, 257.-The defendants were trustees of a chapel consisting of two floors. The upper floor was the chapel and was used solely for public worship. The lower floor contained a lecture hall, and other rooms. The lecture hall was used as a Sunday school and an institute, the members of which paid subscriptions. Concerts and lectures were given there, and charges made for admission. A bazaar had been held there, the proceeds of which were applied to the chapel building fund. The defendants had no beneficial interest in the chapel. Held, that they were liable as "owners for the expenses of paving the portion of the street on which the chapel abutted.-Hornsey Local Board v. Brewis, 60 L.J. M.C. 48.

Lunatic:

(iii.) C. A.-Fund in Court-Charging Orders-Death of Lunatic-Adminis tration.-A sum of stock was in Court to the credit of a lunatic, so found by inquisition. Judgments had been obtained against him, and charging orders upon the stock, not to be enforceable until his death, had been made in favour of the judgment creditors. On the death of the lunatic, held, that the proceeds of the stock, to the extent of the charging orders, belonged to the judgment creditors, who must be paid in priority to any claim by the administrator.-In re Leavesley, 39 W.R. 276.

Mandamus.-See Coroner, p. 78, iv.

Marriage Settlement:

(iv.) Q. B. D.-Solvency of Settlor—13 Eliz., c. 5—Bills of Sale Act, 1878, s. 4.-A., in consideration of his intended marriage, executed an agree ment assigning to a trustee on trusts for the benefit of the intended wife, all the personal chattels and effects of which he was then possessed. He had at that time sufficient money to pay all his creditors in full, but shortly afterwards judgment was recovered against him, and his furniture was seized. Held, (1) that the furniture was included in the deed; (2) that the agreement was not void as a fraud on A.'s creditors, as he was solvent at the time of executing it; (3) that it was not a bill of sale.-Wenman v. Lyon, 64 L.T. 88; 39 W.R. 301.

Married Women:

(v.) Q. B. D.—Contract-Capacity--Separate Estate-Restraint on Anticipation-Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 1, sub-ss. 2, 3, 4.-A married woman has no power to contract with respect to or to bind her separate estate which is subject to a restraint on anticipation. A married woman, as a security for sums owing in respect of services rendered to herself and her husband, and for money lent, executed a deed of mortgage which purported to charge certain specific separate

estate. Such separate estate was subject to a restraint on anticipation, and she had at the time of executing the deed no separate estate free from such restraint. Held, that she had no power to contract as she had no separate estate free from anticipation, and, therefore, that she was not liable.-Braunstein v. Lewis, 64 L.T. 265.

(i.) Ch. D.-Conveyance by-Base Fee-Fines and Recoveries Act, ss. 1, 15, 19, 40, 77-Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 1, sub-s. 1, s. 2.A., a spinster, being tenant-in-tail in remainder of land, barred her estate tail and conveyed the land by deed duly enrolled to S. The consent of the protector of the settlement was not given, and a base fee was accordingly created. After the death of the protector of the settlement, the base fee having fallen into possession, and A. having married in 1885, A. executed a deed enlarging the base fee. The deed was not concurred in by A.'s husband, nor acknowledged by A. Held, that it was effectual.—În re Drummond & Davie's Contract, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 524; 64 L.T. 246.

(ii.) Ch. D.—Equity to a Settlement.—A married woman was entitled to reversionary interests under the wills of two persons who died before Malin's Act. The interests were sold by auction for £170, and the interests were assigned by the husband and wife by a deed acknowledged by the wife. The wife received the benefit of the £170. One of the interests fell in, and the wife became entitled to £500, of this £100 was paid to the husband, and the rest expended by him in the payment of debts and maintenance of the family. The other reversion fell in, and a sum of £500 now stood in Court to the credit of the assignee, subject to the wife's equity to a settlement, which she claimed. She had no other property. Held, that the whole sum ought to be settled.— Roberts v. Cooper, 64 L.T. 227.

(iii.) Ch. D.-Reversionary Personal Estate-Chose in Action-Life Policy. -Malins' Act applies to the reversionary legal choses in action of a married woman, such as policies of life assurance, as well as to her reversionary equitable choses in action.-Witherby v. Rackham, 39 W.R. 363.

(iv.) C. A.-Separate Estate-Restraint on Anticipation-Order for Payment of Costs-Married Women's Property Act, 1882, ss. 1 (2), 19.—A married woman was entitled to certain income for her separate use without power of anticipation. She commenced an action against the trustees of the fund, and was ordered to pay them the costs thereof, the order limiting execution to her separate estate not subject to restraint on antici. pation. At the date of the order the trustees had in their hands a sum representing arrears of her income, which had accrued due since the date of the commencement of proceedings by her. Held, that the trustees ought to have leave to retain their costs out of such sum.-Cor v. Bennett (No. 2), 39 W.R. 401.

(v.) Q. B. D.-Separate Property-Action for Tort-Damages-Married Women's Property Act, 1882. s. 1, sub.s. 2, s. 5.-A husband and wife brought an action for tort in respect of personal injuries to the wife, and the jury awarded damages to the wife, and a sum for expenses to the husband. The whole amount recovered was paid to the plaintiff's solicitor. Held, that the amount awarded to the wife was her separate property, and that a garnishee order attaching the whole of the money in the hands of the solicitor to answer a judgment debt of the husband was invalid. -Beasley v. Roney, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 509; 39 W.R. 415. (vi.) Q. B. D.-Liability of Husband-Gift by Husband to Wife-Devolution to Husband-Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 1, sub-s. 3, s. 23.—

A deed of gift by a husband settling property on his wife to her "own proper use and benefit," with "full power and authority to sue and give receipts "constitutes such property separate estate of the wife. A married woman, having separate estate, borrowed money in 1883. On her death her husband took possession of her property without taking out administration. Held, that he was liable for the sum borrowed by the wife, but only to the extent of the property which had been her separate estate.-Surman v. Wharton, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 491; 39 W.R. 416.

