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vessel was stopped for more than forty-eight consecutive hours, the payment of hire should cease until she should be again in an efficient state to resume her service." While on a voyage to H. part of the engines broke down, and she had to put back to L. Repairs could not be effected there, and A. and B. agreed that a tug should be employed to tow her to H., and that the cost of the tug should be treated as general average on ship, cargo, and freight. The ship was taken to H. by the tug aided by her own engines, which were only partly disabled. The cargo intended for H. was discharged by the ship's own machinery. Held, that B. could not claim hire for the voyage from L. to P., the ship not being independently efficient for the purpose, but that he could claim hire for the full time actually occupied in discharging cargo at H., the ship being in an efficient state for that particular employment.Hogarth v. Miller Brother & Co., L.R. [1891] A.C. 48; 64 L.T. 205. (i.) H. L.-Collision-Fog.-Decision of C. A. (see Vol. 15, p. 62, ii.) affirmed. The Vindomora, L.R. [1891] A.C. 1; 60 L.J. P. 1; 63 L.T. 749.

(ii.) P. D.-Collision-Misleading Lights.-The T., a steamship under way in the Mersey, came into collision with the S. whilst carrying, in addition to the regulation lights, an additional white light on the mizen truck, alleged to be a customs signal light. No regulation or practice as to carrying such light was proved, and it being doubtful on the evidence whether such light, together with the T.'s masthead light, might not have misled those in charge of the S. into thinking that the T. was at anchor, held, that the T. must be deemed in fault.-The Talbot, L.R. [1891] P. 184.

(iii.) P. D.-Collision-Costs-High Court-County Court Limit.-In the absence of special circumstances justifying proceedings in the High Court, a plaintiff in a collision action will not be allowed costs, if he recovers an amount not exceeding the county court limit of £300, although he claimed a greater sum.-The Asia, L.R. [1891] P. 121; 60 L.J. P. 38.

(iv.) P. D.—Limitation of Liability—Gross and Register Tonnage-Merchant Shipping (Tonnage) Act, 1889.-The amount to which a ship's liability is limited, in case of collision, is to be ascertained with reference to the gross tonnage, without any deduction in respect of master's-room, chart-room, boatswain's store-room, or space used for berthing the crew. The Umbilo, L.R. [1891] P. 118; 60 L.J. P. 7; 39 W.R. 336. (v.) P. D.-Managing Owner-Duty of-Accounts-Time.-It is the duty of a managing owner to account to his co-owners for the ship's earnings and expenses within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time depends on the circumstances of each case, and there is no fixed rule that the accounts are to be ready before the ship sails on her next voyage.— The Mount Vernon, 64 L.T. 148.

(vi.) P. D.-Necessaries-Charter - party-Broker's Commission-The M., while on a voyage, was chartered by her owner, through a shipbroker, for a future voyage. Subsequently the shipbroker arrested the M. in a suit for necessaries, to recover his commission on obtaining the charterparty. Held, that such commission did not come within the meaning of the term "necessaries."-The Marianne, L.R. [1891] P. 180; 60 L.J. P. 39.

(vii.) P. D.-Salvage-Inequitable Agreement.-A salvage agreement for services to be performed on the high seas will not be set aside merely because one of the contracting parties was at a disadvantage; but if,

in addition to that circumstance, the sum required by the intending salvor appears to the Court exorbitant, the agreement will be set aside as inequitable.-The Rialto, L.R. [1891] P. 175.

(i.) H. L.-Wharfinger-Representation.-- Decision of C. A. (see Vol. 15, p. 23, ii.) reversed.--The Calliope, L.R. [1891] A.C. 11; 60 L.J. P. 28; 63 L.T. 781.

Slander:

(ii.) C. A.-Privileged Occasion-Meeting of Board of Guardians-Presence of Reporters.--The defendant, a member of a Board of Guardians, made a speech which would have privileged if the meeting of the board at which it was made had been a private one. Held, that the presence of reporters at the meeting, who were not in any way brought there by the defendant, did not destroy the privilege.-Pittard v. Oliver, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 474; 39 W.R. 311.

