(i.) H. L.-Appeal-Formâ Pauperis.—Their lordships expressed an opinion that some means ought to be devised to put a stop to appeals in formâ pauperis for which there was not a shadow of foundation.-Blair v. North British & Mercantile Insurance Co., L.R. 15 App. Cas. 495. (ii.) C. A.-Appeal-Habeas Corpus.-An appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from an order directing a writ of habeas corpus to issue where the liberty of the subject is not involved, and where the Court of Appeal has power to enforce its decision.-Reg. v. Barnado; Jones's Case, 39 W.R. 195.

(iii.) C. A.—Appeal-Security for Costs-Foreign Company.-On an appli cation that a foreign company domiciled abroad should be ordered to give security for the costs of an appeal, it appeared that the company had a branch business in London, and had assets in this country of the value of upwards of £20,000. Held, that there was no case for ordering security to be given. In re Apollinaris Company's Trade Mark, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 1; 63 L.T. 502.

(iv.) C. A.-Security for Costs-Motion for New Trial.-As a general rule the Court of Appeal will not order a party moving for a new trial under the Judicature Act, 1890, of an action tried with a jury to give security for the costs of the motion. Heckscher v. Crossley, 39 W.R. 211. (v.) Ch. D.-Chambers—Adjournment to Judge-Order for Delivery of Securities. It is an absolute unqualified right of a suitor to have a summons adjourned from the chief clerk to the judge, at any time before the order made on it is drawn up and passed, or before anything has been done under it. When an order has been made on a party to deliver up securities, and some of the securities have been actually delivered up, a four-day order to deliver up securities in the terms of the former order ought not to be made, but such order should specify the securities which still remained to be delivered up.-Scott v. Homer, 63 L.T. 618.

(vi.) Ch. D.-Company-Settling List of Contributories-Time for AppealR.S.C., 1883, 0. lv., r. 70.—An appeal from a certificate settling the list of contributories in the winding-up of a company need not, unless injury has been caused by the delay, be brought within twenty-one days. In re Liverpool Household Stores Association; e.p. Weld-Blundell, 63 L.T. 383.

(vii.) Ch. D.- Company — Winding-up — Unregistered Company - Vesting Order-General Powers-Companies Act, 1862, ss. 95, 203.-It is proper to make an order vesting in the official liquidator of an 'unregistered company "the property which is vested in the trustees of the company, the motion for such order being made in the name of the company; but it is not proper to order that the liquidator should be at liberty, without the sanction or intervention of the Court, to exercise all or any of the powers conferred on him by sect. 95 of the Companies Act, 1862.—In re Britannia Permanent Benefit Building Society, 63 L.T. 304.

(viii.) C. A.-Costs-Set-off--R.S.C., 1883, O. lxv., r. 27, sub-r. 21.—A party who was entitled to certain costs, to be paid out of the estate, appealed against an interlocutory order, and his appeal was dismissed with costs. Held, that the costs to be paid by him could not be set-off by order of the Court against those which he was entitled to receive, but ordered that no costs should be paid out to him for a fortnight, that the

respondent might carry in in his bill of costs of the appeal, and that the set-off might be considered by the taxing master.-Dennis v. Crawshay, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 318; 63 L.T. 597.

(i.) C. A. & Ch. D.-Costs-Taxation-Apportionment—Practice of Chancery Division. The plaintiff claimed an injunction and damages in respect of nuisance caused by dancing entertainments carried on in a room over his office, and also in respect of alleged disorderly conduct of visitors on the staircase. Judgment for £20 damages was given in respect of the first issue, and for the defendant in respect of the second issue. The taxing master was directed to tax the defendant's costs of so much of the action as related to the disorderly conduct, and to tax "the plaintiff's costs of the rest of the action." The taxing master awarded to each party a moiety of the general costs, and where the items related solely to one issue, awarded them to the successful party. Held, that the Court would not interfere with the taxation, as it had been made in accordance with the practice of the Chancery Division.-Jenkins v. Jackson, 60 L.J. Ch. 45; 63 L.T. 487 & 688.

