(i.) Q. B. D.-Disqualification-Alms-Reform Act, 1832, s. 36.—A person had, during the qualifying period, been an alms-person of a certain hospital, and had as such received a weekly allowance, and occupied a plot of ground assigned to him by the charity; the alms-persons of the charity being elected by the trustees from among poor persons of good character, and being forbidden to be absent from the hospital without leave, and being liable to dismissal at the discretion of the trustees for certain causes. Held, that he was disqualified by the receipt of alms. - Dia v. Kent, 63 L.T. 641; 39 W.R. 173.

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Objection-Notice of Place of Signature-Registration Act, 1889, s. 18.-A notice of objection given to the overseers, and applying to several registered electors, had the names of the persons objected to placed in a schedule following the signature of the objector. Held, that the notice was good.-Sutton v. Wade; Gale v. Overend; Moore v. Atkinson, 60 L.J. Q.B. 28; 63 L.T. 588; 39 W.R. 223.

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Occupation Franchise-Bankruptcy.—A person whose name was on the occupation list had been adjudicated bankrupt during the qualifying period. The trustee in bankruptcy had not interfered with his occupation, and the bankrupt had remained in occupation, and the landlord had accepted rent from him, after the adjudication. Held, that he was properly placed on the list.-Mackay v. McGuire, 60 L.J. Q.B. 24; 39 W.R. 109.

Restraint of Trade.-See Contract, p. 43, i.

Revenue:

(iv.) H. L.-Probate Duty-Business in India.-The deceased was one of sixteen partners in the working of a silk and indigo business in India. The business was entirely carried on in India by managing agents, who were alone empowered to use the name of the firm, and had power to determine (subject to the opinion of a committee of partners) what branches of business were to be undertaken. There was a committee of partners in England to advise with the agents. The firm had agents in London to whom produce was consigned. It was provided that on the death of a partner his representatives should not become partners in respect of his share, but should be entitled to sell the share within a specified period. All the partners except two resided in the United Kingdom. Held, that the share or interest of the deceased partner was not liable to probate duty.-Laidlay v. Lord Advocate, L.R. 15 App. Cas. 468.

Sale of Goods :

(v.) P. C.-Stoppage in Transitu.-Where goods have not been delivered to the purchaser, or to any agent of his, to hold for him otherwise than as a carrier, but are still in the hands of the carrier as such, and for the purposes of the transit, the goods are in transitu, and may be stopped, although the carrier was the purchaser's agent to accept delivery so as to pass the property. The right to stop under such circumstances is not affected by the facts (1) that the purchaser has handed to the shipping agents the bills of lading received by him from the vendor, and has received a fresh bill of lading from them; (2) that the purchaser is himself a passenger in the vessel on board of which the goods are shipped to be carried to their ultimate destination.-Lyons v. Hoffnung, L.R. 15 App. Cas. 391; 59 L.J. P.C. 79; 63 L.T. 293,

Sale of Shares:

(i.) C. A.-Certification of Transfer-Voucher of Title-Ultra ViresRepresentation as to Credit and Ability-Signature-Lord Tenterden's Act, s. 6. Decision of Q. B. D. (see Vol. 15, p. 137, iv.) affirmed.— Bishop v. Balkis Consolidated Co., L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 512; 59 L.J. Q.B. 565; 63 L.T. 601; 39 W.R. 99.

Scotch Law:

(ii.) H. L.—Jurisdiction-Arrestment ad Fundandam Jurisdictionem— Solicitor's Lien.-A., a domiciled Englishman, being the defendant in a Queen's Bench action, obtained judgment for costs against B., the plaintiff, a domiciled Scotchman. X. executed in Scotland an arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem against B. of the amount due under the judgment, and his summons was served on A. The solicitors of A. in the Queen's Bench action then obtained a charging order against the costs recovered by him in the action. Held, that even if the charging order was retrospective in its operation, the arrestment was effectual for the purpose of founding jurisdiction, as it could in no way affect the operation of the charging order.-North v. Stewart, L.R. 15 App. Cas. 452.

