Mr. LONG. What rate of pilot training is proposed by the amendment?

Mr. FERGUSON. Up to 10,000.

Mr. LONG. As I understand, there will be approximately 18,000 planes in the Air Force when it reaches its projected strength.

Mr. FERGUSON. That is correct. There are approximately 47,000 pilots now. Therefore, if we put the new men in we will crowd out the older pilots who are skilled and who have had the 10 years required to fly some of the jet bombers and cruisers.

Mr. LONG. Is the Senator aware of the fact that in most of the transport planes and bomber planes which I assume would be the majority, there are two pilots, a pilot and a copilot, and that the copilot is usually completely qualified to be a pilot?

Mr. FERGUSON. That is correct.

Mr. LONG. If we could get the planes and extend the Air Force we could, if necessary, put a less experienced man alongside a copilot and a less experienced man alongside a pilot, and the planes could be operated just as efficiently without a great amount of training of the young men who would take the place of the copilots.

Mr. SYMINGTON. If that premise is correct, is it not true that it is fundamentally wrong in the beginning to have two pilots in the cockpit?

Mr. FERGUSON. It would all depend on the destination of the flight. The Air Force itself would determine what men it wanted in the pilot's and copilot's seats.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. FERGUSON. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I wish to express my appreciation for what the Senator from Michigan did in the Senate committee with respect to flight pay. I believe it will pay off for the Air Force. There has been some discussion in the Senate to the effect that it would not make any difference if more money were provided for the training of pilots. We broke up the Air Force in 1946 and started it again in 1950, as a result of the Korean war. It is like building an apartment house. First it is necessary to build a big foundation in order to support the structure.

Some persons criticized the pilottraining program in 1951, a year after the Korean war started. If we follow through with the feeling that seems to be developing, to the effect that the less money that is given to the Air Force, the better the Air Force will be, it might be a good idea not to give the Air Force any money, and then we will have a perfect Air Force.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FERGUSON. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senator from Missouri does not understand why we should refer to the year 1951. We might hark back to the year 1942. Our active pilot-training program got started rather late in 1941. We were training pilots at an astronomical rate. In fact, we had some bases throughout the country that were turning out more than half the total number the Air Force set as a goal for a year.

So I think it is proper to go back to 1951. I believe the Air Force should be constantly planning for an expansion of training. If war came tomorrow, our pilot-training program could conceivably jump about 5 or 6 times this number. But we are now talking about an interim period.

I wish to comment briefly on what the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG] said. We cannot have inefficient men in airplanes. I do not care if he is sitting airplanes. I do not care if he is sitting in the tail or is sitting on the right hand side in the compartment. The whole crew must be trained completely. I will not subscribe to any lessening of standards or lessening of qualifications. An inefficient man might take over a plane and lose not only the plane, but

all the men in it.

We have always had high standards of qualifications in the Air Force, and I will fight to my last breath any attempt to reduce those standards. But today we are not talking about standards; we are talking about the training of pilots.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a statement I submitted to the Committee on Appropriations concerning section 628 of the House bill.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR GOLDWATER Section 628 in House bill limits proficiency flying in the Air Force to a period not to exceed 12 hours during any 3 consecutive months for any officer whose primary duty involves participation in operational or training flights.

Because the Air Force has been negligent in correcting the abuses evident in connection with the certification of eligibility for flight pay, it was inevitable that the Congress should get into this administrative function of the Air Force and the Air Force must accept this blame and start immediate corrective action.

The provisions of section 628 anticipate a budgetary saving in the cost of flying hours through the limitations in proficiency filying. It has been argued that the sum of $118,144,800 could be saved by the adoption of this amendment and I would like to point out a fallacy in this argument. The sum is arrived at by assuming that it costs $100 an hour to fly an airplane. I would like to point out that the cost of fuel is a minor item in the maintenance of a plane and that whether that airplane flies or not there is a substantial cost to its maintenance. In fact, if an airplane is not flown for a period of time, it could become more costly to fly than if it were flown regularly. Airplanes, whether they fly or not, are subjected to daily inspections, including the running up of engines, and are subjected to periodic, thorough inspections based on flying time or the lapsed number of days, so the savings anticipated by this section just aren't possible.

