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assistants should be put into Class 5. Schedule 6 provides for the appointment of assistants and junior assistants. S., before the passing of the Act, held a certificate which entitled her to fill the oflice of assistant teacher in any State school. Held, that Schedule 6 was prospective only, and that S. had a status which entitled her to be put into Class 5, and that the classifiers had no right to classify her as a “ junior assistant teacher.”—Main v. Stark, 63 L.T. 10.
(i.) C11. D.—Direcfors—Misfeasance—-Crass NegIigence—- Committee of Direci0rs—Qu.0rum.—“ Misfeasance " under sect. 165 of the Companies Act, 1862, includes such non-feasance as is negligence amounting to a breach of trust. Liability for negligence cannot be imputed to the directors under this section unless it is crass negligence resulting in loss. To constitute crass negligence there must be a mischievous or reckless doing or abstaining from doing some particular thing which it was the plain duty of the directors not to do or to do. The burden of showing crass negligence is on those who allege it; but where the facts establish crass negligence, but show that a satisfactory explanation is possible, the burden of proof is shifted. Directors of a company (acting within their powers) resolved that all the powers of the Board hedelegated to a committee of three, no quorum being appointed. Held (1), that all the members of the committee must be present at a meeting, though they need not be unanimous; (2), that they could not appoint other members either in addition to or to fill a vacancy on the committee.—In re Liverpool Household Stores Association, 59 L.J. Ch. 616; 62 L.T. 873.
(ii.) Ch. D.—Direclor—Resignation—Pr0fifs out of Ca,pital—Liability—Secrelary.—-In the case of a company governed by Table A., a director’s resignation conveyed to his co-directors is not effectual, and such director retains his oifice and responsibility until his resignation has been accepted by a general meeting. From the year 1881 onwards reports and balance-sheets were issued in the names of the directors showing profits, in respect of which dividends and bonuses were paid. No profits were really made in the years 1881 to 1884, a large liability having been left out of the balance-sheets of those years, and the dividends and bonuses were really paid out of capital. The directors did not personally investigate the reports, but adopted what was laid before them by the secretary. Held, that all the directors were liable for the dividends and bonuses paid out of capital from 1881 to 1884 with interest. Held, also that the secretary was liable for the sums so paid out of capital for six years from the date of the writ, the Statute of Limitations applying to his case.—Mu-nicipal Freehold Land Sociely v. Pollington, 63 L.T. 238.
The deed of settlement of a company required that twenty-one days notice of any extraordinary general meeting should be advertised, and that the objects of the meeting should be specified. The directors advertised an extraordinary general meeting, and stated that a special resolution would be proposed toalter the deed of settlement in the following particulars : “ to alter the scale of voting by giving to every qualified shareholder one vote for every share." The resolution proposed was: “That every proprietor shall have one vote for every share, provided that no proprietor shall be entitled to vote at any general meeting in respect of any share unless registered as holder of such share for at least six calendar months prior to such general meeting.” The chairman refused to allow the plaintiff to put an
amendment, the plaintiff did not challenge such ruling, but moved the rejection of the resolution, which was carried. Held (1). that the resolution was covered by the notice; and (2), that the plaintifi must be taken to have waived any irregularity in the chairma1i’s ruling.Hend/erson v. Bank of Australasia, 62 L.T. 869.
(i.) Ch. D.—Sha.res—- Allolment—RepucZ|'ation.—Winding-Up—Relief.—S. applied for shares in s. compauy,pn.ying nothing on application,and received notice of allotment. He shortly after ascertained that the company was, as he alleged, a bogus company, and gave notice that he withdrew his name. He was afterwards told that the directors had been advised that they could not make him liable as a shareholder, and, therefore, took no steps to have his name taken off the register. The company was wound up, and S. was placed on the list of contributories. Held, that under the circumstances, his name could not be taken ofi the list.— Re The Lennox Publishing C0. ,- e. p. Storey, 62 L.T. 791.
(v.) Ch. D.—Newspaper Comments.—-A newspaper published articles reflecting on the conduct of the directors of a company. A winding-up petition was presented, and a cross-examination of the directors was about to be held. The newspaper published an article commenting on the petition, and with reference to the cross-examination said : “ If they are compelled to make a full statement of the afiairs of the bank we shall have some interesting revelations.” The Court found that the articles were instigated by the petitioning shareholder. On motion to commit the publisher of the newspaper, he was ordered to pay a fine of £50 and costs.—In re Crown Bank, L.R. 44: Ch. D. 649.
