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Ship :(i.) C. A.-Bill of Lading-Exceptions - Thieves. — Goods were shipped
under a bill of lading which exempted the shipowner from liability for loss caused by "thieves of whatever kind, whether on board or not, or by land or sea." Held, that the exception did not protect the shipowner from liability for the loss of the goods, which were stolen during the stowage by stevedores who were in his service.-Steinman & Co. v.
Angier Line, L.R. (1891] 1 Q.B. 619; 60 L.J. Q.B. 425; 64 L.T. 613. (ii.) C. A.-Charter Party-Advance Freight "if Required”- Requirement
after Loss.—Decision of Q. B. D. (see Vol. 16, p. 61, ii.) reversed.Smith, Hill & Co. v. Pyman Bell & Co., L.R. (1891] 1 Q.B. 742 ;
64 L.T. 436; 39 W.R. 466. (ii.) P. D.-Collision-Thames Rules, Arts. 17 (c), 18.-When a steam-vessel
is beginning to turn round in the Thames she ought to give the four. blast signal prescribed by Art. 18. It is not enough to give the three. blast signal under Art. 17 (c), when she reverses her engines.—The New
Pelton, L.R. (1891] P. 258. (iv.) H. L.-Collision-Crossing—Thames Rules, Art. 24.—Decision of C. A.
(see Vol. 15, p. 96, ii.) affirmed.—The River Derwent, 64 L.T. 509. (v.) P.D.-Collision-Damages-Interest.-Where damages were awarded
in respect of a collision which occurred thirteen years ago, held, that interest was properly awarded for the whole period since the collision.
The Kong Magnus, L.R. (1891] P. 223. (vi.) C. A.-Collision.-Fairway of Navigation.- A ship going down the
Clyde on a dark night stopped her engines and turned across the fairway of navigation for the purpose of anchoring. A following ship collided with her. Held, that the first ship was to blame, as she did not use any means of giving notice of her mancavre to following vessels.- The
Queen Victoria, 64 L.T. 520. (vii.) C. A.-Deviation—"Necessity.”—The “necessity ” which will justify a
deviation exists where a deviation is reasonably necessary, and in considering whether it is so, danger, distance, accommodation, expense, and every other material circumstance ought to be taken into account ; and when a competent master, being obliged to put back for repairs, chooses a more distant port in preference to a nearer one in the bona fide exercise of his judgment for the benefit of both the ship and cargo, the Coart ought not on light grounds to consider the deviation unauthorised. The plaintiffs shipped goods in the defendants' vessel at Swansea for delivery at New York. The ship met with bad weather, and had to put back for repairs, and the goods were damaged by water. The master communicated with the defendants from Queenstown, and was directed to put back to Bristol. The vessel was lost on the way to Bristol. It appeared that the vessel could be repaired more quickly and at less expense at Bristol than at Swansea, the nearer port, and the defendants had facilities at Bristol for transhipping the goods, but it did not appear that there were more facilities there than at Swansea for improving the condition of damaged goods. The vessel carried other cargo besides the plaintiffs' goods. The jury found that there was no deviation. Held, that the Judge was right in not telling the jury that the owners of the goods ought to have been consalted. Held, also, that the Judge was not bound to have directed the jury, that on the evidence there was no necessity for patting back to Bristol, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, on the ground that the master had acted for the best in the interests of both cargo-owners and shipowners.-Phelps, James & Co. v. Hill, L.R. (1891) 1 Q.B. 605 ; 60 L.J. Q.B. 382 ; 64 L.T. 610.
(i.) P. D.-Salvage-Default Proceedings-Derelict.-Where five men found
a marine boiler derelict and floating on the sea, and brought it ashore, the Court, in a default salvage action, awarded them £50 and costs out of £58, the net proceeds of the boiler.—The Boiler ex Elephant, 64 L.T. 543.