Solicitor:

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Costs-Charging Order-" Property Recovered Or Preserved."-The defendant in an action paid money into Court, and put in a defence denying liability, and a counter-claim arising out of the same matters as the claim. The plaintiff's solicitor obtained a charging order on the fund in Court. Judgment was given for the plaintiff on the claim, and for the defendant on the counter-claim. Held, that the sum recovered on the counter-claim must be set off against that recovered on the claim, and the solicitor's charging order limited to the balance due to the plaintiff, that being the sum "recovered or preserved."-Westacott v. Bevan, 39 W.R. 363.

(iv.) Ch. D.-Costs-Taxation-District Registry-Petition of CourseR.S.C., 1883, O. xxxv., rr. 6, 6a, sub-r. 2, 16; 0. lxii., r. 18.-A district registrar at Liverpool has power, on a petition of course, to make an order on a solicitor for delivery and taxation of his bill of costs. The clients carried on business at Liverpool, the solicitor resided and practised at Sheffield, and the work had been done in London and Sheffield. Held, on the balance of convenience, that the taxation ought not to be removed from Liverpool to London.-In re Porrett, 64 L.T. 194; 39 W.R. 333.

(v.) Ch. D.-Costs-Taxation-Common Order-Material Circumstances— 6 & 7 Vict., c. 73, s. 37.-Where there is already an order in force for taxation of a solicitor's bill of costs, and an action pending in which the amount of the bill is claimed as a set-off, a common order to tax ought not to be obtained on a petition of course, both the facts mentioned being material, and such as ought to be brought to the attention of the Court. Where a common order to tax had been improperly obtained, but it was the interest of both parties that the taxation should take place at once, the Court, being moved by the party who had obtained the order to discharge it, refused to do so, but amended it by striking out all directions as to payment, and directed that the question of payment of the amount certified should be referred to the judge at the trial of the pending action.-In re W. S. Webster, 64 L.T. 250. (vi.) C. A.-Scale Fee-Mortgage-Further Charge. - Decision of Ch. D. (see Vol. 16, p. 63, iv.) reversed.-Aylesford (Earl) v. Poulett (Earl), L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 248; 60 L.J. Ch. 204; 39 W.R. 241.

(vii.) C. A.-Scale Fee-Negotiating Scale-Fee Paid for Evidence-General Order, Sched. I., Part I., r. 11.-Where real estate is sold by private contract under the direction of the Court, the solicitor who does all that a solicitor can do in arranging the sale and the price and terms

thereof, "arranges the sale," and is not disentitled to the scale fee for "negotiating a sale," by the mere fact that the contract does not become binding till sanctioned by the Court, provided that it is ultimately BO sanctioned, and an actual sale is thereby effected. Decision of Ch. D. (see Vol. 16, p. 63, v.) reversed. Fees paid by the client to valuers (though they may be auctioneers or estate agents) to obtain their evidence that the price is proper, and so obtain the sanction of the Court, are not "commission paid by the client to an auctioneer or estate or other agent" so as to disentitle the solicitor to the scale fee aforesaid.-McGowan v. Murray, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 105; 60 L.J. Ch. 118; 63 L.T. 793; 39 W.R. 227.

(i.) Ch.

D.-Negligence-Mortgage-Valuation.-A mortgagee's solicitors noticed on the title a considerable difference in the prices previously paid for the property, and pointed this out to the valuer acting for the mortgagee, who, notwithstanding, adhered to his valuation. The solicitors did not point out to the mortgagee the variation in prices, knowing that he would rely on the valuer's opinion. The security proved deficient. Held, that the solicitors had not failed in their duty. Where a valuer is employed to value property on behalf of a mortgagee. he is liable to the mortgagee in damages if he fails to use due care and skill. But if there is no contractual relation between the valuer and the mortgagee, an action to make him liable for loss caused by an unskilful or careless valuation could only succeed as an action for deceit, and in such a case it would be necessary to show fraud.-Scholes v. Brook, 63 L.T. 837.

