as with a ward of Court in any case, is a contempt, which the Court has jurisdiction to punish upon the application of the guardian, though the father is alive and is guardian, or there is a testamentary guardian whose position has been established by a decree of the Court.* So it is a contempt to encourage an infant to leave the custody of those under whose care he has been placed by the Court, or for a father to be instrumental in the abduction of his daughter, a ward of Court, contrary to the order of the Court; or, it would seem, to have taken the body of a ward in execution upon an action at law; § or to marry a ward without the leave of the Court, whether there be disparagement in the marriage or no ; or to remove an infant ward out of the jurisdiction, even where he has enlisted in the army, without leave of the Court, by sending him with the regiment on foreign service. As to a marriage without leave, a contempt is not committed by an innocent person, who has merely some hand in the actual ceremony,** but is committed by any person * Eyre v. Countess of Shaftesbury, 1722, 2 P. Wms. 102; Butler v. Freeman, 1756, Amb. 301. See also Phipps v. Anglesea, 1721, 1 P. Wms. 696. The jurisdiction as parens patriæ is exercisable though the infant has no property within the jurisdiction. In re Spence, 1847, 2 Ph. 247; In re A. B., an Infant, 1885, I T.L.R. 657, Chitty, J.; Sumner v. Kingscote, 1885, 1 T.L.R. 351, per Chitty, J.; Cutler v. Wright, W.N. 1890, p. 28, per Stirling, J. t Dr. Yalden's Case cited, 1 P. Wms. 697. See Iredell v. Iredell, 1885, I T.L.R. 260. Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort (Long Wellesley's Case), 1831, 2 Rus. and Myl. 639, Lord Brougham, L.C. 8 Bond v. Roberts, 1843, 13 Sim. 400. | Cases cited note (o); Richardson v. Merrifield, 1850, 4 D.G. & S. 161; Hill v. Turner, 1737, 1 Atk. 515 (wife committed, and suit for alimony and restitution of conjugal rights restrained). ¶ Harrison v. Goodall, 1852, Ray. 310, note (a); Rochford v. Hackman, 1854, 23 L.J. Ch, 261 (discharge ordered). ** More v. More, 1741, 2 Atk. 157, Lord Hardwicke, L.C., S.C. Moor v. Moor, Barnard, 404. who takes some part in the contrivance of the marriage, though ignorant of the fact that the party is a ward.* Where, however, recent decisions had established that payment into Court under the Trustee Relief Act of a fund in which an infant is interested had the effect of making the infant a ward of Court, and a person, domiciled in Scotland, had married an infant, also domiciled in Scotland, but made a ward in this way, Page Wood, V.C., held that the party might well be, as he pleaded, ignorant of this law, and that he was not punishable as for contempt, though, unless the property in Court was very small, the Court ought not to part with it without a settlement.† Though the marriage is celebrated in a foreign country, and without the jurisdiction of the Court, and its validity is doubtful, yet the persons contriving the seducing of the ward away from this country are guilty of contempt.‡ There is no contempt when the marriage takes place after the ward has attained majority, though it be but the day after, and the Court will not commit for an alleged breach * Herbert's Case, 1731, 3 P. Wms. 115, Jekyll, M.R. (There could be no excuse, because acts and orders of Court are public; but see Metropolitan Music Hall v. Lake, 1889, 58 L.J. Ch. 513; 60 L.T. 749. The case was one in which an Oxford undergraduate, aged eighteen, was induced to marry a servant, and the M.R. also held that the marriage of an infant without the consent of his guardians is encouraged at the peril of those instrumental therein-parson marrying, and pretended barrister acting as guardian); Nicholson v. Squire, 1809, 16 Ves. 259, Lord Eldon, L.C. (but note this report is ex relatione, and cf. More v. More, ubi supra); Millet v. Rowse, 1802, 7 Ves. 419, Lord Eldon, L.C. + Re Tweedale, 1859, Johns, 109. See further Se. C.S. & O. in Private Inter. national Law, pp. 68, 69, 422, 423. Ib. Butler v. Freeman, ubi supra; Bathurst v. Murray, 1801-2, 8 Ves. 74 ; Kent v. Burgess, 1840, 11 Si. 361, S. C. Burgess v. Kent, 10 L.J. Ch. 100. Long v. Long, 1823, 2 Si. & S. 119; Longbottom v. Pearce, 1858, 3 D.G. and J. 545 n.; White v. Herrick, LR. 4 Ch. 345 (overruling Biddle v. Jackson, 1858, 26 Beav. 282, Romilly, M.R.; S.C. Biddles v. Jackson, 3 D.G. & J. 544, L.J.J. (disagreement-no order); Sams v. Cronin, Ex parte Reed, 1874, 22 W.R. 204. of an order after majority, for that the order, having been made till further order, and not discharged, is still, technically, in force.