(ii.) Q. B. D.-County Court Appeal.—Service of Notice-R.S.C., 1883, O. lix., r. 12.-Semble, that in the case of an appeal from a county court, where the solicitor to the respondent carries on business in the country, service of the notice of motion on his London agent is not sufficient service.-Powell v. Thomas, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 97; 39 W.R. 224.

(iii.) C. A.-Counter-claim-Default of Defence-Judgment—R.S.C., 1883, O. xxiii., r. 4; 0. xxvii., rr. 2, 11.—Where a plaintiff makes default in delivering a defence to a counter-claim, the defendant cannot sign judgment upon default, but must move for judgment.-Jones v. Macaulay, 39 W.R. 211.

(iv.) Ch. D.- Discovery — Leave to Interrogate Several Defendants Security-R.S.C., 1883, 0. xxxi., r. 26.—Where the plaintiff applies for leave to serve interrogatories upon and for an order for discovery of . documents against several defendants who appear separately, separate deposits must be made, both in respect of the interrogatories, and of the order for discovery for each defendant.-Liverpool and Manchester Aerated Bread and Café Co. v. Frith, 63 L.T. 677.

(v.) C. A.- Divorce Discovery

Criminating Documents Infant -Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869, s. 3-A person cannot be compelled to discover that which, if discovered, may tend to prove him guilty of adultery. Although, as a general rule, the objection that discovery would tend to criminate the party against whom it is sought, ought not to be taken on the summons for discovery, but in the affidavit made in answer thereto, and ought to be taken with respect to the particular interrogatories, or documents, as to which the objection applies, yet, if it is evident that the discovery or an affidavit of documents is wanted solely for the purpose of proving adultery against the party against whom it is sought, the order ought not to be made. Semble, that in divorce suits discovery may be granted against an infant.-Redfern v. Redfern, 39 W.R. 212.

(vi.) C. A.-Ejectment-Judgment in Default.-Person not DefendantR.S.C., 1883, 0. xii., r. 25.-The plaintiff issued a writ against J. to recover possession of a house, and signed judgment in default of appearance. The sheriff ejected H., who was found in possession, and put in the plaintiff. H. had no knowledge of the action, and did not claim

through J. He applied that the writ and proceedings should be set aside for irregularity, and that possession should be restored to him. Ordered, that the judgment and subsequent proceedings be set aside, and the plaintiff go out of any possession obtained under the judgment; the order to take effect only if H. should elect within twelve days to be added as a defendant; H. to be at liberty to appear on filing an affidavit that he was in possession by himself or his tenant at the time of issuing the writ; the order to be without prejudice to any right the plaintiff might thereafter have to sign judgment against J. on filing a proper affidavit.-Minet v. Johnson, 63 L.T. 507.

(i.) Q. B. D.-Justices-Appeal-Statement of Case-Notice-Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857, s. 2.-Where an appellant entered a special case stated by justices for the opinion of the Superior Court, and after having entered it sent a copy of the case and notice of appeal to the respondent, held, that the Act had not been complied with, and that the case must be struck out.-Edwards v. Roberts, 60 L.J. M.C. 6.

(ii.) C. A.-Motion for New Trial-Action Tried before Official Referee.Where an action has been tried before an official referee, a motion for a new trial must be made before the Queen's Bench Division, and not before the Court of Appeal.-Gower v. Tobitt, 39 W.R. 193.

(iii.) C. A.-Motion for Judgment on Verdict-Judicature Act, 1890, s. 2.— Motions for judgment upon the verdict of a jury must be made before the judge who tried the case, and will not in future be heard by the Court of Appeal, even by the consent of parties.-Stevens v. Marston, 39 W.R. 129.

