from the territorial and boundary point of view only. He would, therefore, be grateful if the Serbian delegation would be so good as to define their proposal further. He thought it indispensable to know explicitly and in advance all the proposals which the delegations wished to make, and he hoped the commission would find no difficulty in recognising the reasonableness of his request. If the other delegations had no further remarks to lay before the commission, he proposed to adjourn the discussion till the next day, so that the Turkish delegation might have the necessary time to examine the proposals in their entirety.

LORD CURZON Said he did not think that any points put before the conference that day could have come as a surprise to the Turkish delegates. He could have understood if difficulty had arisen over the statement made by M. Stambouliisky, which had been heard that afternoon for the first time. But that was not the point at issue. Three speeches had been made in the morning in reply to the Turkish claims. The Turkish representatives had challenged these statements; they had asked for an opportunity to reply, and had undertaken to do so; their interests were at stake, and they knew more about the matter than anyone else. He must, therefore, express his extreme surprise that they were not ready. He was loth to waste the labours of the conference by proposing another adjournment; in fact, he declined to do so, and must proceed with his own remarks; but he would have been able to speak with more authority and impartiality had he been in possession of the Turkish arguments. He therefore wished to suggest with all courtesy that the Turkish delegation should do the conference the honour of delivering as soon as possible their replies on a subject which must be thoroughly familiar to them.

ISMET PASHA said that when he had not seen in advance the documents and proposals submitted to the commission, and had not had the necessary time to study and analyse them, he could not broach their discussion. His purpose in asking for an adjournment was to examine the question from a general point of view; this request seemed to him quite natural, and was also consonant with the rules of the conference. He asked the commission to afford him the possibility of working freely and methodically.

LORD CURZON said that that was also his desire. The most methodical arrangement was that when a speech was delivered the reply should be delivered immediately after; if that were not possible, the next most methodical plan was for the debate to be continued. That was the course he now proposed to follow.

He would devote his observations to the widest aspect of the Turkish case put forward that morning. He had had the advantage. of consulting with his colleagues, the representatives of the inviting. Governments. What he had to say represented their united opinion. They had heard that morning the remarks of the representatives of three other Governments. With a great deal of what they said he was also in agreement. The observations he was about to make

therefore represented a very considerable body of united opinion among the Powers present.

Four questions had been raised :

1. The western frontier of Eastern Thrace.

2. The demilitarised zones on the north or west of Eastern Thrace.

3. Western Thrace.

4. Access to the Egean Sea for Bulgaria.

On the first question, the claim put forward by the Turkish delegation that morning was that the new treaty should restore the Thracian boundary of 1913.

He would like the conference to be quite clear as to the juridical position of the matter, as defined by the treaties. An attempt was being made to deal with the treaties in an extraordinarily disrespectful manner.

Up to 1913 the whole of Western Thrace belonged to Turkey. The greater part was ceded to Bulgaria in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest. In 1915 an additional portion of Western Thrace, including Karagatch and Demotika, was ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria. By the Treaty of Neuilly in 1919, Bulgaria had renounced in favour of the Principal Allied Powers the whole of Western Thrace, including the part ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria in 1915. Finally, in August 1920, the Thracian Treaty was signed (but not ratified), by which the whole area was handed to Greece. Western Thrace had since that time been occupied and administered by Greece. That was the position, as he understood it, as laid down by the treaties.

The Turkish delegates now came forward with the claim to recover the pre-war frontier. That morning the Turkish delegates had listened to a number of arguments against this position. These were the arguments to which he hoped the Turkish delegates would be able to give a reply; he would summarise them, and state what appeared to be the relative degree of their importance.

The first argument, arising out of the treaties, was employed with great force by M. Veniselos-that the territory now claimed by Turkey had nothing whatever to do with the Treaty of Sèvres, and had not belonged to Turkey before the war, except a small part voluntarily ceded to Bulgaria in 1915. Its fate was already decided by the Treaty of Neuilly, from which the Allied Powers had not the slightest intention of departing.

