Antipodes, that the case of Chong Quork may be brought before higher Courts than that constituted by the Premier of New South Wales sitting in camera.

Kant and the Metaphysical Principles of Jurisprudence.

To the English Student of Jurisprudence and Ethics, a sound translation of Kant's Rechtslehre should be so very welcome that we propose to develop some points left untouched in our remarks on Mr. Hastie's excellent edition (The Philosophy of Law, by IMMANUEL Kant. Translated from the German by W. HASTIE, B.D. Edinburgh. T. and T. Clark. 1887), in a former number of this Review (Law Magazine and Review, No. CCLXIX., for August, 1888).

We have always thought that as a scientific exposition of the Principles of Jurisprudence, Kant's work is practically useless to the modern student. On the other hand, it is of great value as throwing, so to speak, a side light upon the subject, by its analysis of Legal conceptions from an Ethical and Metaphysical standpoint. It is always necessary to remember that the title which the author gave to his work was not, as Mr. Hastie translates it, "The Philosophy of Law," or "The Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence," but Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, i.e., the "Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Law." John Austin, in his Lectures, has expressed great admiration of the "rare sagacity" and grasp of complex notions which Kant displayed in this work, but he strongly deprecates the introduction by the great German philosopher, into the subject of Positive Law, of such vague ideas as that of the Law of Nature or Jus Gentium.

The best instance of Kant's analytical power is, perhaps, his remarkable definition of Law, quoted by Mr. Hastie at

P. 45: "The whole (or as Professor Holland puts it better, 'The totality,') of the conditions under which the voluntary actions of any one person can be harmonized in reality with the voluntary actions of every other person, according to a Universal Law of Freedom."

It would be a task of supererogation at the present time to criticise Kant's views on Jurisprudence in any detail, but we are entitled perhaps to say a word about his present translator's opinions as expressed in the Preface. We candidly admit that with the general tone of his remarks, as well as with many of his facts, we are bound to disagree. Speaking from the point of view of Jurisprudence and not from that of Ethics, we think that Mr. Hastie is too great a Kant enthusiast. We do not think that there is any such tendency in this respect towards a "return to Kant" as he supposes. We are content for the present to remain with Austin, notwithstanding Mr. Hastie's depreciation of that author, and we should much like to know what Mr. Hastie means by his astounding allusion to "The Historical School of Hugo and Savigny and Puchta,-which is also that of Bentham, Austin, Sir Henry Maine and Herbert Spencer," and by his extraordinary imputation to Hobbes of "Antinomian Naturalism and Arbitrary Politicality." These matters seem to be too high for our limited grasp of the Schools of Jurisprudence and Ethics.

Reviews.

A Handbook of Public International Law. By T. J. LAWRENCE, M.A., late Deputy-Professor of International Law, Cambridge. Third Edition. Cambridge: Deighton and Bell. London: G. Bell and Sons. 1890.

A new edition of this useful little book is now before us, and we gladly hail its appearance. The author, Mr. T. J. Lawrence, is indeed an old contributor to this Review, since a chapter of his larger work, Essays on some Disputed Questions in Modern International Law, that on The Suez Canal and International Law, appeared in the Law Magazine and Review, No. CCLI., for February, 1884. He claims that the present volume is in no sense an analysis of any larger work, but an analysis of Public International Law as such. During the five years which have elapsed since the issue of the Second Edition, questions connected with the acquisition by Civilised Powers of territory in colonies, have acquired an importance which they have not possessed since the last remaining districts of the American Continent passed under the Sovereignty of States recognised by International Law, and the Author appears to have adequately dealt with them. We regret, however, that he has not relied more fully on Halleck, whose book is very practical, and less on Hall, whose Treatise is one of pure theory; perhaps in a future edition Mr. Lawrence may see his way to improve his Handbook on the lines which have suggested themselves to us during its perusal.

The Nature and Value of Jurisprudence. By CHAN-TOON, Barrister-at-Law, of the Middle Temple. Second (enlarged) Edition. Reeves and Turner. 1889.

