matter of the contract, but not so far as to form the foundation of it. The medical evidence was that the vendor, though capable to some extent of transacting business, was not competent to enter into the contract, which, however, was reasonable and simple. There was strong lay evidence that he understood the contract. Held, that the contract ought to be enforced, the Court being of opinion that the vendor understood the transaction.-Birkin v. Wing, 63 L.T. 80.

See Vendor and Purchaser, p. 27, v.

Copyright:

(i.) Q. B. D.-Work of Art-Artistic Merit-Author-Registration— Copyright (Works of Art) Act, 1862.-The plaintiffs were a firm of printers. J., a member of the firm, conceived the idea of publishing cards bearing the representation of a hand making a cross, as a means of instructing voters at elections how to mark their ballot papers. J., being unable to draw, employed an artist in the service of the firm to draw the design. The plaintiffs registered the drawing under the Copyright (Works of Art) Act, 1862, and in the memorandum stated J. to be the author. The defendants published cards bearing a design of a similar nature, the idea of which was taken from the plaintiffs' cards, though the drawing was slightly different. There was no artistic merit in either drawing. Held (1) that the plaintiffs' drawing was so far not the subject of copyright that it was not entitled to protection except against an exact reproduction; (2) that J. was not the author of the drawing, and that the registration was consequently void.-Kenrick v. Lawrence, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 99; 38 W.R. 779.

Costs:

(ii.) Ch. D.-Taxation-Principle.-A motion by W. to have his name removed from the register of shareholders of a company was heard as a witness action, and was allowed to stand over, W. being absent, on condition that he paid the company "all their costs of such motion incurred up to the present time, including the costs of the hearing of this motion this day." The motion, when heard, was decided in favour of W., and the taxing master was ordered to tax the costs of W. of his motion except the costs previously directed to be paid by him. Held, that the costs which were to be paid by W. ought not to include the costs of an interlocutory application to attach the secretary of the company for non-compliance with an order for discovery, which costs had by consent been made costs in the action, nor the costs of an interlocutory application to postpone the trial, on which no order had been made; but that the taxing master had a discretion to include in such costs the costs of items which had been utilised at the postponed hearing. In re Metropolitan Coal Consumers' Association; Wainwright's Case, 63 L.T. 216.

(iii.) C. C. R.-Two Counts to Indictment-Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, ss. 4, 9-24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, s. 52-Unsworn Evidence.-The first count of an indictment charged the defendant with attempting to defile a girl under thirteen, and the second count charged him with an indecent assault. The girl's evidence was admitted on both counts, though not given on oath. Held, that the proceedings on each count were separate and distinct, and that such unsworn evidence was only admissible on the first count, and therefore that a conviction on the second count, which depended on the admissibility of such evidence, could not be sustained.-Reg. v. Paul, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 202; 62 L.T. 845; 38 W.R. 704.

Damages :

(i.) Ch. D.-Compensation for Minerals-Interest on-3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 42, s. 29.-The defendant was declared liable in respect of minerals wrongfully removed from under the plaintiff's land. On further consideration, the plaintiff claimed interest on the sum assessed as the value of the minerals, with half-yearly rests. Held (1), that the action was in the nature of an action for money had and received, and that interest could not be given as damages; (2), that there was no fiduciary relation between the parties on which the claim could be based; (3), that the claim ought to have been made at the trial, and that it was too late to raise it on further consideration.—Phillips v. Homfray, L.R. 44 Ch. D. 694; 59 L.J. Ch. 547; 62 L.T. 896.

Easement:

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Air-Passage of-Prescription.-The cellar of the plaintiff's house was ventilated by a shaft cut through the rock into a disused well in an adjoining yard, owned and occupied by the defendant. It had been so ventilated for at least forty years, without interruption, and with the knowledge of the occupiers of the yard. Held, that the plaintiff could claim, as against the defendant, the easement of the free passage of air through the shaft and well; and that a lost grant of the right ought to be inferred.-Bass v. Gregory, L.R. 28 Q.B.D. 481.

Ecclesiastical Law:

(iii.) Court of Arches.-Faculty for Burial-Closed Churchyard-Family of Parishioner.-By an Order in Council a churchyard was closed except as to burials in reserved grave spaces allotted to members of the families of parishioners. Held, that a faculty for the reservation of a space in the churchyard for exclusive burial could be granted to a living nonparishioner, a member of the family of a parishioner.--In re Sargent, L.R. 15 P.D. 168.

Evidence :

(iv.) C. A.- Disclosure of Information-Public Policy-Prosecution. --A prosecution instituted by the Director of Public Prosecutions is a public prosecution; and therefore the rule of public policy which prevents a witness being asked such questions as will disclose the informer, if he be a third person, and also such questions as will disclose whether or not the witness was the informer, applies not only to such a prosecution, but also to subsequent proceedings founded thereon. The only exception to the rule is when it appears to the Judge that the disclosure of the information may be necessary to establish the innocence of a prisoner.-Marks v. Beyfus, 59 L.J. Q.B. 479; 38 W.R. 705.

