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her future offspring. The husband made her an allowance, and they corresponded until 1880. when the husband refused further communication with her. She afterwards committed adultery. Held, that he was not disentitled to a divorce.—Lander v. Lu'nder, 63 L.T. 257.

P.D.—Divorce—Allowance to Wife—Dum Castu petitioner obtained a decree on the ground of his wife's adultery, the decree not to be made absolute till the petitioner had agreed to make her an allowance. The parties prepared an agreement which contained a

dum casta. clause. The Court expressed an objection to the clause, but made the decree absolute.— Weller v. Weller, 63 L.T. 263.

P. D.—Diro1-ce— Collus1'on—Cruelty—-Judicial Separation.—When a wife obtained a decree nisi for adultery and cruelty, which had been rescinded on the ground of collusion, held, that a decree for judicial separation ought not to be granted.—Butler v. Butler, 63 L.T. 256.

P. D.—Dirorce—Indian—-Marriage In'valid—Second 1lIarriagc—Will— Indian Divorce Act, 1869, s. 57.—The respondent and co-respondent in an Indian Divorce Suit, the decree in which was made absolute in November, 1879, came to England, and were married in February, 1879. The husband immediately after executed a will leaving all his property to his “reputed wife." In April, 1881, they went through a second form of marriage. Held, that in consequence of the Indian Divorce Act, sect. 57, the first marriage was invalid, and that the will was revoked by the subsequent marriage.-- Wurter v. Warter, L.R. 15 P.D. 152.

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having dissolved a marriage, has power to order that the marriage settlements be varied, no matter where, or in what form, such settlements have been exeouted.—-Nunneley v. Nu/rmeley, 63 L.T. 113.

P. D.—Divorce—Variation of Sett'lement—-Permane'nt Zlfaintenance— Rerersinnary Interests.—A wife having obtained a decree for divorce petitioned for variation of the marriage settlement and for maintenance. The present joint income of the husband and wife amounted to about £1,500 a year, and they were both entitled to considerable property in reversion. The registrar recommended either that a permanent income of £700 a year should be secured to the wife for life, or that she should have secured to her an annual sum equal to one-third of the present joint income, such sum to be increased on the falling in of the husband’! reversionary interests. The husband preferred the former course, and the Court ordered that it should be adopted.—Warren v. Warren, 63 L.T. 264.

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of Infants Act 1886, s. 7—Declarati0n.—When s. judicial separation was i

granted on the petition of a wife, on the ground of gross cruelty on the part of the husband towards his wife and child, held, that a declaration ought to he annexed to the decree that the respondent was a person unfit to have the custody of the child. The Court refused to lay down any rules as to the making of such a declaration.—-Hrmdford v. Ha/ndford, 63 L.T. 256.

P, D.—Re.stilu!ion of Conjugal Rights—Allowance—Allegations of Misconduct — Evidence. — Allegations of misconduct, short of a matrimonial ofience, are relevant to the question of what allowance should be made by a respondent to a petitioner, upon non-compliance with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, and such allegations are for the consideration of the Court, and ought to be referred to the Court by the registrar. The Court allowed evidence as to such alleged misconduct to be given by aflidavit, reserving to the incriminated party the right of cross-examination if desired.—Swif6 v. Swift, 63 L.T. 262.

Landlord and Tenant :

(i-) Q. B. D.—Ewecution against Goods of Third Party—Right of Landlord to Claim Arrears of Rent—Co1mty Courts Act, 1888, s. 160.—Execution having issued upon a County Court judgment against the defendant, goods belonging to him were taken in execution in a house of which his wife was lessee. The landlord gave a notice to the bailiff claiming arrears of rent due from the wife. Held, that, as the defendant’! goods were rightfully taken in execution, the landlord's claim was good.Hughes v. Smallwoocl, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 306; 59 L.J. Q.B. 503; 63 L.T. 198.

Limitations :—

(ii.) Ch. D.—-Disab1'lity—Accr'uer of Rigt|t—Tenant in Ta1'l—ReaI Property Limitation Act, 1874, ss. 1, 3, 9.—The plaintiffs mother on the death of R., which took place in 1871, became entitled as tenant in tail by descent to certain property, being then under no disability. She married in 1875, and died in 1882, without having acquired possession of the property. The plaintiff became entitled on her death as her issue in tail, and in 1889, being still an infant, commenced an action to enforce his right. Held, that the right to possession first accrued in 1871, and that as there had been no possession for twelve years by the plaintiff or his mother, through whom he claimed as tenant in tail, his right was new barred.—Murray v. Watkins, 62 L.T. 796.

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(iii.) Ch. D.—Pav1''ng of Street—Notice to Owner—Validity.—The term “owner " as defined in the Public Health Act, 1875, sect. 4, does not include a receiver of rents and profits appointed by the Court, and service on him of a notice under sect. 150 is invalid.—Bacup (Corporation of) v. Smith, L.R. 44 Ch. D. 395; 59 L.J. Ch. 518; 63 L.T. 195; 38 W.R. 697.

