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Q. B. D.—Rating—Machiflery.—Premises were used as a bobbin-net factory. There were machines therein which were capable of removal, some being fixed to the floor by screws, and the rest not fixed at all. Held, that though the machinery was not part of the freehold, and remained personal property, yet, being essentially necessary and permanently attached to the business, it was rightly taken into account as enhancing the value of the premises in estimating the rateable value.-
Giford rf' Co. v. The Chard Union, 63 L.T. 249.
Q. B. D.—Settlement—Deriz-ative Settlement—Divided Parishes Act, 1876, s. 35.—In determining the settlement of a married woman, it appeared that her husband had never acquired a settlement for himself; but the birth settlements of the husband and of his father were both shewn. Held, that the pauper’s husband took his father’s settlement, it not being derivative, and that the pauper took the same settlement, and not the birth settlement of her husband.— West Ham Guardians v. St. Giles's-in-the-Fields Overseers, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 272; 38 W.R. 736.
C. A. —Ewec14tio'n—Validity—Reference to Power.—A power to appoint in tail does not authorise an appointment for life. By deed of September 5th real estate was conveyed to such uses as Mr. and Mrs. P. should by deed appoint. By deed of September 9th they appointed it to the use of themselves successively for life, remainder to the use of such of their children in tail as they should jointly appoint, with remainders over. By asubsequent deed Mr. and Mrs. P., in exercise of the power conferred by the deed of September 5th, and of every power and authority enabling them in that behalf, appointed the property to themselves successively for life, remainder to the use of their son E. for life, remainder to his children and remoter issue as he should appoint, with remainders over. Held, that even if the power conferred by the deed of September 9th authorised an appointment for life, there was no intention of exercising it, and that the appointment was wholly bad.—Po1-ter v. De Quetteville, 59 L.J. Ch. 595.
WiZl—Intention.—Under the will of D., T. was tenant for life of shares of certain funds, with power after his death to appoint among his children so much of the said funds as he might be “ entitled or presumptively entitled to.” T., by will, in exercise of the power, appointed £5 to be paid out of his share of the said funds to each of his children except P., and he appointed the remainder of his share to P. And he gave all his other property to P. Held, that the will operated as an appointment of an accrued as well as the original share of T. in the said funds. — Bannerman v. Toosey, 63 L.T. 105.
Ch. D.— Exercise by Will-Remoteneas.—A testatrix had under her marriage settlement power to appoint a fund by will among the children and issue of the marriage. By her will she gave all the property “ which by virtue of any power or authority, or of any separate right of property she was competent to dispose of ” on trust for sale, and after payment thereout of funeral and testamentary expenses to invest the residue, and hold the same on trust for her husband for life, and after his death on trust, as to one seventh part for her son, and asto the other six seventh parts for her daughters, with a direction that the trustees should hold the daughters’ shares on trust for each daughter for life, and after her death on trust for her children. There was evidence that the
testatrix and her husband had forgotten the existence of the settlement. Held, that such evidence could not be acted on, that the will must be regarded as an exercise of the power, and that the daughters tool: their shares of the settled funds free from the fetters attempted to be imposed by the subsequent direction.—Nield v. Boyd, 63 L.T. 92.
C. A.—-Exercisa--Reversionary Fund.—-A., on the marriage of his son in 1815, settled two sums of £10,000 each on trust for the son and his wife successively for life, and in default of issue of the marriage, as A. should by deed, will, or codicil referring to the settlement, appoint. A., by his will in 1832 (not referring to the settlement), bequeathed his residuary personal estate on trust for his son for life, and in default of issue of his son, for A.’s daughters and their children, the daughters taking life interests. By a codieil made in 1833 A. directed that the two sums of £10,000 mentioned in the settlement should form part of his residuary personal estate, and be paid to his executors and trustees. A. died in 1834, hi son in 1850, without having had issue, and the son’s wife in 1889. At her death the two sums of £10,000 were represented by £25,000 console. Held, that the two sums of £10,000 only became part of A.’s estate when the amounts became payable to his executors and trustees, and that there was no question of apportionment
between tenant for life and remainderman.—Matheson v. Goodwyn, 63 L.T. 201.
