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(i.) Ch. D.-Separate Use-Will-Contingent Interest—" Title"-Married
Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 5.-A testator left property in trust for
Master and Servant:(ii.) Q. B. D.-Injury to Scholar-Negligence of Teacher-Liability of
Manager of School. The defendant was vicar of a parish and a member of the committee of management of the elementary school of the parish. The plaintiff, a pupil at the school, was injured owing, as was alleged, to the negligence of one of the teachers during school hours. Held, that the defendant was liable for such negligence, if proved.--Crisp v. Thomas, 62 L.T. 810.
Metropolis Management: (iii.) Q. B. D.--Building—“ Wooden Structures.”—A steam roundabout,
shooting-gallery, and caravans are not "wooden structures or erections of a movable or temporary character" within the meaning of the Metropolis Management and Building Acts Amendment Act, 1882, and may, therefore, be set up without obtaining the licence of the London
County Council.-Hall v. Smallpiece, 59 L.J. M.C. 97. (iv.) Q. B. D.-Scavenging-Ashes---Trade Refuse—Metropolis Management
Act, 1855, ss. 125, 128.--The defendant had in his hotel a steamengine for electric lighting and other purposes. Held, that the ashes and clinkers from the furnaces were domestic refuse, and not the refuse of a trade, manufactare, or business, and that the defendants were bound to remove them without extra payment.-St. Martin's Vestry v.
Gordon, 62 L.T. 835. (v.) Q. B. D.-Street Open at Both Ends- Private Road-Continuing Offence
- Metropolis Management Act, 1855, 8. 202—Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1862, s. 98.–The appellants were the owners of a road which they had laid out for building as a street for the pur. poses of carriage traffic, but which they had not dedicated to the public. They had placed, at the junction of the road with a public highway, and without the consent of the Board of Works or their successors, certain gates to exclude the public. They were convicted for having laid out such a road, the same not having an entrance of the full width of such road nor being open at both ends from the ground upwards. They were subsequently convicted for permitting the said road to be continued so formed and laid out for a certain number of days. Held, that no new street laid out for building should have barriers across it to exclude the public without the consent of the Board of Works or their successors, and that the appellants had been properly convicted of a continuing offence.- Daw v. London County Council, 59 L.J. M.C. 112; 62 L.T. 937.
Mortgage :(i.) Ch. D.-Costs-Plaintiff's Costs—Priority.-A puisne incumbrancer
brought an action against prior mortgagees and the trustees of a will for the administration of the estate. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to his costs of the administration proceedings out of the estate in priority to the prior mortgagees, so far as such proceedings were proper, and also for the benefit of the prior mortgagees, but must add the rest of his costs to his security. Held, also, that the trustees’ costs of the action, so far as they were costs of which the prior mortgagees had had the benefit, mast come out of the estate as
between solicitor and client.—Lee v. Barne, 62 L.T. 922. (ii.) Q. B. D.--Attornment Clause - Bills of Sale Acts, 1878, and 1882.--
The ordinary attornment clause used in mortgages of real property is valid, and creates the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties, notwithstanding sect. 6 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, and sect. 9 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882. Mumford v. Collier,
L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 279; 38 W.R. 716. (iii.) C. A.-Collateral Advantage-Solicitor— Auctioneer-Costs. - Decision
of Ch. D. (see Vol. 15, p. 85, v.) affirmed.- Field v. Hopkins,
L.R. 44 Ch. D. 524 ; 62 L.T. 774. (iv.) C. A.-Exclusion of Right to Redeem-Validity.—Decision of Ch. D.
(see Vol. 15, p. 86, i.) affirmed.-Marquis of Northampton v. Pollock,
63 L.T. 136. (v.) Ch. D.- Foreclosure-Receiver -- Possession.-A receiver and manager
was appointed by an interlocutory order in an action to foreclose the mortgage of a public house, the mortgagor being in possession. He continued in occupation of part of the premises, and was alleged to have interfered with the management of the business by the receiver. Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled, before judgment, to an order directing the mortgagor to give up possession to the receiver, and restraining him from occupying any part of the premises. —Taylor v.
Soper, 62 L.T. 828. (vi.) Ch.D.- Redemption by Second Mortgagee-Loss of Deeds—Indemnity.
