« PreviousContinue »
Ch. D.—Winding.up—Arra'ngement—Sancti0n to Scheme—J01'nt Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870, s. 2.—The Court has power to sanction a scheme which will deprive debenture-holders of their security. It will not, however, sanction a scheme which would bear inequitably on any of the persons inter-ested.—In re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas, and Pacific Junction Railway Co., 63 L.T. 578.
C. A. & Ch. D.—Winding-up—Distribution of Assets—Shares issued at a Discount.—The articles of a company contained no provision for the distribution of the assets in case of a winding-up. It issued shares of £10 each which were fully paid in cash. It afterwards issued shares of £10 each “ with the sum of £10 as paid-up thereon ” at the price of £3 per share. The certificates did not state that they were fully paid up. There were no creditors. In the windingqip there was a surplus. Held, that the holders of original shares must receive £7 per share, and that the balance must be distributed rateably.—In re Weymouth and Channel Islands Steam Packet Co., 59 L.J. Ch. 714; 63 L.T. 445 and 686; 39 W.R. 5 dz 49.
Ch. D.—Winding-up—Irregular Forfeiture of Shares—Damages—
See County Court, p. 43, iv.
domiciled in Brazil executed in that country a power of attorney, whereby he nominated A. as his attorney to purchase and sell shares in public companies. The document was general and might be acted on in any country, and the intention was that it should be acted on in England. lt was put in force in England. Held, that it must be construed according to English, and not Brazilian law.—Chutenay v. Brazilian Sub-marine Telegraph Co.— L.R.[lB91] 1 Q.B.79; 63 L.T. 275; 39 W.R.65.
Q. B. D.—Receiz-ership Order—F0reig'n. Liquidation—Efl'ect of.—M. recovered judgment against a French company, and on his application a receivership order was made, and a receiver appointed to receive the interest of the company in certain goods. Seven days later the company went into judicial liquidation in France, and L. was appointed liquidator. The receiver afterwards received certain money arising from the sale of goods belonging to the company. The Court found that according to French law the judicial liquidation did not make void such an order as the receivership order, and therefore held that it was good in favour of M. against L.—Levasseur v. Mason 3" Barry, 63 L.T. 700.
Contract :— (vi.) Ch. D.—Prumoters of Ewhibition—Pe1'sonal Lialn'Iily.—-Six gentlemen
formed themselves into an executive council for the purpose of promoting an exhibition. They opened an account at a bank in the name of the exhibition, cheques drawn on which were to be signed by two of such gentlemen, and countersigned by the secretary to the council. The exhibition was afterwards incorporated as a company, and acopy of the articles of association was sent to the bank. The
(i.) Q. B. D.—Restra1''nt of Trade—Consideratio'n.—A contract by
account was dealt with in the same manner as before. The company went into liquidation, and, the banking account being overdrawn, the bank sought to make the members of the executive council personally liable. Held, on the evidence, that such liability had never been contemplated, and that the hank had never considered the members of the council as customers, and could not make them personally liable for the overdraft.—Coutts 8' Co. v. Irish Exhibilion in London, 63 L.T. 489.
which certain persons dealing in mineral waters bind themselves not to sell their goods at less than a specified price, is a contract in restraint of trade for which there is no consideration, and cannot therefore be
enforced in a court of law.——Urmston v. Whitclegg Brothers, 63 L.T. 455.
(ii.) Q. B. D.—Oounty Court—Refreshers.—Whcre a county court is held
from day to day, it rests with the judge to say whether the sittings shall
be one continuous sitting, or a succession of sittings, so that, when a,
case which is in the list is not reached on one day, but is heard in its turn on another day, a refresher may be allowed by order of the judge as upon an adjournment for want of time.—1:leap v. Pearl, L.R.  1 Q.B. 110; 39 W.B. 95.
C. A. & B. D.—-County Court—County Courls Act, 1888 ss. 181-119—Cou'nty Court Rules, 1889, Append1'1:.—Where, in a county court action, more than £10 is claimed, but less than £10 recovered, there is a discretion to tax the costs as between solicitor and client on the higher scale. Qumre, whether a master of the High Court has jurisdiction to tax the bill.—In re Langlois tf’ Biden, 39 W.R. 1l0 and 181.
See Partnership, p. 52, iv. Practice, p. 54, viii.; p. 55, i. Ship, p. 62, i.
