3

UNIVERSITY Or

79

QUARTERLY DIGEST.

the plaintiff changed his solicitor. The registrar of the County Court refused to tax on the High Court scale the costs of the solicitor who acted for the plaintiff in the High Court. Held, that the solicitor was entitled to recover such costs against his client, as they did not come within sect. 48 of the County Courts Act, 1888, not being costs for work done in a County Court.—Boydell v. Millar, 39 W.R. 335.

Criminal Law:

(i.) C. C. R.-Fraud-Preparing False Evidence for an Arbitration.-The defendant was tried and convicted on a count which stated, in substance, that having been appointed by the sellers of a cargo of wheat to take samples of the cargo to be used in case the quality of the cargo should be submitted to arbitration, he had, with the intent of deceiving the arbitrator to be appointed, substituted other wheat for the samples which had been taken from the cargo, and had forwarded the false samples as if they were genuine samples taken from the cargo. Held, that the count stated an indictable offence at common law.-Reg. v. Vreones, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 360; 60 L.J. M.C. 62; 39 W.R. 365. Crown:

(ii.) C. A.-Gold Mining--Mixture of Minerals-Right of Subject to Work.Decision of Ch. D. (see Vol. 16, p. 44, i.) affirmed.-Attorney-General v. Morgan, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 432; 60 L.J. Ch. 126; 39 W.R. 324.

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Execution-Validity—Fraud.—The mortgagee in possession of property was induced by the fraud of her solicitor, and under the belief that she was signing a lease of the property, to execute a deed which falsely recited that the solicitor had agreed to pay her the amount due on the mortgage, and purported to assign to him the mortgage debt and securities for the same. Held, that the deed was void, as the mind of the mortgagee did not go with the deed, and she had not been guilty of negligence.-Favell v. Wright, 64 L.T. 85.

Ecclesiastical Law:

(iv.) Ch. D.-Sequestration-Effect of-Sequestration Act, 1871.-The rights and position of an incumbent after sequestration, except so far as they are interfered with by the express terms of the Sequestration Act, 1871, remain unaltered. A rector, therefore, after sequestration of his benefice, has the right of appointing a parish clerk.-Lawrence v. Edwards, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 144; 64 L.T. 77; 39 W.R. 411.

(v.) C. A.—Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874, ss. 8, 9—Representation— Second Representation.-See Vol. 16, p. 44, iv. Held, that the mandamus ought not to go, as the effect of the bishop's answer to the representation was that he had considered all the circumstances of the case which he honestly thought material, and it had not been shown that he had considered and acted on anything which was not a circumstance of the case.-Reg. v. Bishop of London (No. 2), 63 L.T. 819. (vi.) In the Court of the Archbishop of Canterbury.-Holy Communion-Celebration of.-The mere fact that two candles, though not required for the purpose of giving light, are kept standing on the communion table during the service is not a breach of the law. The use of a cup containing water and wine mixed beforehand is not unlawful, but the mixing of water and wine in and as part of the service is unlawful. It is not unlawful to stand during the service down to the ordering of the bread and wine on the west side of the table and not on the north side. The manual acts must be performed so as to be

visible to the congregation. The singing of the hymn Agnus Dei immediately after the prayer of consecration is not an unlawful addition to the service. The making of the sign of the cross during the absolution and benediction is an addition to the ceremonies of the church, and is unlawful. Pouring the water and wine into the paten and chalice and drinking the same is not by itself a ceremony, and where such acts are done after the benediction, and not as part of the service, they are not unlawful.-Read v. Bishop of Lincoln, L.R. [1891] P. 9.; 64 L.T. 149.

Evidence:

(i.) Ch.D.—Admissibility—Promissory Note-Stamp-Stamp Act, 1870, 8.54.-A promissory note insufficiently stamped cannot be admitted in evidence to prove the receipt of the money for which it was given.Ashling v. Boon, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 468; 64 L.T. 193; 39 W.R. 298. Executor.-See Vendor and Purchaser, p. 104, ii.