In 1867 M. mortgaged his life interest in settled funds, and three policies of life insurance. He afterwards mortgaged his life interest, but not the policies, to the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action for redemption and foreclosure. H. was the legal personal representative of the first mortgagee. It appeared that the mortgage deed of 1867 and the policies were not in the possession of H. The plaintiff had paid into Court what was certified to be due to H. for principal, interest, and costs, and now claimed that the whole som should be retained as indemnity against the loss of the deed and policies. The insurance company declined to make any arrangement with regard to indemnity till the policies should become claims. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to a bond of indemnity from H., and to have £100 retained to meet costs which might be incurred when the policies should become
claims. --Caldwell v. Matthews, 62 L T. 799. (vii.) Ch. D.- Reversionary Interest - Arrears of Interest-Limitations — In a
mortgage deed, dated in 1875, a reversionary interest in personalty was assigned by way of mortgage, with a covenant to pay principal and interest on a day certain, but withont any covenant to pay interest in the event of the principal, or any part of it, remaining unpaid. The mortgagor paid a sum on account of principal, but never paid any interest. In an action for foreclosure, held, that interest was recoverable as damages, and that it was not limited to six years' arrears.Mellersh v. Brown, 63 L.T. 189; 38 W.R. 732.
(i.) Ch. D.-Transfer-Escrow—Negligence, Solicitor-Agent-Cash Pay.
ment-Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 56.—The plaintiff transferred a mortgage to the defendant. The same solicitor acted for both parties. The plaintiff executed the transfer, and handed it and the title deeds to the solicitor, who undertook to return them or pay the consideration money. The plaintiff made no enquiries for nearly six months, having been told by the solicitor that some notice was required. Shortly after the plaintiff bad enquired as to the transfer, the solicitor handed over the transfer and the title deeds to the defendant, who paid no cash to the solicitor, but set off a debt owed by him. The solicitor then became bankrupt. Held, that the defendant ought to have paid cash, and was not entitled to set off the solicitor's debt, that the plaintiff had not been guilty of negligence, that the transfer was only an escrow, till the defendant had paid cash to the solicitor, and that the defendant must pay the plaintiff the consideration money or return the deeds.Coupe v. Collyer, 62 LT. 927.
Municipal Election:(ii.) C. C.R. --- Corrupt Practices — Order for Prosecution -- Indictment
Adjoining County-Jurisdiction. The commissioner for the trial of municipal election petitions ordered certain persons, prosecuted before him for a corrupt practice committed at a municipal election in Nottingham, to be prosecuted on indictment for the offence at the ensuing assizes at Derby. Held, that he had jurisdiction to order the trial at Derby ; that his order was sufficient without describing the corrupt practice; that the Derbyshire grand jury could find, and the judge of assize had jurisdiction to try the indictment; that "Derbyshire to wit" in the margin of the indictment was sufficient, although the body of it disclosed offences out of Derbyshire only ; that the words "a corrupt practice in the commissioner's order were reasonably interpreted “some corrupt practice," and that the prosecution were not precluded from preferring a number of charges of bribery in the indictment.- Reg. v. Riley and Campion, 59 L.J. M.C. 122; 63 L.T. 119.
Nuisance :(iii.) Ch.D.--Quia Timet, Action-Injunction.--- Action to restrain the defen
dant, the owner of an open space in the middle of a town, from allowing the same to be used for exhibitions which might be a nuisance to inhabitants of adjoining houses. The defendant had allowed such an exhibition to be held there for several days, and had asserted his right to allow such shows, and declined to undertake not to allow them. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction.-Phillips v. Thomas, 62 L.T. 793.
Patent: (iv.) Ch. D.-- Action for Account-Denial of User-Discovery.- Action
against a licensee for an account of royalties. The defendant denied user, and alleged that the process which he employed was a secret process of his own. The plaintiff closely interrogated him as to his process by detailed reference to the plaintiff's specification, and also required names of some of his customers. Held, that the defendant must answer fully so long as he did not disclose his own secret. Held, also that he must answer the interrogatory as to his customers. Ashworth v. Roberts, 63 L.T. 160.
Poor Law:(i.) Q. B. D.-Rating-Machinery.-Premises were used as a bobbin.net
factory. There were machines therein which were capable of removal, some being fixed to the floor by screws, and the rest not fixed at all. Held, that though the machinery was not part of the freehold, and remained personal property, yet, being essentially necessary and per. manently attached to the business, it was rightly taken into account as enhancing the value of the premises in estimating the rateable value.
Gifford & Co. v. The Chard Union, 63 L.T. 249. (ii.) Q. B. D.-Settlement, Derivative Settlement–Divided Parishes Act,
1876, s. 35.- In determining the settlement of a married woman, it appeared that her husband had never acquired a settlement for himself ; but the birth settlements of the husband and of his father were both shewn. Held, that the pauper's husband took his father's settlement, it not being derivative, and that the paoper took the same settlement, and not the birth settlement of her husband.- West Ham Guardians v. St. Giles's-in-the-Fields Overseers, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 272; 38 W.R. 736.