The proviso which limits flying time to 12 hours during any 3 consecutive calendar months is restrictive to the point that pilot proficiency will decline to an unacceptable standard. Among those affected will be flying officers engaged in operations, operational planning, command and other duties affiliated with training, combat, and combat support.

Section 628 arbitrarily and without any consideration of ability or future usefulness to the Air Force in positions of commands, further provides that all rated personnel with over 15 years rated service shall be ex

cluded from meeting proficiency requirements for flight pay. I would call to your attention that a close personal friend of mine, Col. James Johnston, who is now in Korea, has 141⁄2 years of rated service and has just shot down his tenth MIG. The Air Force has very slowly, and I criticize it for this slowness, come to the conclusion that age has nothing to do with a man's ability in combat. During World War II age excluded many officers who would have been been allowed to fly in combat or to command of great service to their country had they at older ages. Older pilots do not have the daring of the younger pilots, but they do have the understanding and the knowledge and the intense interest in their equipment which enables them to get the most out of it. To arbitrarily and without any consideration of ability exclude all personnel in the Air Force with over 15 years of service from

further proficiency flight requirements would be a very serious mistake.

Of the flying officers now on duty in the Air Force, over 18,000 (about one-third) have already seen combat in Korea. During the past 2 years the Air Force has been almost entirely dependent upon the so-called proficiency pilot and new flying training graduates for Korean replacements. Without the leadership, experience and know-how afforded by these more seasoned officers, our combat effectiveness could not have been maintained. Any reduction of the minimum standards of flying proficiency will, in addition to establishing increased accident rates, provide a requirement for increased precombat training with resultant increases in dollar expenditures.

There is a very close correlation between the flying experience of the individual and his accident rate. That means that the young pilot with lesser experience will show a higher accident rate. However, as a man grows older and gets more ex

perience, the accident rate tends to level off

and stays level pretty far out into time.

Like civilian enterprise in general and civil airlines in particular, the Air Force must rely upon experience to increase flying efficiency and effectiveness. Just as the airlines would not trust expensive aircraft, cargo, and personnel to the care of green, inexperienced pilots, likewise, the Air Force, as the greatest airline in the world, cannot depend upon inexperienced crews to carry the payload of combat weapons and personnel. Experience pays off in dollars as well as combat effectiveness.

The following table clearly demonstrates that aircraft accidents decline with experience as typified by age.

Accident rates per 100,000 first pilot-hours and per 1,000 pilots, July to December 1950

professional quality of our Air Force leadership. This proviso, coupled with the limitations on flying hours, will make it impossible to maintain the high standards of professional competence presently required of our senior flying officers. It strikes at the tradition of personal, active participation in flight leadership so long an essential part of the military flying service. As General Patton so aptly said, "You can't push a noodle across the plate-you have to pull it." This applies to leadership, and in such highly professional field the full strength of leadership would be impaired if the commanding officers and operational officers of squadrons, groups, or wings were not rated personnel having full acquaintanceship with the equipment in their command. Younger pilots would resent any other situation.

Affected will be approximately 4 percent of the flying officers in the Air Force. It is this 4 percent to which we must look for leadership, experience, and professional judgment necessary to enable proper planning and employment of our air weapons systems. Only from current experience can these officers recognize the possibilities and limitations of these systems. The development of commanders, from the individual combat aircraft to the major air command, is dependent upon accumulation of flying, administrative, technical, and executive experience. The restrictions imposed by section 628, if continued, will increase by years the time necessary to develop the experience required to command our combat crews, our squadrons, our wings, and our major commands.

