(i.) Ch. D.-Will-General Testamentary Power-Will not referring to Power.-A married woman, who had a general testamentary power of appointment over a fund, which was subject to the life interests of herself and her husband, but had no separate property, and no other power of disposition or appointment over property, by her will, not referring to the power, gave a legacy to A., and the residue of all her properties "and any properties which may have become to me, or may become to me hereafter by will or otherwise," to her husband. Held, that the will must be construed as an appointment of the reversionary fund, as to part thereof, namely the amount of the legacy, to A., and as to the residue to the husband; and that the legacy was therefore not payable till the reversionary fund fell into possession.-Ludlam v. Ludlam, 63 L.T. 330.

(ii.) Ch. D.-Will-Power-Republication.—A married woman, having a power of appointment by will, made a will dealing with the property subject to the power and all other, if any, property over which she had any power of disposition. After her husband's death she signed, in the presence of two witnesses, a paper which contained no reference to her will, but merely stated that certain specified property was a present to X. This paper was admitted to probate with her will. Held, that it was not a republication of her will, and that she was intestate as to her property (not being separate property or within the power) other than that specifically mentioned in the paper.-Bilke v. Roper, L.R. 45 Ch.D. 632; 63 L.T. 448; 39 W.R. 93.

Master and Servant:

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Defective Machinery-Volenti Non Fit Injuria.-The fact that a workman knows of a defect in a machine at which he is employed, and continues to work at the machine in spite of such knowledge, does not disentitle him to compensation for an injury sustained in consequence of such defect, unless he has a thorough comprehension of the risk, and voluntarily undertakes it.—Brooke v. Ramsden, 63 L.T. 287.

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(iv.) Q. B. D.-Dispute - Justices - Jurisdiction-Limitation of Time.-A dispute" between an employer and a workman under the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, sect. 4, is not limited to strictly legal causes of action. The Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, does not apply to a court of summary jurisdiction sitting under the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, as a court of civil jurisdiction; and a complaint under the lastnamed Act may be brought before the Court though more than six months have elapsed since the complaint arose. -Charles v. Mortgagees of Plymouth Waterworks, 39 W.R. 122.

(v.) Ch. D.-Employing Servant of Another.-An action will lie against a person who continues to employ the servant of another after notice of the prior contract of service, and in order to maintain such an action it is not necessary that the contract should create the strict relation of employer and employed. Therefore a contract between A. and B. that A. should perform in a ballet under the direction of B. during the coming pantomime season at the Crystal Palace or elsewhere in London, at a named salary, entitles B. to maintain an action against X., who has employed A. after notice of the contract.-De Francesco v. Barnum, 63 L.T. 514.

(vi.) C. A.-Implied Authority-False Imprisonment.-The defendant was owner of a public-house. N. was his servant, and acted as manager of the bar. The plaintiff, a customer, tendered a foreign coin in lieu of a half-sovereign. N. gave him into custody for attempting to pass false coin. There was no proof of any authority in N. to give suspected

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persons into custody, other than the fact that he was the manager of the bar. Held, that there was no evidence of any liability in the defendant for the action of N.-Abrahams v. Deakin, 63 L.T. 690; 39 W.R. 183.

Metropolis Management:

(i.) C. A. & Q. B. D.-Elected Vestryman-Qualification-OccupationQuo Warranto-Metropolis Local Management Act, 1855, s. 6.—A quo warranto is the proper proceeding to question the election of a vestry. man in a metropolitan vestry. The qualification of such a vestryman being to be rated or assessed as the occupier of a house, etc., upon a rental exceeding £25 a year, held, that S., who was rated in respect of the premises of a club of which he was secretary, was not qualified, the occupation of the premises as secretary being in the nature of an occupation by a servant. Held, also, that his occupation of part of the premises during the day as a private office, he paying a rent to the club for the same, was not a qualification, he being merely the licensee of the club.-Reg. v. Soutter, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 57; 63 L.T. 279; 39 W.R. 8 & 65.