(vi.) C. A.—-Con./lict of La'ws—Fore''gn Bankruptc'y.—A party to a contract made and to be performed in England is not discharged from liability thereunder by a discharge in bankruptcy or liquidation under the law of a foreign country in which he is domiciled.—Antony Gibbs gs’ Sons v. Société Industriells des Métauw, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 399.
(viii.) Ch. D.—Incapuciiy—Unsoumcl M1'ml.—Action for specific performance of a contract for sale. Defence, unsoundness of mind and incapacity on the part of the vendor. It was held that the vendor, who was eighty years old, suflered from general enfeeblement of mind, and from brain disease and insanity produced thereby, and also from insanity evidenced by delusions. One of such delusions entered to some extent into the
matter of the contract, but not so fnr as to form the foundation of it. The medical evidence was that the vendor, though capable to some extent of transacting business, was not competent to enter into the contract, which, however, was reasonable and simple. There was strong lay evidence that he understood the contract. Held, that the contract ought to be enforced, the Court being of opinion that the vendor understood the trans11ction.—Birkin v. l'Ving, 63 L.T. 80.
See Vendor and Purchaser, p. 27, v.
(i.) Q. B. D.—lVork of Art--Artist|'c Merit—:l'uthor—Registrafi0n—Copyright (Works of Art) Act, 1862.—-The plaintifis were u firm of printers. J., a member of the firm, conceived the idea of publishing cards bearing the representation of a hand making a cross, as a means of instructing voters at elections how to mark their ballot papers. J., being unable to draw, employed an artist in the service of the firm to draw the design. The plaintiifs registered the drawing under the Copyright (Works of Art) Act, 1862, and in the memorandum stated J’. to be the author. The defendants published cards bearinga design of a similar nature, the idea of which was taken from the plaintifis’ cards, though the drawing was slightly difierent. There was no artistic merit in either drawing. Held (l) that the plaintiffs’ drawing was so far not the subject of copyright that it was not entitled to protection except against an exact reproduction; (2) that J. was not the author of the drawing, and that the registration was consequently v0id.—Kenr1'ck v. Lawrence, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 99; 38 W.R. 779.
(ii.) Ch. ]).—Ta.2:ati0n—-Principle.—A motion by W. to have his name removed from the register of shareholders of a company was heard as a witness action, and was allowed to stand over, W. being absent, on condition that he paid the company “all their costs of such motion incurred up to the present time, including the costs of the hearing of this motion this day." The motion, when heard, was decided in favour of W., and the taxing master was ordered to tax the costs of W. of his motion except the costs previously directed to be paid by him. Held, that the costs which were to be paid by W. ought not to include the costs of an interlocutory application to attach the secretary of the company for non-compliance with an order for discovery, which costs had by consent been made costs in the action, nor the costs of an interlocutory application to postpone the trial, on which no order had been made ; but that the taxing master had a discretion to include in such costs the costs of items which had been utilised at the postponed
hearing.—In re Metropolitan Coal Consumers’ Association ,- Waim.vright'a Case, 63 L.T. 216.
Criminal La :—
(iii-) C. C. R.—Two Counts to Indicl7nent—-Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, ss. 4, 9-24 5’ 25 Vick, c. 100, s. 52—U'nsworn Evidc1u:e.—The first count of an indictment charged the defendant with attempting to defile a girl under thirteen, and the second count charged him with an indecent assault. The girl’s evidence was admitted on both counts, though not given on oath. Held, that the proceedings on each count were separate and distinct, and that such unsworn evidence was only admissible on the first count, and therefore that a conviction on the second count, which depended on the admissibility of such evidence,
could not be sustained.—Reg. v. Paul, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 202; 62 L.T. 845; 38 W.R. 704.
§' 4 Will. I V., c. 42,.s. 29.-The defendant was declared liable in respect of minerals wrongfully removed from under the plaintiff's land. On further consideration, the plaintiff claimed interest on the um assessed as the value of the minerals, with half-yearly rests. Held (1), that the action was in the nature of an action for money had and received, and that interest could not be given as damages; (2), that there was no fiduciary relation between the parties on which the claim could be based; (3), that the claim ought to have been made at the trial, and that it was too late to raise it on further consideration.—Philli_ps v. Homfray, L.R. 44 Ch. D. 694; 59 L.J. Ch. 5&7; 62 L.T. 896.
house was ventilated by a shaft out through the rock into a disused well in an adjoining yard, owned and occupied by the defendant. It had been so ventilated for at least forty years, without interruption, and with the knowledge of the occupiers of the yard. Held, that the plaintifi could claim, as against the defendant, the easement of the free passage of air through the shaft and well; and that a lost grant of the right ought to be inferred.—Bass v. Gregor: , L.R. 28 Q.B.D. 481.