Ch. D.—Amendment of Judgment—R.S.C., 1883, O. xxviii., r. 11.— The defendant had covonanted with the plaintifi that he would not during the remainder of the term of the lease of a certain shop, carry onacertain business within one mile from the house. Action in 1870 to restrain breach of the covenant. Perpetual injunction granted restraining the defendant from carrying on the business within one mile from the house. Motion to commit the defendant for breach of the injunction. The defendant moved to amend the decree by inserting the words “ during the remainder of the lease.” The lease had expired in 1881. Held, that the words ought to be inserted.—Shipwr1'ght v. Clements, 63 L.T. 160; 38 W.R. 746.
of a Divisional Court on a case stated by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue under sect. 19 of the Stamp Act, 1870, is an “ order," and not a “judgment,” and an appeal from such decision must be brought
P. C.— Costs—Arbitrat1'on—Difl'ere'nt Issues.—The appellants brought an action claiming a lump sum as unliqnidated damages. The action was referred on the terms that the award should be “ for a sum certain for the plaiutifis, or an award for the defendant as the arbitrators may find," with liberty “ to enter the said award as the verdict in this cause, and to sign final judgment therein ; " costs to follow the verdict and to be taxed in the ordinary way. The arbitrators awarded the plaintiffs an amount less than one quarter of that claimed, and a verdict was entered for the amount so found due. Held, that even apart from the terms of the reference, the Court had no power to direct a verdict to be entered for the defendant for the difierence between the amount claimed and that awarded, and the costs to be taxed on the footing that the defendant had succeeded as to parts of the c1aim.—O’R0urke v. Commissioner of Railways, 63 L.T. 66.
(i.) Ch. D.—Con.sent Order—CounseZ’s Autho1'ity—Mista'ke.—Where a counsel, being authorised by his client to consent to an order, by mistake agrees to terms which are not according to his client’s intention, the client may withdraw his consent before the order is drawn up.—Lewis v.
(ii.) Q. B. D.—Counsel—Right to be Heard b1./—Gas Companies Acts Amendment Act, 1880, ss. 10, 12.—'1'he chief gas examiner of the metropolitan district has a discretion as to whether he will or will not hear counsel upon an appeal to him by a gas co1npany.—Reg. v. Williamson, 59 L.J. Q.B. 493; 38 W.B. 769.
(iv.) P. D.—Divorcs—Variation of Scttlement—Serz-ice ofPetition.—The Court dispensed with service of a petition for variation of a marriage settle. ment in a case where both the respondent and the surviving trustee of the settlement were uncertificated bankrupts, and where notice of the application to dispense with service had been given to the Chief Official Receiver in bankruptcy.-Snelling v. Snelling, 63 L.T. 263.
(v.) P. D.—Judicial Separation—Custody of Child— Interim Order.-On an ox pm-te application by a wife, a petitioner for a judicial separation, and on aflidavit by her that she believed that her husband intended to remove the only child of the marriage out of the jurisdiction, the Court made an interim order, restraining him from removing the child. —Harris v. Harris, 63 L.T. 262.
(vi.) C. A.—Evidenca—Admiralty Action—Matter of Nautical SI.-ill.—Iu Admiralty actions, when the Court is assisted by nautical assessors, evidence as to matters of nautical skill is not admissible; and hence, where in an action for damage to cargo the Judge found on the advice of his nautical assessors that all screw alleys, however well-made, may emit smells which may damage sensitive cargo, the Court of Appeal, being assisted by nautical assessors, refused to allow the shipowners to give evidence to shew that the particular screw alley in question did not emit any such smell, on the ground that it was a question of nautical skill about which no evidence could be given.—The Assyrian, 69 L.T. 91.
(vii.) Ch. D.—Ex parte Injunction—Dissolution—Undertaking—Non-compliance.—The Court declined to hear an on parts motion to dissolve an ex parte injunction. Plaintifi obtained an ex parts injunction on Saturday on condition of adding a party as plaintifi for the purpose of his counsel giving the usual undertaking as to damages. The writ was not amended till the following Tuesday, whilst a motion was being made to dissolve the injunction. The Court dissolved the injunction on the ground that plaintifi had not complied with the condition on which it was granted, whereby defendant had been without the protection of the undertaking as to damages.—Spanish General Agency Corporation v. Spanish Corporation, 63 L.T. 161.
(viii.) C. A.—Letters of Request.—An order for letters of request to issue to a foreign court can only be made where it is soughttoexamine witnesses under the order, and there is no jurisdiction to make such an order where production of documents only is asked for.—Cape Copper Co. v. Comptoir cl’Escompte de Paris, 38 W.R. 763.
(ix.) Ch. D.—Mandotory Injunction-Restoration of Fence.—In an action to restrain the defendant, a person in a humble position in life, from permitting certain fences to remain broken down and removed, the Court ordered the defendant to restore and replace such fences, instead of making a negative order restraining him from permitting them to remain broken down and removed.—Bidwell v. Holden, 63 L.T. 104.
r. 9. In a foreclosure action an order had been made authorising two of a large class of persons, all having the same interest in the equity of redemption, to defend the action on behalf of and for the benefit of the others. Held, that a foreclosure order could not be made unless all the parties interested in the equity of redemption were parties to the aotion.—Gz'ijlith v. Pound, 59 L.J. Ch. 522.