Now, I have no argument, nor am I holding any brief for the officer who is permanently assigned to an administrative or desk job and who continues to draw flight pay by making so-called proficiency flights. But somebody has to run the Air Force. Not all of those in the Pentagon like to sit behind a desk. Many of them would rather be out on a flying assignment. However, those who no longer want to fly should be grounded by a proper flying evaluation board or the proper application of Air Force Regulation 60-2. This regulation provides a minimum requirement for a pilot of 100 flying hours a year, divided into 15 hours of night flying, 20 hours of instrument flying, and 65 hours of navigation and transition flying. Fifty percent of these requirements must be met each 6 months or the pilot is removed from flying status. This, I can tell you from 24 years of flying experience, is the very minimum for the maintenance of proficiency in all types of aircraft-not only the small ones, but the big ones. I would not hesitate to say that a pilot who flies less than 100 hours a year has no business getting into an airplane. There are many things that a pilot learns to do instinctively, but the involved procedures in instrument flying, the constant necessity for thorough acquaintanceship with the location of controls in his cockpit, require constant practice. Taking off and landing an airplane is something anybody can do. It's what goes on between the take-off and the landing that makes for safety, and a man could no more be a safe pilot with less than a hundred hours a year than a lawyer could maintain his proficiency or a doctor his skill by working only 6 months of the year.

This will not result in a saving of dollars. It will result in a waste of life and equipment and, if for no other reason that this, section 628 should be removed from the bill.

The Air Force plans to have a total of 124,545 officers at the end of fiscal year 1954. Of these, 69,449 will be on flying status. This is a little over half total officer strength. (Pilot strength alone is considerably less than half total strength.)

Proficiency flying will affect about 20,000 flying officers, or 30 percent of the total. After becoming a major and on up to the grade of colonel, the pilot's chances of being behind a desk become increasingly greater, but this does not lessen the possibility that he may become engaged in operational flights or in combat flights during the course of his career. It can be observed from the

foregoing table that approximately 27 percent of the officer strength of the Air Force will be of major's rank or above in 1954, and they are officers who will be denied adequate proficiency training if the provisions of section 628 become law.

We are all aware that the Air Force has been guilty of flying-pay abuses from its very inception. But the elimination of these abuses should be an Air Force administrative

responsibility which the Air Force must be compelled to exercise to a greater degree than it has in the past. Some progress has been made in this respect. The Air Force, by constant evaluation, has been removing officers from flying status in recent years at a rate in excess of 1,000 a year. All couriers in the Air Force have been removed from flying status. Stewards and attendants have been removed from flying status. Every lawyer in the Air Force Judge Advocate section has been returned to full flying duty or taken off flying status, at his own option. Flight surgeons are being continually removed from flying status on an individual basis, particularly those with highly developed medical skills. The Air Force is now in the process of establishing a flight status selection system which will require a periodic review of each officer to determine if he shall remain on flight status.

Instead of adopting the provisions of section 628, I would suggest that the Air Force be subjected to strong resolution by the Congress, indicating that it is the desire of Congress that the Air Force remedy this situation. I believe that it can be accomplished by administrative procedures within the Air Force without legislation. This could be accomplished by properly applying the provisions of Air Force regulation 60-2, requiring minimum flying requirements. An evaluation board might also be established which would operate much like the Navy's Promotion Board. All rated personnel, when they reach their 40th birthday, could be evaluated by this Board to determine whether or not they should be continued on a rated status. Those whose qualifications obviously did not fit them for command or operational posts at a high level would be dropped from flying status. This would not necessarily mean that they would be released from service, because they would serve in administrative capacities, in supply, materiel, etc.

