a menace; but the clause had been introduced by the Powers with a precisely opposite intention, as a limitation on themselves, which implied recognition of the rights and interests of Russia.

Lord Curzon did not wish to argue the matter at great length, but proposed to put the case into two or three sentences. The old policy of the Powers, which had been pursued up to the time of the recent war, had been to shut the Straits because the Powers feared that Russia might come out to attack them. Russia now wanted to pursue the same policy in an inverse sense, namely, to close the Straits in order that the Powers might not come in to attack her. Why should it be impossible to adopt the new conception of creating in all straits of the world the maximum of free transit for all? Why could not Russia accept the Allied proposals, with all their advantages and their very small obligations, as readily as the Allies themselves? The proposals made by the Allies ten days ago had been received with assent and almost with enthusiasm throughout the world. It would be very unfortunate if the only note of hostility and criticism came from the present conference, and from the Russian delegation alone.

M. Chicherin had again complained that the present question had not been debated in a sub-commission. As M. Chicherin had already been informed several times, the reason for this was that the Straits question, being so important as affecting all the States concerned, was more suitable for discussion in the commission itself. This had been his own view and that of his colleagues from the start. As regards the examination of the question by experts, there had been no separate negotiations in this any more than in any other cases. When questions assumed a technical form the practice always was to leave the discussion to experts. The Allies would have been very glad if the Russian experts had taken a larger part in these discussions on the Straits. He could assure M. Chicherin that in the present instance there had been no departure from the ordinary procedure and no disrespect towards M. Chicherin or his colleagues.

M. Chicherin had spoken of a counter-projet which was to come from the Turks. If this projet were forthcoming, the commission would doubtless have heard of it from the Turkish delegation. Finally, M. Chicherin had spoken of a Russian counter-projet. Lord Curzon had only received that document just before the present meeting, but he was not going to ask for a sub-commission to discuss these two documents. He would examine them himself the same evening with his colleagues and the experts and would deliver the considered reply of the Allies on the following morning. He would therefore propose to adjourn the meeting unless any other delegation wished to speak at once.

M. CHICHERIN wished to make a few remarks in reply to the first British delegate, without going into the whole question in detail. As regards the fundamental principles outlined by Lord Curzon, it seemed to the Russian delegation more modern, more advanced and more progressive to try to limit the arena of military operations and shut off certain seas or straits from those operations and from movements of warships, than to enlarge that arena, open more seas to warships, and increase the size of naval forces. The Russian

delegation had all the more right to speak thus since they had presented a declaration signed by M. Chicherin together with their counter-scheme, whereby they undertook in the event of the adoption of their counter-proposal for the closing of the Straits to suggest to the littoral Powers of the Black Sea the summoning of a conference for the purpose of laying down reciprocal conditions for the real safety of the shores of that sea.

The information of the Russian delegation regarding public opinion in various countries on this question did not altogether tally with the statements made by the first British delegate. M. Chicherin felt bound to answer the reproaches made by the first British delegate against the Russian delegation of having misunderstood the conciliatory dispositions of the inviting Powers. The Russian delegation would, on the contrary, be very glad if they were able to discern on the side of the inviting Powers any acts which showed consideration for the vital interests of Russia, for only acts of this kind could give them proof of friendly sentiments on the part of those Powers.

There was one proposal of the inviting Powers which the first French delegate had quoted as a most striking example of moderation, namely, that each Power should under certain conditions have three men-of-war of 10,000 tons each in the Black Sea; but the nonlittoral Powers were only to maintain their three war vessels in that sea in the event of the total demilitarisation of the Black Sea Powers, and if no demilitarisation took place they would be able to keep a larger number. The only force which the first French delegate could present as a real guarantee for the safety of the Straits was a moral power, the League of Nations. But that League was not recognised by Russia; the United States and Germany were not members of it; and as a guarantee for safety it had been powerless to protect Lithuania. It had not been able to do anything when confronted with a sudden blow by a general whom his own country disowned at that very moment. The League was organised impotence. Such was the only guarantee of safety which the first French delegate proposed to give to Turkey after demilitarising the Straits.

The Russian delegation greeted with pleasure the president's assurance that the counter-scheme which they had submitted would be examined in detail by the present commission, and that they would have opportunity when discussing these proposals with the other delegations to furnish the latter with proofs of their desire for conciliation, provided that the vital interests of Russia were respected.

LORD CURZON wished to correct M. Chicherin on one point. He (Lord Curzon) had said that the Allies were quite prepared to give full consideration to the Russian proposal and deliver their answer the next day, but he had said nothing to indicate that he was now prepared at the last moment to take the Russian draft line by line and word by word. Such procedure would detain the conference in Lausanne for six months. He did not propose to turn the present commission into a sub-commission for detailed examination of any proposals which anybody might bring forward.

ISMET PASHA wished to define the present position. At the last meeting of the commission it had been decided that the Turkish experts should get into touch with the Allied experts, and that the latter should furnish the former with all such explanations as they might desire. Ismet Pasha thanked the Allied experts for the manner in which they had kindly answered the questions put to them; but on certain occasions he had noticed that the experts did not possess the same authority as members of sub-commissions to decide difficult points, and consequently matters of essential importance had perforce been left unsolved as being outside the experts' powers. The Turkish delegation had therefore considered it necessary to embody in two drafts the modifications which they proposed to make in the drafts of the Allied experts. Some of these modifications concerned demilitarisation and others the freedom of transit, and they must be studied paragraph by paragraph. The Turkish delegation had the right to request that these proposals should be examined and taken into consideration either by the commission itself or by a sub-commission.