Settled Land:

(iii.) C. A.-Heirlooms-Sale of-Tenant for Life-Settled Land Act, 1882, 88. 37 & 53.-The tenant for life has a discretion to sell heirlooms, but in the exercise of that discretion, and when determining whether they ought to be sold or not, he must act as a trustee not for himself only, but also for all parties interested under the settlement, and must take into consideration all the circumstances of the particular case. Decision of Ch. D. (see Vol. 16, p. 23, iv.) affirmed.-In re Earl of Radnor's Settled Estates, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 402; 59 L.J. Ch. 782.

(iv.) C. A. & Ch. D.-Capital Money-Improvements-Will & SettlementOne Settlement Settled Land Act, 1882, ss. 2 (1), 33; 25 (xix.) (xx.)-Lands were limited by deed of settlement made in 1872 on trusts for persons by way of succession, and the trustees had a power of sale. Lands were afterwards devised by will to the trustees of the settlement on the trusts declared by the settlement concerning the lands therein comprised, and by the same will the residuary personal estate was bequeathed to the executors on trust to convert and invest in the purchase of lands to be settled on the trusts declared by the will of the lands comprised therein. Held, that for the purposes of the Act the settlement and the will constituted one settlement, and that money, being part of the testator's residuary estate in the hands of the executors and uninvested, was capital money arising under the Act for the purposes both of the settlement and of the will, or of either of them; and might be applied in affecting improvements on the lands comprised in the settlement. Where settled land consists of mining property, the erection of a new pumping engine and new pumps for the purpose of carrying out an effective system of drainage, is an "improvement." In re Mundy's Settled Estates, 63 L.T. 311;

39 W.R. 209.

(v.) Ch. D.--Trust for Sale-Tenant for Life of Proceeds-Leave of Court to exercise Powers-Pending Action in Palatine Court-Settled Land Act, 1882, s. 63-Settled Land Act, 1884. s. 7.-The tenant for life is the proper person to judge whether, when, and how the land should be put in the market; and when land has been devised on trust for sale, and all the purposes for which such trust was created paramount to the

interest of the tenant for life of the proceeds have been fulfilled, and there remains a simple trust of the proceeds for one or more persons for life with remainders over, the Court will give the tenant for life leave to exercise the powers of the Act. The fact that the testator's estate is being administered in the Palatine Court does not prevent the High Court making such an order, especially where the land is outside the jurisdiction of the Palatine Court.-In re Harding's Settled Estates, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 60; 63 L.T. 539; 39 W.R. 119.

Ship:

(i.) P. D.-County Court-Admiralty Jurisdiction-Venue-County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1868, ss. 3, 4-County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1869, ss. 1, 2, 4.-The plaintiff commenced an action in personam in the A. county court, within the jurisdiction of which his vessel then was, against the charterer, for breach of an alleged warranty in the charter-party as to the depth of water at the defendant's wharf, whereby the plaintiff's vessel had been damaged, the wharf being in the jurisdiction of another county court. Held, that the A. court had jurisdiction. The County of Durham, L.R. [1891] P. 1.

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Charter-party-Advance Freight "if required "—Require ment after Loss.-A cargo was shipped under a charter-party which stipulated for "one-third freight, if required, to be advanced, less 3 per cent. for interest and insurance." The vessel was wrecked and the cargo lost, after which the shipowner required payment of the advance freight. Held, that the requirement was not too late, and that the charterer must pay it.-Smith, Hill & Co. v. Pyman, Bell & Co., L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 42; 63 L.T. 642.

(iii.) P. D.-Charter-party-Negligence of Crew-Excepted Perils-General Average. A ship was chartered to proceed to A. and load a cargo for B. The charter-party provided that the shipowners should not be responsible for the negligence of the crew during the voyage." The cargo was damaged while loading owing to the negligence of one of the crew who left a valve open. Held, that the loss was occasioned "during the voyage," and that the shipowners were not liable. Held, also, that the shipowners were entitled to a general average contribution from the charterers in respect of the loss, as the negligence of the shipowners' servant which caused the loss was negligence for which they were not responsible. The Carron Park, L.R. 15 P.D. 203; 59 L.J. P. 74; 63 L.T. 356; 39 W.R. 191.