But I strongly question whether the Congress wishes to adopt the provisions of section 628, whereby men who are engaged in operational command will no longer be required to fly and proficiency flying in the Air Force will be limited to 48 hours a year. Skillful piloting is a bond that holds men together, just as skillful attainment in the field of law or the field of medicine holds men in those professions to a common in

terest. To deny Air Force officers the right to fly when they have the skill and want to use it would be like denying the right of surgery to a doctor or the right of argument to a lawyer. This will create a serious morale problem. In fact, the news that the amendment is in the bill has resulted in much discomfort and dissatisfaction among the pilots of all ages in the Air Force already.

I earnestly urge, because of the false impression of savings, because of the dangers involved in lowering flight proficiency standards and because of the harm to morale that would result through the adoption of the provisions of section 628, that my amendment be accepted and the provisions of section 628 be struck from the bill. The Air Force can work out this problem and it must be told, in strong language, to do so, and I certainly would not expect it to take longer than the next year to weed out those who do not want to fly, those who are not fit to fly, and those who for other reasons should be removed from flying status.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FERGUSON. I yield.

Mr. LONG. I was trying to illustrate that we are not nearly so hard-pressed for pilots as some persons would lead us to believe. I am not advocating that it is necessary to have an inexperienced man as a copilot. We do not have to. We already have experienced pilots. According to the Senator from Michigan, we are training 8,000 pilots a year for 18,000 airplanes, which would be peak strength. That would mean that over a 2-year period sufficient pilots would be trained to provide almost one pilot for every airplane.

In about 3 years enough pilots could be trained for every pilot position in the Air Force, plus having a backlog of 47,000 pilots to call upon.

Mr. FERGUSON. General Twining, who is in charge of the Air Force, has indicated very clearly that he would like to examine the program in all its details. In 1953, only 6,000 pilots were trained in a year. So we are now up to 6,000, and the Senate, without being asked by the Air Force, wants to compel the Air Force, with the facilities they have to increase the number to 10,000. I believe the new Chiefs of Staff ought to be allowed to work out the problem. I think they can solve it. I think training is now costing too much money. That statement is based on facts we have received. I understand that preliminary training by private contractors costs less than training by the Air Force itself. I do not advocate training by outside contractors. I think the Air Force should become so proficient, and should have its own training plans so well laid out and its training force so well prepared that it could train personnel needed to serve as pilots.

Some of the items are not only for personnel, but are for maintenance, operation, parts for planes, and repairs.

Mr. President, let us give the new Joint Chiefs of Staff the right to come to Congress and ask for additional money if they say it will be necessary to train more pilots. At present they say they do not need the funds. Let us keep tight hold on the purse strings, to see if we

know and understand, perhaps, more about what is at issue here today than the new Secretary for Defense. But if I am able to interpret the debate correctly, the Secretary for Defense has dictated the amounts of the Air Corps budget which the Senate and the body on the other side of the Capitol will finally pass.

I am especially proud to see the great and heroic fight made by the junior Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], who has been on the floor every minute of every hour, armed with facts gained from his experience in the difficult position of Secretary for Air. He has met the arguments which have been made in support of the drastic cuts in our first line of defense, the Air Force.

Judging as a layman the argument which has taken place in this great deliberative body, I think the decision, by all odds, should go to those who maintain that it is highly dangerous to make the cuts which the majority party are pushing through.

I wish to associate myself with the senior members of the Appropriations Committee who, year after year, have gone through the difficult task of allocating funds. I refer particularly to the distinguished Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], who has offered an amendment with respect to pilot training.

The best argument I have heard for pilot training was the statement by the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee [Mr. SALTONSTALL], who pointed out that the ratio required for training a pilot was six experienced airmen for each pilot trained. Think of that. It will mean some time and some money, in peacetime, to keep in the training schools those six experienced airmen for each pilot.

But suppose an emergency should arise, and we had to devote six experienced, trained airmen to the production of each pilot. We could not buy time. We could not spare from our combat effectiveness the men who would have to be ordered to the front all around the world. And yet, according to the statement of the man who, I presume, is the best qualified on this subject, it would require six experienced, time-tested and proven airmen to produce each pilot. While we have the time, we are putting dollars ahead of the precious time element in preparing for any contingency.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MONRONEY. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. First I wish to thank my distinguished colleague from Oklahoma for those undeserved but very kind remarks.

