say, that the parties to a shipping contract, without special contract on the subject of General Average, have only recently obtained the knowledge of what their relative rights were in such cases, and have learnt that in several respects they were different from what the Average Adjusters generally had thought; that is, that General Average claims for nearly a century had been wrongly settled. A similar surprise, even more recently, but in the other direction, was sustained in France, when the Court of Cassation, in 1890, held that a Particular Average might, under certain circumstances, when of sufficient gravity to imperil ship and cargo, change its character and become a General Average, an exception which, so far as putting into a port of refuge in consequence of Particular Average and the expenses occasioned thereby, is obviously of the largest description (see Revue Internationale de Droit Maritime, Vol. II., p. 92), but as there is no direct provision of the Code the parties can still contract as they will about it. As the decisions of the French Courts are accepted as authorities in other countries having similar provisions, it may almost be assumed that the Continental laws generally would be interpreted as the French Court of Cassation has interpreted that of France. Here then, if anywhere, it was desirable to get uniformity; the views of all concerned had been upset by the decisions of the Courts of two leading European nations, the Rules adopted previously to the decisions had been different, and the decisions of the Courts introduced yet other and further differences, and yet it was open to all to contract as they chose. Under these circumstances, it is not desirable to criticise the Rule introduced and carried unanimously at Liverpool. It may or may not be the best possible determination of the moot question, but it is a determination, and henceforth those who adopt the YorkAntwerp Rules, 1890, in their contracts of affreightment

will, at all events, have the advantage of knowing what their liabilities will be, independently of the place at which they were incurred or at which they were adjusted.

The new Rules XIII. and XIV. are of great importance. Heretofore the only recognised qualification of the cost of repairs was what was well known as the "one-third new for old" rule, that is to say, that after the first voyage of a ship, it was considered that the general condition was improved by having repairs effected upon her, and new material used instead of that which was partially used. This was obviously a very rough Rule, even as far as wooden ships were concerned, as there would be a considerable difference between the enhanced value of a vessel by reason of extensive repairs if she was one year or ten years old, and the difference was even more glaring in the case of sails and rigging, and such like things which perish with the using. But when iron and steel ships were introduced, the Rule became so obviously absurd that a clause was almost invariably inserted in English policies of insurance on such vessels, either abrogating or modifying the Rule. As such policies, however, could not affect the cargo owners, in an adjustment of General Average, these would only pay on an assumption of two-thirds the actual price of ship's repairs, leaving the underwriters on ships to pay the ship's share in full, plus the one-third part of the cargo's share. This anomaly led the Association of Average Adjusters, in 1887, to adopt a species of sliding scale for iron vessels, according to age of the vessel and the nature of the repairs; but it is doubtful how far a mere agreement of Average Adjusters as to the propriety of such an arrangement could or would have been held of itself to legalise an adjustment made on such a basis. But now, there being nothing illegal in the plan, it is incorporated, together with the old one-third new for old slightly modified, in the case of wooden ships, in Rule XIII., whilst a further Rule XVI.

embodies the practice of Average Adjusters as to temporary repairs, and any person agreeing to have the YorkAntwerp Rules, 1890, incorporated agrees to this equitable arrangement as a part of the contract, subject to this, that if the contract be a Spanish one, and adjusted in Spain, he is bound by Art. 853 (6) of the Spanish Code to the one-third new for old rule in the adjustment of values of spars, sails, ropes, and other ship's apparel.

It would not be difficult to multiply instances out of the several Codes where the York-Antwerp Rules, even in their present form, appear likely to clash with them, and give rise to litigation to determine the rights of the contracting parties, and it is greatly to be feared that if the Law of General Average, either as laid down by the Courts as Common Mercantile Law in this country, or the modified form of it embodied in the York-Antwerp Rules, now under consideration, were enacted in this country as a Code, as proposed, amongst others, by Mr. Carver, in the Third Edition of his most valuable work on Carriage by Sea, the result would be only to increase the difficulty of adapting contracts between mercantile people to the varying and progressive conditions of shipbuilding and trade on this important matter. Perhaps the true remedy would be to get other Maritime States to repeal their Codes so far as they interfere with the liberty of contract, in which case the York-Antwerp Rules, as amended and adapted from time to time to meet the changes of trade, would become, as we commenced by saying they might become, a most valuable voluntary Code, which the parties might adopt en bloc, or with such modifications as seemed good to them to meet the particular requirements of each individual trade or ship.

