(i.) Q. B. D.--Unqualified Person-Agent for-Discretion of Court — Punishment-Solicitors Act, 143, s. 32.-In cases within the Solicitors Act, 1843, s. 32, the Court has a discretion to inflict a smaller punishment than striking off the rolls. A solicitor verbally agreed with a debt collector to act as his solicitor in all county court matters, on the terms that he should pay over to the debt collector half the costs, when any costs were recovered, and should receive no costs when none were recovered. This agreement was acted on in several cases. Held, that the solicitor had acted as agent for an unqualified person, and that he ought to be punished by suspension for a year.-In re a Solicitor; e. p. Incorporated Law Society, 63 L.T. 350.

See Attachment, p. 36, ii. Scotch Law, p. 60, ii. Trustee, p. 65, iv.

Tenant for Life :

(ii.) Ch. D.-Shares in Company-Bonus-Reserve Fund.—The articles of a company provided for increase of capital, and empowered the directors to accumulate a reserve fund, and to pay interim dividends. Shares in the company were settled by a testator who died in 1884, at which time the company had a reserve fund of £3,000. In October, 1888, the reserve fund was £9,000. The shareholders had received various sums partly as "dividend," and partly as "bonus." In April, 1889, the directors resolved to distribute £15,000 as a "special bonus," and the sum was paid as an "interim dividend." Large extraordinary expenditure was incurred in that year, and the reserve fund was reduced by November, 1889, to £2,000. Held, that the tenant for life of the settled shares was entitled to the whole of the amount paid in respect of the shares, the company not having turned any part of the accumulated and undivided profits into capital.-Sugden v. Alsbury, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 237; 60 L.J. Ch. 29; 63 L.T. 576; 39 W.R. 136.

Trade Mark:

(iii.) Ch. D.-Registration Essential Particular - Distinctive Device Distinctive Label.-To support an application for the registration of a trade mark, it must be shewn that it consists of or contains an essential particular, which has been claimed as such in the application. The representation of an exhibition prize medal is not such a "distinctive device as can constitute an essential particular, although no other prize medal was granted at the same exhibition for the same class of goods. Semble, that a label which contains only elements which are incapable of constituting essential particulars is not, as a whole, a "distinctive label," though the elements are arranged in a novel manner. In re Bryant & May, 59 L.J. Ch. 763; 63 L.T. 676.

(iv.) Ch. D.-Registration-Rectification of Register.-It is not proper to register as a new mark an old mark with an addition, the exclusive right to the use of which is disclaimed. The Court may rectify the register by expunging a mark which ought not to have been registered, notwithstanding a lapse of five years since the registration. The fact that a mark has through misrepresentation been registered as an old mark is a reason for exercising this jurisdiction. Where part of a registered mark is common to the trade, the Court may order a note to that effect to be added to the registry, such note being limited, if the mark is registered in several classes, to the class in which such part of the mark has been proved to be common, or to the class in which the parties asking for the addition of the note are aggrieved.-Baker & Sons v. Rawson Brothers, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 519; 63 L.T. 306.

(i.) Ch. D.-Registration-Old Mark-Additions - Disclaimer - Patents, &c., Act, 1883, ss. 69, 71, 74 (2).-Where an application is made to register a mark as an "old mark," but the mark proposed to be registered differs from that of which user is alleged in that it contains substantial additions, the registration must be refused, and there is no power to disclaim the additions. — In re Meeus's Trade Mark, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 41; 63 L.T. 610; 39 W.R. 216.

(ii.) H. L.-Registration - Special and Distinctive Words - Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, s. 10.-To entitle "special and distinctive words" to be registered, they must have been used before the passing of the Act of 1875, alone, and not in combination with other words. The appellants used the words "Perry Davis' Vegetable Pain Killer as their trade mark for a medicine before the passing of the Act. Held, that the words "Pain Killer" could not be registered as they had not been used alone, and also because they were not "special and distinctive words."-Perry Davis & Son v. Harbord, L.R. 15 App. Cas. 316; 60 L.J. Ch. 16; 63 L.T. 389.

Trespass:

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Accidental Injury-Negligence.-In the absence of negligence a man who accidentally shoots another is not liable in an action of trespass.-Stanley v. Powell, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 86; 39 W.R. 76.

Trustee :

(iv.) Ch. D.—Breach of Trust-Contribution-Solicitor.-A trustee who, as solicitor to the trust, has negligently advised an improper investment of trust funds, and has been made liable for loss occasioned thereby, is not entitled to contribution from his co-trustees.-Smith v. Blyth, 63 L.T. 546.

(v.) Ch. D.-Breach of Trust-Limitations-Trustee Act, 1888, s. 8, sub-s. 1 (a), (b).—In an action to render trustees liable for a loss arising from an improvident investment of trust funds, where the breach of trust was committed more than six years before the commencement of the action, the lapse of time affords a good defence under clause (b), but not under clause (a), of sect. 8, sub-sect. 1, of the Trustee Act, 1888.-Andrew v. Cooper, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 444; 59 L.J. Ch. 815; 39 W.R. 219.

