it. I am largely responsible for their being here, because I have always entertained the conviction that the assent of Russia is both necessary and desirable with a view to a proper, peaceful and permanent solution of the question. I should therefore be very much. disappointed if we went away from here with a treaty to which is attached a Straits Convention that is not signed by Russia. But it is not fair to suggest that we are imposing this treaty; for if M Chicherin is unwilling to sign it, bitterly as we shall regret his action, we shall have to accept it."

M. CHICHERIN spoke as follows:

"I much regret to see from the reply of the president that the divergences which separate us are insurmountable.

"The president stated that there have been seven meetings of the Straits Commission, at which we could have negotiated. I venture to remind you, Gentlemen, of what took place during those seven meetings. Although we have had the honour to be in the same room as the representatives of the inviting Powers, that does not mean that we have been able to negotiate. Negotiation means joint discussion of broad lines and of details, analysis of divergences, ascertaining in what respects interests clash and finding compromise between them. What have we been able to do during the seven meetings? Our general scheme was rejected in toto. When we presented our counter-draft, which contained concessions, it was rejected en bloc without even discussing it. It is quite untrue that the Straits Commission decided against the creation of a sub-commission. Just the opposite was the case. At the meeting on the 8th December I asked when the sub-commission for the discussion of the draft convention was to meet; I was told that this was still premature, that the time had not yet come. The president even said that M. Chicherin could shut himself up in a room and prepare the text, which would facilitate the work.' I have attended all the meetings of the Straits Commission, and I declare that the Russo-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation have not taken part in a decision of that commission to the effect that there should be no sub-commission, nor have they witnessed the adoption of any decision of the kind. As regards the work of the experts, we received an authoritative explanation from the president of the conference that the meetings of the experts would be solely for the purpose of giving explanations for the information of those taking part. It was therefore agreed that the consultations of the experts would not imply any negotiations. Our experts came away from one of these meetings, firstly, because it was desired to exclude Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia from the question of demilitarising the Straits, and, secondly, because the experts' meetings were turned into negotiations which were conducted without the partici pation of Russia and her allies.

"Since the 20th December, we have been completely banished from the negotiations, despite our repeated demands. Is it possible now, under present conditions, to begin these negotiations again? Take, for instance, heading (a) in paragraph 1 of the annex to the

convention: Complete freedom of navigation and passage by day and by night under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities or tax or charge whatever unless for services directly rendered, such as pilotage, light, towage or other similar charges, and without prejudice to the rights exercised in this respect by the services and undertakings now operating under concessions granted by the Turkish Government.' I ask, what are these 'taxes What are these services and undertakings' ? We ought to discuss these taxes, we ought to examine the status of these services and undertakings, we ought to ascertain whether they merit confidence. We are asked to give pledges binding on Russian commerce. These taxes can decide the fate of all our

6

southern trade. We are required to sign a blank cheque. This shows how many questions arise in connection with a single paragraph. It is not the experts but the plenipotentiary delegates alone who can pledge their Governments in these matters. The president told us that the delegations of the inviting Powers had listened to the wishes of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia and had taken account of them in their draft; in the same way the Tsar used to listen to the wishes of the representatives of the provinces, and used to take the decision himself. This is not the way in which we regard relations between sovereign States.

"As regards the root of the matter, it is too late to discuss it any further. But I wish to make one observation. The president has said that the decision regarding naval strength rests with Russia; that means that Russia must arm. There is the advice.

which is given to us.

"The president says that the draft also embodies the views of Turkey. We know how these views are imposed on her by dint of an ultimatum and threats of war. We are told that a treaty is not being imposed upon us when you say to us Sign, or go away.' This summons is what is commonly called imposing a treaty.'

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Taking account of the fact that the draft convention concerning the régime of the Straits presented by the inviting Powers threatens the security and vital interests of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia;

"That it makes it impossible to establish a stable and peaceful situation in the Near East and on the Black Sea:

"That it will result in imposing on Russia and the other countries an additional burden of naval armaments and places an obstacle in the way of establishing general peace;

"Remaining faithful to the provision of article 1 in the RussoTurkish Treaty of Moscow, dated the 16th March, 1921 (subsequently confirmed by the Treaty of Kars between Turkey and the Trans-Caucasian republics, and by the Treaty of Angora between Turkey and the Ukraine), which declares that each of the two contracting parties undertakes in principle not to recognise any treaty of peace or any international act which it may be sought to impose upon the other party;

"And lastly, being firmly convinced that the Turkish people [9454]

Q 4

by continuing the struggle will free itself from conditions of peace imposed by the strongest States of the moment-conditions which would violate Turkey's independence and sovereign rights and constitute a permanent threat to the security of Constantinople;

"The Russo-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation do not agree to the draft of the inviting Powers, make it clear that they are irreconcilably opposed to the whole policy of domination and violence expressed in this draft, and wish to emphasise the inability of the present conference to accomplish a work of real peace.

"At the present time, there is no agreement with Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia. There have been no negotiations nor even attempts at negotiations with them. Under these conditions therecannot be any decision in the Straits question. There is none and there will not be any without Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia. If the convention is signed without Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia, the latter will retain an entirely free hand and complete liberty of action. If certain Powers sign this convention without Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia, the Straits question remains and wil remain open."

