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entitled to rely upon an agreement between the principal and his agent, the efiect of which is to discharge the agent from his liabilities.—

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Rolling Slock—-Railway Co1npanies Act, 1867, s. 4i.—A railway company, under the powers of their special Act, constituted a certain loop lino a separate undertaking, with a separate capital in guaranteed and debenture stocks. The company were to work the loop line; the dividends on the separate capital being guaranteed by the tolls arising from the c0mpany’s general traflic over it; the company was to pay adaily sum on account of such tolls to trustees for the guaranteed and debenture stockholders; and all sums so payable were to be payable out of, and charged upon, the “ gross receipts " arising from the traflic passing over both the loop line and any other line cf the company. A judgment creditor of the company, for a debt due under an agreement for the hire of rolling stock, obtained the appointment of a receiver and manager. Held (1) that the instalments due under the hiring agreement came within the words " working expenses and proper outgoings " in sect. 4 of the Act; (2) that the trustees were not entitled to the tolls arising from trafiic over the loop line until due provision had been made for the working expenses and proper outgoings; (3) that the receiver must be at liberty to pay the instalments due in respect of the rolling stock out of the receipts of the company as they came into his hands.—l-n re Ea.»'fern 'S’ lllicllands R1 ., 63 L.T. 181.

Railway COII1n1iSSiO1’1.—Divisiou of Rates—Privafc Branch Railway —“Person Inleresled."—'I'., the owner of a private railway communi. eating with the defendants’ line, collected and loaded goods on trucks and handed over such trucks to the defendants at the junction of her railway with their line ; and also received from the defendants, at such junction, trafiic for delivery at the other end of her line. Held, that T. was “a person interested ” within sect. 1'L of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, and was entitled to an order requiring the defendants to distinguish the rates in such books as they were by statute compelled to keep.—T0mlins0n v. L. & N. W.R., 63 L.T. 86.

Ch. D.—Rece1'uer—Unpaid Capital—Ei=ecution.—The appointment of a receiver of the undertaking of a railway company under sect. 4 of the Railway Companies Act, 1867, does not aifect the right of a judgment creditor to issue execution against unpaid capital under sect. 36 of the Companies Act, 1845. Such unpaid capital is not receivable by the receiver. Where H., a receiver appointed as aforesaid, held shares on which it was alleged that moneys still remained due, and a judgment creditor gave notice of an application for leave to issue execution against him to the extent of such moneys, held, that such proceeding was not a contempt of Court.—In, re West Lancashire Rwy. Co., 63 L.T. 56.

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(i.) Q. B. D.—Weight—Falsa Statement by Servant of Seller—Liability.— To snpportaconviction under sect. 29 of the Weights and Measures Act, 1889, there must be a false representation as to the weight of coals sold by the seller of them, and the seller is not liable for a false representation made by his scrvant.—R0berts v. Woodward, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 412; 63 L.T. 200; 38 W.R. 770.

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(ii.) H. L.—Successio'n.—Period of Vesting—Acceleration.—X., who died in 1865, left his whole property on trust to pay an annuity to his widow and accumulate the residue of the income till her death, the property and accumulations being then disposed of in favour of his children, with a provision for the lapse of the shares of any of the children who should predecease “the term of payment of their provisions without leaving issue.” The widow repudiated her testamentary provision. The period allowed for accumulation expired in 1886, the widow still surviving. Held, that the period of distribution was not accelerated by the widow’s repudiation, and that the beneficiaries could not be ascertained till her death.—Muirhead v. Muirhead, L.R.l5 App. Cas. 289.

Settled Land :

(iii.) C. A.—Capital Money—Applicalion of-Improvement Charge—Bonus to Lender.—Where a tenant for life of settled lands has created a terminable rent charge in pursuance of any Act of Parliament for the purpose of repaying money borrowed for improvements, the trustees of the settlement may, in applying capital money to the expenses of redeeming such rent charge, include in such expenses a bonus to the lender for taking repayment before the proper time.—In re LorcZ Egmont's Settled Estates, 38 W.R. 762.

(iv.) C11. D.—Sale of Heirlooms.—Application by the tenant for life for the sanction of the Court to a proposed sale, for the sum of £55,000, of three pictures, part of a collection of 279 pictures, settled as heirlooms. The application was supported by the tenant-for-life's eldest son, who was of age, and the next, but was opposed by the sole trustee of the settlement, and by the brother and some collateral relations of the tenant-for-life. Held, that the evidence shewed that the price was a good one, and one which might not be obtained in the future, and that under the circumstances of the case the sanction of the gourt ought to be granted.—In re Earl of Radnor's Settled Estates,

3 L.T. 191.

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(v-) B. D.—Bill of Lading—Liability of Sh1'p0wner—Exe1nption.—A bill of lading exempted the shipowner from liability for damage to cargo arising from: “Negligence or default of pilot, master, mariners, engineers, or other persons in the service of the ship, whether in navigating the ship or otherwise, loss or damage arising from rain, storage or contact with other goods being excepted, and the ship not being liable for any consequence of the causes herein excepted, however caused or originated.” The plaintiff's goods, after being placed on board, were injured by reason of persons, for whose acts the shipowner was responsible, negligently exposing them to rain and to contact with other wet goods. Held, that the words “or otherwise" referred to

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negligence in bringing about excepted loss or damage other than loss or damage caused in navigating the ship, and therefore that the shipowner was not liable.—N0rman v. Binnington, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 475 ; 59 L.J. Q.B. 490; 63 L.T. 108; 38 W.R. 702.