Slander:(ii.) C. A.-Privilege.—The plaintiff had acted for about three weeks as
valet to S. While visiting Edinburgh as such valet, the plaintiff stayed at the W. hotel, and on leaving Edinburgh the plaintiff and S. went to N., where 8. had been invited to stay with the defendant, the Mayor of N. On the morning of their leaving Edinburgh, the chief constable of N. received a letter from the police of Edinburgh, stating that a watch had been stolen from a bedroom in the W. hotel, near to the room occupied by the plaintiff. The letter conveyed suspicion that the plaintiff might be the thief, but stated that there was no evidence against him, and that caution ought to be used in making inquiries. The letter was shewn to the defendant, who privately communicated it to S. The plaintiff was soon afterwards discharged by S. in consequence of the communication. He obtained a verdict in an action for slander. Held, that the occasion of the communication was privileged, and that the case ought to bave been withdrawn from the jury.--Stuart v. Bell,
64 L.T. 633. (iii.) C. A.-Special Damage.-The defendant uttered a slander consisting of a false imputation against the chastity of the plaintiff, an unmarried
The slander was attered in the presence of the plaintiff's mother, who repeated it to the plaintiff, who repeated it to X., who was engaged to marry the plaintiff. X. consequently broke off his engagement. The defendant had not authorised the repetition of the slander. Held, that he was not liable in damages.-Speight v. Gosnay, 60 L.J. Q.B. 231.
Solicitor:(iv.) c. A.-Costs—Taxation-District Registry-Petition of Course
R.S.C., 1883, 0. xxxv., rr. 6, 6a, sub.r. 2, 16; 0. Ixii., r. 18.—Decision of Ch. D. (see Vol. 16, p. 100, iv.) reversed.-In re Porrett,
60 L.J. Ch. 396; 39 W.R. 531. (v.) C. A.- Scale Fee-Negotiating Sale-Commission Paid to Estate Agent
General Order, Schedule 1, r. 11.-The owner of an estate in Devonshire appointed a local surveyor as bis estate agent, with a view to its development as a building estate, and agreed that his remuneration should be a percentage on the purchase-money of land sold. An offer for purchase of part of the land was made to the owner, and the estate agent being ill, the negotiation for the sale was conducted, at the owner's request, by the owner's London solicitor. The local agent assisted by preparing the plans, and advising as to the price and the restrictive covenants to be imposed. The local agent received his percentage on the purchase-money, the vendor being reminded that it was also remuneration for work done during the preceding ten years. Held, that this was “a commission paid by the client to an estate agent," and that the solicitor was not entitled to the scale fee for nego
tiating the sale.-In re Withall, 39 W.R. 529. (vi.) C. A.-Taxation of Costs after Payment - Special Circumstances —
Discretion of Judge.- Property was sold by the mortgagor. While the parchaser was pressing for completion, and threatening an action, the mortgagee's solicitor delivered bills of costs amounting to £48 16s.
The mortgagor was absent from the country, but his solicitor paid "ander protest" £42 in discharge of the bills; which was accepted. The mortgagor's solicitor took out a summons for taxation after payment, alleging as special circumstances (1), the mortgagor's absence ; (2) the payment having been made “under protest ;” (3) the “ pressure arising from the necessity of getting the sale completed. The Court below ordered taxation. Held, on appeal, that there was some doubt whether the grounds alleged were sufficient to constitate a clear case of “special circumstances,” but that as there were some grounds for holding that there was such a case, the discretion of the Judge ought not to be interfered with; and that appeals in cases of this kind ought not to be encouraged where the amount in qnestion was so small.--In re Cheesman,
L.R. (1891] 2 Ch. 289; 64 L.T. 602; 39 W.R. 497. (i.) C. A. -Lien-Extent of - Advances-Security.—A solicitor has a lien on