(iv.) C. A.-Damage to Cargo-Charter-party-Excepted Perils-Negligence. -Decision of P. D. (see Vol. 16, p. 24, vii.) affirmed.-The Accomac, L.R. 15 P.D. 208; 59 L.J. P. 91; 37 W.R. 133.

(v.) C.A.-Demurrage-Strike-Liability of Consignee.-Decision of Q. B. D. (see Vol. 16, p. 25, i.) affirmed.-Budgett v. Binnington, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 35; 60 L.J. Q.B. 1; 39 W.R. 131.

(vi.) P. D.-Collision—Action in Rem—Delay.—In a collision action in rem the plaintiff is not limited to any specified time within which he must commence his action, but when an action is commenced a long time after the collision, the action may be dismissed on the ground of laches, if it is inequitable that it should proceed. In determining such question, the opportunities which the plaintiff has had of arresting the defendant's ship, the availability of the defendant's witnesses, and any other circumstances which affect the possibility of securing a fair trial, will be considered; and if the action is allowed to proceed, all reasonable presumptions will be made in the defendant's favour. An action was commenced by a British ship against a Norwegian ship, the X., eleven

years after the collision. The X. had been in English ports thirty-five times, and in Scotch ports twelve times, since the collision, and some of her crew were not available as witnesses. Held, that it was not inequitable that the action should proceed. The Kong Magnus, 63 L.T. 715.

(i.) P. D.-Collision-Costs-High Court-County Courts Admiralty Juris diction Act, 1868, ss. 3, 9.—The plaintiffs in a collision action claimed more, but recovered less, than the county court limit. Held, that they should be allowed no costs.-The Herald, 63 L.T. 324.

(ii.) P. D.-Collision-Fishing-Vessel-Regulation, Art. 10 (d.)—If a vessel when fishing becomes stationary in consequence of her gear getting fast to an obstruction, she must shew the light and make the fog-signal for a vessel at anchor, although the weather is clear when she becomes stationary.-The Warwick, L.R. 15 P.D. 189; 63 L.T. 561.

(iii.) P. D.—Collision—River—Rules of Navigation.—A collision occurred in a foreign river with regard to the navigation of which there were no positive rules printed or circulated. It was proved, however, that there was a practice that a vessel navigating against the tide should wait at a bend for a vessel coming in the opposite direction to clear her. Held, that a vessel navigating against the tide and disregarding such practice must be held to blame for a collision occurring at a bend.-The Talabot, L.R. 15 P.D. 194.

(iv.) P. D.-Collision-Steamship and Barge-Both to Blame.-A barge being moored at night astern of a steamship in a dock, the latter moved her propeller, and damaged the barge so that she sank. There was no one on board the barge. Held, that the barge was to blame in having no one on board, whereby the collision might have been avoided, or the barge beached, and only half damages were awarded to the barge. -The Scotia, 63 L.T. 324.

(v.) P. L.-Collision-Measure of Damages-Demurrage.-The appellant ship being found to blame for a collision with the respondents' ship, the respondents claimed demurrage in respect of the time their ship was under repairs. It appeared that during the repairs another ship of the respondents was substituted for the damaged one, and that no actual loss by demurrage had been sustained. Held, that the respondents were not entitled to demurrage.-The City of Peking, L.R. 15 App. Cas. 438; 39 W.R. 177; The City of Peking v. La Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes, 59 L.J. P.C. 88.

The

(vi.) P. D.-Collision-Negligence of Tug-Liability of Tow.-The C. came into collision with a barge, which was in tow of a steam-tug. collision was caused by the joint negligence of the C. and the tug. Held, that the owners of the barge were not liable.-The Quickstep and Hopper Barge, L.R. 15 P.D. 196; 59 L.J. P. 65; 63 L.T. 713.