(iv.) B. D.—Supera.n'n.uation Allowance—L1matic Asylum—Chaplain— Lunatic Asylums Act, 1853, s. 57.—The chaplain of a lunatic asylum is an oflicer of the asylum, though he does not reside there, or give his whole time to the duties of his ofiice, and is qualified as such to receive a superannuation allowance if granted by the visitors.—Reg. v. County Council of Hereford, 38 W.R. 775.

Marriage Settlement :

(v.) C11. D.—Cove'nant to Settle—After-acquired Propert1/.—A reversionary interest in personalty which vests in the wife during the coverture, but is liable to be divested by appointment, is bound by a covenant in a marriage settlement on the part of the husband to settle any personal estate which during the ooverture should “come to or vest in" the husband by right of the wife, or in her by bequest, gift, or Otherwise.— Cumberlege v. Cumberlege-Ware, 63 L.T. 52; 38 W.R. 767.

Married Woman :—

(vi.) C. .A.—Li'ability to be Sued —Ma.rr1'ecl Women’s Property Act, 1882, s. 1, sub-s. 2.—K., a married woman, was entitled to the residue of an estate. The certificates of shares not fully paid up, part of such residue, were handed to her, but no transfer was executed. A call was made and the executors were compelled to pay it. Held, that they were entitled to sue K. for indemnity with respect to her separate estate.—Whit1aker

v. Kershaw, 63 L.T. Z03.

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Master and Servant:

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Ch. D.—Separate Use—Will—Co-nt1'ng¢mt Interest—“ Title "—Marr1'ad lVomen’s Property Act, 1882, 0. 5.—-A testator left property in trust for E. for life, and if E. should die without issue, to the persons who at the time of the failure of the preceding trust would be his next-of-kin, and entitled to his personal estate under the statutes of distribution if he had then died intestate. The testator died in 1879. E. died in 1886 without issue. One of the next-of-kin of the testator, if he had died at the same time as E., was P. She married in 1857, made her will in 1887, and died in 1889, leaving her husband surviving. Held, that the property first accrued to P. in title and interest on the death of E., that she was entitled to it for her separate use, and that it passed by her will, her husband not being entitled to it in his marital right.—Stockley v. Parsons, L.R. 45 Ch. D. 51; 59 L.J. Ch. 666; 62 L.T. 929 ; 33 W.R. 712.

See Will, p. 30.


Q. B. D. —-Injury to Scholar—Negligence of Teacher—Liabili'ty of Manager of School.—The defendant was vicar of a parish and a member of the committee of management of the elementary school of the parish. The plaintifi, a pupil at the school, was injured owing, as was alleged, to the negligence of one of the teachers during school hours. Held, that the defendant was liable for such negligence, if proved.—O'r1'sp v. Thomas, 62 L.T. 810.

Metropolis Management :

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Q. B. D.—Bu1'lding—“ Wooden Str'uctures.”—A steam roundabout, shooting-gallery, and caravans are not “wooden structures or erections of a movable or temporary character" within the meaning of the Metropolis Manatzement and Building Acts Amendment Act, 1882, and may, therefore, be set up without obtaining the licence of the London County Counoil.—-Hall v. Smullpiece, 59 LLJ. M.C. 97.

. B. D.—Sca1-engin.q—Ashes—Trade Refuse—Metropolia Management Act, 1855, ss. 125, 128.--'I'he defendant had in his hotel a steamengine for electric lighting and other purposes. Held, that the ashes and clinkers from the furnaces were domestic refuse, and not the refuse of a trade, manufacture, or business, and that the defendants were bound to remove them without extra payment.—St. Martin’s Vestry v. Gordo-n, 62 L.T. 835.

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—Meh-opolis Management Act, 1855, s. 202—Meir0polis Management Amendment Act, 1862, s. 98.—The appellants were the owners of a road which they had laid out for building as a street for the purposes of carriage trafiic, but which they had not dedicated to the public. They had placed, at the junction of the road with a public highway, and without the consent of the Board of Works or their successors, certain gates to exclude the public. They were convicted for having laid out such a road, the some not having an entrance of the full width of such road nor being open at both ends from the ground upwards. They were subsequently convicted for permitting the said road to be continued so formed and laid out for a certain number of days. Held, that no new street laid out for building should have barriers across it to exclude the public without the consent of the Board of Works or their successors, and that the appellants had been properly convicted of a continuing ofience.—Da/w v. London. County Council, 59 L.J. M.C. 112; 62 L.T. 937.

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(i.) Ch. D.—Costs—Plainh'.{f’s Costs—Pr1'or1't1.1.—-A puisne incnmbrancer brought an action against prior mortgegees and the trustees of a will for the administration of the estate. Held, that the plaintifi was entitled to his costs of the administration proceedings out of the estate in priority to the prior mortgagees, so far as such proceedings were proper, and also for the benefit of the prior morrgagees, but must add the rest of his costs to his security. Held, also, that the trustees’ costs of the action, so far as they were costs of which the prior mortgagees had had the benefit, must come out of the estate as between solicitor and client.—Lee v. Borne, 62 L.T. 922.