* § viii. Interference with process and execution. (a.) Generally. Persons engaged in serving or executing the process of the Court are not to be molested. It is a contempt to use contumelious language on being shewn a copy of a writ, or to assail process - servers with indecent and disrespectful language concerning the Judge from whose Court the process issues,§ or to use violent and threatening language towards and forcibly detain a solicitor's clerk serving process, or to set hounds upon, or to beat a process-server, or to hinder a bailiff or messenger in the execution of his warrant,†† or to assault such an one in the discharge of his duty,‡‡ or for the captain of a ship to threaten to throw a bailiff overboard, using very contemptuous language, and so to put him out of possession,§§ or, apparently, for the governor of a gaol to refuse to allow service upon a prisoner, or to impede the service of a ** * Sumner v. Kingscote, 1885, 1 T.L.R. 351, Chitty, J. A.P. notes to + Price v. Hutchison, 1869, L.R. 9 Eq. 534. Cons. Ord. 42, г. 2, is now repealed and not re-enacted, but the principle remains. Ord. xliv., r. I. Reg. v. Crosse, 1704, 6 Mod. 43, Bl. 4 Com. vi., xv. § Witham v. Witham, 1669, 3 Ch. Rep. 41; Anon. 1711, 1 Salk. 84. See Miller v. Knox, 1838, 4 Bing. N.C. 589. Price v. Hutchison, ubi supra. Bell v. Labouchere, 1890, Times, 1st July, 1890. **Rose v. West, Cary, 38; Dastiones v. Apprice, ib. 91; Morgan v. Jones, 1743, cited, Van v. Price, 1745, 1 Dick. 91; Ex parte Clarke, 1830, 1 R. & M. 563. †† Powell v. Ball, 1705, 6 Mod. 210; Ex parte Page, 1810, 1 Rose 1; 17 Ves. 59, Lord Eldon, L.C. Elliot v. Halmarack, 1816, 1 Meriv. 302; Emery v. Bowen, 1836, 5 L.J. N.S. Ch. 349. §§ Ex parte Dixon, 1803, 8 Ves. 104. Danson v. Le Capelain, 1852, 21 L.J. Ex. 219. subpæna upon a witness,* or to make the person serving a subpoena to eat the same, and otherwise to ill-treat him, throwing him into a river for dead,† or to interfere to prevent an infant from obeying the order of the Court, for example, by carrying him away from his usual residence and concealing his address so as to prevent personal service on him, or for the minister of a parish to prevent the statutory publication of a citation in his church,§ and where an injunction was granted against A., restraining him (not expressing his servants or agents), from cutting timber, A.'s servant cutting timber included in the order was committed, not for breach of the injunction, but as for contempt.|| But a party obstructing a bailiff in honest defence of his property, and not contumaciously, but under a mistake, ought not to be visited with imprisonment.¶ And the Court makes some allowance for human infirmities,** not deeming it a contempt merely to snatch at a writ, it not being shewn that any disrespect [molestation or obstruction] was intended,tt nor is it necessarily a contempt to collar and shake a process-server.‡‡ (b.) Interference with receivers and sequestrators. While the orders of the Court exist they must be obeyed,§§ and though an order for a receiver be erroneously made, * Clements v. Williams, 1836, 2 Scott 814. + Williams v. Johns, 1773, 2 Dick. 477; 1 Mer. 303, n. Thomas v. Gwynne, 1845, 8 Beav. 312. See M'Cartney v. Simonton, 1843, 5 Ir. Eq. R. 594. § Burton v. Mattons, 1740, 2 Atk. 114. Wellesley v. Mornington, 1848, 11 Beav. 181. Ex parte Page, ubi supra. ** Oppert v. Dadelzein, Times, 4th August, 1890; report corrected, ib. 5th August, 1890. †† Weekes v. Whiteley, 1835, 3 Dowl. 536. Adams v. Hughes, 1819, 1 Br. & B. 24. §§ Russell v. East Anglian Ry. Company, 1850, 3 M'N. & G. 104, 117. it is a valid order so far as it constitutes the receiver an officer of the Court, whose possession must not be interfered with without the leave of the Court.* So it is a contempt to disturb a receiver or sequestrator by forcible ouster,t or by forcibly taking possession, or by bringing an action to disturb the possession, without the leave of the Court,§ even on the part of one receiver against another receiver whom he finds in possession of part of the property he has been appointed to get in,|| or, a receiver being in possession of the profits of a benefice, for a subsequent incumbrancer, with notice of the appointment of a receiver, to obtain the issue of a writ of sequestration directed to the receiver already appointed, or, after a receiver and manager has been appointed by the Court to keep the business together, for a former clerk of the firm to send round a circular to the customers indicating, contrary to the fact, that the business was in a failing state,** or for any one, except the landlord distraining for a year's rent accrued due prior to the date of the order of adjudication (whose right to distrain for the rent due to him the Bankruptcy Law was not intended to *Hawkins v. Gathercole, 1852, 21 L.J. Ch. 617, 619; Ames v. Birkenhead Docks, 1855, 20 Beav. 332; Randfield v. Randfield, 1860, 1 Dr. & Sm. 310. But see Drewry v. Thacker, 1818, 3 Sw. 529, 546 (persons to have benefit of fact that order ought not to have been made). Rule of Irish Court of Chancery that remainderman might enter into possession on accruer of his title without taking any steps to remove receiver over estate of former tenant, aliter in the Exchequer. Re Stack, 1862, 13 Ir. Ch. Rep. 213, 221. + Pelham v. Newcastle, 1712 (?), 3 Sw. 289, n. (solicitor directing ouster committed). See Newcastle v. Pelham, 1713, 3 Br. P.C. 460. Broad v. Wickham, 1831, 4 Si. 511. § Angel v. Smith, 1804, 9 Ves. 335; Brooks v. Greathed, 1820, 1 J. & W. 176, 178. || Ward v. Swift, 1848, 6 Hare 312. ¶ Hawkins v. Gathercole, 1852, 21 L.J. Ch. 617 (undertaking required to deal with writ of sequestration under direction of Court). ** Helmore v. Smith (2), 1886, 35 Ch. D. 449. |