(vii.) Q. B. D.-Pilotage Compulsory Pilotage Dues ·

Merchant Shipping

Acts, 1854 & 1889.-Where a public local Act, in force before the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, and regulating a port, imposes a penalty on unauthorised persons acting as pilots, pilotage is compulsory. Pilotage dues, fixed by trustees under a local Act, and under the Act of 1854, and duly sanctioned by Her Majesty in Council, may be sued for by a pilot who has rendered services as such. The Merchant Shipping Act, 1889, is retrospective, as it declares the meaning of the Act of 1854, and by it the word "ship" in the Act of 1854 includes a foreign ship."-Jones v. Bennett, 63 L.T. 705.

(i.) Q. B. D.-River Thames-Conservancy Bye-law-Navigation of Barge. -By the proper construction of Bye-law 16 of the Thames Conservators, a craft of above fifty tons burthen must have, when under way, two competent hands on board for its navigation. Such bye-law is not complied with in the case of a craft of over fifty tons burthen where there is on board one competent man and a boy.-Goldsmith v. Slattery, 63 L.T. 273.

(ii.) Ch. D.— Managing Owner ·

Duties of Commission.-It is one of the duties of a "managing owner" of a ship to procure charters and freights, and therefore a shipbroker, who is managing owner of a ship, and receives a fixed sum as remuneration for his services, is not entitled to take a commission or brokerage for procuring charters and freights.— Williamson v. Hine Brothers, 63 L.T. 682.

Solicitor:

(iii.) Ch. D.—Breach of Trust-Liability of Partners.-Where moneys come under the control of a firm of solicitors with notice of the fact that they are trust funds which are to be invested on mortgage, and one of the partners in the firm advises the trustees as to the sufficiency of the proposed security, he is acting within his authority as a partner, and knowledge of the nature of the security must be imputed to his partners, and where an advance is made on improper security under his advice, his partners, or their estates if they have since died, are liable jointly and severally with him for the loss. The liability is not discharged by a judgment which has been recovered against the first-named partner in his capacity of trustee. Where the advance has been made on property of a speculative nature, they are not entitled to the protection of sect. 4 of the Trustee Act, 1888.-Blyth v. Fladgate, 63 L.T. 546. (iv.) Ch. D.-Costs-Scale Fee-Mortgage-Further charge.-A tenant for life of settled estates mortgaged his life interest. The trustees of the settlement were then empowered by a private Act to raise a sum on mortgage of the fee, part of which was to be employed in paying off the charge on the life interest. The mortgagees of the life interest advanced the sum to be raised on the mortgage of the fee, employing the same solicitor as on the occasion of the former mortgage. Part of such sum was retained by the mortgagees in repayment of the charge on the life interest, and the balance paid to the trustees. Held, that the mortgage by the trustees was a further charge for the balance paid to them, and that the solicitor was not entitled to the scale fee in respect of that transaction, as he had previously investigated the title.-Earl of Aylesford v. Earl Poulett, 63 L.T. 519; 39 W.R. 106.

(v.) Ch. D.-Costs-Scale Fee-Negotiating Sale.-To entitle a solicitor to the scale fee for negotiating a sale, the negotiation must be complete and result in a binding contract, and must have been carried through by the solicitor himself without assistance. A contract which is conditional on the consent of the Court being obtained does not entitle the solicitor who conducted the negotiations to a scale fee. "Arrange" in Rule 11 to Schedule I., Part I., of the General Order, means finally arrange."— Macgowan v. Murray, 60 L.J. Ch. 6; 63 L.T. 537: 39 W.R. 90.

(vi.) Ch. D.-Retainer-Trustee.-A firm of solicitors were requested by the persons beneficially interested in a trust fund to examine a proposed security for the investment of the fund. There were then no properly appointed trustees, but while the negotiations as to the advance were going on, M. and others consented to act as trustees with knowledge of the proposed advance. Their appointment was not made till after the advance was completed. Held, that the relation of solicitor and client existed between the firm and the trustees.-Morgan v. Blyth, 63 L.T. 546.