Q. B. D. —- Charter-party — Bill. of Lading — Exceptions — “ Baltic Clo.use.”—By a bill of lading goods were made deliverable to order or assigns “paying freight for the goods, and all other conditions as per charter-party." Held, that this did not import into the bill of lading an exception in the charter-party as to loss occasioned by negligence of pilot, master, or mariners, &c., “ as per Baltic Bill of Lading, 1885."— Serraino v. Campbell, 59 L.J. Q.B. 452; 63 L.T. 107.

C. A. 86 P. D.—CoZlision—Compulsory Pilota,ge—Port of Llanelly— Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, s. 353.—Pil0tage for vessels trading to Llanelly was compulsory before the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, and therefore continues compulsory. In an action for damage by collision the Court found the defendant's vessel alone to blame, but that it was exempt owing to compulsory pilotage, and the claim was accordingly dismissed without costs. The defendant had counter-claimed. Held, that the plaintifi was entitled to have the counter-claim dismissed with costs.—-The Ruby, L.R. 15 P.D. 139 & 164.

P. D.—Collision—Fishing Smacks—Both to—Co.sts.—A fishing smack ought to have two hands on deck, and where she collides with another smack owing primarily to the wrongful manmuvre of such smack, she will also be held to blame if it appears that had she had the hands on deck they might have taken means to avoid a collision. In a collision case where both ships are held to blame, the plaintifl is entitled to costs if he admits in his statement of claim that he is to blame.—The General Gordon, 63 L.T. 117.

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at the stern does not infringe the regulation which orders a ship which is being overtaken by another to “ shew from her stern to such lastmentioned ship a white light or a flare-up light."—Thc Stakesby, L.R. 15 P.D.166; 63 L.T. 115.

P. D.-—Collis1'0n—Steamship and Sailing-Ship.—Where a steamship neglects to keep out of the way of a sailing-ship, it is not the duty of the sailing-ship, except under very exceptional circumstances, to take measures to avoid a collision, because any action on her part might increase the risk of collision.—The Highgate, 62 L.T. B41.

P. D. — Damages— Repairs—BanI;ruptcy.—Where in the registrar's report in a collision action it appears that the claimant claims as part of his damages the cost of repairing his ship, but has not paid the shipwright, and has become insolvent since the repairs were executed, and the registrar allows the item, the Court can do nothing to insure the money being paid over by the claimant to the shipwright, and will not retain the money in the registry until the claimant proves that he has paid the shipwright.—The En(leavour, 62 L.T. 840.

P. D.—Dama'gs to Cargo—Charter-party—E:ccepted Perils—Negligence. —A provision in a charter-party exempting owners from liability for damage to cargo caused by the “act, neglect, or default of the master or crew in the navigation of the said vessel in the ordinary course of the voyage,” does not relieve them from liability for damage caused by the joint negligence of one of the crew and shore engineers employed to repair the ship’s machinery. Semble, that negligence on the part of the ship’s engineer in connection with such repairs was not “ in the navigation of the vessel in the ordinary course of the voyage."—The Accomac, 63 L.T. 118.

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shipped under a bill of lading which incorporated a clause in a charterparty fixing a certain number of lay days for unloading and allowing other days for demnrrage. There was no exception of strikes. By the custom of the port of discharge the unloading was the joint act of the shipowner and the consignee. During the lay days a strike tool: place among the shipowner’s labourers and those of the consignee, and the discharge of cargo was stopped until after the expiration of the lay days. Held, that the consignee was liable for demnrrage, although the shipowner had been unable to do his part in the unloading.Budgetf §" Co. v. Binnington §" Co., L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 320.

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Coll/iairm.—Cargo was insured against damage “ consequent on collision." The ship met with a collision, and had to put into port for repairs. Some of the cargo insured had to be discharged for the purpose of such repairs, and being perishable was damaged by the handling and delay. Held, that the collision was not the proximate cause of the loss, and that the insurer was not ]iable.—Pink v. Fleming, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 396.

Q. B. D.—M0rtgage of—Articles Passing to Mortgage0.—A mortgage of a ship passes to the mortgagee under the word “ ship " articles necessary to the navigation of the ship or the prosecution of the adventure which were on board at the date of the mortgage, and articles subse

quently brought on board in substitution for them.—Coltma.n v. Cha1nberlain, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 328.