Executor:

(v.) C. A. Distribution of Residue-Call on Shares-Refunding.-The fact that executors have knowledge that a call may be made on shares, part of their testator's estate, is not notice of a debt; and where executors have been compelled to pay such call after they have distributed the estate, they are entitled to call on the residuary legatee to refund. Whittaker v. Kershaw, 63 L.T. 203.

(vi.) Ch. D.— Retainer-Loan by Wife to Husband-Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 3.-A wife advanced money to her husband for the purposes of his business. He died intestate and insolvent, with. out repaying the advance, and the widow took out administration.

In

a creditor's administration action, held, that she was entitled to retain the amount of her debt out of personal estate coming to her hands.Crawford v. May, 38 W.R. 765.

Fishery :

(i.) Q. B. D.-Fishery Acts-Offence Against-Right to Prosecute-28 & 29 Vict., c. 121, s. 27, sub.-ss. 2, 4, s. 35-36 & 37 Vict., c. 71, ss. 36, 62-41 & 42 Vict., c. 39, s. 7.-A. was summoned for fishing without a licence in a fishery district subject to a board of conservators, upon the information and complaint of H., a duly appointed water-bailiff employed by the board. It was not proved that the board had authorised H. to commence proceedings. Held, that the penalty could only be recovered by the board, that H. was not entitled to commence proceedings, and that A. was not liable to conviction.-Anderson v. Hamlin, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 221; 63 L.T. 168.

Foreign Judgment:

(ii.) C. A.-Action to Enforce-Retrial of Action-Fraud.-Where an action is brought to enforce a foreign judgment, the defendant may plead that it was obtained by fraud, though the alleged fraud cannot be proved without re-trying the question which has been adjudicated on by the foreign court.-Vadala v. Lawes, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 310; 63 L.T. 128.

Highway :

(iii.) Q. B. D.--Obstruction-Summons - Dismissal-Appeal-Highway Act, 1835, ss. 72, 105.-A summons against a person for wilfully obstructing a highway was dismissed by the justices. Held, that the informant had no right to appeal to Quarter Sessions.-Reg. v. Justices of County of London, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 357.

Husband and Wife :

(iv.) P. D.-Divorce-Adultery--Counter-Charge of Cruelty-Intemperance. -A charge of adultery was established against a wife, who made a counter-charge of cruelty against her husband. It appeared that she was of drunken habits. Held, that the husband ought not to be disentitled to relief unless such gross violence should be proved against him as the Court cannot allow to be excused on the ground that he was provoked to it by her intemperance.-Forsyth v. Forsyth, 63 L.T. 263. (v.) P. D.—Divorce-Cruelty.—Continued unkindness and neglect on the part of a husband, who refused to occupy the same room with his wife, and told her that he loathed being in the same room with her, held, to constitute cruelty, which, coupled with adultery, entitled the wife to a divorce.-Bethune v. Bethune, 63 L.T. 259.

(vi.) P. D.-Divorce-Desertion.-A husband and wife had been living apart, the wife being willing to co-habit until she discovered that he was living in adultery. She then refused to resume co-habitation, although he wrote several letters offering to do so. Held, that there was no proof that his offers were not bona fide, and that the separation which the wife insisted on could not be treated as desertion.-Lodge v. Lodge, L.R. 15 P.D. 159.

(vii.) P. D.-Divorce-Wife's Adultery-Desertion.-A husband and wife separated by mutual consent in 1875, in consequence of medical advice to the effect that pregnancy would be dangerous to the sanity of the wife and

her future offspring. The husband made her an allowance, and they corresponded until 1880, when the husband refused further communication with her. She afterwards committed adultery. Held, that he was not disentitled to a divorce.-Lander v. Lander, 63 L.T. 257. (i.) P. D.-Divorce-Allowance to Wife-Dum Casta Clause.--The petitioner obtained a decree on the ground of his wife's adultery, the decree not to be made absolute till the petitioner had agreed to make her an allowance. The parties prepared an agreement which contained a dum casta clause. The Court expressed an objection to the clause, but made the decree absolute.-Weller v. Weller, 63 L.T. 263.