See Mortgage, p. 88, i.

Tenant for Life :

(ii.) Ch. D.-Waste-Timber-Local Custom.-Where the owners of an estate had for many years periodically cut beech woods (beech being timber by the custom of the country), removing the older trees so as to ensure a succession of young trees, which were in demand for the purposes of a local industry, held, that a tenant for life of the estate, impeachable for waste, was not committing waste by continuing such periodical cuttings, and was entitled to the profits thereof. Held, also, that a direction in the will under which she claimed that the tenant for life should repair and keep in order the mansion house, park, and grounds, did not compel her to clean out an ornamental lake, having regard to the condition of the lake at the testator's death.-Dashwood v. Magniac, 60 L.J. Ch. 210; 64 L.T. 99.

Trade Mark:

(iii.) Ch. D.-Application to Register-Fraudulent User of Old MarkPatents, &c., Act, 1883, ss. 62, 64.-Where an applicant for the registra tion of a new trade mark has previously used substantially the same mark, with certain words containing a fraudulent misrepresentation, the Court will not allow the new mark with the omission of the fraudu. lent words to be registered, as the applicant might thereby obtain the benefit of the previous fraudulent user.-In re Fuente's Trade Marks, 64 L.T. 196.

(iv.) Ch. D.-Special and Distinctive Words-User-Association with other Words and Marks.-Messrs. Heidsieck & Co. claimed user, before the passing of the Act of 1875, of the words "Monopole" and "Dry Monopole as a trade mark for champagne. The words were printed on the labels and wrappers of their bottles, and branded on their corks and packing cases. The words "Heidsieck & Co.," and sometimes the word "Rheims,” and various devices, were also printed or branded on

the same labels, wrappers, corks, and cases. Held, that the association of other words and marks prevented the words "Monopole" and "Dry Monopole," not being fancy words, from acquiring the character of trade marks, and such words, which had been registered as trade marks in 1882, must be expunged from the register.-Richards & Co. v. Butcher & Robinson, 63 L.T. 757.

(i.) Q. B. D.-Trade Description-Application of Invoice-Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, s. 2, sub-s. 1 (d.), s. 5, sub-s. 1 (d.)—A. ordered six barrels of beer of X., a brewer. X. sent six casks of beer to A., and at the same time delivered him an invoice, in which the casks were described as "barrels." The term "barrel" in the beer trade means a cask containing thirty-six gallons. One of the casks was of much smaller capacity than thirty-six gallons. A. summoned X. for having applied a false trade description, namely, barrel, to a cask of beer false as to the measure and gauge thereof. Held, that the description in the invoice was not the less applied to the cask because the invoice was not physically attached to the cask.-Budd v. Lucas, L.R. [1891] 1 Q.B. 408; 39 W.R. 350.

Trust:-

(ii.) Ch. D.-Declaration of.-A. deposited certain bonds to bearer with his friend X., and signed a memorandum containing a list of the securities, and stating that they were to be given to specified charities. The memorandum was witnessed by one person. During A.'s life he received the interest on the securities, and withdrew some of them, and also made sundry alterations in the memorandum. He afterwards caused a fresh memorandum to be written, but did not sign it. Held, after A.'s death, that there was no valid declaration of trust in favour of the charities, and that the memoranda were imperfect testamentary documents, and that the securities passed to A.'s executors.-Champ v. Marshallsay, 64 L.T. 13.

Trustee:

(iii.) Ch. D.-Breach of Trust-Instigation of Cestui-que Trust-Indemnity -Trustee Act, 1888, s. 6.-R. being absolutely entitled in remainder to the trust funds of his mother's marriage settlement, his mother being tenant for life, by his own marriage settlement covenanted that he would pay £10,000 to the trustees thereof after his mother's death, and in case of his death during his mother's life, that his executors should pay the trustees a yearly sum during his mother's life, to be applied as if it were income of the £10,000. R. took the first life interest under the settlement, and his wife a life interest in remainder. R. assigned to the trustees as security the trust funds of his mother's settlement, the trustees of which had notice of the assignment. R. being in difficulties, the trustees of his mother's settlement were persuaded by R., his mother, and his wife, to apply a part of their trust funds in discharge of his debts. The trustees of R.'s settle ment sued such last-mentioned trustees for breach of trust, claiming that the funds should be replaced. The defendants claimed that the interests of R. and his wife should be impounded and declared liable to indemnify them. Held (1) that there was no such right of indemnity, as the interests of R. and his wife were not interests of a "beneficiary in the trust estate " of which the defendants were trustees; (2) that, even if the interest of R.'s wife had been such an interest, the Court would not in its discretion under the Act have impounded it, as there had been no misrepresentation on her part, and the defendants must be taken to have known that she could not validly deal with her reversionary interest.-Ricketts v. Ricketts, 64 L.T. 263.

(i.) C. A.-Investment—Power to Vary—Trust Investment Act, 1889, ss. 3, 6. -In the absence of any express prohibition in the instrument creating the trust, the power to vary investments given by sect. 3 of the Trust Investment Act, 1889, applies as well to investments-of the classes specified in sub-sects. (a) to (9) of that section-existing prior to, or not made under that Act, as to investments made under the powers given thereby.-Lopes v. Hume-Dick, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 423; 60 L.J. Ch. 177; 64 L.T. 32; 39 W.R. 225.

(ii.) C. A.—Investment-Company Incorporated by Act of Parliament.—A charter was granted to the London Assurance in pursuance of an Act of Parliament, which empowered the Crown to grant a charter of incorporation to a marine insurance company. The London Assurance and another corporation were afterwards amalgamated by a private Act of Parliament. Held, that the London Assurance was a company incorporated by Act of Parliament, within the meaning of a trust deed which authorised investments in the shares of any company incorporated by Act of Parliament.—Elve v. Boyton, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 501.

(iii.) C. A.-Failure of Beneficiary-Legal Estate-Right to Call for Conveyance. Under the will of A., who died in 1859, B. was entitled to the equitable reversion in fee in freehold land, the legal estate being vested in P. as trustee of A.'s will. B. devised the land to M. in trust for his wife for life and after her decease on trust for his son G. G. was illegitimate. On the deaths of B.'s wife and G.; held, that M. had no right to call for a conveyance of the land from P.-Moody v. Penfold, L.R. [1891] 1 Ch. 258; 60 L.J. Ch. 143.

(iv.) C. A.-Payments by- Commission to Rent Collector.-Where trustees have been appointed to receive the rents of, and to manage a trust estate, receiving a commission on the rental, they will not be allowed to charge a commission paid by them to a rent collector.-Cox v. Bennett, 39 W.R. 309.

Vendor and Purchaser:

(v.) C. A.-Conditions of Sale-Right to Rescind.-Conditions of sale stipulated that the vendor should have the right to rescind the contract if unable to satisfy any objection insisted on by the purchaser, "notwithstanding any previous negotiation or litigation." An order was made on summons declaring that the vendor had not shewn a good title, and ordered him to pay the purchaser the costs of investigating the title. Held, that it was no longer open to him to avail himself of the above condition. In re Arbib's & Class's Contract, 64 L.T. 217; 39 W.R. 305.

(vi.) C. A.-Covenant for Title-Statutory Declaration. Decision of Ch. D. (see Vol. 15, p. 141, v.) affirmed.-L. & N.W.R. v. Boulton, 63 L.T. 727. (vii.) Ch. D.-Specific Performance-Purchaser in Possession-Title Accepted --Payment of Purchase-Money into Court.-The under-lessee of property contracted to purchase it, and accepted the title. The time fixed for completion was the date of expiration of the lease, and the purchaser was to pay interest in default of completion. The purchaser remained in possession, but refused to complete or pay the purchase-money; he claimed to be in possession under the sub-lease and not under the contract, and now offered to pay rent. On a motion for an order on him to pay the purchase-money into Court, held, that he had an option of giving up possession or paying the purchase-money into Court, and had not lost that option by accepting the title. Ordered, that he should

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