Extradition:

(ii.) Q. B. D.-English and Foreign Warrants-Description of OffenceLarceny. In proceedings under the Extradition Acts it is not neces sary that the description of the offence in the English warrant should correspond in terms with the description in the foreign warrant. It is sufficient if evidence has been brought against the prisoner in a foreign country establishing a crime by the law of that country, and if the same facts establish a crime by English law. An attorney or agent who receives money from a client to invest when a suitable investment in found, both attorney and client in the meantime seeking for such investment, has received the money for "safe custody," and, if he misappropriates it, is guilty of an offence against the Larceny Act, 1861, sect. 76.—In re Bellencontre, 39 W.R. 381.

Friendly Society :

(iii.) Q. B. D.—Misappropriation by Officer-Conviction under Statute-Bar to Action-Friendly Societies Act, 1875, s. 16, sub.-s. 9.-The defendant, an officer of a friendly society, was charged with misappropriation of the society's moneys, and, an order for payment not having been complied with, was imprisoned. The directors of the society sued him for the amount which he ought to have paid. Held, that the plaintiffs having availed themselves of their statutory remedy, and the defendant having been convicted and punished, the plaintiffs' remedy by action was barred.— Vernon v. Watson, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 400; 60 L.J. Q.B. 205. Husband and Wife :

· (iv.) C. A.—Right to Custody of Wife's Person.-The relation of husband and wife does not give the husband complete dominion over the wife's person, when unaccompanied by any circumstance of misconduct, or any approximate approach to misconduct on her part, which would entitle the husband to restrain her. Where a wife has refused to comply with a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights obtained by the husband, he is not entitled to seize her by force and keep her in confinement.-Reg. v. Jackson, 39 W.R. 407.

(v.) P. D.-Divorce-Wife's Adultery-Separation Order in Force against Husband.-In an undefended divorce suit a decree nisi for divorce was granted on the ground of the wife's adultery in favour of a husband who had been previously convicted of an aggravated assault on the wife, and against whom a separation order and an order for an allowance had been made in consequence of such assault.-Sergent v. Sergent, 64 L.T. 236.

(i.) C. A.-Divorce-Cruelty-Delay.-No general rule can be laid down as to what amount of insult or offensive conduct on the part of a husband will, in the absence of physical violence, amount to cruelty. A wife petitioned for a divorce cn the ground of adultery and cruelty. She had been separated from her husband for twenty years, and the alleged cruelty was before the separation. She explained the delay by saying that she wished to wait till her son, the only child of the marriage, was grown up. Held, that the delay was unreasonable.Beauclerk v. Beauclerk, 60 L.J. P. 20; 64 L.T. 35.

(ii.) P. D.-Divorce-Custody of Children.-A marriage being dissolved on the wife's petition, the custody of the children was given to the petitioner, and the respondent was ordered to allow her permanent maintenance. The petitioner took charge of one child, a girl, but allowed the respondent to retain the other, a boy. Subsequently, on proof that the petitioner was no longer a fit person to have charge of her daughter, and that the respondent, who had married again, was leading a respectable life, the Court made an order transferring the custody of the daughter to him, but refused to reduce the amount of the petitioner's maintenance.-Witt v. Witt, L.R. [1891] P. 163; 64 L.T. 121.

(iii.) P. D.-Divorce-Provision for Guilty Wife-Dum Sola Clause.-Provision was made for the maintenance of a wife found guilty of adultery without the insertion of a dum sola et casta clause, the provision being a bare allowance for her maintenance.-Lander v. Lander, L.R. [1891] P. 161; 64 L.T. 120; 39 W.R. 416.