The second argument, which had been used with much force by M. Nintchitch and supported by M. Duca, was the geographical argument that the Maritza was the best natural frontier, far better than any artificial frontier which could be created, and one which. would provide, from the point of view of security, as good a boundary as could be found.

The third point, which had not yet been made by anybody, but to which he attached very great importance, was that the Maritza frontier was the frontier consistently put forward by the Turks themselves. Their present demands were entirely new. All previous

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demands made by the Turks, such as those put forward by Hamid Bey to the High Commissioners at Constantinople, had invariably been for the Maritza frontier. When he (Lord Curzon) went to Paris, and on the invitation of the Powers drew up the note of the 23rd September, which had brought about the present conference, the Turkish case-strongly supported by the French Government, who were very familiar with the Turkish claims-was for the recovery of Thrace up to the Maritza. The words of the note of the 23rd September were as follows:

"The three Allied Governments avail themselves of this opportunity to state that they are favourably disposed towards the desire of Turkey to recover Thrace as far as the Maritza and Adrianople."

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The Turkish reply to that invitation asked " that there should be restored to the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Thrace as far as the western bank of the Maritza, including Adrianople." In a later note dated the 4th October the Turks said that they had received with satisfaction the recognition of their incontestable rights in Thrace." Lastly, the Mudania Convention described the line behind which the Greeks were to withdraw, which was "the Maritza line down to the Egean Sea." Therefore, during the past two or three months the frontier consistently claimed by Turkey had been that of the Maritza and no further.

The fourth argument employed that morning rested on ethnical and economic grounds. M. Veniselos had said that the population, before its displacement by the influx of refugees from elsewhere, which had entirely upset the balance, was predominantly Greek in the proportion of at least two to one, and he had undertaken to give exact figures. He (Lord Curzon) hoped to receive figures from the Turkish delegation too. M. Veniselos had also said that the trade and agriculture of the district were in the main Greek. These arguments would undoubtedly require detailed consideration later on.

The Turkish delegates then raised the question of the military security of their position. In this connection the proposal had been made for a demilitarised zone or zones on one or both sides of the River Maritza. The proposal took a double form. In the morning, M. Nintchitch had suggested that such a demilitarisation (by which he meant the razing of forts and the exclusion of troops, rather than neutralisation) might be effected along the northern frontier of Eastern Thrace. The Turkish delegation had quite properly and reasonably asked for a definition of the area to be demilitarised. He thought that if the idea were to be pursued it ought to be examined by the military experts in a sub-commission on which the Turka would doubtless speak with great authority. Whether it was necesGary or desirable to demilitarise the frontier on the north from the Black Sea, he as a civilian could not say; but when the corner running southwards was turned, he was in a position to give a definite opinion on the line from the frontier to the sea, for the matter had been carefully considered by the inviting Powers, who were united in

their opinion. Starting at a point north of Adrianople on the Bulgarian frontier, there would be a demilitarised zone for an area to be determined, of some 20 or 30 kilom. in breadth on either side of the Maritza River throughout its whole course, between Eastern and Western Thrace, down to the sea in the neighbourhood of Dedeagatch and Enos. The Turkish delegation would see at once how such a suggestion touched the question of their military security. It was clear that with the demilitarisation of Adrianople on the one side, and of Karagatch on the other, the military danger to Adrianople from the forts on the other side of the river would disappear. The matter would no doubt have to be investigated by experts, but he desired to submit the proposal as the deliberate opinion and advice of the inviting Powers as the best solution possible.