County Court :—
Ch. D.—Wind1'ng.up—Tran.sfer of Petition—County Courts Act, 1888, s. 126.—The High Court has jurisdiction to order the transfer of a winding-up petition from a county court to itself, although the petition has been opened in the county court.—In re East Dulwich, No. 295, Starr-Bowkett Building Society, 39 W.R. 32.
C. C. R.—Larceny—Secur1'iy for Money—Bill of Excha'nge—Broker 0r Agent—2'L 3" 25 Vict., c. 96, s. 75—Bills of Ezcha'nga Act, 1882, s. 18.—A document which is a complete bill of exchange in all respects, except that the signature of the drawer is absent, is, when in the hands of the intended drawer, a valuable security, and a bill of exchange, and is a security for the payment of money within 24 & 25 Vict., c. 96, s. 75. Whether a person intrusted with a security for money with a direction in writing as to its application, or that of the proceeds, was so entrusted as a broker or agent within the meaning of such section, is a question of fact for the jury; and the fact that he had an interest in the transaction greater than that of a mere agent, would not deprive him of his capacity of agent.—Reg. v. Bowerman, L.R.  1 Q.B. 112., 63 L.T. 532; $9 W.B.. 207.
1 Will. 'fr M., c. 30; 5 Will. .}' M., c. 6; 55 Geo. III., c. 134.—The fact that qum-tz rock contains lead, copper, iron, and other minerals besides gold, in quantities so small that the rock could not be profitably worked for such minerals, does not entitle a subject to work the rock for gold without n licence from the Crown.—A.-G. v. Morgan, 59 L.J. Ch. 772; 63 L.'1'. 337; 39 W.R. 169.
to set aside a mortgage executed by her to the trustees of a loan society to secure moneys misappropriated by her husband, who had been secretary to the society, alleging that the deed had been executed under threats of a criminal prosecution against him. Held, that it was shewn that though there might have been no threat used against her, yet it had been conveyed to her, either by the trustees, or by her husband, or their agent, that he would be prosecuted unless some step was taken to prevent it, and that the deed had been executed by her with the motive of so doing, and must therefore be set s.side.—HcClatchie v. Haslam, 63 L.T. 376.
Dunm_qe.-.—Where the right of the plnintilf to relief in an action to restrain the obstruction of ancient lights rests mainly on damage likely to accrue within a reasonable time, but not suffered in the present, the Court will grant an injunction, and not give compensation by way of damages. The possible future use of the plaintifl:"s premises must be considered in granting an injunction or directing an inquiry as to dnmages.—Dicker v. Popham, Radford 3' C0., 63 L.T. 379.
Ecclesiastical Law:— (iv.) Q. B. D.—Public Worship Regulation Acf, 1874, sn. 8, 9—Represen
tulion-—Second Representatio'n.—A “represontation" was made to a bishop that images had been placed in the cathedral of the diocese, which tended to encourage superstitious ideas and devotions. The bishop refused to transmit it, and nu application for a mandamus to direct him to do so was still sub judice. A second representation was made to the efiect that the images had, in fact, encouraged superstitious ideas and devotions. The bishop refused to transmit it, on the ground that it was in substance the same as the former. On an application for n mandamus, held, by Stephen, J., that the application differed materially from the former one, and that the mandamus ought to go; held, by Hawkins, J., that it ought not to go, as, if the new matter disclosed a new oflence, it was not within the Act, and that if it did not, the representation was substantially the same as the former; and further, that as the bishop had stated that he “had considered the whole circumstances of the case," there was no appeal from his opinion. —Reg. v. Bishop of London (N0. 2), 39 W.R. 141.
Elementary Education :(v.) Q. B. D.—School Board — Vacancy — “ Crime ” — Com1icfion. under
Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act, 1887—ls'lementary Education
with the administration of the law ” in a proclaimed district in Ireland. Held, that he had been “punished with imprisonment for a crime,” and that his oflice was va.cant.—Conybem-e v. London School Board,
Q. B. D.—-Political O.[Te'nce-Habcas Corpus—Jur1's(liction of Magistrate —1'.'ztra(l1'tion Act, 1870, s. 3.—An offence of a “ political character” for which a fugitive criminal is not to be surrendered, is a crime “incidental to and forming part of a political disturbance.” On an application for a writ of llabeas corpus, the Court before which the application is made may review the whole evidence brought beforeit, whether such evidence was brought before the committing magistrate or not.—E. p. Castioni, 39 W.R.. 202.
EX60l1tOr.—-See Administration, p. 33. ii.