(ii.) P. D.-Divorce-Collusion-Cruelty-Judicial Separation.—When a wife obtained a decree nisi for adultery and cruelty, which had been rescinded on the ground of collusion, held, that a decree for judicial separation ought not to be granted.-Butler v. Butler, 63 L.T. 256. (iii.) P. D.-Divorce-Indian-Marriage Invalid-Second Marriage-WillIndian Divorce Act, 1869, s. 57.-The respondent and co-respondent in an Indian Divorce Suit, the decree in which was made absolute in November, 1879, came to England, and were married in February, 1879. The husband immediately after executed a will leaving all his property to his "reputed wife." In April, 1881, they went through a second form of marriage. Held, that in consequence of the Indian Divorce Act, sect. 57, the first marriage was invalid, and that the will was revoked by the subsequent marriage.- Warter v. Warter, L.R. 15 P.D. 152. (iv.) P. D.-Divorce-Variation of Settlement―Jurisdiction.-The Court, having dissolved a marriage, has power to order that the marriage settlements be varied, no matter where, or in what form, such settle. ments have been executed.-Nunneley v. Nunneley, 63 L.T. 113. (v.) P. D.-Divorce-Variation of Settlement-Permanent MaintenanceReversionary Interests.-A wife having obtained a decree for divorce petitioned for variation of the marriage settlement and for maintenance. The present joint income of the husband and wife amounted to about £1,500 a year, and they were both entitled to considerable property in reversion. The registrar recommended either that a permanent income of £700 a year should be secured to the wife for life, or that she should have secured to her an annual sum equal to one-third of the present joint income, such sum to be increased on the falling in of the husband's reversionary interests. The husband preferred the former course, and the Court ordered that it should be adopted.-Warren v. Warren, 63 L.T. 264.

(vi.) P. D.-Judicial Separation-Cruelty to Wife and Child-Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, s. 7-Declaration.-When a judicial separation was granted on the petition of a wife, on the ground of gross cruelty on the part of the husband towards his wife and child, held, that a declaration ought to be annexed to the decree that the respondent was a person unfit to have the custody of the child. The Court refused to lay down any rules as to the making of such a declaration.-Handford v. Handford, 63 L.T. 256.

(vii.) P. D.—Restitution of Conjugal Rights—Allowance—Allegations of Misconduct - Evidence. — Allegations of misconduct, short of matrimonial offence, are relevant to the question of what allowance should be made by a respondent to a petitioner, upon non-compliance with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, and such allegations are for the consideration of the Court, and ought to be referred to the Court by the registrar. The Court allowed evidence as to such alleged misconduct to be given by affidavit, reserving to the incriminated party the right of cross-examination if desired.-Swift v. Swift, 63 L.T. 262.

Landlord and Tenant:

(i.) Q. B. D.-Execution against Goods of Third Party-Right of Landlord to Claim Arrears of Rent-County Courts Act, 1888, s. 160.-Execution having issued upon a County Court judgment against the defendant, goods belonging to him were taken in execution in a house of which his wife was lessee. The landlord gave a notice to the bailiff claiming arrears of rent due from the wife. Held, that, as the defendant's goods were rightfully taken in execution, the landlord's claim was good.Hughes v. Smallwood, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 306; 59 L.J. Q.B. 503; 63 L.T. 198.

Limitations:

(ii.) Ch. D.-Disability-Accruer of Right-Tenant in Tail-Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, ss. 1, 3, 9.-The plaintiff's mother on the death of R., which took place in 1871, became entitled as tenant in tail by descent to certain property, being then under no disability. She married in 1875, and died in 1882, without having acquired possession of the property. The plaintiff became entitled on her death as her issue in tail, and in 1889, being still an infant, commenced an action to enforce his right. Held, that the right to possession first accrued in 1871, and that as there had been no possession for twelve years by the plaintiff or his mother, through whom he claimed as tenant in tail, his right was now barred.-Murray v. Watkins, 62 L.T. 796.

See Mortgage, p. 15, vii. Company, p. 7, ii.

Local Government:

(iii.) Ch. D.-Paving of Street-Notice to Owner-Validity. The term owner as defined in the Public Health Act, 1875, sect. 4, does not include a receiver of rents and profits appointed by the Court, and service on him of a notice under sect. 150 is invalid.-Bacup (Corporation of) v. Smith, L.R. 44 Ch. D. 395; 59 L.J. Ch. 518; 63 L.T. 195; 38 W.R. 697.

(iv.) Q. B. D.-Superannuation Allowance-Lunatic Asylum—Chaplain— Lunatic Asylums Act, 1853, s. 57.-The chaplain of a lunatic asylum is an officer of the asylum, though he does not reside there, or give his whole time to the duties of his office, and is qualified as such to receive a superannuation allowance if granted by the visitors.-Reg. v. County Council of Hereford, 38 W.R. 775.

Marriage Settlement:

(v.) Ch. D.-Covenant to Settle-After-acquired Property.-A reversionary interest in personalty which vests in the wife during the coverture, but is liable to be divested by appointment, is bound by a covenant in a marriage settlement on the part of the husband to settle any personal estate which during the coverture should "come to or vest in" the husband by right of the wife, or in her by bequest, gift, or otherwise.Cumberlege v. Cumberlege-Ware, 63 L.T. 52; 38 W.R. 767.

Married Woman :

(vi.) C. A.-Liability to be Sued -Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 1, sub-s. 2.-K., a married woman, was entitled to the residue of an estate. The certificates of shares not fully paid up, part of such residue, were handed to her, but no transfer was executed. A call was made and the executors were compelled to pay it. Held, that they were entitled to sue K. for indemnity with respect to her separate estate.-Whittaker v. Kershaw, 63 L.T. 203.