his client's documents only for taxable costs, charges, and expenses incurred by him as solicitor of the client, which will include advances made by him in the course of his business as a solicitor, but not loans or advances not so made, and which are not liable to be taxed or moderated by the taxing master. If the solicitor takes security from his client, and the position of the parties, and the ciroumstances of the case, and the nature of the security are such that the taking of the security is inconsistent with the continuance of the lien, the lien will be deemed to have been abandoned. A solicitor took as secarity from his client, a married woman, a promissory note (in which her husband joined as security), with a provision for payment of interest, and a charge on a life policy, and there was no provision made for the continuance of the lien. Held, that the security was inconsistent with the continuance of the lien, as it gave more than the lien, and that the lien must therefore be taken to have been abandoned, it being the duty of a solicitor to explain to his client the effect of every transaction between them.-E. p. Payne Collier ; in re Taylor, Stileman and
Underwood, L.R. (1891] 1 Ch. 590; 64 L.T. 605; 39 W.R. 417. (ii.) Ch. D.-Lien for Costs.-A. was threatening to sue B., and B. agreed to
give him a charge on certain moneye, which B.'s solicitors were taking proceedings to recover from two insurance companies on two separate policies. The charge was prepared by B.'s solicitors, who sent it to A. with a letter undertaking, out of any moneys received by them from either the S. Co. or the M. Co. under the policies, " after payment of the legal charges,” to pay A. the amount secured by the charge. The M. Co. agreed to pay a sum in compromise of the proceedings, and B.'s solicitors wrote to A. that he might consider himself secured. After. wards the S. Co. obtained judgment in their favour. Held, that the undertaking and the surrounding circumstances shewed that there was a bargain that B.'s solicitors were entitled to have their costs of the proceedings with reference to both policies out of any moneys received, in priority to any payment to A. on his charges.—Mackenzie v. Mackintosh, 64 L.T. 318.
(iii.) Q. B.D.-Unqualified Person-Process-Server—6 87 Vict., c. 73, s. 2–
23 & 24 Vict., c. 127, s. 26.-A person employed by a solicitor as &
Tenant for Life :(i.) C. A. & Q. B. D.-Agricultural Holdings (England) Act, 1883, s. 29
Compensation paid by Executors of Tenant for Life—Right to Charge.— Where the execators of a deceased tenant for life have paid to an out. going tenant the compensation payable under the Act, the tenant for life having died three days after the amount payable had been ascertained, held, by Cave, J., that the executors were, and by Williams, J., that they were not, entitled to a charge on the holding for the amount paid. Held, by C. A., that they were so entitled.—Gough v. Gough, 64 L.T. 532;
39 W.R. 494 & 593. (ii.) Ch. D.-Shares-Bonus Dividend— Capital or Income.-Shares in a
company were settled. The company had, under powers in its articles, accumulated a large depreciation fund, for purposes some of which are usually provided for out of income, and some out of capital. Some of the shares of the company were not fully paid up. It was resolved to distribute the depreciation fund, and to increase the capital of the company by issuing new shares, and to call ap part of the unpaid capital. Dividend warrants for 50 per cent. on the amount paid up on their shares were sent to the shareholders, with forms for their signature, requesting that the amount might be applied in payment for the new shares, which were offered to holders of fully paid.op shares, and in pay. ment of the calls which were made on partly paid-up shares. The trustees of the settled shares, which were fully paid.ap, accepted the new shares, and sold them at a profit. Held, that the transaction was not an appropria. tion of accumulated profits as an increase of capital, bat a distribution of surplus profits by way of dividend, with an option to the shareholders to invest the same in new capital, and that the tenant for life was entitled to the bonus dividend, but that the profit made by the sale of the new shares belonged to the capital of the trust estate.-Ellis v.