(iv.) P. D.-Restitution of Conjugal Rights-Non-Compliance with OrderSettlement-Matrimonial Causes Act, 1884, s. 45.-Where an order for restitution of conjugal rights is disobeyed by the wife, the Court may order her to make an annual payment to the husband, and to secure it by settlement, although her only property is settled on herself for life without power of anticipation.-Michell v. Michell, L.R. [1891] P. 166; 64 L.T. 91.

See Married Woman, p. 86, vi.

Infant:

(v.) Ch. D.-Guardianship.-A Protestant married a Roman Catholic woman, and agreed that the children of the marriage should be educated as Roman Catholics. A daughter was born and baptised as a Roman Catholic. The father died in 1886, and the mother in 1889. M., the mother's cousin, a Protestant, had, with the mother's consent, taken care of the child during nearly the whole time from the father's death until after the mother's death, when C., the mother's brother, took forcible possession of the child, and sent it out of the country. The child was brought back under Habeas Corpus proceedings, and C. applied to have himself, and certain Roman Catholics, strangers to the child, appointed guardians. M. opposed this, and proposed herself and the child's paternal uncle, a Protestant, as guardians. Held, that C.'s conduct in taking the child away shewed him to be an unfit guardian, and that the strangers ought not to be appointed, unless the Court was 'constrained on religious grounds to appoint them. Held, also, that the Court was free to consult the best interests of the child, and that M. and the uncle ought to be appointed, with liberty to educate her as a Protestant.-In re Violet Nevin, 64 L.T. 107.

(vi.) C. A.-Liability—Bill of Exchange—Infants' Relief Act, 1874, s. 1— Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 22.-An infant cannot bind himself by

the acceptance of a bill of exchange, even though the bill is given for the price of necessaries supplied to him during infancy.-E. p. Margrett ; in re Soltykoff, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 413; 39 W.R. 337.

See Power, p. 90, iv. Practice, p. 91, iv. Will, p. 105, v.

Insurance :

(i.) C. A. & Q. B. D.—Policy—Duration—Accidents—“ Any one Accident."-By a policy of insurance against "accidents caused by vehicles" belonging to the plaintiffs, for which the plaintiffs might become liable, the defendants agreed to pay the sum of £250 in respect of any one accident. The policy declared that the plaintiffs had paid the premium for twelve calendar months, from the 24th of November, 1887. An accident happened to one of the plaintiffs' vehicles on the 24th of November, 1888, at 10.30 p.m., and caused injuries to forty persons, and the plaintiffs became liable to pay £800. Held, that the policy covered the 24th of November, 1888. Held, also, that the defendants were liable to pay the whole £800.-South Staffordshire Tramways Co. v. Sickness and Accident Assurance Association, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 402; 60 L.J. Q.B. 47; 63 L.T. 807; 39 W.R. 292.

(ii.) Q. B. D.—Ship — Mutual Association — Member. — The defendant association's articles defined members as persons, who on behalf of themselves or any other persons, insured or entered for protection any ship; and provided that any liability of a member in respect of any insurance should be deemed to be a liability to the association, and not to any other member; and also that all claims should be enforced against the association only, and not against the members, but that the association should not be liable to any member, " or other person,' except to the extent of the funds, which the association could recover from the members, "or persons liable for the same." The defendants by a policy of insurance covenanted with a firm described in the policy as a "member" to pay losses on a ship. By the terms of the policy "members" having ships entered were to make good losses on the ship according to the provisions of the articles, and there was an arbitration clause, which provided that the obtaining of a decision from the arbitrators was to be a condition precedent to the right of the " member" to maintain an action on the policy. The plaintiffs were part-owners of the ship insured. Held, that as they were not "members" of the association they could not maintain an action in their own names on the policy.-Montgomerie v. United Kingdom Mutual Steamship Association, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 370; 39 W.R. 351.