(iv.) Ch. D.-Official Referee-Order to Suspend Proceedings.-When an action goes to an official referee for trial he is to be deemed an officer of the Court, and the Court may order him to suspend proceedings, notwithstanding the Arbitration Act, 1889.-Palmer v. Hardwick, 63 L.T. 302.

(v.) Ch. D.-Parties-Trustee-Beneficiaries.-Where a claimant against the estate of a deceased person seeks to follow the assets into the hands of a trustee, it is not necessary to make the beneficiaries parties. Andrew v. Cooper, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 444; 59 L.J. Ch. 815.

(vi.) Ch. D.-Partition-Costs-Adverse Claims.-The certificate in a partition action found that the plaintiff and defendant were each entitled to one-third, and that A., B., or C., persons claiming under different wills made by X., a former owner of the remaining third, was entitled to such third. Before further consideration, probate was granted of the will under which C. claimed, and C. applied to have the certificate amended by finding her entitled to the share of X. The amendment was made, and C. was ordered to pay to A. and B. their costs of the application. Held, on further consideration, that C. ought to have her costs of the partition action, including the costs of the application to amend the certificate, but not the costs which she had paid to A. and B.-Hawkes v. Hawkes, 63 L.T. 488.

(vii.) Ch. D.—Payment into Court--Affidavit —Notice — Chancery Funds Consolidated Rules, 1874, r. 34-Chancery Funds Amended Orders, 1874, 0. 5-Supreme Court Funds Rules, 1884, rr. 2, 41; 1886, rr. 2, 41.-A trustee paying money into Court under the Trustee Relief Act, 1847, need not now serve notice of such payment on the persons interested in the money. In re Graham's Trusts, 63 L.T. 664; 39 W.R. 157.

(i.) Ch. D.-Pleading-Amendment-Statute of Frauds-A. asked B. to bid for him at a sale by auction of a house. B. did so, the house was knocked down to him, and he took the conveyance. A. sued B. to have it declared that he was his agent and trustee. B. denied the agency, and pleaded the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds. B.'s counsel, after A.'s counsel had replied, asked leave to amend by pleading the 7th section. Held, that although under the 4th section an agency might be established by parol, the 7th section applied, by which all declarations of trusts of lands must be proved by writing. But held, that as the 7th section had not been pleaded, and could not be added by amendment at so late a stage, it was not available as a defence.-James v. Smith, 63 L.T. 524.

(ii.) C. A.—Service-Defendant Out of Jurisdiction—R.S.C., 1883, O. ix., r. 2.-The plaintiff, being unable to discover the defendant's address, obtained an order for substituted service. It then appeared that the defendant had gone abroad before the issue of the writ without any intention of evading service, and had remained abroad ever since. Held, that the writ being a writ for service within the jurisdiction, the order for substituted service could not be maintained.- Wilding v. Bean, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 100; 60 L.J. Q.B. 10; 39 W.R. 40. (iii.) Q. B. D.-Service-Manager of Firm-Alleged Partner—Judgment— R.S.C., 1883, 0. ix., 6; 0. xii., r. 15; 0. xlii., r. 10.—Where a writ is served on the manager of a firm, and is subsequently served on a person who is alleged to be a partner, judgment ought not be signed until the expiration of eight days after the last service, and, if so signed, will be set aside on the application of the alleged partner, inasmuch as it might affect him personally by execution being issued against his goods.Alden v. Beckley & Co., L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 543; 63 L.T. 282; 39 W.R. 8. (iv.) P. D.-Ship-Collision-Two Defendants-Form of Decree.-In an action for collision against two vessels and their owners, where both the defendant vessels are found to blame, and neither is exonerated on the ground of compulsory pilotage or other like defence, the Court should condemn the owners of each vessel and their bail in the amount of damages and costs, and the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the whole amount from the owners of either vessel and their bail, without regard to any question of contribution.-The Avon and The Thomas Joliffe, L.R. [1891] P. 1; 63 L.T. 712; 39 W.R. 176.

