in the cause, is a thing to be disapproved, though when innocently done, and without intention to prejudice the hearing, it is not, perhaps, a contempt.*

(c.) Advertisements in connection with pending case.

In a bill brought touching the real and personal estate of S., deceased, who had issue a daughter by his first wife, married to the plaintiff, P., the question was, whether the defendant, who had been before S.'s maidservant, was married to him. The case set up was that S. and the defendant had been married in the Fleet prison, he by the name of R. M., and she by the name of A. H., that the marriage took place in 1705, and that a child had been born thereof. This marriage had been adjudged good in the Spiritual court, and the sentence affirmed by the Delegates; but the daughter claiming title to a moiety of the real estate, a trial at bar had been directed in the Common Bench, and the marriage found as a fact. At this stage the plaintiff's father advertised in a newspaper that whosoever should furnish proof that R. M. and A. H. were really those persons, and not S. and his maidservant, would receive a reward of £100, and his expenses: Lord Parker, L.C., holding the advertisement very dangerous and a contempt of court tending to the suborning of witnesses, committed him, though believing in the innocence of his intention.† This case was distinguished in Plating Co. v. Farquharson,‡ on the ground that the advertisement there was for documentary evidence, while here it was for oral, and was

* Baker v. Hart, 1742, 2 Atk. 488, Lord Hardwicke, L.C. See cases cited in second part of next sub-section ; and further as to this sub-section, Williams v. Prince of Wales Assurance Co., 1857, 23 Beav. 338; Kitcat v. Sharp, 1883, 52 L.J. Ch. 134; 48 L.T. 64; 31 W R. 227; Helmore v. Smith, 1886, 35 Ch. D. 449.

† Pool v. Sacheverel, 1720, 1 P.W. 675. See Reg. v. Most, 1881, 7 Q.B.D. 244, 258, 259, per Huddleston, B.

§ i. (c.), supra.

further disapproved generally.* But where a co-respondent offered, through the local papers where he resided, a reward of one hundred guineas for such information as would lead to the discovery and conviction of the instigators of the charges against him, Sir James Hannen regarded this as a contempt in that it tended to deter witnesses from coming forward to give evidence.† And Butt, J., though doubting very much whether a bonâ fide attempt to procure evidence in a suit, even by an advertisement offering a reward, was a contempt, granted an attachment where he believed that to procure evidence was not the sole motive, and where the document published as the offer of the reward was calculated to prejudice the petitioner in the eyes of the public, and to discredit her in the assertion of her right in the Court.‡

It would seem, therefore, that an advertisement may legitimately be published offering a reward for documentary, and, perhaps, even for oral, evidence; but that the advertisement should be carefully confined to this purpose, and should not either by the manner of its

*

Jessel, M.R., would not have come to the same conclusion on the same facts, and the distinction ought to be whether or no the person advertising, advertises for what he believes to be true, or for what he knows to be false. James, L.J., was unable to reconcile Pool v. Sacheverel with the well estab. lished practice of the Government in offering rewards for evidence in criminal cases. But this practice was abandoned in 1884, it being found to lead to undesirable results, to the production of false evidence, and even to the concoction of conspiracies to accuse of atrocious crimes. Answer of Secretary of State to questions in the House of Commons, Hansard, 3rd series, Vol. 330, p. 902. And, any way, the practice of the Home Office cannot affect the law. It is submitted that the facts of the case-the marriage in the Fleet, and the time-should not be overlooked. It is not so long ago that five shillings was the price of an affidavit outside the Guildhall.

↑ Brodribb v. Brodribb, 1886, 11 P.D. 66 (attachment ordered, but delayed for apology).

Butler v. Butler, 1888, 13 ib. 73 (attachment ordered, but delayed fo removal of obnoxious placards).

publication, or through the matter of its contents, be of a character to prejudice, or interfere with, the case of another party.*

We have seen that high authority has expressed disapproval of the publication by a party of an interlocutory order,† and a plaintiff inserting an advertisement in The Times, incorrectly stating the effect of an interim injunction, was ordered to insert another advertisement correcting his error. But the printing and circulating by the plaintiff, in places of mercantile resort, of handbills reciting an ex parte order restraining H. from parting with the bills. of lading of certain goods which had come to H.'s hands by way of consignment, and cautioning persons against dealing with H. without inquiry as to ownership, has been held by Lord Brougham, L.C., no contempt at all,§ nor is it a contempt in a party to publish an advertisement in a technical Review correcting a daily newspaper report of an interlocutory application. ||

It would seem, therefore, that, although the practice is not to be commended, a party, or his solicitor, or any other interested person, will not incur the penalties of contempt by advertising an interlocutory order and correctly making its effect and purport known to some of those having a particular and legitimate interest in being made aware of it, but that the thing should be done with singleness of purpose and with some sufficient excuse.

