the sons, left no issue. Three of his brothers had left issue. Held, that the survivorship indicated in the accruer clause was survivorship, with reference to the person on whose death the share was to go over, and that W.'s share was undisposed of.-King v. Frost; Underwood v. Frost ; Price v. Frost; Plomley v. Frost, L.R. 15 App. Cas 548; 63 L.T. 422. (i.) P. D.-Exercise of Power-Subsequent Marriage-Wills Act, s. 18.-A testator made a will whereby he bequeathed all his property, including lands over which he had a power of appointment, to a lady whom he married subsequently to the execution of the will. Held, that the subsequent marriage did not entirely revoke the will. Administration with the will annexed granted to the widow, limited to property over which the testator had a power of appointment.-In the goods of Russell, 59 L.J. P. 80.

(ii.) Ch. D.-Forfeiture Clause-Interference with Management-Frivolous Action.-A testator devised a freehold estate to two trustees on trust to pay annuities to A. for life, with remainders over, and provided that if A. should interfere, or attempt to interfere, with the management of the testator's real or personal estate, the annuities should cease. The trustees entered into possession and paid the annuities. A. brought an action against the trustees, alleging that the annuities had not been paid, that the estate had been wasted, and that the buildings were out of repair, and claimed an account, an injunction, and a receiver. The Court held on the evidence that none of the charges against the trustees had been proved, and that the action was groundless and frivolous, and was an attempt to interfere with the management, and that the plaintiff had forfeited his annuities.--Adams v. Adams, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 426; 63 L.T. 442.

(iii. C. A. & P. D.-Probate-Will Procured by Beneficiary - Onus of Proof. Where a will is procured and propounded by a person taking a large benefit thereunder, it will be regarded with suspicion, although it was prepared by a solicitor, and although fraud is not pleaded in opposition, and there was no testamentary incapacity, and the onus of proving that the testator knew and approved of the contents of the will is on the person propounding it; and in default of satisfactory evidence to that effect probate will be refused.-Brown v. Fisher, 63 L.T. 465.

(iv.) P. D.-Probate-Will and Codicil-Alterations.— Iuterlineations and alterations in a will admitted to probate where it was proved that they had been inserted before the date of the execution of a codicil to the will.-Tyler v. Merchant Taylors' Company, L.R. 15 P.D. 216.

See Administration, p. 33, i. Married Woman, p. 49, i., ii.

Quarterly Digest

OF

ALL REPORTED CASES,

IN THE

Law Reports, Law Journal Reports, Law Times Reports, and Weekly Reporter,

FOR FEBRUARY, MARCH, AND APRIL, 1891.

By C. H. LOMAX, M.A., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law.

Administration:

(i.) P. D.-Grant Pendente Lite-Limited Grant.-An administrator pendente lite, who was the executor of the will in dispute, had taken out a general grant of administration, but found a difficulty in obtaining sureties to the administration bond to the full amount of the testator's estate. Held, that the grant might be limited to the amount to be received in respect of certain sums, part of the estate, which were immediately payable.—Askew v. Askew, L.R. [1891] P. 174; 64 L.T. 145. See Lunatic, p. 85, iii.

Adulteration :

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, ss. 6, 25-Written Warranty. The appellants agreed in writing with H. to be supplied daily with a certain quantity of "genuine good new milk of the best quality with all its cream on," and the vendor by the contract, warranted each supply of milk to be pure, genuine, and unadulterated. A churn containing milk supplied under the contract was labelled warranted genuine new milk with all its cream on." The milk in the churn was proved to be adulterated. Held, that the contract and the label together constituted a written warranty sufficient to discharge the appellants.-The Farmers & Cleveland Dairies Co. v. Stevenson, 60 L.J. M.C. 70; 63 L.T. 776.

Apprentice

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Refusal of Master to Maintain-Conduct of Apprentice.To an action for breach of a covenant by the master in an apprenticeship deed to keep, teach, and maintain the apprentice, it is a good defence to prove that the apprentice was an habitual thief while in his master's service.-Learoyd v. Brook, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 431.

F

or on

(i.) Ch. D.-Setting aside Award--Misconduct-Evidence of.-Motion by W. to set aside an award in favour of R. on the ground of the misconduct of the arbitrator in taking a bribe. The only evidence of the truth of the allegation was that of persons who had heard the arbitrator admit the fact in a conversation at which R. was not present. Held, that the admission was not sufficiently proved to enable the Court to set aside the award as against R.-In re Whiteley & Roberts' Arbitration, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 558; 60 L.J. Ch. 149; 64 L.T. 81; 39 W.R. 248. (ii.) H. L.- Scotch Law-Act of Regulations, 1695, s. 25.-An award of an arbitrator may, according to Scotch law, and notwithstanding the Act of Regulations, 1695, be set aside if the arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction, or disregarded the conditions of reference, or been guilty of misconduct. The appellants contracted with a railway company to construct a line, to be completed by the 30th of September, 1884, or before such respective days thereafter as might be respectively fixed by the arbiter," the appellants to be liable to pay £20 a day as compensation if the line should not be completed by the stipulated time. The contract contained an arbitration clause, and provided that a part of the second section of the line should not be formed till a certain bridge was finished. In consequence of the non-completion of the bridge, the appellants did not gain access to the ground on which such part was to be constructed till February, 1886, and the line was not completed till May, 1886. The arbitrator awarded that the respondents should have six months extension of time, but that they were liable for the delay from the 30th of March, 1885, till May, 1886. Held, that the award was good on the face of it and that there was no evidence that the arbitrator had awarded damages in respect of the delay caused by the bridge not being completed.— Adams v. Great North of Scotland Railway Co., L.R. [1891] A.C. 31. See Building Society, p. 74, v.