In support of the position he has just taken, the junior Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER] mentioned the fact that if we have a war we can rapidly expand our pilot training program. At the same time, it has been stated here that years are required to train a good pilot.

Consider the fact that the entire United States might be seriously crippled, if not destroyed, within a matter of days, if not hours. What kind of fantastic talk, from a practical standpoint, do we indulge in when we say that

we can rapidly start increasing our pilot training program if we have a war. At the same time the chief problem, from a military standpoint-and this I know after years of service in the Pentagonis to keep the country from being destroyed in a matter of days, if not hours, under the new concept of the atomic age and the jet bomber.

Mr. MONRONEY. I thank the Senator for his observation.

In line with this amendment, our Government must create an adequate Government must create an adequate reservoir or stockpile of the men who must fly the supersonic planes. If this bill is to be rammed through the Senate tonight, the Senate had better adopt an amendment to the bill guaranteeing that there will be no need for a combat Air Force to meet hostilities around the world for a period of 2 or 3 years.

The proposed cuts would render ineffective an efficient combat Air Force which could take its place on the world front.

Another important factor which I think should give us pause has been mentioned in the words of the senior member of the Appropriations Committee, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], who stated that the average age of the Air Force was 29 years.

Think of it, Mr. President. Twentynine years is the average age. I have heard many times on the floor references made to the combat effectiveness of the troops of Chiang Kai-shek, with their average age of 27. We have an Air Force whose average age is 29, and we deny funds to give ourselves an adequate reserve and an adequate stockpile and an adequate group of trained pilots. Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MONRONEY. I yield.

Mr. LONG. Did I understand the Senator to say that 29 is the average age of our pilots?

Mr. MONRONEY. As I understand from the distinguished Senator from Arizona, that is the average age of our Air Force pilots.

Mr. HAYDEN. I said that the average age of the men who fly the B-47, which can deliver the atom bomb, is 29 years.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, this vast reservoir of pilots that is talked about is made up of young men who flew the B-17, B-19, and B-25 for 50 or 75 missions over Germany. They were called back in the Korean war. In the meantime they had married and had children. I am told that men in civilian life who are getting little businesses started and have families growing up are not the ideal Reserve pilots. We must get the youth and put them through this long period of training. It through this long period of training. It will cost dollars, but we dare not risk obsolescence in the Air Force, either in men or material. I believe we would be penurious and sacrificing the safety of the Nation if we adopted that kind of policy.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MONRONEY. I yield.

Mr. LONG. When the Senator compares that average age with the average age of the soldiers of General Chiang

Kai-shek's army, I hope he realizes that in many armies there are many very young men at the beginning of the war. During wartime, we take many men at the age of 18 and 19 years. That brings down the average. On the other hand, we have been trying to get as pilots men who come out of college, rather than boys who are just out of the high school.

Mr. MONRONEY. I thank the Senator from Louisiana. On the question of winning time, which we cannot pay for, I dare say most Senators know of cases of young men who were killed as P38's spun into Long Island Sound. Those kids were put into high-powered combat aircraft, because we suddenly were drawn into war and had to have pilots. A young man, a Harvard student, worked in my office one summer. He was visiting at my home after he had graduated from primary flight school, and he was going to fly a P-38. An older aviator who was there at the same time was talking to him. After the boy had left the older aviator said to me, "I am afraid you will not see that chap again." I said, "Why not?"

He said, "He has not had sufficient hours in the air to fly so hot a ship."

Mr. President, that is the penalty we pay in the lives of hundreds of our best young men, because time does not permit us to give them the background training so they can safely become the world's greatest pilots. While we have the time I do not think we ought to put dollars ahead of the lives of our airmen, and ahead of the security of the Nation. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. In corroboration of the position which the Senator from Oklahoma takes, despite what in my opinion is loose talk from the standpoint of facts with respect to the pilotreserve program, I should like to present an illustration from Congress.