Barfield, 64 L.T. 625. Trade Mark:(ii.) Ch. D.-Alteration of Register – Terms.-On motion for leave to alter
the registration of certain trade-marks by striking out of each of them as registered the words “ trade-mark,” held, that leave should be given only on terms that the applicants should undertake to indorse on their application and enter on the register a statement of the essential particulars their marks, and a disclaimer of the exclusive right to the added matter (if any) to the satisfaction of the comptroller.-In re
Colman's Trade-Marks, L.R. (1891] 2 Ch. 402 ; 64 L.T. 507; 39 W.R. 488. (iv.) H. L.-Name of Place-Rectification of Register.- Decision of C. A. (see
Vol. 14, p. 130, iii.) affirmed.--Montgomery v. Thompson, L.R. (1891)
A.C. 217. (v.) C. A.- Registration, Wrongful—" Person Aggrieved"_"Fancy Words"
-Patents, &c., Acts, 1883 & 1888.-A person is "aggrieved” by the wrongful registration of a trade mark if he is in the same trade as the person who has registered it, and desires to deal in goods which are covered by it, or if the area of business open to him is thereby narrowed, or if he is likely to be not only excluded from but hampered in his trade thereby, or if in his opposition to the registration of a second trade mark, the fact of such wrongfully registered mark being on the register is used against him. A trade mark must at the date of registration distinguish the goods of the person registering it from all others. An importer of foreign goods cannot register as his own the trade mark of the producer, even if he has an exclusive contract for this country; and the registration will not be rendered valid by the subsequent acquisition
of the whole output. A mark ought not to be registered if it is proved that the intention is only to exclude from the English market similar goods intended for foreign consumption, and having the mark affixed to them by the foreign producer whose mark it is. A label ought not to be registered when it contains, with other matter, a device to which special attention is directed as being the "trade mark." A mark wrongfully registered ought to be removed, although, by reason of some intervening events it might be immediately re-registered. The names of certain well-known mineral water springs are geographical and are not "fancy words not in common use" (See Vol. 16, p. 26, iii.).-In re Apollinaris Co.'s Trade Marks, L.R. (1891] 2 Ch. 186.
Trade Union.-See Charity, p. 111, iv.
Trover:(i.) Ch. D.-Title- Trustee-Possession of Cestui-que Trust—Jus Tertii
Auctioneer.—Where a cestui-que trust is by leave of the trustee in possession of settled chattels, the trustee has an immediate right of possession sufficient to enable him to bring an action of trover. Where the plaintiff has a title to the goods and also a right of possession, a wrongdoer cannot set up a jus tertii in answer to the plaintiff, where the third person whose claim could defeat the plaintiff's title has not intervened. Where an auctioneer, acting bona fide, has received goods to sell, and has sold them and handed them over to a purchaser with the view of passing the property, he has converted the goods, and is liable to the true owner if the person who instructed him has no title to sell the goods.—Barker v. Furlong, L.R.  2 Ch. 172 ; 60 L.J. Ch. 368; 64 L.T. 411.
Trust:(ii.) Ch. D,-Discretion to Apply Income for Benefit of Bankrupt- Assign.
ment- Date of Cesser.— Appointment on trust to pay income to B. till he should become bankrupt, or cease to be entitled to receive the same or any part thereof for his own personal use or benefit by any means or for any purpose, and in case of the cesser of B.'s interest in any such manner, the trustees to have a discretion to pay to B. or to apply for his benefit the whole or any part of the income; and subject to such trusts the funds were appointed on trust for other persons. The income of the trust funds was payable on January 15th and July 15th. On January 30th, 1889, B. charged his interest in favour of L., notice of which charge was received by the trustees on August 23rd. In November, 1890, B. became bankrupt, but the trustee in bankruptcy did not claim the income. Held (1) that the charge operated a cesser of B.'s interest from its date, and not from the date of notice to the trustees ; (2) that the discretionary trust was good, though it did not extend to the benefit of any wife or children of B., and that the trustees might apply the income for B.'s benefit, though they could not properly pay it to him.-Good v. Lickorish, 60 L.J. Ch. 341 ; 39 W.R. 472.
Trustee:(iii.) Ch. D.- Appointment of New Trustee~" Acting" Trustee--Vendor and
Purchaser Act, 1874, s. 5-Land Transfer Act, 1875, s. 48.-A trust deed gave the power of appointing new trustees to the “acting" trustee for the time being. The last acting trustee, A., died intestate, leaving B. his heir-at-law. B. died intestate leaving c. his beir-at-law. C. died intestate, leaving X., Y, and Z. his co-heiresses at law. X., Y. and Z.