(ii.) C. A.-Scavenging-Ashes-Trade Refuse-Metropolis Management Act, 1855, ss. 125, 128.—Decision of Q. B. D. (see Vol. 16, p. 14, iv.) affirmed.-St. Martin's Vestry v. Gordon, L.R., 1891, 1 Q.B. 61.

Metropolitan Building Act:

(iii.) Ch. D.-"Adjoining Owner"-Notice-18 & 19 Vict., 1855, ss. 3, 82, 85, sub-s. 1.-A tenant in possession of part of a house under an agreement for a greater interest than as tenant from year to year is an " adjoining owner," and entitled to be served with three months' notice before any alterations affecting his premises can be commenced by the "building owner;" and service of the notice on the person in receipt of the whole of the rents of the tenement is not sufficient.-Fillingham v. Wood, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 51.

Mines:

Mines

(iv.) Q. B. D.-Working Shaft-Guides-Signalling-Metalliferous Regulation Act, 1872, s. 23, sub-s. 10.--A completed shaft in a mine, from which a level or tunnel is being driven, but by means of which no ore has been yet raised, is a "working shaft," and must be provided with guides and means of signalling.-Foster v. North Hendre Lead Mining Co., L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 71; 60 L.J. M.C. 6; 63 L.T. 458.

See Crown, p. 44, i.

Mortgage :

(v.) P. C.-Absolute Conveyance-Evidence to Explain.-B. had deposited the title deeds to property with a bank to secure a cash credit. He afterwards executed an absolute conveyance of the property to the bank in pursuance of an agreement recited therein that the price should be paid by deducting £400 from the amount due. Held, that, though evidence was admissible to shew that, notwithstanding the deed, the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee still subsisted, the presumption was that the deed truly set forth the nature of the contract, and that very strong evidence was required to rebut that presumption. -Barton v. Bank of New South Wales, L.R. 15 App. Cas. 379. (vi.) C. A.-Equitable Mortgagees-Postponement of First-Negligence-Title Deeds-Legal Estate.-Decision of Ch. D. (see Vol. 15, p. 125, iv.) reversed.-Taylor v. Russell, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 8; 60 L.J. Ch. 1; 63 L.T. 593; 39 W.R. 81.

(i.) Ch. D.-Equitable-Notice-Priority.-R., a solicitor, received money in 1883 from H., a client, to invest, and represented that he had invested in on a particular mortgage. The mortgage had in fact been previously taken by R. in his own name, and he never transferred it to H. He afterwards deposited the title deeds of the mortgaged property with his banker to secure his overdrawn account, and paid interest to H. till his death in 1885, and afterwards to his executors. R. died in 1888 indebted to the banker, who gave notice of his claim to the mortgagor. The banker had no notice of H.'s claim at the time of the deposit, and his notice was prior to any notice by H.'s executors. Held, that R. was a trustee of the mortgage for H., that neither H. nor his executors were guilty of negligence, and that the banker's notice did not give him priority.Humber v. Richards, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 589; 59 L.J. Ch. 728; 63 L.T. 451; 39 W.R. 186.

(ii.) Ch. D.—Foreclosure-Order Absolute-Receiver-Rents not accounted for-Opening Foreclosure.-A receiver had been appointed in a foreclosure suit. The receiver had been discharged, and the foreclosure made absolute, and the mortgagee had sold part of the property. The mortgagor afterwards discovering that the receiver had omitted from his accounts certain rents which he had received, moved that the foreclosure might be re-opened. Held, that there was no evidence that the mortgagee had ever received any of the rents not accounted for, and that, the receiver not being an agent of the mortgagee for all purposes, but an officer of the Court, the foreclosure ought not to be re-opened because he had made a mistake which the mortgagor had not discovered till too late.-Ingham v. Sutherland, 63 L.T. 614.