Habeas Corpus :
Husband and Wife :
H. L.—Appeal—Judicature Act, 1873, s. 19.—There is no right of appeal from an order of the High Court of Justice granting a habeas corpus and discharging a prisoner.—BeZl Cox v. Hake: andLord Penzancc, L.R. 15 App. Cas. 506; 63 L.'l'. 392; 39 W.R. 145.
C. A.—Diuorce—Access to Children—Matrimou1'ul Causes Act, 1857, s. 35.—-When :1. wife is divorced on the ground of her adultery, the judge has full discretion as to allowing her access to the children of the, marriage. A marriage being dissolved on account of the wife's adultery the custody of the children was given to the father, and no declaration was made as to access by the mother. The father permitted her to see them for some time, and afterwards withdrew his permission. The judge refused her application for an order for access, and the Court of Appeal afiirmod his decision.--Handley v. Iiamlley, 63 L.T. 535; 39 W.R. 97.
Ch. D.—Di1'orce—Access—Jurisdiction—Gu.ardiunship of Infants Act, 1886.—A husband obtained a divorce on the ground of his wife's adultery, and was given the custody of the infant child. The mother applied to the Chancery Division for an order allowing her access. Held, that the Divorce Court had full power to make orders as to access, and that if the Chancery Division had also power to make an order, it ought not to be exercised in a case where the Divorce Court had dealt with the matter.—Mzmders v. M(tnders, 63 L.T. 627.
P. D.— Divorce — Husband's Suit — Verdict Against C0-resp0udent—Dismissal as Against Resp01l1lent.—In a husband's suit for divorce on tho ground of adultery, the respondent did not file any answer or appear. The jury found a verdict against the co-respondent, and con. demued him in damages. The Court, not being satisfied with the evidence against tho wife, directed her to be summoned. She was examined by the Court, and cross-examined, and the Court being satisfied that she had been forced, dismissed the petition as against her, but gave judgment against the co.respondeut for damages and costs.-Long v. Long, L.R. 15 P.D. 218.
(vi.) P. D.—Restitution of Coujugal Rights-Order for AlluwuncU.—The wife
having failed to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights obtained by her husband, the Court ordered her to make him an
allowance of £200 per annnm, with liberty to deduct £75 per annum till she had recouped herself the amount of a debt due to her by her husband for money lent to him. 'l'he Court refused to enter into a minute debtor and creditor account between the parties, referring to the time when they were living tcgether.—Swift v. Swift, 63 L.T. 711.
See Practice, p. 55, v.
mate child is entitled to its custody, unless she proved to be unfit to have control of it. She does not lose her rights over the child by committing it to the care of another person for the purpose of its education, and the Court will assist her to regain its custody. She has also the right to nominate a guardian for the child, whom the Court will appoint if he be a fit and proper pers0n.—Reg. v. Barnarclo ,- Jo'nes's Case, 39 W.R. 195.
See Married Woman, p. 48, 5. Practice, p. 55, v.
Justices :— (ii.) Q. B. D.—Diseretion—Declin1'ng Jurisdiction.—Upon an application
for a summons for penalties for which a company was liable for failing to complete a reservoir, the justices refused to hear the application, on the ground that the present prosecutor had previously taken out a summons for an offence of the same kind, which was dismissed on legal grounds. Held, that the justices were wrong in declining jurisdiction, and that they must be ordered by mandamus to hear the application.Reg. v. Bryde and The Pontypool Gas Co., 63 L.T. 645; 39 W.R. 171.
1l1oney—Con1-eyanci-ng Act, 1881, s. 14, sub-s. (1).—Action for ejectment for breach of covenant to repair, the landlord claiming a sum paid by him as a surveyor's fee as “ a reasonable compensation in money for the breach.” The jury found that the premises were out of repair at the time of the notice given by the landlord, but could not agree whether they were so at the date of the writ. Held, that the landlord could not recover possession, as it was incumbent on him to prove want of repair at the date of the writ. Held, also that the landlord could not claim payment of the surveyor's fee.—Skinnera’ Company v. Knight, 63 L.T. 698.
—An agreement for a lease of houses provided that the lease should contain the usual and proper covenants “to insure from loss by fire, repair, and pay rent and all outgoings that may be charged on the property and ground." The lease, as settled by the conveyancing counsel of the Court, contained a proviso for re-entry, not only for nonpayment of rent, but for breach of any of the covenants and agreements contained in the lease. Held, that the proviso for re-entry must be limited to non-payment of rent.—In re Amlerton and Milnefa Contract,
—ln an action by a municipal corporation for libel, the alleged libel was the publication of statements that bribery and corruption existed in the