(vi.) Ch. D.-Breach of Trust -Default.-A testator gave his sons in succession an option of purchasing his mill at a valuation, payable by instalments with interest, the son purchasing to give a bond and execute a mortgage. The trustees of the will were authorised to invest trust funds as therein mentioned, and, if any of the sons should carry on the testator's business, then on the security of the business premises. The eldest son exercised the option, and bought the mill for £58,000 payable by half yearly instalments of £2,000, and executed a mortgage. The son required further capital, and a company was formed, which purchased from him the equity in redemption of the mill. The company failed, and it was sought to fix the trustees with wilful default in not getting in the instalments from the son or from the company. Held, that the trustees were bound to take the mortgage, and were not liable for so doing; and that as they had acted bona fide, and done the best they could in the circumstances, they were not liable for the loss which had occurred.-Addison v. Topp, 63 L.T. 665.

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(i.) Ch. D.-Breach of Trust-Investment-Money Kept in Business – Discretion.-A testator bequeathed a legacy in trust for S., and after reciting that he wished his widow to enter into the business which he carried on in partnership with D., and that the bulk of his property was invested in the said business, he empowered his trustees to invest or continue invested the moneys in their hands as trustees in the said business or any other business. Held, that it was not a breach of trust to leave part of the trust moneys in the business after the widow had retired therefrom. After the retirement of the widow D. became insolvent, and agreed to a composition, payable by three instalments. Only one instalment of the amount due in respect of such trust moneys was paid, which the trustees did not invest but placed on deposit at a bank. No pressure was made for payment of the other instalments. Held, that it was not a breach of trust to omit to press for such payment, as the trustees had an honest and reasonable belief that no benefit would have resulted; and that it was reasonable to place the instalment received on deposit, with a view to invest it together with the next instalment when received, and that no order should be made against the trustee in respect of such non-investment.—Johnson v. Davies, 39 W.R. 107.

(ii.) C. A.-Improper Investment-Sale of Trust Funds-Liability to Replace. Decision of Ch. D. (see Vol. 15, p. 98, v.) affirmed.—Clark v. Trelawny, 63 L.T. 296.

See Administration, p. 34, iii. Solicitor, p. 63, iii. Will, p. 68, iv.

Unsound Meat:

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Possession of-Preparation for Sale-Liability-Public Health Act, 1875, ss. 116, 117.-A person who has slaughtered a beast, which he knows to be unfit for the food of man, and is about to dress the carcase for human food, is guilty of an offence against sect. 117 of the Public Health Act, 1875, although he has not actually exposed the flesh for sale.--Mallinson v. Carr, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 48; 63 L.T. 459.

Vendor and Purchaser:

(iv.) C. A.-Conditions of Sale-Misleading. S. claimed to be entitled beneficially to real property, which was vested in a trustee on trusts which had expired in 1876. His title depended on the death, intestate and without heirs, of the original settlor, who was believed (though no legal proof was forthcoming) to have so died in 1851; and no claim had ever been made by anyone as his heirs. S. put up the property for sale under conditions which required the purchaser to assume that the original settlor had so died, but which did not shew that the title depended entirely on such assumption, and did not explain how or why it so depended. Held, that the condition was not misleading.— In re Sandback and Edmondson's Contract, 39 W.R. 193.

(v.) Ch. D.-Conditions-Time for Requisitions.-A condition limiting the time for requisitions does not bind the purchaser where the abstract shows no title at all; and assuming that this rule does not hold where the vendor can shew a good holding title, though not one which would be forced on a purchaser, yet the vendor cannot take this position after the purchaser has refused the title and demanded back his deposit. And in such a case the purchaser is entitled to a return of his deposit.-Saxby v. Thomas, 63 L.T. 695.

(i.) Ch. D.-Option to Purchase-Notice to One of Several Trustees.-A lease was granted by three trustees, with an option to the lessee to purchase the fee on giving, during the term, notice in writing "to the said lessors, or the survivors or survivor of them, or the executors, administrators, or assigns of such survivors." The lessee during the term gave notice in writing of his intention to exercise the option to one only of the trustees, all three being still alive. Held, in an action by the lessee for specific performance of the agreement for sale, that the notice ought to have been given to all the trustees, that the notice given was insufficient, and that there was no contract which could be enforced.-Sutcliffe v. Wardle, 63 L.T. 329.

(ii.) Ch. D.-Outgoing Tenant-Distress.-A farm was sold under the direction of the Court subject to such tenant right as the outgoing tenant should possess. The day for completion was the 29th of September, on which day the tenancy determined. The purchaser was let into possession soon after that day, the purchase money having been paid, but no conveyance was executed. The receiver, who had been previously appointed, at the instance of the persons having the legal estate, then distrained for arrears of rent on certain crops which, by his agreement, the tenant was bound to leave on the farm. Held, that the persons who had the legal estate had the right at law to distrain, but that they were, in equity, trustees for the purchaser, and could not exercise their legal right to his prejudice. - Manisty v. Archdale, 63 L.T. 626; 39 W.R. 185.