(iii.) Ch. D.-Sale-Reservation of Minerals-Petition-Service-25 & 26 Vict., c. 108, s. 2.-A petition by a mortgagee for the sanction of the Court to his selling the surface of the mortgaged land with a reservation of the mines and minerals, must be served on the mortgagor.—In re Hirst's Mortgage, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 263; 60 L.J. Ch. 48; 63 L.T. 444.

Negligence:

(iv.) Q. B. D.-Dockyard-Unsafe Berth-Damage-Respondeat Superior.Action against the Port Admiral and other officials of Chatham dockyard for damage to a barge, caused in consequence of its having been moored in an unsafe berth, which was pointed out by the foreman of the dockyard. Held, that the doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply, that the defendants had not invited the plaintiff to place his barge in the unsafe place, and that they were not liable.-Wright v. Lethbridge, 63 L.T. 572.

(v.) Q. B. D.-Illegal Act—Injury—Liability.--A. illegally obstructed the pavement by placing across it a slide for lowering goods into a cellar. B. finding the pavement obstructed stepped on the slide to pass over it. The slide was slippery, though not obviously so, and B. fell and was injured. Held, that A. was liable.-Lee v. Nixey, 63 L.T. 285.

Nuisance :

(vi.) Ch. D.-Club-Crowds-Cabs.-Where pugilistic entertainments at late hours were given at a proprietory club, held, that a nuisance caused to the neighbours by the collection of crowds outside the club, and the arrival and departure of cabs, was a reasonable and probable consequence of the acts of the proprietors, and ought, together with the whistling for cabs during certain hours, to be restrained by injunction.-Bellamy v. Wells, 63 L T. 635; 39 W.R. 158.

(i.) Ch. D.-Pollution of Stream-Local Board-Mandamus or Injunction.— A bill was filed to 1868 for an injunction to restrain a local board from allowing sewage to flow into a brook, so as to cause a nuisance. The answer raised no objection to the jurisdiction, and an interlocutory injunction was granted. A supplemental writ was issued, and an injunction and damages were asked for, including damages occasioned by the failure of the local board to comply with the interlocutory injunction. The judge held that the nuisance had been so far abated that the injunction need not be continued, but that certain moneys ought to be paid by the defendants to the plaintiffs. The defendants contended that the proper remedy was mandamus and not injunction. Held, that it was too late to take the objection, and that the case must be dealt with as if it had been waived; and that as damages could be given in lieu of an injunction when there is jurisdiction to grant an injunction, there must be judgment against the defendants for the moneys so found due from them.-Warwick & Birmingham Canal Navigation Co. v. Burman, 63 L.T. 670.

Poor Law:

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Rating-Exemption of Crown-Building used for Public Purposes-Police Quarters.-A building wherein police officers are required to reside, paying rent for such occupation, being entirely used for the purposes of such residence, and containing no cells for prisoners, is not entitled to exemption from rating as crown property, and the police officers are rateable in respect of their occupation, such occupation being a beneficial one.-Showers v. Assessment Committee of Chelmsford Union, 60 L.J. M.C. 1; 63 L.T. 529; 39 W.R. 174.

Partition :

(iii.) Ch. D.-Costs-Incumbered Shares-Discretion of Court-Partition Act, 1868, s. 10.-The Court has an absolute discretion as to the costs of a partition action up to trial; but as a general rule will order those costs to be borne by the whole estate, that is by each share in proportion to its value, the shares for this purpose being ascertained at the date of the chief clerk's certificate. There is no fixed rule that only one set of costs will be allowed in respect of each share. Where the plaintiff and the defendant were each entitled to a moiety of the property, the plaintiff's moiety being incumbered, held, that the costs of all parties, including those of the mortgagees, must be paid first out of the proceeds of sale.-Belcher v. Williams, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 510; 63 L.T. 673.