Involved in this problem were also the questions of the railway and of Bulgarian access to the sea. The Turkish delegation must remember that no part of the railway on the right bank of the Maritza from Mustapha Pasha to Kuleli Burgas was in their hands at the time of the armistice. Moreover, Karagatch was not the sole railway station of Adrianople; there was a station on the other side of the river across the bridge, connected with the main line at Karagatch. The railway, in these circumstances, could be under some form of international control by a commission or otherwise. The railway in question did not concern the Turks alone, but was equally of interest to Bulgaria and Greece. If Karagatch were taken out as the Turks proposed, a small Turkish block would be created in the middle of the line which might be used later for an attack on Bulgaria. He therefore, on behalf of his colleagues, advocated a broad neutral strip from the angle of of the the Bulgarian frontier to the Egean Sea, which would remove any military menace, solve the railway difficulty and provide access for Bulgaria to the sea. These questions would require to be fully examined by a sub-commission. He hoped he had made it clear that the railway and port of Dedeagatch must be in the hands of some body or commission of an international character, sitting at Dedeagatch or elsewhere, and a good many alterations at Dedeagatch would be necessary to make that port adequate for Bulgarian trade. He merely mentioned this in order to show that these were points upon which the inviting Powers would be quite prepared to give their advice in the proposed sub-commission.

There remained for consideration the question of Western Thrace, for which, or a portion of it, the Turkish delegation had that morning demanded a plebiscite, although the area in question had not been defined by them. On this matter the Powers took a firm stand. The question of Western Thrace did not admit of doubt or dispute; the point had been settled by the Treaty of Neuilly, subject to the article which gave Bulgaria access to the sea. The area did not belong to Turkey before the war; Turkey had voluntarily surrendered it. The Greeks could not fairly be asked to give it up, not only because they were in legal occupation, but also because the area was absolutely necessary

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in order to enable them to accommodate the enormous influx of refugees who had gone there from Eastern Thrace and elsewhere. The inviting Powers were united on this and could not let the matter be reopened. There was no more case for a plebiscite in this area than in any other area outside the Turkish frontier. Even if a plebiscite were taken, it would afford no genuine test, owing to the extensive movements of the population in these troublous times. But it was clear, as shown by the statements of the various delegates, that the idea of setting up a little autonomous State on the west bank of the Maritza and in the eastern portion of Western Thrace could not commend itself to any sensible person. The Powers would hold themselves up to ridicule if they allowed the Treaty of Neuilly to be reopened in this way. He earnestly hoped, therefore, that they would hear no more of the matter.

On the questions which he had placed before the conference the inviting Powers were unanimous and were prepared to hear the Turkish reply next day. To sum up, the cession of Eastern Thrace up to the Maritza had been consistently and continuously demanded by Turkey, and had been conceded at Paris. He himself had been a party to the concession. A further concession, not contemplated in March, had been made at Mudania, namely, the immediate occupation of Eastern Thrace up to the Maritza even prior to the meeting of the present conference. He would ask in all friendship and regard that the Turkish delegates should confine themselves to the demands in the Turkish programme which the Powers were perfectly ready to concede, and not render the negotiations more difficult by persisting in demands which it would be quite impossible to grant.

M. BARRÈRE said he had followed with keen interest this courteous, moderate and conciliatory discussion which did honour to all the delegations taking part in it. He hoped the debate would continue with the same breadth and rapidity. He wished to state that he entirely concurred in the clear and moderate statements of Lord Curzon, which corresponded with the views of the French Government and with his own. He specially appreciated the conciliatory spirit shown by M. Nintchitch and M. Duca, who had indicated. their desire to avoid creating any subject of discord in the Balkans. He trusted that Turkey would take heed of the views expressed that day.

MARQUIS GARRONI shared the views of Lord Curzon and M. Barrère. Even when the Allies contemplated a frontier less favourable to Turkey, he had never ceased to recommend the adoption of the boundary now proposed by the Powers, and he asked the Turkish delegation to accept it. In his view, Lord Curzon's proposals were perfectly acceptable and of such a nature as to prevent fresh conflict.

M. VENISELOS said in connection with M. Stambouliisky's statement regarding the Bulgarian outlet on the Egean Sea that he was ready to give all necessary guarantees with a view to the utilisation by Bulgaria of the Maritza, the railway and the port of Dedeagatch