§ iv. Attempts to Influence the Court.

Every private communication to a Judge, for the purpose of influencing his decision upon a matter publicly before him, is a contempt; and it is immaterial that no personal disrespect to the Judge was intended by the person making the communication.*

So it is a contempt to send money to a Judge as a bribe,† to dedicate and send to a Judge a pamphlet commenting on pending proceedings, to write and send a threatening. or insulting letter to a master as an interference with a pending matter,§ or to write to a Judge telling him that he dare not exercise his authority over the writer.||

Sv. Abuse of the process of the Court.

It is a contempt to pervert the Sovereign's writ, or the process of the Court, to the purpose of private malice, extortion or injustice. And all suitors amenable to the authority of the Court, who by force or fraud wilfully pervert the course of Justice, are liable to punishment as for contempt.**

So it has been held a contempt to try a feigned issue

allowed him in judging for himself of the effect of a particular question. Reg. v. Boyes, 1861, 30 L.J. Q.B. 301; Reg. v. Kinglake, 1870, 22 L.T. 316 (pardon-corrupt practices); Ex parte Reynolds, 1882, 20 Ch. D. 294 C.A.; Chitty's Archbold, p. 640.

*Re Sombre, 1849, 1 Mac. & G., 116, 122, per Lord Cottenham, L.C.

+ Martin v. Martin, 1747, 2 Russ. & Myl. 674, n. Lord Hardwicke, L.C. (suitor). See v. Campb. Lives, 45 (ed. 1846).

Ex parte Jones, 1806, 13 Ves. 237. See also Roach v. Garvan, 1742, 2 Atk. 469.

§ Re Keane, Lord Cranworth, L.C., 23 (solicitor-rule nisi to strike off the rolls). Case), 1837, 6 L.J. N.S. Ch. 185; 2 M. (counsel).

|| Ib.

Bl. 4, Com. vi., xv.

Dec., 1857; A. 270, Seton, i., 651 In re Ludlow (Lechmere Charlton's & C. 316, Lord Cottenham, L.C.

**Smith v. Bond, 1845, 14 L.J. Ex. 114, 115, per Pollock, C.B.

without the consent of the Court,* and it is a contempt to bring a mere fictitious action, not to determine a right or controversy, but in deceit of the Court, and to raise an evil fame of a third person, and if these things are so the reality of the debt does not make a material difference,t or to fabricate a fictitious special case for the opinion of the Court, although no fraud is intended,‡ or to put in an absurd plea of infancy on purpose to create delay,§ or for a nominal plaintiff, secured against costs and without beneficial interest, to act in collusion with the defendant in injury of the real plaintiff,|| or for a petitioning creditor to lend himself to a solicitor, to become his instrument, under a guarantee against expense, or for a solicitor to insert scandalous matter in an affidavit, and put counsel's name thereto, without authority,** or, apparently, for the plaintiff to cause to be delivered a false account of his place of abode, contrary to the requisition of a Judge's order,†† or for counsel to make himself a party to a fraud on the Court by conspiring with a solicitor to induce a party to make affidavits which the counsel knows to be substantially untrue, and which are used to delude the Court.11

* Hoskins v. Berkeley, 1791, 4 T.R. 402 (proceedings stayed).

+ Coxe v. Phillips, 1736. See Ca. t. Hardwicke, 237 (proceedings stayed and vacated-parties and attorneys committed-person aggrieved, though not a party, may move as amicus curiæ).

‡ In re Elsam, 1824, 3 L.J. K.B. 75. In this instance the person fabricating the case was an attorney personally interested, and the judgment would have operated on parties not aware of the proceedings. Fined £40.

§ Lord v. Thornton, 1615, 2 Bulst. 67 (attached).

|| M'Gregor v. Barrett, 1848, 6 C.B. 262 (attached). Ex parte Wilson, 1819, Buck. 306, Leach, V.C.

** Bishop v. Willis, 1749, 5 Beav. 83, n. (committed and ordered to pay costs of scandal).

++ Smith v. Bond, 1845, 14 L.J. Ex. 114.

Linwood v. Andrews, 1888, 58 L.T. 612; W.N., 1888, p. 81, Kay, J. (committed, and ordered to pay costs of motion); see also Stat. West. I, c. 29; Bl. 3 Com. 29.

In the same manner, a breach of an undertaking by the party giving it is a contempt*, or to attempt substantially to escape the effect of an undertaking by procuring legislative enactment.†

Service of subpana held, in the circumstances, a breach of an undertaking not to molest.‡

To send to a ward's solicitors letters, not of bona fide complaint in any matter, but merely with the intention to annoy the ward, is a breach of an undertaking not to communicate with the ward directly or indirectly, and a contempt.§

§ vi. Interference with Parties, Witnesses and Others.

It is the right of all suitors to approach the Court free from all restraint or intimidation, and those who have duties to discharge in a Court of Justice are protected by the law, and shielded on their way to the discharge of such duties, while discharging them, and on their return therefrom.

(a.) Menace.