Landlord and Tenant:

(iii.) C. A.-Breach of Covenant-Assignment without Consent-MistakeRelief.-A lessee had covenanted not to assign or underlet without the landlord's consent, such consent not to be arbitrarily withheld in the case of a respectable or responsible person, and the lessor had a power of re-entry for breach of covenants. The lessee underlet part of the premises, and his solicitor having forgotten the covenant in the lease, the lessor's consent was not asked. The under-lessee was respectable and responsible, and the lessor had not suffered, and would not be likely to suffer, any injury from the underlease. Held, the omission to ask the lessor's consent was not a mistake in respect of which the Court could grant equitable relief against forfeiture, and that the lessor was entitled to re-enter.-Barrow v. Isaacs & Son, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 417; 60 L.J. Q.B. 179; 39 W.R. 342.

(iv.) Ch. D.-Covenant not to Assign-Person of Responsibility-Manufac turing Premises.-A lease of land, with an iron furnace and mill and

certain water-rights for the purpose of working the same, contained a covenant by the lessees not to assign or underlet without the consent of the lessors, "such consent not to be unreasonably refused, or refused to a person of responsibility and respectability." The lessees agreed to assign to a municipal corporation, the corporation agreeing not to use the water-rights for the purpose of manufacturing iron or steel. The lessors refused their consent. Held, that the corporation was not 8 person of responsibility and respectability" within the meaning of the covenant, and that the consent had not been unreasonably refused.Harrison, Ainslie & Co. v. Corporation of Barrow-in-Furness, 63 L.T. 834; 39 W.R. 250.

(i.) Ch. D.-Covenant to Pay Rent without Deduction-Remedying Insanitary Condition-Metropolis Local Management Acts, 1845, s. 73; 1862, s. 96.— The plaintiffs were lessees from the defendant of a house at a rent "to be paid without deduction, free and clear from all deductions for main-drainage and sewer rates, metropolitan and local improvement rates, taxes, &c.," and the lessees covenanted to pay the rent "free and clear of all deductions," and to pay all main-drainage and sewer rates, &c. (following the words of the reservation). The defendant was required by the local authority to construct a drain into the sewer, and did not comply with the demand, whereupon the local authority did the work and recovered the expenses from the plaintiffs. Held, that the payment in question was not within the express covenant in the lease, and that the covenant to pay rent without deduction could not be construed as a contract between landlord and tenant to exclude the tenant's right to deduct this payment from his rent under sect. 96 of the Act of 1862.-Home and Colonial Stores v. Todd, 63 L.T. 829. (ii.) C. A.-Lease-Proviso for Re-entry-Distress.-A lease contained a proviso for re-entry: "If and whenever any one quarter's rent hereby reserved, or any part thereof, shall be in arrear for twenty-one days, and no sufficient distress can be had or levied for the same.' quarters' rent being in arrear on March 25th, the lessor distrained more than twenty-one days after such date, but realised less than two quarters' rent. He then commenced an action to recover the premises under the proviso for re-entry. Held, that the right of re-entry accrued as often as a quarter's rent was in arrear for twentyone days, and no sufficient distress could be levied; and that, as these two conditions existed at the date of the issue of the writ, the plaintiff was entitled to recover.-Shepherd v. Berger, 39 W.R. 330. Lands Clauses Act:

Three

(iii.) Ch. D.-College-Application of Purchase Money-Universities and College Estates (Amendment) Act, 1880, ss. 2, 4.-Money which has arisen from the sale to a railway company of land belonging to a college, and which is standing in Court, cannot be applied in the manner provided by sect. 2 of the Act above-mentioned without the consent of the Board of Agriculture.-E. p. King's College, Cambridge, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 333; 39 W.R. 331.

Libel:

(iv.) H. L.-Inuendo-Reasonable Meaning of Words-Question for Jury.The respondent, a member of Parliament, asked a question in the House of Commons which implied that one C. had been guilty of improper conduct. C. wrote to the respondent to complain of the imputation, and published his letter in the appellant's newspaper. The letter contained the following passages: Supposing, for example,

I asked a question based on hearsay evidence to the effect that I heard, from a gentleman whom I would not think of doubting, that you