Banker:

(iii.) C. A.—Loan-Deposit of Securities—Enquiries as to Title.—-Decision of Ch. D. (see Vol. 15, p. 106, i.) affirmed.—Simmons v. London Joint Stock Bank ; Little v. Same, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 270; 63 L.T. 789.

See Bill of Exchange, p. 74, i.

Bankruptcy :

(iv.) C. A. & Q. B. D.—Annulment—Effect of.—The defendant's affairs were in liquidation in 1879, the plaintiff appearing as creditor for £4,000. In 1885 he signed judgment for that amount, and the liquidation was turned into a bankruptcy. The plaintiff abandoned his claim, and the bankruptcy was annulled. He afterwards revived his judgment, and issued execution thereon. Held, that though the judgment, being regular in itself, could not be set aside after such a lapse of time, it was contrary to good faith and the legal rights of the defendant to enforce it, and the execution must be set aside.-Brandon v. McHenry, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 538; 64 L.T. 59; 39 W.R. 372.

(v.) Q. B. D.-Discharge-Refusal-Second Application-Practice-Bankruptcy Act, 1883, ss. 28, 104.-Where the discharge of a bankrupt has been absolutely refused, the bankrupt cannot apply again de novo for his discharge. The Court, however, has power to entertain an application for a review, and may rescind or vary its former order if it

thinks fit. An application to review need not necessarily be founded on evidence which might have been before the Court on the first application. The general rule is, that a rehearing under seot. 104 should not be granted where the only object of the applicant is to get another opportunity for appealing when he has let the time for appealing from the original decision go by.-E. p. Tobias; in re Tobias & Co., L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 463; 64 L.T. 115; 39 W.R. 399.

(i.) C. A.—Judgment Summons-Order for Payment by Instalments--Jurisdiction. An order for payment by instalments, under sect. 5 of the Debtor's Act, 1869, cannot be made in the High Court upon a judgment summons after a receiving order has been made against the judgment debtor.-Ford v. Nuthall, 64 L.T. 241.

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Order and Disposition-Custom of Trade.-P. sent the debtor, a retail ironmonger, certain safes on sale or return. The safes remained on the debtor's premises till his bankruptcy, when they were claimed by the trustee as being in his order and disposition. Issues were tried by a jury, who found that there was a custom among whole. sale dealers in iron safes to send safes to retail dealers on sale or return, and that the custom was so well established that it ought to be known to all persons giving credit to the bankrupt in the way of his trade. Held, that the finding was correct, and that P. was entitled to the safes. -E. p. Poppleton; in re Lock, 63 L.T. 839; 39 W.R. 384.

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Provable Debt-Betting-Estoppel.-A. obtained judgment by default against a debtor for money lost in betting, and, in consideration of the debtor abandoning a summons to set aside the judgment, abstained from posting the debtor. Held, that as the consideration for the judgment was the money lost in betting, and not the abstaining from posting, the judgment debt was not provable. Where, after a receiving order had been made, the debtor's solicitor requested a creditor to prove his debt in order to vote for a scheme under which a dividend was to be paid on all provable debts, the trustee is not, after the scheme has been carried, estopped from rejecting the proof of such creditor, at any rate in the absence of proof that the scheme would not have been carried without the assistance of such creditor. An assignee from such creditor is in no better position than such creditor.-E. p. Seaton; in re Deerhurst, 64 L.T. 118.

(iv.) Q. B. D.-Proof-Voting-Contingent Debt-Surety-Bankruptcy Act, 1883, Appendix, Sched. 1, r. 9.-Even if the liability of a surety for the debtor can become the subject of proof before the debt for which he is surety has been paid, such proof could only be for an unliquidated or contingent debt, in respect of which the creditor would not be entitled to vote.-E. p. Whittaker; in re Parrott, 63 L.T. 777; 39 W.R. 400. (v.) Q. B. D.-" Property "-Salary-Assignment of-Chaplain to Workhouse. A chaplain to a workhouse, appointed and paid by the guardians, but liable to dismissal only by the Local Government Board, is not a public officer so as to render a charge by him on his salary invalid as against his trustee in bankruptcy.-In re Mirams, 64 L.T. 117.

(vi.) Ch. D.—Scheme of Arrangement—Approval of Court-After acquired Property-Bankruptcy Act, 1883, ss. 18, 28, 44.-In the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in a scheme of arrangement approved by the Court, the scheme only operates to convey to the trustee the property to which the debtor is entitled at the date of the approval of the scheme by the Court, and the approval by the Court operates as a discharge of the debtor.-England v. Provincial Assets Co., 64 L.T. 53; 39 W.R. 286.