Ch. ]).—Pa'rHes—T/rude Mark—Infringemeni.—H. agreed to consign his wine for sale in the United Kingdom exclusively to the plaintifls. The plaintifis sued to restrain the defendants from using a colonrable imitation of H.’s trade mark. Helcl, that the plaintiffs had no interest in the trade mark, and could not maintain the action. Leave given to amend by making the owner of the trade mark plaintiE.—Richards and
Ch. D.—Patent—I’etilionfor Revocati0n— Transfer—R.S.C., 1883, O. xlix, r. 3.—The Chancery Division will order a transfer of a petition for the revocation of a patent to the Queen's Bench Division to be heard by the Judge at the same time as nn action for damages before a Judge
and jury arising out of the same subject matter.—In. re Edge’s Patent, 38 W.R. 698.
Ch. D.—Petition—Sale —-Minerals—Confirmaiion of Sales Act, 1862.— Petition by trustees with an absolute power of sale for the sanction of the Court to the sale of minerals apart from the surface. The beneficiaries, who were all infants, were not parties. The Court made the order without directing service on the beneficiaries.—In rs
(vi.) P. D.—Probafe—Inierest—Legitimacy.—In a probate suit, where the
real question in dispute was the defendant's legitimacy, the plaintiff moved to strike out the statement of defence. Held, that the matter
was too serious to be decided on motion.—In the goods of Harrington, 63 L.T. 238.
money to meet his wife costs of a divorce suit, the decree nisi in which had been rescinded on the intervention of the Queen’s Proctor, on the ground of collusion, the Court ordered the money to be paid out to the Queen's Proctor in part payment of his c0sts.—B'utler v. Butler, L.R. 15 P.D. 161.
1862, ss. 35, 62.—Motion to rectify the register of members of a company. The noticeof motion was served on the company’s solicitors, who accepted service on behalf of the company in the usual way. At the hearing the company did not appear. Held, that the service was not suflicient, and that no order could be made until the company itself
had been served at its registered oflice, or until it nppeared.—In re The De11.1:er 'Um'ted Breweries Co., 63 L.T. 96.
(ix.) Ch. D.—Third Party Procedure—-Origi'nating Summo1ts—R.S.C., 1883,
O. xvi., r. 48; O. lv., rr. 3, 4, 5, 6.—'1'he third Iparty rules are not intended to apply to the procedure directed for originating summonses,
and the relief to be obtained thereby, and the Court has no power to give
a defendant to an originating summons leave to issue a third-party notice.—A.-G. v. Woodall, 63 L.T. 100.
C. A.—Ven/ue—Convenience.—Where the Judge of the Probate Division had changed the venue of a probate case from the assizes to Middlesex, on the ground that it could not conveniently be heard at the assizes, the Court of Appeal, on consultation with the Judge appointed to preside at the assizes in question, found that the Judge of the Probate Division had been under a misapprehension in supposing that it could not conveniently be heard there, and ordered that it should be so heard.—Ja.ckson v. Braithwaite, 63 L.T. 231.
Ch. D.—Writ—Service—Parfnership—Dissolutio11—F0reign Partnership.—For the purposes of service under Ord. 9, r. 6, and Ord. 16, r. 14, s. partnership which has been dissolved before the commencement of the action without the plaintiffs knowledge, must be treated as still subsisting. Service on one partner when within the jurisdiction eflected under either branch of Ord. 9, r. 6, is good service on all the partners, although the partnership is a foreign one and all the partners reside and are domiciled out of the jurisdiction.—Shepherd v. Hirsch Q' Co., 38 W.R. 745.
Principal and Agent :(v.) Ch. D.—Acfion against Agent—Part1'es.-—Action against the Agent
General of a Colonial Government by the equitable assignees of persons who had entered into a contract with the Government, claiming relief in respect of a sum which the plaintiffs alleged had been received by the defendant from the Government as trustee for the plaintiffs, and afterwards in breach of trust repaid by him to the Government. The money had been deposited in the personal name of the defendant, and the plaintiffs contended that he was therefore personally liable for it. The Government was not made a party to the action. Held, that the defendant was only an agent, and could not constitute himself a trustee against his principals; and that the question could not therefore be tried in the absence of the Government, the plaintiffs case being that
there was a trust which the Government could not intercept.— Wright v. Mills, 63 L.T. 186.
Q. B. D.—B|'1'bery of Agent—Remedies of Princi'pal.—Where an agent is bribed to induce his principal to pay a price for goods bought from the briber which is above the market price, the principal has two distinct causes of action. He may sue the agent for the amount of the bribes received by him, and he may also sue the agent and the briber, either jointly or severally, for damages for the loss occasioned by their joint fraud. In an action against the briber the defendant is not