There was in the House of Representatives a fine young Congressman from Pennsylvania, Bob Coffee, who had a notable battle record. He was flying in the National Guard and spent every bit of time he could get away from the House of Representatives in flying. The Air Force came to me and said that he did not have enough hours of flying to fly a jet, and would I discuss it with him. I did. He was very decent about it, but he said, "I am going to continue to fly." He spun in his jet plane, and that was the end of a fine young Congressman.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, we cannot buy time in training men to fly supersonic planes. The staggering number of victories the United States Air Force has had in Korea has not been particularly because the Sabrejet is a greater plane than the MIG 15, but because our pilots have had the training to make them better pilots.

Mr. President, since we all admit that there is a gap between the power of Russia's air force and ours, with the balance of power resting largely on the side of Communist air power, I should like to ask, When will the time come for us to close that gap? Are we going to wait to close it when it is convenient from a budgetary point of view to get out of

second place and get into the first place position of airpower, or are we going to close the gap when there is a definite military danger?

I have heard the argument made on the floor of the Senate that we must get rid of the peaks and the valleys, and that we must have a sustained position in which the United States can continue from year to year.

Mr. President, I feel sure, after hearing the debate on the bill, that as a result of what we are doing today we will have a sustained position as a second-class airpower. Instead of having peaks and valleys we will freeze ourselves permanently in the valleys. If war should come, and God pray it does not, it will mean that we have frozen ourselves in the valley of death. Without proper air power, with our enemy possessing the atomic bomb, this Nation, I believe, would be at a terrific disadvantage.

As my friend, the distinguished junior Senator from Missouri has stated, this is not a budget based on military need; this is not a budget based on military experience; it is a budget based on the dictates of the Secretary of Defense and the Comptroller General in the Pentagon, Flying officers, both on and off the record, have told me that these cuts are to a great extent going to disrupt not only the force and energy of our Air Force, but also its morale.

As the distinguished junior Senator from Missouri has stated, these figures represent force. We cannot go into Montgomery Ward or Sears Roebuck and order in 30 minutes, a nice, shiny, bright atomic bomber that will carry the atomic bomb, or a souped-up supersonic fighter that will fly against the MIG's. We must have lead time, and design, and prototypes, and long periods of testing. We prohibit the making of any purchases unless appropriations have been made, and therefore the passage of the bill with the drastic cuts in it will freeze the natural development we should have.

I remember a little bit of recent history during the brief period I have served in Congress. In 1939, if the United States had had 5,000 first-line combat planes, and had warned Hitler not to move into Poland, I do not believe Hitler would have moved into Poland, because we would have had the airpower to have made it highly doubtful that he would have taken the risk to touch off World War II. We did not have those We did not have those 5,000 first-class planes, and we saw the results in the loss of millions of lives and wreckage and dislocations in the entire world, because we were practicing economy even in those days, as we seem to be practicing it now on the vital military strength of the United States.

I remember in 1950, the House repeatedly and I am proud to say I was a Member of the House of Representatives at that time-and consistently supported a 70-group Air Force. The bill went to conference, but only a handful of Senator were fighting for the 70-group Air Force, and the Senate conferees opposed it. The House stood pat, and finally, rather reluctantly, the Senate gave in.

A few months later the Korean situation "broke." Again we found ourselves without proper preparation for war. The rest of the Government took orders, I suppose and the Senate followed-from another Secretary of Defense, Mr. Louis Johnson, who took action to reduce the number of wings in the Air Force.

Today we are told we must not follow the testimony and judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the battle-tested judgment of the pilots who have participated in the battles in Europe and in Korea, or the judgment of General Spaatz, who today is the adviser to the President of the United States, so far as our Air Force in the European theater is concerned; but we are supposed to take the judgment of a brand new group, the brand new Chiefs of Staff, who in a few months will be on the job and will be asked to study these matters.