Ecclesiastical Law :— (iii.) Court of A1'cheS.—Faculty for BuriaZ—Cl0sed Chu.rchya.rd—FamiZy
of Pa1'ishio'ner.—By an Order in Council a churchyard was closed except as to burials in reserved grave spaces allotted to members of the families of parishioners. Held, that a faculty for the reservation of a space in the churchyard for exclusive burial could be granted to a living nonparishioner, a member of the family of a parishi0uer.—In re Sargent, L.R. 15 P.D. 168.
Evidence :(iv.) C. A.—Disclosure of Information—PubIic Policy—Prosec'ution.—A
Executor : (Y-)
prosecution instituted by the Director of Public Prosecutions is a public prosecution ; and therefore the rule of public policy which prevents a witness being asked such questions as will disclose the informer, if he be a third person, and also such questions as will disclose whether or not the witness was the informer, applies not only to such a prosecution, but also to subsequent proceedings founded thereon. The only exception to the rule is when it appears to the Judge that the disclosure of the information may be necessary to establish the innocence of a prisoner.—Ma.rks v. Beyfus, 59 L.J. Q.B. 479; 38 W.R.. 705.
Q. A.— Distribution of ResicZua—Call on Shares—Refunding.—The fact that executors have knowledge that a call may be made on shares, part of their testator’s estate, is not notice of a debt; and where executors have been compelled to pay such call after they have distributed the estate, they are entitled to call on the residuary legatee to refund.—Whittake'- v. K€7'.s/zalt1, 63 L.T. 203.
(vi.) Ch. D.—Reta1'ner—Loan by Wife to HusbancZ—Ma1'ried ll"0me'n's
Prope1ty Act, 1882, 8. 3.—A wife advanced money to her husband for the purposes of his business. He died intestate and insolvent, without repaying the advance, and the widow took out administration. In (vi.)
a credito1*’s administration action, held, that she was entitled to retain
the amount of her debt out of personal estate coming to her hands.— Crawford v. May, 38 W.R. 765.
'employed by the board.
29 Vict., c. 121, s. 27, sub.-ss. 2, 4, s. 35—36 §" 37 Vict., c. 71, $5. 36. 6241 §"42 Vict., c. 39, s. 7.—A. was summoned for fishing without alicence in a fishery district subject to a board of conservators, upon the information and complaint of H., a duly appointed water-bailifi It was not proved that the board had authorised H. to commence proceedings. Held, that the penalty could only be recovered by the board, that H. was not entitled to commence
proceedings, and that A. was not liable to conviction.—Anderson v. Hamlin, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 221; 63 L.T. 168.
Foreign Judgment :—
C. _A..—Action to E'n./'0rce—-Retrial of Action—Fraud.—Where an action is brought to enforce a foreign judgment, the defendant may plead that it was obtained by fraud, though the alleged fraud cannot be proved without re-trying the question which has been adjudicated
Q. B- D.—Obstruction—-Summons-Dismissal—Appeal—Highway Act, 1835, ss. 72, 105.--A summons against a person for wilfully obstructing a highway was dismissed by the justices. Held, that the informant had no right to appeal to Quarter Sessions.—Reg. v. Justices of County of London, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 357.
—A charge of adultery was established against a wife, who made a counter-charge of cruelty against her husband. It appeared that she was of drunken habits. Held, that the husband ought not to be disentitled to relief unless such gross violence should be proved against him as the Court cannot allow to be excused on the ground that he was provoked to it by her intemperauce.—F0rsyth v. Forsyth, 63 L.T. 263.
P. D.—Divorce—Cruelty.—C0ntinued unkindness and neglect on the part of a husband, who refused to occupy the same room with his wife, and told her that he loathed being in the same room with her, held, to constitute cruelty, which, coupled with adultery, entitled the wife to a divorce.—Bethu.ne v. Bethune, 63 L.T. 259.
P. D.—Dii'orce—Deserti0n.—A husband and wife had been living apart, the wife being willing to 00-habit until she discovered that he was living in adultery. She then refused to resume co-habitation, although he wrote several letters ofiering to do so. Held, that there was no proof that his offers were not bond, fnle, and that the separation which
the wife insisted on could not be treated as desertion.—Lodge v. Lodge, L.R. 15 P.D. 159.
P. D.—Divm'ce—Wife's AdzIbery—Desertion.—A husband and wife separated by mutual consent in 1875, in consequence of medical advice to the efiect that pregnancy would be dangerous to the sanity of the wife and