LORD CURZON feared that he was unable to accept the position taken up by Ismet Pasha. Time was going on; the conference had been at work for over four weeks; the last meeting on the Straits question had been held ten days ago; since then there had been constant conversations and explanations between the Allied and the Turkish experts. The Russian delegation had now suddenly sprung upon the conference an entirely new projet. Why had they not done so a week ago? Then Ismet Pasha had just informed the commission that he had two projets to put forward and apparently expected time to be found for their discussion. If that was so, why had these projets not been heard of before? The Allies would never have wasted ten days in discussions among the experts if they had known that two new Turkish schemes were to be produced. He must say with the utmost emphasis that business could not be conducted in such a way. Ismet Pasha knew perfectly well that he (Lord Curzon) had always been willing to consider every Turkish representation, but neither his colleagues nor he could go on indefinitely examining new proposals in detail three weeks after the beginning of the discussion. He was quite prepared to listen with respect to whatever the Russian and Turkish delegations might have to say the next day, but for his own part he would not initiate any new and prolonged examination of a scheme submitted at the last moment, and he appealed to his colleagues in the conference to support him in that attitude.

were

M. BARRÈRE thought that Lord Curzon's remarks perfectly correct and entirely concurred in them. He wished, however, to put one question to the Turkish delegation. Ismet Pasha had begun by saying that he had certain amendments to propose. Subsequently he spoke of two new drafts. There would appear to be some misunderstanding. Did the Turkish delegation accept the Allied draft in principle, provided they could suggest amendments in it? In that event the Allied delegations and the Turkish delegation would be in agreement, and their points of view would differ only as regards wording and not on questions of fact. -

MARQUIS GARRONI did not want to make any remarks which might prolong the discussion, and entirely agreed with the statement just made by the president. He only wished to recommend that all should contribute their share of goodwill to the discussion, for otherwise the debates of the commission would never come to an end.

M. CHICHERIN explained briefly that the Russian-UkrainianGeorgian delegation had not been able to present their counterscheme sooner, because more than a week had elapsed since the last meeting of the Straits Commission. They had only become. acquainted with the Turkish proposals at the last meeting, and despite their requests no sub-commission had been called together. Consequently it had been impossible to submit a counter-scheme either to the commission or to a sub-commission. The best means of shortening the work of the conference would have been to create a sub-commission.

Two of the proposals of the inviting Powers (the third and the fourth) had only been handed to the Russian delegation at 11:30 on the previous evening. The inviting Powers were therefore on the

same level as the Turkish and Russian delegations.

He hoped that the inviting Powers would take account of the position of the Russian and Turkish delegations, and would not arrogate to themselves any privileges which would violate the principle of equality between the participating Powers.

ISMET PASHA thought it necessary to give some explanations regarding the Turkish point of view. The Turkish delegation had become acquainted with the drafts communicated by the Allies. The experts had come together and studied these drafts, and they had made as many modifications in them as they could. Ismet Pasha had himself attended these meetings, and the Allied experts had admitted to him that there were some questions which lay outside their competence. On the Turkish side certain proposals had been made, but the Allied experts had avoided examining them. The Turkish delegation were thus only defining the points on which the experts had reached agreement and those on which it had not even been possible to start a discussion, either because the experts were not empowered to do so or because the difference of opinion was too great. In this connection Ismet Pasha renewed his statement that the modifications which he was now submitting in textual form referred to demilitarisation and freedom of transit, and that as the two other Allied drafts (those respecting the duties of the Commission of the Straits and the political guarantee) had not been received in time, he would not be able to present his observations on these matters until a later date.

Ismet Pasha also wished to answer M. Barrère's question respecting the acceptance in principle of the drafts which had been submitted. The Turkish delegation had only been able to study one part of these drafts, in particular that which dealt with demilitarisation-i.., a régime under which it was assumed that no fortifications would exist. With a view to removing the inconvenience which must arise from such a situation, the Turkish delegation were putting forward certain proposals which required to be discussed and

studied either in a sub-commission or in a commission, where they would produce arguments in support of their point of view. This did not imply either acceptance or refusal of the drafts in question. Ismet Pasha therefore thought that the best course would be to submit to the commission the modifications which he proposed; they could then be examined, and the Allies would be in a position to give their answer as soon as practicable.*

LORD CURZON saw no use in pursuing the discussion further at the present meeting. It was not quite fair for Ismet Pasha to say that he had not had an opportunity of making his views known during the past ten days. Lord Curzon himself knew Ismet Pasha's views on every point, for his Excellency had been kind enough to state them repeatedly to the experts and various members of the Allied delegations, and it was in deference to his views that the Allied proposals had been revised. But to begin the whole discussion over again was out of the question. Ismet Pasha would have plenty of opportunity the following morning for stating his views to the commission, but, as Marquis Garroni had just said with so much force, it must be remembered that if the conference were to begin wrangling over little details it would continue for six months. The greater part of the questions at issue had already been thoroughly studied; delegates might pretend that they did not know each other's views, but in point of fact they did know them perfectly. He suggested that a serious effort should be made on the following day to carry the matter a definite stage further towards solution.

(The commission rose at 7 P.M.)

(Third Draft.)

ANNEX (A) TO No. 19.

December 14, 1922.

FREEDOM OF THE STRAITS.

Rules for the Passage of Vessels through the Dardanelles, Sea of
Marmora and Bosphorus.

(Note. The term "Straits" for this purpose shall include the
Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus.)

| ARTICLE 1.—Merchant Vessels, including Hospital Ships, Yachts and Fishing Vessels and Non-Military Aircraft.

(a.) In Time of Peace.

Complete freedom of navigation and passage by day and by night under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities, or tax or charge whatever, unless for services directly rendered, such as pilotage, light, towage or other similar charges, and without prejudice to the rights exercised in this respect by the services and

* For the text of the modifications suggested by the Turkish delegation, see Annexes (F) and (G).