Master and Servant:

(i.) C. A.-Contract of Employment-Time Certain-Breach.-The defendant, a shirt manufacturer, agreed to employ the plaintiff for five years as agent, canvasser, and traveller, the remuneration of the plaintiff to be by commission on his sales. After two years the defendant's factory was burnt, and he did not resume business. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to substantial damages for the loss of his employment, and that the defendant was not excused from fulfilling his agreement by the destruction of his factory.-Turner v. Goldsmith, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 544.

(ii.) C. A.-Forfeiture of Wages-Agreement. The plaintiff, on entering the service of the defendant company signed a written agreement providing that the company's manager might decide that wages owing to him by the company should be retained as liquidated damages for any breach of the company's rules, and that his certificate to that effect should be conclusive as between the company and the plaintiff. The plaintiff having been dismissed by the manager for a breach of the rules, brought an action for wages owing to him. The manager then, without hearing anything which the plaintiff might wish to say, signed a certificate that the plaintiff's wages were forfeited. Held, that the certificate was no defence to the action, as the manager had not given the plaintiff an opportunity of being heard on the question of forfeiture. -Armstrong v. South London Tramways Co., 64 L.T. 96.

(iii.) C. A.-Negligence of Teacher in School-Liability of Manager.- (See Vol. 16, p. 14, ii.) Held, by C. A., that the defendant was not liable for the negligence, if proved, of the teacher, as there was no relation of master and servant between them.-Crisp v. Thomas, 63 L.T. 756.

Metropolis Management:

(iv.) Q. B. D.-Closing of Passage-Michael Angelo Taylor's Act, s. 79.—The justices in special sessions have power to order the closing of a passage if it is likely to, or may possibly, become, "a harbour or receptacle for filth and rubbish," although it has not actually become so.-Reg. v. Cloete, 64 L.T. 90.

Mine:

(v.) Q. B. D.-Wages-Payment by Weight-Deduction-Coal Mines Regu lation Act, 1887, s. 12, sub-s. 1.-The plaintiffs were employed by the defendants to cut large coal at wages which depended on the weight gotten. Held, that it was not lawful for the defendants to make deductions from the wages in respect of the small coal which was found amongst the coal raised when screened at the pit's mouth.-Bruce v. Abercarn Colliery Co.; Huggins v. London & South Wales Colliery Co., L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 496.

G

Mortgage :

(i.) Ch. D.-Costs-Solicitor.-A solicitor, who is mortgagee, and acts for himself in a redemption action, is entitled to costs out of pocket, but not to profit-costs. The objection to the allowance of profit-costs need not be taken at the hearing.-Stone v. Lickorish, 64 L.T. 79; 39 W.R. 331. See Principal and Surety, p. 94, v., vi.

Municipal Corporation:

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Election-Disqualification-Interest in Contracts—Municipal Corporations Act, 1885, ss. 12, 22.-A. was a member of a firm interested in contracts with the corporation of a borough. He dissolved the partner. ship, and assigned all his interest in the contracts to the other partner, but remained liable on bonds which secured the due performance of the contracts. The corporation was no party to the assignment, and did not assent thereto, or release A. from his liability on the bonds. A. then stood as a candidate at a municipal election. His interest in the contracts, and the fact that his candidature was objected to, were matters of notoriety. Held, that A. was disqualified, and that the votes given for him were thrown away.-Cox v. Ambrose, 60 L.J. Q.B. 114.

Negligence.-See Solicitor, p. 101, i.

Notice:

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Constructive-Agent.-Notice to a solicitor's managing clerk may be notice to the solicitor's client, but not unless the solicitor, with his client's consent, has committed to the clerk the entire management of the matter which he was retained to conduct.-E. p. McGowan ; in re Ashton, 64 L.T. 28; 39 W.R. 320.

Partnership.-See Limitations, p. 84, v.

Patent:

(iv.) Ch. D.-Action for Infringement-Particulars of Breaches.-It is not the office of particulars of breaches to answer an interrogatory as to the construction of the patent, but only to tell the defendant what he has done in infringement. The plaintiffs' patent was for improvements in lamps, and the specification contained four claims, viz., for a lamp, a modified form of lamp, a method of supplying heated air, and a method of distributing the same. They brought an action for infringe. ment, and by their particulars of breaches alleged infringement by the user of the mechanism claimed in these four claims, and complained of a particular lamp sold by the defendants. The defendants applied for further and better particulars, asking what parts of the specification and figures had been infringed, which of the lamps had been infringed, and whether the plaintiffs claimed all lamps with the methods of supplying and distributing heated air, or only one of the two lamps claimed. The plaintiffs withdrew the allegation of infringement of the first claim. Held, that the particulars as so amended were sufficient.-Wenham Co. v. Champion Gas Lamp Co., and Todtenhaupt & Co., 63 L.T. 827.

v.) Ch. D.-Validity-Prior Publication-International Convention.-A person who has applied for protection for an invention in a foreign state with which an international convention for the mutual protection of inventions, &c., exists, and who within seven months from such application applies for an English patent under sect. 103, sub-sect. 1 of the Patents Act, 1883 (as amended by sect. 6 of the Patents Act, 1885),