(v.) Ch. D.-Special Case-Answer--Further proceedings-R.S.C., 1883, O. xxxiv. Where an answer to a special case disposes of the action in which the case is stated, a declaration in the terms of the answer ought to be taken, and further proceedings stayed, and the action need not be set down for trial on motion for judgment.-Ruff v. Sivers, 60 L.J. Ch. 36.

(vi.) C. A.-Writ-Renewal-Limitations.—The rule of practice is not to extend the time for renewing a writ of summons, after the expiration of twelve months from the date of the writ, where the plaintiff's claim would, in the absence of renewal, be barred by the Statute of Limitations. Semble, that there would, in exceptional circumstances, be a discretion to extend the time.-Hewett v. Barr, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 98. (vii.) C. A.-Writ-Service out of Jurisdiction-Contract-Place of Payment -R.S.C., 1883, 0. xi., r. 1 (e).-A contract which may be performed either within or without the jurisdiction, is not a contract" which, according to the terms thereof, ought to be performed within the jurisdiction," so as to empower the Court to allow service out of the

jurisdiction of notice of the writ in an action for breach of the contract.-Bell & Co. v. Antwerp, London and Brazil Line, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 103; 39 W.R. 84.

See County Court, p. 43, iv.

Principal and Agent:

(i.) P. C.-Authority to Borrow—Authority exceeded-Liability.—Where an agent has, under his power of attorney, authority to raise money by loan for the purposes of the business entrusted to him, which authority must under circumstances of emergency be deemed to include power to borrow on exceptional terms outside the ordinary course of business, a lender is not bound to enquire whether in the particular case the emergency has or has not arisen; and such lender is entitled to recover from the principal if he lends to the agent bona fide and without notice that the agent is exceeding his mandate.-Montaignac v. Shitta, L.R. 15 App. Cas. 357.

(ii.) C. A.-Bribery of Agent-Remedies of Principal-Decision of Q. B. D. (see Vol. 16, p. 21, vi.) affirmed.-Mayor, &c., of Salford v. Lever, 63 L.T. 659; 39 W.R. 85.

See Ship, p. 63, ii.

Purchaser for Value :

(iii.) Ch. D.-Fraudulent Deed—13 Eliz., c. 5.—A purchaser for value of any interest under a fraudulent deed, whether the interest is legal or equitable, having no notice of the fraud, can set up the deed, which is not fraudulent as against him.-Halifax Joint Stock Banking Co. v. Gledhill, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 31; 63 L.T. 623; 39 W.R. 104.

Railway :

(iv.) C. A.-Debentures-Gross Receipts-Working Expenses-Hire of Rolling Stock-Railway Companies Act, 1867, s. 4.-Decision of Ch. D. (see Vol. 16, p. 22, i.) affirmed. In re Eastern & Midlands Railway, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 367; 63 L.T. 604.

(v.) Railway Commission Court.—Undue Preference—Trade Association-Public Interests-Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, ss. 7, 27.— The applicants complained of undue preference, in that the rates for carriage of grain and flour from C. to B. were less than those for carriage of the same goods from L. to B., though the distance from C. to B. was greater than that from L. to B. The respondents proved that owing to competition the traffic from C. to B. would be lost if the rates were raised. Held, that the interests of the public did not require that the traffic from C. to B. should be secured, and that there was an undue preference. Liverpool Corn Trade Association v. L. & N.W.R., L.R.[1891] 1 Q.B. 120; 63 L.T. 564.

Registration:

(vi.) Q. B. D.-County Vote-Ownership-Description of QualificationPower to Amend.-The nature of a voter's qualification was described in the list of ownership electors as "freehold house." It was proved that the house was leasehold, and that the voter's interest was sufficient to qualify him. Held, that the revising barrister had no power to amend the list by altering the word "freehold" to "leasehold" in the absence of a declaration under sect. 24 of the Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act, 1878.- Plant v. Potts, 63 L.T. 585,