have described. You have only got to read the commercial statistics of the district so far as they are available in order to establish this very elementary fact.

"On the point of strategy Ismet Pasha said very little, and perhaps wisely: he confined himself to saying that if the Mosul Vilayet was returned to Turkey the Turkish Government might be relied upon not to have any hostile intentions. Let us see what that means. Let us suppose that I yielded to Ismet Pasha and said he could have back the Mosul Vilayet. It is a rich country. Mosul would be an excellent place for an army corps to be stationed, and no doubt would make a first-class military station. The southern frontier is only 60 miles from Bagdad. Ismet Pasha has suggested that the Jebel Hamrin will make a good defensive boundary. But it is well known that this is not a great range of mountains, but merely a series of rolling downs. Is it not obvious that a Turkish army placed at Mosul would have Bagdad at its mercy, and could cut off the wheat supply almost at a moment's notice? It could practically reduce Bagdad by starvation. Moreover, it would be able to cut the line which runs to Khanikin, one of the main trade routes of the Eastern world. Thus it could make an Arab kingdom well-nigh impossible. I would not care to be on the throne of Bagdad if I had a Turkish army within 60 miles of me. Only a few months ago, when dealing with Thrace and Constantinople, it was proposed to put the Thracian frontier at 80 miles from Constantinople; the Turkish Government then said that it was quite impossible for them to accept so great a danger to their country and capital, that the frontier must be pushed further back, and that they must be given the whole of Eastern Thrace to secure their safety. Yet they come here and argue that it would be no danger to Bagdad to have the frontier brought down to 60 miles from the capital. I do not dispute for a moment the present very genuinely friendly intentions of the Turkish delegation, but it only needs a slight study of history to know that a powerful military nation like the Turks, if they were allowed to occupy the position they now claim, would probably bring about the extinction of the Arab kingdom at no distant date.

"I was rather surprised to hear Ismet Pasha lay stress upon the argument relating to the position in Mosul at the time of the Armistice of Mudros. During the last few weeks he has been contending that the Armistice of Mudros has been wiped out and is not worthy of consideration, and that everything ought to date from the Convention of Mudania, which was concluded only three months ago. But to-day he based his argument upon the allegation that on the 31st October, 1918, when the Mudros Armistice came into force, the British forces were not in occupation of the greater part of the Mosul Vilayet and therefore we could not claim to retain it. Let me give him the facts. The armistice was concluded on the 30th October 1918. The news of it did not arrive in the remote districts of Mosul until the 1st November, in the following week. On the 30th October the British forces were already in occupation of Altun Keupri, Kirkuk, Tauk, Yoz Khurmati, &c., the principal [9454]

N 4

Turkish towns in the vilayet. On the 1st November, before the news of the armistice had arrived, they were 13 miles outside Mosul city. On the 3rd November they occupied the town, where there were only one Turkish regiment, 850 rifles, 100 sabres and a few guns. The Turkish commander did not receive the full terms of the armistice till the 4th November; on the 9th November he received orders from the Turkish Government to evacuate. Apart from this, will Ismet Pasha allow me to remind him that armistice conditions have nothing to do with the final settlement of the conditions of peace? There is not a war in history in which movements of troops have not taken place after the conclusion of an armistice. In spite of the Armistice of Mudania, the movements of troops in Eastern Thrace are going on at this moment, as is well known. There is not a single treaty in history in which the armistice lines have been the peace lines ultimately laid down. Moreover, article 7 of the Mudros Armistice expressly authorised the Allies' troops to occupy strategical points in Turkey outside the armistice lines in the event of any situation arising which threatened the security of the Allied lines. That was precisely the case with Mosul, and therefore the occupation of that city, only a few miles distant, a few hours after the armistice was signed was fully provided for by the terms of the armistice itself.

"I only desire to allude to one more subject before I conclude, and that is a subject which was not referred to by Ismet Pasha, but which is widely and constantly discussed in the press of the world. It is supposed and alleged that the attitude of the British Government with regard to the retention of Mosul is affected by the question of oil. The question of the oil of the Mosul Vilayet has nothing to do with my argument. I have presented the British case on its own merits quite independently of any natural resources there may be in the country. I do not know how much oil there may be in the neighbourhood of Mosul, or whether it can be worked at a profit, or whether it may turn out after all to be a fraud. During the time I have been connected with the foreign affairs of my country I have never spoken to or interviewed an oil magnate. I have never spoken to or negotiated with a single concessionnaire or would-be concessionnaire for the Mosul oil or any other oil. I do not think that everyone in this room can say the same. It is notorious that since we have been here in Lausanne three representatives of the Turkish delegation were sent to London to offer oil concessions in the Mosul area (which is not theirs to dispose of) to British concessionnaires. That was done without reference to me and without my knowledge. I believe these gentlemen, when they arrived in London, said they had come over in order to inspect the institutions and collections of that great capital. I don't think they saw many of them. They came back very quickly when they found there was no actual business to be done behind my back, and their visit to British institutions was therefore postponed. I hope that next time they come to London they will give me the pleasure of calling on them, and I will have the greatest satisfaction in taking them personally to the British Museum. Meanwhile, what

are the facts of the case? Just before the war a concession was given for the oilfields of the Mosul and Bagdad Vilayets by the Turkish Government to a British limited liability company-the Turkish Petroleum Company. The Germans had an interest in the company, and when they were defeated in the war their interest passed to the British. The British Government, after full examination, were convinced, and remain convinced, of the validity of this concession. They felt and feel bound to uphold it. But both the British Govern. ment and the company itself recognise that oil is a commodity in which the world is interested and as to which it is a great mistake to claim or to exercise a monopoly. Accordingly the company, with the full knowledge and support of the British Government, took steps, and negotiations have ever since been proceeding, to associate the interests of other countries and other parties in this concession, so that all those who are equally interested may have a share.