A creditor's winding-up petition having been presented

* See also a note, iv. L.Q.R. 370.

+ Baker v. Hart, sub-section (b.), supra.

Matthews v. Smith, 1844, 3 Hare 331, Wigram, V.C. (not a contempt calling for committal-patent case).

§ Powis v. Hunter, 1832, 2 L.J. (N.S.) Ch. 31 (motion refused).

|| Buenos Ayres Gas Co. v. Wilde, 1880, 42 L.T. 657; 29 W.R. 43, Malins,

V C. (Daily Telegraph-Review of Gas and Water Engineering. See this case as to "Cautions")

against a company, the chairman of the company inserted. an advertisement in the Standard and other newspapers charging the petitioners with corrupt motives. Lord Romilly, M.R., refused to commit on an undertaking being given not to repeat the advertisement, and, subsequently, ordered the directors to pay the costs of the motion if the petitioners would undertake not to bring an action for libel, otherwise no costs on either side.*

Pending a suit between the Republic of Paraguay and the defendant, E. A. L., the solicitor in England to the Republic inserted in the Times two advertisements purporting to be citations, one in a civil, one in a criminal cause, to E. A. L., issuing from Courts in Paraguay. The citations contained imputations of gross misconduct against E. A. L. On motion to commit the solicitor, it was argued that the Court would not hinder the issue of citations in this way by a foreign friendly State. Malins, V.C., answered that the act was, in fact, not the act of the State, but the act of the solicitor. The solicitor, expressing regret, was ordered to give an undertaking not to repeat the advertisements, and to pay the costs of the motion.†

(d.) Party Refuting Comment.

When a defendant has been attacked by certain portions of the press, a public protest by him against the newspaper articles, though it might be technically a contempt, would not, probably, be a contempt to be visited with punishment, but an attack upon one of the Judges of the Court and counsel retained in the cause goes beyond the limits of permissible latitude.‡

*Re General Exchange Bank, 1866, 12 Jur. N.S. 465.

↑ Republic of Paraguay v. Lynch, W.N. 1872, p. 48. The learned ViceChancellor apparently thought that the citations were not advertised in good faith as a step in the causes in Paraguay, but to prejudice the defendant in the suit here.

Reg. v. Castro (the Defendant's case), 1873, L.R. 9 Q.B. 230. In a case before the Judicature Acts, where the defendant, conducting his case in person.

Note to Article II. Adjudications on alleged contempts before the Commissioners for the purposes of the Special Commission Act, 1888.

The Special Commission Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict., c. 35), constituted three persons—namely, Sir James Hannen, Sir John Charles Day, and Sir Archibald Levin Smith, Commissioners for the purposes of the Act. These purposes were to constitute a Special Commission to inquire into the charges and allegations made against certain Members of Parliament and other persons by the Defendants in the then recent trial of an action entitled O'Donnell v. Walter and another. For the purposes of this inquiry the Commissioners had all such powers, rights, and privileges as are vested in the High Court or in any Judge thereof, on the occasion of any action, in respect of the punishing persons guilty of contempt. As might be expected from the nature of the inquiry, there were not wanting applications to the Commissioners to exercise these powers, and although the determinations of the Commissioners (who were not sitting as Judges or exercising any function of the judicial offices which they chanced to fill) in respect of these applications are not of authority, I have thought it not inexpedient to collect them here in a short note as, at any rate, expressions of opinion by very learned men, given after argument by counsel and under responsibility, affording useful illustrations and exemplifications of some points and principles considered or enunciated in the text of this Article. The

had been repeatedly fined by the Judge at nisi prius for contempt, it was laid down by the King's Bench, that if by reason of fine or committal the defendant in person had been prevented from making his defence, then, if the fine or committal were the punishment for what could not by any reasonable intendment constitute a contempt, a new trial should be granted, but not otherwise, for the defendant could not have the advantage of his own delinquency. Rex v. Davison, 1821, 4 B. & Ald. 329. There is no express Rule. See d. Act, 1873, § 23; R.S.C. Ord. xxxix.; lxxii., r. 2.