P. C.—Pilot—Negligence—Harbo*u/r Bnard.—A harbour board was empowered by statute to license pilots for their district. Pilotage was not compulsory within the district. The harbour master, who was a licensed pilot, was acting as pilot for a ship, being engaged by the owners, when she was lost through his negligence. Held, that the harbour board was not liable.—-Shaw, Scwill &' Albion Co. v. Timaru Harbour Board, 62 L.T. 913.

P. D.— Sal'vage—Towage—Acti0n in Personam.—The plaintiff, the owner of a steam-tug, agreed to tow five barges for the defendant from C. to P. During the towage the tug rendered services of the nature of salvage services to the barges. At the end of the towage two of the barges were delivered to the Government, to whom the defendant had agreed to deliver the barges. The plaintifi brought an action of salvage in personam against the defendant in respect of these two barges, and in rem in respect of the other three. Held, that he was entitled to

salvage, and that an action in personam would lie against the defendant. —l"ii-e Steel Barges, L.R. 15 P.D. 142.

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the M. in the Atlantic. The M. was leaking and could not use her engines. The masters of the two ships signed an agreement that the owners of the M. should pay £5,000 to be towed to Halifax. This was more than one-fifth of the total value of the M., her cargo, and freight. The master of the C. would not take less, and the master of the M. believed, with reasonable grounds, that his vessel would be abandoned if he did not sign. The service was performed. Held, that the agreement was made under compulsion, and could not be enforced, the sum stipulated for being exorbitant. The salvors were awarded £3,000 as a

fair remuneration and allowed the costs of the action.—The Mark Lane, L.R. 15 P.D. 135.

Q. B. D.—Tha.m:s By-La.w—Na.vigat1'ng—Towing Barges.—-A by-law made in pursuance of the Watermen’s and Lightermen's Amendment Act, 1859, provides that any person who, when navigating any steamboat on the Thames between Vauxhall Bridge and the entrance to the Victoria Docks,shall at the same time tow more than six barges exceeding ten tons each attached thereto, shall incur a penalty. X. in charge of a steamboat towed thirty-one such barges into the Victoria Docks from a dolphin situate about 100 yards above the entrance. Held, that he was not navigating n. steamboat on the river within the meaning of the by-law, and had not incurred the penalty.—Rolles v. Newell, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 335; 59 L.J. Q.B. 423.

Slander :

(i.) B. D.—Pri1-ilege—Words spoken honestly but “carelessly."—In an action for slander against a member of a board of guardians by the clerk to the bonrd for defamatory words spoken at a meeting of the board, the jury found " that the words were spoken honestly in the discharge of a public duty, without malice, but carelessly ; " and found a verdict for the plaintiff for 4Os. Held, that the occasion was privileged, that the word “ carelessly” did not take away the privilege, and that the verdict ought to be entered for the defendant.—Pittard v. Oliver,

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Solicitor .—

(ii-) Q. B. D.—Negligence—Action Commenced in Superior Court—C0u.nty Court Action.—-The plaintiff, the defendants’ solicitor, commenced on their behalf an action in the Palatine Court which might have been tried in the County Court. The action was dismissed, and the defendants refused to pay the plaintiffs costs, on the ground that he was guilty of negligence in having commenced the action in the Palatine Court. Held, that the plaintiff had not been guilty of actionable negligence in not advising that the action should be brought in the County Court.—-Barker v. Fleetwood Improvement Commissio'ners, 62 L.T. 831..

Trade Mark :

(iii.) Ch. D.—Rect[ficntion—Person Ag.qrie1-ed—Rcmo1-al of Griez'a-ncePatents, §’c., Act, 1883, s. 90.—'1'he A. Company had agreements with the owners of two German springs of mineral waters, one purporting to give them the sole right of selling the waters of the first spring all over the world, and the other to give them the sole right of selling the water of the second spring in Great Britain and the Colonies. The owners of the second spring bound their continental customers not to export the water from the Continent, and the labels of the bottles bore acaution to this effect. The A. Company refused to supply the V. Company with either water, and bound their customers not to do so. The A. Company had registered the names of the springs as trade marks. The V. Company moved to expunge them. Held, that the V. Company were not persons aggrieved, as they could not obtain the water of the first spring at all, and could not obtain that of the second without notice of the A. Company's rights. The V. Company also moved to expunge the A. Company's mark “ Hunyadi Janos," claiming to be aggrieved on the ground that the A. Company had threatened proceedings against them for selling a difierent water under the name “Hunyadi Lazlo." The A. Company disclaimed, shortly before the hearing of the motion, the use of the words “ Hunyadi ” and “ Janos," except in combination. Held, that the V. Company were persons aggrieved, but that the grievance being removed, the mark ought not to be expunged; the A. Company to pay the costs.—Re Apollinaris Company's Trade Marks "Apollinaris " “ Fricclerichshall" and “Hunyadi Janos," 63 L.T. 162.

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