Partnership:

(iv.) Ch. D.-Loans by Partners-Action for Dissolution-Costs.-Two partners had voluntarily brought money into the partnership, there being no stipulation in the articles requiring them to do so, and at the date of the dissolution of the partnership by an order in an action for such dissolution, moneys were found to be due to the plaintiff and defendant respectively, in respect of the sums so brought in. Held, that the sums were loans by the individual partners, and must be repaid out of the assets in priority to the costs of the action. Rosher v. Crannis, 63 L.T. 272.

See Solicitor, p. 63, iii.

Patent:

(v.) H. L.-Provisional and Complete Specifications-" Distinct Statement of the Invention"-Patents, &c., Act, 1883, s. 5, sub-ss. 3, 4, 5.--Decision of C. A. (see Vol. 14, p. 44, iii.) affirmed.-Vickers & Sons v. Siddell, L.R. 15 App. Cas. 496; 63 L.T. 590.

(i.) Ch. D.-Validity—Amendment of Specification-Patents, &c., Act, 1883, s. 18.-A patent was granted for a telescope ladder, consisting of two distinct ladders, one to be drawn up out of the other by a cord, and a lever bracket to fix the sliding ladder at any height. The specification claimed: "(1) The two ladders occupying the space of one only; (2) the ready means of working by the cord; (3) the simple bracket lever." The patentee obtained leave to amend his specification, and he struck out the claims (1), (2), (3), and substituted: "The combination in a telescope ladder, as herein described, of means for raising, lowering, and stopping, all as herein described." Held, that the claim before amendment was really for a combination, and that the amendment was only a "correction or explanation," and did not make the specification, as amended, claim an invention larger than or sub. stantially different from that claimed by the original specification, and did not, therefore, make the patent invalid.-Kelly v. Heathman, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 256; 60 L.J. Ch. 22; 63 L.T. 517; 39 W.R. 91.

Poor Law:

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Rating-Industrial School.-An industrial school, certified under the Industrial Schools Act, 1866, is rateable to the poor rate.County Council of Durham v. Assessment Committee of the Chester-leStreet Union, 63 L.T. 461; 39 W.R. 188.

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Rating-Railway-Lands Occupied but not Used-Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, s. 133.-A railway company in the course of completing their line took land for the purpose of buying off opposition, and not for actual use in the undertaking. A deficiency was thereby created in the poor rate. Held, that the company must make good the deficiency.-Overseers of Putney v. L. & S.W.R., 60 L.J. Q.B. 18; 39 W.R. 144.

(iv.) Q. B. D.-Rating-Local Board-Waterworks-Deficiency of Water Receipts. The appellants, an urban sanitary authority, under statutory powers erected waterworks. Their receipts for the supply of water in a given year were £5,700, but their expenditure was greater than their receipts, and the deficiency was made up by a transfer from the general district rate; no part of the sum transferred was received in respect of water charges, or of a rate in aid, and none of it was applied towards the working expenses, but part was applied in repaying instalments of loan, and part in paying interest on loans. The waterworks account was bound to repay the amount so transferred to it in case the receipts for water supply should ever exceed the working expenses of the waterworks. Held, that no part of the sum so transferred was money potentially available to a hypothetical tenant as an item of gross profits, and that no part of it should be included in the receipts of the appellants for the purpose of calculating the rateable value.-Merthyr Tydfil Local Board v. Merthyr Tydfil Assessment Committee, 63 L.T. €48. (v.) Q. B. D.-Lunatic-Becomes Pauper-Liability-Lunatic Asylums Act, 1853.-A private patient in a county lunatic asylum, who became a pauper, was placed on the list of patients chargeable to the M. Union, within which the asylum was situated. No justice's order was made requiring her to be maintained as a pauper in that asylum. The M. guardians paid for her maintenance as a pauper primarily chargeable to their union, and sought to recover the amount paid from the guardians of the I. Union, within which was a parish from which the pauper was irremovable. Held, that the pauper was not legally chargeable to the M. Union, and that the amount could not therefore be recovered.Ipswich Guardians v. Macclesfield Guardians, 63 L.T. 526; 39 W.R. 221.