So it is a contempt to threaten a petitioner with the publication of a statement of facts concerning her unless she withdraws her petition, or for the defendant to send

*Att..Gen. v. Manchester and Leeds Ry. Co., 1839, 3 Jur. 379, Lord Cottenham, L.C. See Ord. xii., r. 18 (Solicitor-Admiralty).

Grand Junction Canal, 1835, 1 Ry.
But qu. if anything could be done to
See Note at end of this Article.

+ London & Birmingham Ry. Co. v. Ca. 224, 241, per Lord Cottenham, L.C. hinder the party applying to Parliament. ‡ Lawford v. Spicer, 1856, 2 Jur. N.S. 564, Stuart, V.C.

§ Scott v. Padwick, 1887, 3 T.L.R. 675, Chitty, J. See S.C. 1888, 4 ib. 569. Whilst a person sues or defends as a pauper

any person who takes, or agrees to take, or seeks to obtain from him any fee profit or reward, for the conduct of his business in the Court, shall be guilty of a contempt of Court. R.S.C., Ord. xvi., r. 27.

|| Re Mulock, 1864, 33 L.J. M. 205, 206, per Sir J. P. Wilde, J.O.; In re Johnson, 1887, 20 Q.B.D. 68.

In re Mulock, 1864, 33 L.J.M. 205, S.C. Ex parte Chetwynd, Re Mulock, 10 Jur. N.S. 1188.

postcards to the plaintiff threatening an exposure by like means if the action is persisted in,* or to terrify a witness about to be examined on Commission,t or for a husband by menace to prevail upon his wife to put in an answer contrary to what she believed to be the fact, or for the respondent to threaten one whom he knew to be a probable witness that if she gave evidence she would be indicted for perjury,§ or for the defendant to send to the plaintiff, pending the suit and enquiries before the Chief Clerk, a letter threatening indictment for swindling, perjury, and forgery, or to threaten a prosecutor with danger of his life, saying that he would be hanged. But it is not a contempt to indict a prosecutor for perjury, pending the prosecution. T

If the purpose is to intimidate, it is immaterial that the threat had not the effect desired (a).

(b). Other ways.

It is a serious contempt to tamper with a witness in an action, to induce her by an offer of money to go away and hide herself where the other party cannot find her. A person employing an agent who does such a thing, though himself innocent, should not get his costs if he is included in the motion to commit.*

*Sharland v. Sharland, 1885, 1 T.L.R. 492.

+ Partridge v. Partridge, 1640 (?), Toth. 40. Ex parte Halsam, 1740, 2 Atk. 50.

§ Shaw v. Shaw, 1861, 31 L.J.M. 35, Sir C. Cresswell, J.O. The respondent had also written an abusive letter to another.witness, as to which see the argument at the bar that this was no contempt, because he did not know she was likely to be a witness. But he knew she was cognisant of important facts, and it is submitted that in such circumstances there is a contempt. || Smith v. Lakeman, 1856, 26 L.J. Ch. 305 (committed).

¶ Rex v. Carroll, 1744, 1 Wils. 75. It might be otherwise if the indictment were under circumstances which would be ground for an action for malicious prosecution, and the real object was to interfere with the pending cause.

**Lewis v. James, 1887, 3 T.L.R. 527, Kay, J.

But the mere suggestion to a material witness that he should not attend the trial, and that he should endeavour to regain from the plaintiff possession of an important letter which had been addressed to him, and the giving to him a monetary advantage as an inducement to do these things has been held not to constitute a contempt.*

To inspect the brief of the opposite party, clandestinely taken out of the custody of his attorney, is a contempt.t Semble, it is a contempt to interfere with the conduct of a sale without the leave of the Court.

(c.) Service of Process and Arrest.

No arrest on civil process is lawful in the place where the Queen's Judges are sitting, or within the local limits of the place where they are administering justice. It is a contempt to serve process upon a person attending the Court, or to arrest, on civil process, one attending, going to, or returning from the Court.§

§ vii. Infants and Wards.

The mere fact of an infant being plaintiff in a suit makes him or her a ward of Court, without any express order to that effect, and when there is a suit depending relative to an infant or his or her estate, interference with the infant,

* Schlesinger v. Flersheim, 1845, 14 L.J. Q.B. 97, per Williams, J., sed qu. The decision, which conflicts with Lewis v. James, proceeds on the ground that to constitute an offence there must be an actual deflection of justice. But see Re Mulock, sub-sect. (a) supra, and Art. I., § i.

↑ Bateman v. Conway, 1753, I Br. P.C. 519 (H.L. Ir.). This is the case mentioned in Mulock v. Malone, 1766, Wall. Lyn. 3.

Dean v. Wilson, 1878, 10 Ch. D. 136, Jessel, M.R.

§ Orchard's Case, 1828, 5 Russ. 159, Lyndhurst, L.C.; Cullen's Case, Viner, Abr. t. Contempt.; Garibaldo v. Cagnoni, 1704, 6 Mod. 90; Cole v. Hawkins, 1738, 2 Str. 1994; Gilpin v. Cohen, 1869, L.R. 4 Ex. 131, 134, per Kelly, C.B. See further Note at end of this Article.

|| Gynn v. Gilbard, 1860, 1 Dr. & Sm. 356, Kindersley, V.C.