absurd short sentences for offences against person and property, offenders should, if possible, not be allowed to get out of prison till their bad habits have been changed, and new and good ones formed. Prisoners should be treated like insane persons, or persons affected with contagious diseases, and should not be allowed to mingle and associate with the sane and the healthy till their minds and bodies and habits `are in a sound and healthy condition. In order partially to accomplish these objects, much greater attention should be devoted to offenders when, on the expiry of their sentences, they are about to enter into the society of their old friends, acquaintances, and associates, or the world at large, in order that employment, the means of livelihood, and a new career should be opened up to them. What is the use of keeping offenders in prison for a few weeks, or a few months, or a few years, if they are again to fall into their old evil ways? Attached to every prison, there ought to be a subsidiary establishment, where prisoners should be allowed to remain till they have got a fair start in their new life.

In these observations on imprisonment, I have been referring to imprisonment as a punishment. Here I have to add a few words on imprisonment by way of security. As a general rule, every person charged with an offence should be entitled to his freedom till his trial, on sufficient security being found for his appearance at his trial, or when called on by the Judge to appear before him. In the event of such security not being found to the satisfaction of a Judge, the alleged offender should be imprisoned by way of security until his trial; and should be treated, in every other respect, as innocent of the charge made against him, and should have his trial brought forward with all speed consistent with justice to the public and justice to the prisoner. As a matter of justice and prudence, offences should be tried and punishment inflicted, or innocence found, as early as possible; because nothing can fully

compensate a man who is innocent of a criminal charge made against him, and nothing can so amply punish an offender really guilty as swift and condign punishment. The more immediate and close the two ideas of criminality and punishment are seen by the offender to be cause and effect, the greater his chance of amendment, and the better for Society.

But

As regards Houses of Penitence, I have to state that the administration of houses of penitence is a very difficult matter; for they ought to be suited to the differences in the dispositions of men and women, young and old, in the shape of measures of severity or indulgence. Knowing that the differences in character are infinite, and that circumstances are so diverse that they are not the same for two individuals, we may easily conclude that the task of such administration is impossible of complete realisation. we have always one important fact to guide us in our treatment of an offender,-that is to say, that, if we are attentive enough, the character of the delinquent can be inferred from the offence, and from the circumstances in which the offence was committed. Thus, if we are known to have acquired certain moral habits, we are held in esteem in proportion as these habits are valued in the community; and if we have acquired certain immoral habits, we are not so held in esteem. When people are feeble, we pity them. When they are cruel we hate them. When they are false, we do not trust them. Although a person is deterred from crime by the fear of punishment, he is not reformed. "Reformation," says Bentham, "implies a change of character and moral dispositions." Inasmuch as poverty, ignorance and drunkenness are, as I have stated, the great sources of crime, we should direct our highest energies, in the reformation of criminals, to the eradication of these three great sources. When people are young, new habits of life can be acquired; but, when they

are old, they cannot be so to any very great extent. Hence so little good has been effected by any kind of imprisonment. But, so far as yet known, by reasoning, observation, or experience, the best treatment of prisoners guilty of rapacity is to get them to learn habits of industry, and turn to honest labour to gain the means of an honest livelihood; and of those who are guilty of cunning, to direct them towards a useful application of their habits, and to devote themselves to their own highest interests, which, properly understood, will be those of the community at large. Ignorance must be extirpated by education, moral as well as intellectual. Drunkenness must be extirpated by enforced or voluntary habits of temperance and sobriety. Mankind must be acted upon through their wills, which should be directed towards the realisation of good and useful and national objects, and by a thorough realisation of the philosophy of pains and pleasures as applicable to human actions.

Delinquents are a peculiar race of human beings. Like idiots and lunatics, they yield to every passing temptation. Idleness, intemperance, and vicious connections are the three great causes of crime amongst the poor and ignorant. "Ignorance and indigence," says Bentham, "are the parents of crime." For their reformation, there are required the very opposite habits, which cannot be formed in them except by perpetual superintendence. Constraint alone will not inspire a taste for labour, but will discourage it. A model prison should be a school for learning habits which prevent offenders there imprisoned from ever being there again, and also from committing, or needing to commit, similar offences. Many offences do not spring from vicious habits, but from youth, ignorance, indigence, and sudden anger.

Houses of penitence ought to be made schools for the young and the old, and should have ample provision made

in them for teaching all the branches of an ordinary elementary education, which is now indispensable to all classes and ages of the community. They should also provide instruction in commercial, agricultural and industrial work.

(2.) Pecuniary Punishments.-Pecuniary punishments are mostly inflicted as satisfaction for the injury done, and not as punishment in the usual modern sense of the term. Formerly, pecuniary punishments were almost universal in all countries, and in every description of crime. Certainly, amongst our Teutonic ancestors, pecuniary punishments were universal and applicable to all crimes from the highest to the lowest. In pecuniary punishments, there are great diversities and degrees of justice, both as regards the classes of crimes, and the amounts of compensation, and the degree of punishment inflicted on the offender. When a rich man. and a poor man commit the same offences, a pecuniary punishment, which would be nothing to the former, might be absolute ruin to the latter. In the course of events, pecuniary fines became less numerous amongst the Teutonic Legislators, and ceased to become the great sources of their incomes, as they once were.

In all injuries to private property, and in all cases of theft and robbery, where there is no personal violence used, the punishment might be pecuniary. The law of England adopts a different mode of dealing with such crimes; but with very little effect. When the pecuniary punishment is not paid, some corporeal punishment, by way of imprisonment and hard labour, should be inflicted on offenders against property. When violence against the person is used, corporeal punishment should always be inflicted, by the deprivation of liberty, till such time as the offender is likely to be amended of his evil propensity.

(3.) Punishment of Death.—A question now much agitated is this: Is the punishment of death legitimate, useful, or

necessary for the safety or good order of Society? Till the Eighteenth Century, nobody doubted that it ought to be answered in the affirmative. But, in the present age, a large number of wise and prudent men boldly answer it in the negative. Beccaria was the first author who, in the Eighteenth Century, strongly argued for the abolition of capital punishment. In England this punishment is now reserved to wilful homicide and high treason, and the question here is as to its legitimacy in those cases. On the one hand, some authors deny that Society has a right to take away the life of any man. On the other hand, most people think that the punishment of death is morally legitimate. It is just in itself, they say, when it is necessary or useful for Society. Let us briefly consider this matter as to its legitimacy, and its applicability in general, and in this country in particular.

In discussing this question of legitimacy, we have to deal with this matter from the point of view of abstract justice and pure morality; and, therefore, some people may say that the question is one of no practical importance. I do not agree with this conclusion; for, if the punishment of death is illegal by the moral law, I would require strong evidence to shew that it was morally legitimate by any law. If, however, the punishment is morally illegitimate, there still remains the opportuneness of its abolition where it exists. In the practical affairs of life, we must not be guided exclusively by abstract principles.

Montesquieu held generally that a citizen deserved death when he violated the public security by taking away the life of another, or attempted it. His words are these: "Qu'un citoyen mérite la mort lorsqu'il a violé la sûreté au point d'avoir ôté la vie ou d'avoir entrepris de l'ôter." (Esprit des Lois, Bk. II., Ch. 4.) Beccaria, in his work, Dei delitti e delle pene, cap. 16, denied the legitimacy of the punishment of death. But neither he, nor his successors,