It is proposed that we disregard the judgment of most of the Members on this side of the aisle, who saw the mistakes which were made in 1939 in regard to this matter and who saw the mistakes which were made in not doing everything humanly possible to have a 70group Air Force before the Korean situation "broke.”

Today we are asked to march down the line in following the judgment of a truly great American and great industrial genius, a man who was the head of one of the great corporations of our country, namely, the present Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson. But, Mr. President, I ask to be excused from following his judgment on this matter. Instead, I prefer to follow the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have had this matter under study for years, and the judgment of the Chief of the Air Force and the judgment of General Force and the judgment of General Spaatz, who has long been studying this problem in terms of the situation in the European theater.

Last year this body voted, without a dissenting vote, for a 143-wing Air Force. But now Mr. Charles E. Wilson, the present Secretary of Defense, takes a different view; and less than 20 Members of the Senate wish to have the Senate adhere to the larger number, for which the Senate voted without a dissenting

vote only a few months ago.

I am sure Mr. Wilson is a great industrial leader. No doubt when the president of General Motors Corp. is scheduling the production of Chevrolet scheduling the production of Chevrolet automobiles, for example, he will not hurt his company if he underestimates the production needs for 1 year. In other words, if the required production were underestimated, the result would be that the dealers would not be overloaded; but the demand would continue at a high level. People who wished to buy Chevrolets probably would have to buy Chevrolets probably would have to wait a few months for them, although in that event they would simply think that the Chrevrolet must be a very good automobile, in view of the fact that the demand would then exceed the supply. However, that situation would not hurt the General Motors Corp.; in fact, it might help it.

But if the same gentleman, who now is the head of our Defense Establishment,

underestimates our requirements for airpower, with the result that we lack the aircraft and the airpower we need, the resulting situation will not serve to boost the stock of General Motors Corp., but it will cause us to gamble with the security and safety of the entire free world, which rests upon the strength of the United States, particularly its airpower.

Mr. President, I think it is a sad day for the Nation when we neglect our defenses to the extent that we follow what I believe to be the ill-considered advice and lack of experience on the part of the present Secretary of Defense, and disregard the careful study and the wellchosen testimony of all the military experts, whose duty it is to try to keep our Nation secure.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The

question is on agreeing to the amendments of the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN].

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I desire to associate myself with the remarks of the junior Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] and the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY]. I have listened to the debate all day, and I have participated in it quite actively. I

think much of the debate has been completely fantastic. During the debate I have had the feeling that I was living in an Alice in Wonderland world.

and survival of our country and the secuWe are concerned with the security rity and survival of the free world, upon which world peace depends. Yet the Senate has rejected an amendment which to some extent, at least, would the strengthen the air defenses of United States. Certainly adoption of that amendment would not care for the entire situation; but it would at least provide sufficient funds, to the extent of an additional $400 million, for 200 more B-47's or other essential aircraft.

Now we are debating the question of the training of pilots. Certainly no one has had greater experience with the requirements and periods of training and kinds of training jet pilots must have than has the former Secretary of the Air Force, the present junior Senator from

Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON]. He has told us that years are required to train such

pilots. We know that the testimony he has given here is correct.

Yet, solely for the purpose of saving a mere pittance-in relation to the other appropriations we have made and the appropriations we to will continue make-of less than $50 million, Senators are willing to sacrifice the lives of our pilots and the security of our country. It seems to me completely fantastic that such a situation should obtain in the Senate.

We know from the best possible testimony that careful and expert training of the pilots is absolutely essential, not only to their safety, but also to the defense of the United States. Yet we are

quibbling over the question of the appropriation of $50 million to make such training possible.

Mr. President, I hope very much indeed that the amendments of the senior Senator from Arizona will be agreed to.

i