By far the most original thing in connection with this work is the nationality of its author. An epitome of the views of Austin, Bentham, and Maine by a gentleman who has apparently left his home in China to win his spurs at our own Bar, is a distinctly fin de siècle idea. For the rest, we cannot

discover anything of noteworthy originality or value in the book. It would, perhaps, be unfair to take exception to the author's English and grammatical style, but as to his matter we cannot help remarking that he has scarcely done justice to the somewhat ambitious title of his book. The work is really not a criticism, but merely an analysis of certain wellknown works on the subject of Jurisprudence. Indeed, Mr. Chan-Toon himself, in his preface, modestly confesses that he is indebted to several eminent writers for the theories contained in these Essays."

66

The Law of Building and Engineering Contracts, and of the Duties and Liabilities of Engineers, Architects, Surveyors, and Valuers, with an Appendix of Precedents and an Appendix of Unreported Cases. By ALFRED A. HUDSON, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Waterlow and Sons, Limited, and Stevens and Haynes. 1891.

Law books are of many classes, none of them written from pure love of literature; almost all of them written with the ulterior aim of securing practice or position in the profession of their authors.

Yet, though the object mainly in the view of the writer of a law book is well nigh invariably purely material, law books have been written with a logical method and a lucidity of style that, did their subject admit it, would have entitled them to be classed high in the ranks of literature, and Fearn on Contingent Remainders and the first edition of Benjamin on Sales are examples strongly in point. At the other extremity of the scale of legal text-books is that wretched perversion both of law-and literature, the annotated Act of Parliament which aims, by means of reprinting a statute in very large type, interspersed with the meagrest and often the most foolish of notes, all bound in the gaudiest of bindings, to introduce its compiler, perhaps as ignorant as he may be juvenile, to what he is pleased to call "business."

Between these poles is to be found the vast majority of textbooks. Coke upon Littleton, Williams's Saunders, Bullen and Leake's Precedents, are the princes in this class; but there are an infinity. of others, precious in the sight of the practitioner, though altogether wanting in the graces of literary finish. In this

comprehensive class, Mr. Hudson's laborious, accurate, and useful work will find a not unhonoured place. His book on Building Contracts will, we venture to think, raise the standard of treatises on his subject in no small degree, for he has explored the ancient ways of the learning on building contracts, and has besides opened up stores of information which, till the publication of his book, have been most rarely resorted to, even if known, in a manner that may leave much to be desired in the way of mere arrangement and condensation, but nothing so far as regards full, exhaustive, and accurate treatment of the material which diligence and research could place at his disposal.

A feature of Mr. Hudson's book is his frequent reference to Foreign and Colonial decisions. For this he deems it necessary to apologise; but, in our opinion, very unnecessarily. The more means of information that are afforded on a subject, the greater the probabilities of a fruitful issue to enquiries about it. No sensible and practical man will grudge a single citation which Mr. Hudson has seen fit to make, numerous and copious though those citations undoubtedly are. To the practitioner, and from the form of Mr. Hudson's book, we should judge that it was with regard to the wants and the weaknesses of the practitioner the book was compiled, nothing is more acceptable in the way of a text-book than a work that absolutely exhausts the authorities. They may not need to be all cited in argument, but it most commonly happens, as those with practical experience know well, that some unregarded case in the obscure places of a note may afford the clue to a discrimination of the authorities, and save some client from the pressure of a principle, apparently universal and fatal to the position which the exigencies of his particular case compel him to sustain. Every practical man, therefore, will heartily thank Mr. Hudson for his courage in preferring to sacrifice the superficial symmetry of his book to its working efficiency.

Mr. Hudson again seems greatly troubled as to whether American cases are authorities or not. He cites a passage from Lord Halsbury denouncing the growing practice of "quoting American decisions as authorities in the same way as if they were decisions in our courts." Whether such a practice exists or not is to us unknown. We must assume that it does, since a Judge so conspicuous for the absence of rhetorical colouring in his Judicial