(iii.) C. A.-Succession Duty--Sale of Succession-Free from Incumbrances. -The heir-presumptive of an owner in fee simple of land contracted to sell his expectancy "free from incumbrances." There was no express stipulation as to the succession duty to become payable on his succession. Held, that the purchaser must bear the duty.-In re Langham's Contract, 39 W.R. 156.

Volunteer :

(iv.) Ch. D.-Annuity-Charge on Reversionary Interest-Priority.—An annuity was granted by deed in consideration of love and affection to C., and was charged on certain lands, and on the "moneys, securities for money, and other effects" of the grantor. At the date of the deed the grantor was entitled to a reversionary interest in a sum of stock standing in the names of trustees. At the death of the grantor, the lands charged with the annuity being insufficient to provide it, held, that as regards the reversionary interest of the grantor the deed depended only on contract, and did not create a complete and perfect equitable charge in favour of C., and that as there could be no specific performance of a contract in favour of a volunteer, C. had priority over the grantor's creditors.-Hardinge v. Cobden, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 470; 60 L.J. Ch. 40; 63 L.T. 538; 39 W.R. 90.

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Voluntary Deed:

(v.) Ch. D.-Assignment of Chattels Subsequent Assignment-Covenant for Title-Remedy.-By a voluntary deed A. assigned chattels to X. absolutely. By a second voluntary deed he assigned the same chattels to Y. absolutely, and covenanted that he had a good title to assign free from incumbrances, and that he would warrant the same to Y. Y. was aware of the prior assignment. On the death of A., X. recovered the chattels by action against the executors of A. Held, in the administration of A.'s estate that Y. was entitled to recover damages for breach of the covenants for title.-Gilbert v. Gilbert, 63 L.T. 557.

Voluntary Settlement:

(i.) C. A.—Addition to Fund Settled by Will-Erroneous Impression as to Construction of Will.-Decision of Ch. D. (see Vol. 15, p. 99, iii.) reversed.-Neison v. Walters, 63 L.T. 328.

(ii.) C. A.-Assignment of Debts-Complete Assignment.-P. executed a voluntary settlement in favour of his wife, by which he assigned to trustees debts secured by bills of sale, for which he gave the trustees power to sue. P. got in the debts himself, and died intestate. Held, that the debts were completely assigned by the voluntary settlement, and that P.'s estate must make good to the trustees the amount of the debts.-Bills v. Tatham, 39 W.R. 113.

Will:

(iii.) Ch. D.—Accumulation-Trust for Improving and Maintaining Houses -Thellusson Act.-A direction in a will that the surplus income, after providing for an annuity, shall, during the life of the annuitant, be expended in improving and maintaining the landed estate, is a valid trust during life of the annuitant, and not an accumulation limited to twenty-one years.-Vine v. Raleigh, 63 L.T. 573.

(iv.) Ch. D.—Annuity-Charge on Corpus-Trustees-Power to Mortgage.Testator bequeathed a life annuity to his widow, and gave all his real and personal estate to trustees, on trust, subject to the payment of the annuity, for his daughter for life, with remainders over. He empowered his trustees to carry on his business, and to increase or diminish the real and personal estate employed therein at his death. Held, that the annuity was a first charge on the corpus of the real and personal estate, and that the trustees had no power to create a paramount charge by mortgaging the real estate to raise moneys to discharge debts incurred in carrying on the business.-Leedham v. Patchett, 63 L.T. 545.

(v.) Ch. D.-Construction-Determinable Life Estate Gift Over.—Gift on trust for testator's widow for life, provided she kept the property repaired and did not marry or cohabit with another man, with a gift over in case she failed to repair, or married or cohabited with any other man. The widow committed none of the acts or defaults. Held, that the gift over took effect on her death.-Ruff v. Sivers, 60 L.J. Ch. 36.

Description

Alteration.

(vi.) Ch. D.-Construction · A testator bequeathed "my leasehold house and premises called the Anchor Inn, where I now reside," to his son. At the date of the will the inn was in course of reconstruction, and part of it was separated from the rest and leased to a tenant as a shop. The testator occupied the whole of the house until the alterations had been completed, and afterwards occupied the inn which had been separated from the shop. Held, that as the shop had not been leased till after the date of the will, it was included in the bequest.-Rowland v. Edwards, 63 L.T. 481.

(vii.) P. C.-Construction-Survivorship-Accruer.-A testator devised to each of his five sons a specified portion of real estate, and bequeathed to each an equal share of his residuary personalty, so that each son took for life with remainder to his children, if more than one, as tenants in common in tail, with cross-remainders between them in tail. And he declared that, "in case any or either of my said sons shall depart this life without leaving any child or children, him or them surviving, then I devise the share or shares of such son or sons unto and equally between the survivors and survivor of them, my said sons, and their respective heirs as tenants in common in tail." W., the last survivor of