LORD CURZON said: :

"I will only reply in a few sentences to the remarks which we have just heard. In the first place, I cannot congratulate M. Chicherin on his solitary joke. It is one of the worst I have heard. Jokes are of two kinds: people laugh because they are good or because they are bad, and at the latter they laugh loudest. On this occasion the joke is in the latter category. Because I made the suggestion that the obvious way of limiting the naval forces which enter the Black Sea was to reduce the strength of the forces inside, M. Chicherin now turns round and says that that is encouraging Russia to augment her forces. That, I feel, is a very bad joke. 'M. Chicherin is mistaken about the sub-commission. It was never promised. On more than one occasion I said here quite explicitly that we had no intention to appoint such a body. His complaint on that point was without foundation.

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"He appeared to be very much vexed that the ideas and counter-drafts which were submitted by his delegation in the past -some two months ago-were, as he said, rejected en bloc. Why was that so? Because no one had a good word to say for them. When he came here there were ten States represented in this room, the majority of whom have a great interest in the Straits question and in the Black Sea. Was a single voice lifted in favour of his proposal? Did Turkey, Roumania or Bulgaria say a word on its behalf ? If you have a block of nations-eight, nine or ten-on the one hand, and on the other hand a solitary State putting forward views which nobody shares, is it in the spirit of business a practical proposition that the eight, nine or ten Powers should concede the greater part of their case, in which they believe, in order to satisfy the case of a single Power with whom they find themselves in complete disagreement? No man in the world' ever conducted business on such a basis.

"I was sorry to hear the concluding words of M. Chicherin. He has announced to us that Russia will have no voice and take no part in this convention. The responsibility for that rests on the Russian Government; and even if it be their present decision, I hope the time may come, perhaps in the not distant future, when on reconsidering the matter they may find it in their own as well as in the public interest to give the signature which I understand they refuse to-day.'

(The commission rose at 11.20 A.M.)

APPENDIX TO PART I.

Bulgarian Economic Outlet to gean Sea.

No. 28A.

Explanatory Note.

SUBSEQUENT to the report of the sub-commission shown on p. 79, private conversations took place at Lord Curzon's request between the British, French and Italian experts and the Greek and Bulgarian delegations.

The Bulgarian economic experts represented that the port of Dedeagatch was not suitable for the construction of a large harbour, and that a better site could be found some 6 kilom. to the west : they added that the construction of the port by Bulgarian capital would be impossible so long as this territory was not placed under Bulgarian administration, and so long as the railway connecting it with Bulgaria remained under Greek control.

M. Veniselos, while holding the view that the real economic outlet for Bulgaria was at Salonica, and while offering the Bulgarian Government the same rights at the latter port as he had promised to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, agreed to the provisions which appear in the record of proceedings given below. (See Paper No. 28в.)

According to these provisions, Bulgaria was to obtain a site on the Egean coast on a lease of ninety-nine years, and to establish Bulgarian administration in the harbour eventually to be constructed there, while the railway connecting the new port with Bulgaria was to be placed under the supervision of an international commission.

This new arrangement was officially submitted to the Bulgarian delegation on the 26th January, and was rejected by them. They also refused to consider M. Veniselos's offer of harbour rights at Salonica.

No. 28B.

Commission on Territorial and Military Questions.

Procès-verbal of the Meeting of Friday, January 26, 1923, held by the Sub-Commission appointed to Examine the Measures to be Adopted for the purpose of Assuring to Bulgaria an Economic Outlet to the Egean Sea.

THE meeting took place at 3 P.M. at the Château d'Ouchy under the chairmanship of M. Diamandy. The following were present:

Hon. Harold Nicolson (British Empire); M. Bargeton (France); MM. Veniselos, Politis (Greece); MM. Nogara, Indelli (Italy); MM. Diamandy, Contzesco (Roumania); M. Rakitch (Serb-CroatSlovene Kingdom); Moukhtar Bey (Turkey); MM. Théodorof, Stanciof, Mlle. Stanciof, M. Altinof (Bulgaria).

Secretary M. Lagarde (France).

THE CHAIRMAN laid before the sub-commission the draft convention regarding Dedeagatch which figures as Annex (A). This convention, he explained, had been prepared by a commission of experts who had examined the conditions under which it would be suitable to apply the provisions of article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly regarding the grant to Bulgaria of an economic outlet to the Egean Sea. He asked the Bulgarian delegation to inform the sub-commission of their views on this draft convention.

M. STANCIOF said that the draft convention prepared by the experts of the inviting Powers was based on the principle that Bulgaria would receive on a long lease the territory situated on the coast of the Ægean Sea. Only the administration of this territory would be transferred to Bulgaria; the sovereignty of the territory would remain to Greece. The territory would remain subjected to Greek legislation and the draft convention makes no mention of the jurisdiction which would be exercised in the territory. On the other hand article 4 stipulates that Bulgarian administration would be under the supervision of an international commission, a condition which would constitute a further restriction to liberty of action, which articles 2 and 3 purport to accord Bulgaria.

By thus basing their proposal upon the principle of a lease, the inviting Powers appeared to have had in mind the formal rejection of the request put forward by the Bulgarian Government regarding their outlet upon the Egean Sea.

M. Stanciof added that he did not wish to reopen the discussion which had already taken place semi-officially before the Commission of Experts. He would refrain from restating the arguments upon which the claims of Bulgaria were based, all the more so as these arguments were well known to all the Powers.

M. Stanciof concluded by saying that in present circumstances he had the impression that article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly would appear destined to meet with the same sterile fate as article 28 of the Treaty of Berlin.