Page images
[ocr errors][merged small]

Side by side with the tendency to Federation in our Colonies at the Antipodes, there seems to exist a spirit which in the German Empire is known as Particularism.

This spirit has been remarkably exemplified in a recent case arising in New South Wales, on the point ofthe extent of the Naturalisation conferred by one ofthe Australian Colonies. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that the question should have arisen in regard to a former subject of the Celestial Empire, as the decision of the Premier of New South Wales may have been unconsciously affected by that dislike to Chinese immigrants, which is not confined to our Colonies, but exists in equal vigour in the United States. The facts, however, are simple, and we presume that the decision in the case of Chong Quork must, until reversed, govern all other cases of Naturalisation in Australia. How so Particularist a decision as that Queensland Naturalisation Papers are useless in New South Wales can be reconciled with the Federation of the Australasian Colonies into the self-styled “Commonwealth” of Australasia, we find it difficult to understand. Chong Quork had been naturalised in Queensland, had resided there for several years, had paid his Queensland poll-tax, and assumed, very naturally as it appears to us, that he could remove to any other Australian, or, we should submit, any other British Colony, as a naturalised British subject. But, on arriving in Sydney Harbour, on a steamer from Brisbane, the New South Wales Customs Authorities refused to allow Chong Quork to land, though his wife, who was herself a British subject, and his children, might land, it was admitted. It would seem, from the brief account of his case in the Morm'ng Post for 11th March, 1891, that the New South Wales Customs Authorities would have allowed Chong Quork to land on payment of a fresh amount of £100 as the Local Government Poll Tax. But to pay this would obviously have been yielding the whole point, as to the extent of the Naturalisation conferred by the Government of the Colony of Queensland.

We are ourselves unable to understand, on Constitutional principles, how one Colony can be entitled to refuse validity to the Naturalisation conferred by another. If the Colony of Queensland was a Sovereign, or even semi-Sovereign State, we could understand the.contcntion of Sir Henry Parkes. Or, if it were a State of a Union, such as the United States, we could understand that there might be two Citizenships, and that the Federal Citizenship might not import Citizenship of the several States of the Union. Or, even if the Federation of the “ Commonwealth of Australasia” were an accomplished fact, which it is not, we could imagine that the Federal Constitution might contain some such limitations on Naturalisation. At the same time we should prizmifacic suppose that Naturalisation by the Government of one member of the Federated Commonwealth would import Naturalisation throughout its length and breadth. In the present condition of things, however, we fail to understand what Naturalisation the Government of any British Colony, whether Queensland or New South Wales, can confer save British Naturalisation, and we should submit, as Chong Quork evidently did submit, that such Naturalisation, if valid in itself, in accordance with the powers of the Colonial Government purporting to confer it, not only would be, but must be, valid throughout the United Kingdom and all the Colonies and Dependencies thereof. It is to be hoped, for the sake of the definition of true Constitutional Principles at the Antipodes, that the case of Chong Quork may be brought before higher Courts than that constituted by the Premier of New South Wales sitting in cmneni.

[ocr errors][merged small]

To the English Student of jurisprudence and Ethics, a sound translation of Kant’s Rechtslelzre should be so very welcome that we propose to develop some points left untouched i_n our remarks on Mr. Hastie’s excellent edition (The Philosophy pf Law, by IMMANUEL KANT. Translated from the German by W. HASTIE, B.D. Edinburgh. T. and T. Clark. 1887), in aformer number of this Review (Law Magazine and Review, No. CCLXIX., for August, 1888).

We have always thought that as a scientific exposition of the Principles of jurisprudence, Kant’s work is practically useless to the modern student. On the other hand, it is of great value as throwing, so to speak, a side light upon the subject, by its analysis of Legal conceptions from an Ethical and Metaphysical standpoint. Itis always necessary to remember that the title which the author gave to his work was not, as Mr. Hastie translates it, “The Philosophy of Law,” or “ The Fundamental Principles of jurisprudence," but Metaphysische Anfangsgrzlnde dew Rcc/ztslehre, i.e., the “llletaphysical Principles of the Science of Law.” john Austin, in his Lectures, has expressed great admiration of the “rare sagacity ” and grasp of complex notions which Kant displayed in this work, but he strongly deprecates the introduction by the great German philosopher, into the subject of Positive Law, of such vague ideas as that of the Law of Nature or jfus Gentimn.

The best instance of Kant’s analytical power is, perhaps, his remarkable definition of Law, quoted by Mr. Hastie at p. 45 : “ The whole (or as Professor Holland puts it better, ‘ The totality,’) of the conditions under which the voluntary actions of any one person can be harmonized in reality with the voluntary actions of every other person, according to a Universal Law of Freedom.”

It would be a task of supererogation at the present time to criticise Kant’s views on jurisprudence in any detail, but we are entitled perhaps to say a word about his present translator's opinions as expressed in the Preface. We candidly admit that with the general tone of his remarks, as well as with many of his facts, we are bound to disagree. Speaking from the point of view of jurisprudence and not from that of Ethics, we think that Mr. Hastie is too great a Kant enthusiast. We do not think that there is any such tendency in this respect towards a “ return to Kant ” as he supposes. \lVe are content for the present to remain with Austin, notwithstanding Mr. Hastie’s depreciation of that author, and we should much like to know what Mr. Hastie means by his astounding allusion to “The Historical School of Hugo and Savigny and Puchta,—which is also that of Bentham, Austin, . . . . Sir Henry Maine and Herbert Spencer,” and by his extraordinary imputation to Hobbes of “An'tinomian Naturalism and Arbitrary Politicality.” These matters seem to be too high for our limited grasp of the Schools of jurisprudence and Ethics.

[ocr errors]

A Handbook of Public International Law. By T, Lawmznce, M.A., late Deputy-Professor of International Law, Cambridge.

Third Edition. Cambridge: Deighton and Bell. London: G. Bell and Sons. I890.

A new edition of this useful little book is now belore us, and we gladly hail its appearance. The author, Mr. T. ]. Lawrence, is indeed an old contributor to this Review, since a chapter of his larger work, Essays on some Disputed Questions in Modern I nternational Law, that on The Suez Canal and International Law, appeared in the Law Magazine and Review, No. CCLI., for February, 1884. He claims that the present volume is in no sense an analysis of any larger work, but an analysis of Public International Law as such. During the five years which have elapsed since the issue of the Second Edition, questions connected with the acquisition by Civilised Powers of territory in colonies, have acquired an importance which they have not possessed since the last remaining districts of the American Continent passed under the Sovereignty of States recognised by International Law, and the Author appears to have adequately dealt with them. We regret, however, that he has not relied more fully on Halleck, whose book is very practical, and less on Hall, whose Treatise is one of pure theory; perhaps in a future edition Mr. Lawrence may see his way to improve his

Handbook on the lines which have suggested themselves to us during its perusal.


The Nature and Value of jurisprzedence. By CHAN-TOON, Barrister-at-Law, of the Middle Temple. Second (enlarged) Edition. Reeves and Turner. 1889.

By far the most original thing in connection with this work is the nationality of its author. An epitome of the views of Austin, Bentham, and Maine by a gentleman who has apparently left his home in China to win his spurs at our own Bar, is a distinctly fin de siéole idea. For the rest, we cannot

« PreviousContinue »