(ii.) Q. B. D.—Alto1-nment—Bills of Sale Acts, 1878, and 1882.The ordinary attornment clause used in mortgages of real property is valid, and creates the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties, notwithstanding sect. 6 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, and sect. 9 of the Bills of Bale Act, 1882. Mumford v. Collier, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 279; 38 W.R. 716.

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(v-) Ch. D.—Foreclosure—Rece1'ver—Possession.—A receiver and manager was appointed by an interlocutory order in an action to foreclose the mortgage of a public house, the mortgagor being in possession. He continued in occupation of part of the premises, and was alleged to have interfered with the management of the business by the receiver. Held, that the plaintifi was not entitled, before judgment, to an order directing the mortgagor to give up possession to the receiver, and

restraining him from occupying any part of the premises.—Taylor v. Soper, 62 L.T. 828.

(vi.) Ch. D.—Redemption by Second Mo1-tgagee—Loss of DeecZs—Iudemnity.— In 1867 M. mortgaged his life interest in settled funds, and three policies of life insurance. He afterwards mortgaged his life interest, but not the policies, to the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action for redemption and foreclosure. H. was the legal personal representative of the first mortgagee. It appeared that the mortgage deed of 1867 and the policies were not in the possession of H. The plaintiff had paid into Court what was certified to be due to H. for principal, interest, and costs, and now claimed that the whole sum should be retainedas indemnity against the loss of the deed and policies. The insurance company declined to make any arrangement with regard to indemnity till the policies should become claims. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to a bond of indemnity from H., and to have £100 retained to meet costs which might be incurred when the policies should become claims. --Caldwell v. Matthews, 62 L '1‘. 799.

(vii.) Ch. D.— Reversionary Interest—Arrears of Intereat—L1'mitat|'ons —Ina mortgage deed, dated in 187 5, a reversionary interest in personalty was assigned by way of mortgage, with a covenant to pay principal and interest on a day certain, but without any covenant to pay interestin the event of the principal, or any part of it, remaining unpaid. The mortgagor paid a sum on account of principal, but never paid any interest. In an action for foreclosure, held, that interest was recoverable as damages, and that it was not limited to six years’ arrears.— Mellersh v. Bro1un, 63 L.'I‘. 189; 38 W.R. 732.

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'me'nt—C0nveya1tc1'ng Act, 1881, s. 56.—The plaintiif transferred a mortgage to the defendant. The same solicitor acted for both parties. The plaintiff executed the transfer, and handed it and the title deeds to the solicitor, who undertook to return them or pay the consideration money. The plaintiff made no enquiries for nearly six months, having been told by the solicitor that some notice was required. Shortly after the plaintiff had enquired as to the transfer, the solicitor handed over the transfer and the title deeds to the defendant, who paid no cash to the solicitor, but set oifa debt owed by him. The solicitor then became bankrupt. Held, that the defendant ought to have paid cash, and was not entitled to set ofi the solicitor'n debt, that the plaintifl had not been guilty of negligence, that the transfer was only an escrow, till the defendant had paid cash to the solicitor, and that the defendant must pay the plaintifi the consideration money or return the deeds.Coupe v. Collyer, 62 LT. 927.

Municipal E1eetion:— (ii.) C. C. R. — Corrupt Practices — Order for Prosecution — Indictment —

A1ijoi11ing C0unty—Jur1'sd1'ction.—The commissioner for the trial of municipal election petitions ordered certain persons, prosecuted before him for a corrupt practice committed at a municipal election in Nottingham, to be prosecuted on indictment for the offence at the ensuing assizes at Derby. Held, that he had jurisdiction to order the trial at Derby; that his order was suflicient without describing the corrupt practice; that the Derbyshire grand jury could find, and the judge of assize had jurisdiction to try the indictment; that “ Derbyshire to wit” in the margin of the indictment was suflicient, although the body of it disclosed ofiences out of Derbyshire only ; that the words “ a corrupt practice " in the commissioner’s order were reasonably interpreted “ some corrupt practice," and that the prosecution were not precluded from preferring a number of charges of bribery in the indictment.—Re.q. v. Riley and Campion, 59 L.J. M.C. 122; 63 L.'l'. 119.

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dant,the owner of an open space in the middle of a town, from allowing the same to be used for exhibitions which might be a nuisance to inhabitants of adjoining houses. The defendant had allowed such an exhibition to be held there for several days, and had asserted his right to allow such shows, and declined to undertake not to allow them. Held, that the

plaintifis were entitled to an injuncti0n.—Phillips v. Thomas, 62 L.T. 793. Patent:


(iv.) Ch. D.—Action for Account—DeniaI' of User—Discovery.—Action

against a licensee for an account of royalties. The defendant denied user, and alleged that the process which he employed was a secret process of his own. The plaintifi closely interrogated him as to his process by detailed reference to the plaintiffs specification, and also required names of some of his customers. Held, that the defendant must answer fully so long as he did not disclose his own secret. Held, also that he must answer the interrogatory as to his customers.Ashwnrfh v. Roberls, 63 L.T. 160.

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