Power:(iii.) C. A.-Execution-Validity— Reference to Power.- A power to appoint
in tail does not authorise an appointment for life. By deed of September 5th real estate was conveyed to such uses as Mr. and Mrs. P. should by deed appoint. By deed of September 9th they appointed it to the use of themselves successively for life, remainder to the use of sach of their children in tail as they should jointly appoint, with remainders over. By a subsequent deed Mr. and Mrs. P., in exercise of the power conferred by the deed of September 5th, and of every power and authority enabling them in that behalf, appointed the property to themselves successively for life, remainder to the use of their son E. for life, remainder to his children and remoter issue as he should appoint, with remainders over. Held, that even if the power conferred by the deed of September 9th authorised an appointment for life, there was no intention of exercising it, and that the appointment was wholly
bad.-Porter v. De Quetteville, 59 L.J. Ch. 595. (iv.) Ch. D.-Exercise by Will—Intention. Under the will of D., T. was
tenant for life of shares of certain funds, with power after his death to appoint among his children so much of the said funds as he might be "entitled or presumptively entitled to.” T., by will, in exercise of the power, appointed £5 to be paid out of his share of the said funds to each of his children except P., and he appointed the remainder of his share to P. And he gave all his other property to P. Held, that the will operated as an appointment of an accrued as well as the original share of T. in the said funds. – Bannerman v. Toosey,
63 L.T. 105. (v.) Ch. D.- Exercise by Will— Remoteness.-A testatrix bad under her
marriage settlement power to appoint a fund by will among the children and issue of the marriage. By her will she gave all the property " which by virtue of any power or authority, or of any separate right of property she was competent to dispose of" on trust for sale, and after payment thereout of funeral and testamentary expenses to invest the residue, and hold the same on trust for her husband for life, and after his death on trust, as to one seventh part for her son, and as to the other six seventh parts for her daughters, with a direction that the trustees should hold the daughters' shares on trust for each daughter for life, and after her death on trust for her children. There was evidence that the
testatris and her husband had forgotten the existence of the settlement. Held, that such evidence could not be acted on, that the will must be regarded as an exercise of the power, and that the daughters took their shares of the settled funds free from the fetters attempted to be imposed
by the subsequent direction.-Nield v. Boyd, 63 L.T. 92. (i.) C. A.-Exercise--Reversionary Fund.-A., on the marriage of his son
in 1815, settled two sums of £10,000 each on trust for the son and his wife successively for life, and in default of issue of the marriage, as A. should by deed, will, or codicil referring to the settlement, appoint. A., by his will in 1832 (not referring to the settlement), bequeathed his residuary personal estate on trust for his son for life, and in default of issne of his son, for A.'s daughters and their children, the daughters taking life interests. By a codicil made in 1833 A. directed that the two sums of £10,000 mentioned in the settlement should form part of his residuary personal estate, and be paid to his executors and trustees. A. died in 1834, his son in 1850, without having bad issue, and the son's wife in 1889. At her death the two sums of £10,000 were represented by £25,000 consols. Held, that the two sums of £10,000 only became part of A.'s estate when the amounts became payable to his executors and trustees, and that there was no question of apportionment between tenant for life and remainderman.—Matheson v. Goodwyn, 63 L.T. 201.
Practice :(ii.) Ch. D.--Amendment of Judgment--R.S.C., 1883, 0. xxviii., r. 11.
The defendant bad covenanted with the plaintiff that he would not during the remainder of the term of the lease of a certain shop, carry on a certain business within one mile from the house. Action in 1870 to restrain breach of the covenant. Perpetual injunction granted restrain. ing the defendant from carrying on the business within one mile from the house. Motion to commit the defendant for breach of the injunc. tion. The defendant moved to amend the decree by inserting the words “during the remainder of the lease.” The lease had expired in 1881. Held, that the words ought to be inserted.-Shipwright v.
Clements, 63 L.T. 160; 38 W.R. 746. (iii.) C. A.-Appeal-Time--R.S.C., 1883, 0. lviii., rr.3, 9, 15.- The decision
of a Divisional Court on a case stated by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue under sect. 19 of the Stamp Act, 1870, is an "order,” and not
judgment,” and an appeal from such decision must be brought within twenty-one days.--Onslow v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue,
L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 465; 38 W.R. 728. (iv.) P. C.-Costs- Arbitration-Different Issues.—The appellants brought
an action claiming a lump sum as unliquidated damages. The action was referred on the terms that the award should be “ for a sum certain for the plaintiffs, or an award for the defendant as the arbitrators may find," with liberty "to enter the said award as the verdict in this cause, and to sign final judgment therein;" costs to follow the verdict and to be taxed in the ordinary way. The arbitrators awarded the plaintiffs an amount less than one quarter of that claimed, and a verdict was entered for the amount so found due. Held, that even apart from the terms of the reference, the Court had no power to direct a verdict to be entered for the defendant for the difference between the amount claimed and that awarded, and the costs to be taxed on the footing that the defendant had succeeded as to parts of the claim.--O'Rourke v. Commissioner of Railways, 63 L.T. 66.