F. W. RAIKES.

III. CONTEMPT OF COURT.

III. DIRECT INTERFERENCE.

i. Violent or unseemly behaviour before the Court.

Riot Disturbance-Rudeness-Prevarication-Expressions of sentiments-Insult to Judge-To jurors-To witnesses-Cheering verdictThrowing missile at Judge-Transgression of rules laid down by Judge— Assault in vicinity of Court-Not essential that act should be done in immediate presence of Judge-Test, interference with one acting as a Judicial officer or with a Judicial proceeding-Chambers-Registrar's office-Master's office-Person appealing for protection should do so at once-Disturbance arising out of business relations between solicitors, but not an interference.

ii. Jurors.

Perverse verdict not a contempt-Non-attendance-Refusal to serveMisconduct-Combination to deceive Court.

iii. Witnesses.

Non-attendance-Refusal to be sworn, or to give evidence-Pre

varication.

iv. Attempts to influence the Court.

Private communication to Judge-Attempt to bribe Judge-Flattery of Judge Dedication to, of pamphlet on pending proceedings-Insulting or threatening letter to Judge, or to Judicial officer.

v. Abuse of the process of the Court.

Contempt to pervert writ or process to malicious purposes-ForceFraud-Feigned issue- Fictitious action to raise ill fame of third partyAbsurd dilatory plea-Collusion-Petitioning creditor lending himself to solicitor-Solicitor using counsel's name without authority-False address by plaintiff Counsel party to fraud-Breach of an undertaking-Not to communicate with ward.

vi. Interference with parties, witnesses, and others. Right of such persons to protection.

(a.) Menace.

Threatening publication of statement of facts unless petition withdrawn -Sending postcards threatening exposure by postcards-Terrifying witness-Prevailing upon witness by menace to make false answer

Threatening probable witness with indictment for perjury-Threatening plaintiff with indictment-Threatening prosecutor with danger of his life— Indictment for perjury pending a prosecution-If purpose to intimidate, immaterial that threat had not the effect desired.

(b.) Other ways.

Attempt to bribe witness to conceal herself-By agent of party, position of party-Suggestion not to attend trial-And to regain possession of letter-Monetary advantage given as inducement—Inspection of brief— Interference with the conduct of a sale.

(c.) Service of process and arrest.

Arrest or service on civil process sedente curiâ-Service on civil process of person attending, or going to or from the Court.

vii. Infants and Wards.

Infant plaintiff-Suit relative to infant-Jurisdiction-Encouraging infant to leave custody of guardian-Abduction of ward—Taking ward in execution-Marrying without leave-Removal out of jurisdictionEnlistment-Ignorance of acting or contriving party- Marriage celebrated abroad-Marriage after majority.

(a.) Generally.

viii. Interference with process and execution.

Process-servers and so forth not to be molested-Contumelious, indecent, or disrespectful language-Violent and threatening language-Forcible detainer Assaulting process-server or bailiff-Captain of ship threatening bailiff-Governor of gaol refusing to allow service on prisoner-Impeding service of subpoena-Illtreating person serving subpoena-Concealing infant-Incumbent preventing publication of citation in church-Aiding in breach of injunction-Obstructing bailiff under honest mistake-Snatching at writ-Collaring and shaking process-server.

(b.) Interference with receivers and sequestrators.

i. Generally.

Order to be obeyed, and, though erroneous, constitutes receiver officer of Court-Possession not to be interfered with even by action without leaveOr on the part of one receiver against another-Subsequent incumbrancer -Interference by circular with receiver and manager-Official receiver and trustee in bankruptcy-Inducing receiver not to interfere with business-Order for receiver should disclose over what receiver appointed -May reserve rights of prior incumbrancers-Motion should not be made merely to make costs.