"If the exploitation is successful, Irak will be the main gainer and the world will gain also, and I have no doubt that Anatolia will profit in her turn. That is the substance of the oil affair, which I have explained to the commission in order that they may know the exact amount of influence-and it is NIL-which has been exercised. in respect of oil on the attitude which I have ventured to take up to-day on this question of Mosul.

"I have now completed my statement of the reasons which have rendered it impossible for the British Government to agree to the Turkish demands. With the utmost desire to arrive at an amicable solution with the Turkish delegation of all the difficulties that confront us, and to conclude a treaty honourable to both, this is a demand which I am bound to resist from every consideration of obligation and of honour. It is a demand which I cannot conceive to be in the interests of the country itself to concede in virtue of all the considerations-economic, strategical, political, historical, geographical-to which Ismet Pasha appealed and on each one of which I have been willing to rest my case to-day. Whatever be the strength of my case, I venture to say that no weaker case than that of the Turkish delegation has ever been placed before an international conference.

"But since we cannot agree and since each side appears to be so confident of its own solution, my Government is quite content, relying upon the strength of its case, to refer this matter to independent enquiry and decision and to abide by the result. I have already pointed out, and I could argue at greater length, that this is not a case for a local plebiscite, which, in the light of our experience of recent plebiscites, could only result in bloodshed and confusion, and in all probability would lead to no decision. My point is that a plebiscite cannot determine a frontier. It may elect a deputy or a king, but to ask a mixture of peoples to decide by their votes what should be their frontier is out of the question and has never been successfully done in history. It is because it is a frontier question that I say a plebiscite is out of the question. It must be decided upon an examination of all the interests involved. We have to

determine the future northern frontier of the mandated territory of Irak. Ismet Pasha has based his case upon quite a number of considerations-economic, strategic and otherwise-about which it is impossible for ignorant people to vote, but which clearly ought to be carefully sifted and examined in order that it may be known where the truth lies. Let us have such an impartial examination into the facts of the case. If asked what should be the nature of the enquiry and who should hold it, I think there is little doubt as to the best method to pursue. As the area is part of a mandated territory and the British Government exercise mandatory powers there under the League of Nations, and as we cannot surrender or modify that position without the consent of the League of Nations, I think and propose that the League of Nations should be the body entrusted with the examination to which I have referred. I conclude by inviting the Turkish delegation to accept this proposal on my part, which is made with a sincere desire to arrive at a conclusion, and, as I said just now, my Government will accept the result. I invite them to accept not only because the proposal is essentially fair and equitable, not only because the League of Nations appears to me to be on the whole the most impartial and authoritative tribunal to conduct the examination, but also because the Turkish delegation in the last few weeks have themselves signified their confidence in that body by expressing their desire to become members of the League as soon as peace is concluded. That is the suggestion which I submit to the commission and the Turkish delegation and to which I await with interest their reply."

M. BOMPARD observed that the object of the discussion now proceeding in the commission was to determine the southern frontiers of Turkey in Asia. In this connection, he was bound to note the fact that it had not occurred to any delegation to speak of the frontier between Turkey and Syria. This frontier was not, in fact, under discussion, for the line had been definitely laid down by a Franco-Turkish Agreement. The conference did not have to concern itself with that agreement; it could only remark that it existed and take note accordingly.

This was not the case as regards the southern frontier of Turkey, between the Tigris and Persia. The Turkish and British delegations had stated their views on this question; both of them had set forth arguments, the soundness of which could be estimated. M. Bompard said he would refrain from reopening this debate, and would in particular be careful not to add anything to it; but it was his duty to observe that Lord Curzon's proposal was conceived in an extremely liberal spirit and appeared to be of a kind to solve a difficulty the gravity of which could not escape the notice of anyone. M. Bompard accordingly associated himself with the offer made by the British delegation, and urged that the Turkish delegation should receive it favourably.

MARQUIS GARRONI said that he had nothing to add to Lord Curzon's most lucid statement of the question, or to the proposal

just made by him. That proposal was so entirely reasonable that Marquis Garroni felt sure it would be possible on that basis to find a satisfactory solution for a problem which had so long been under discussion.

In reply to an enquiry by Lord Curzon, ISMET PASHA said that the Turkish delegation were ready to acquaint the conference with their opinion in the afternoon.

The debate was accordingly adjourned until 6 p.м.

(The commission rose at 2:10 P.M.)

APPENDIX.

Correspondence between Lord Curzon and Ismet Pasha
respecting Mosul.

Document A.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Ismet Pasha.

Dear Ismet Pasha,

Lausanne, December 14, 1922.

In our various conversations about Mosul, you mentioned to me the grounds, racial, political, strategic, historical, &c., on which your Government rested their claims for the return of the Mosul Vilayet. I told you in reply that I contested each one of these claims, and I now send you a memorandum with the reasons for which I do so, and which-quite apart from the fact that Great Britain cannot give back a country of which she is a mandatory under the League of Nations-render it quite impossible for my Government to contemplate the surrender of the Mosul Vilayet.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in Document A.

Memorandum on Mosul.

THIS memorandum is submitted by the British delegation in order to summarise the reasons for which the demand made by the Turkish delegation for the restoration to Turkey of the Mosul Vilayet cannot possibly be entertained.

These reasons are racial, political, historical and economic. In each case they contradict and destroy the arguments, based on the same considerations, upon which it is understood, from such explanations as have been received, that the Turkish delegation rely in support of their case.